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ABSTRACT
This  work  purports  to  analyse  the  process  of  the  harmonisation  of  the  law  of  international
commercial arbitration with particular reference to the drafting and diffusion of uniform rules. In
the first chapter a theoretical framework is developed to investigate the effects of globalisation on
law  and  international  relations,  introducing  the  concepts  of  legitimacy  of  global  governance,
epistemic communities and  norm diffusion as elaborated in International  Relations theory.  The
second chapter analyses the debate on the harmonisation of international trade law and outlines the
main techniques, means and actors of this process,  with particular reference to their membership,
statutory purposes and most of all the decision-making methods followed in the production of uniform
rules. The following chapters analyse  the travaux préparatoires of the main harmonisation tools of
the  law  of   international  commercial  arbitration,  namely  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  on
International  Commercial  Arbitration,  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  of  International  Commercial
Contracts, and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, with a view to assessing their impact on national jurisdictions, national courts and arbitral
tribunals. The main findings of this survey are twofold. First, a common decision-making method
within the “formulating agencies” in charge of drafting the uniform rules of the law of international
commercial arbitration is emerging. Although formally inter-governmental bodies made up of state
representatives, these formulating agencies do not follow the traditional decision-making process
founded on bargaining and unanimity (or majority) voting, which is  typical of international law-
making.  Their membership resembles more that of an  “epistemic community”,  i.e. a group of
experts who are constantly attempting to reach a consensus rather than a majority or unanimity and
whose  interests,  proposals  and  positions  are  not  fixed,  but  are  susceptible  to  being  changed
whenever a better argument founded on reasonable grounds is put forward. Second, these uniform
rules are characterised by a strong level of hybridation, in which the distinction between hard and
soft law tends to blur. Accordingly, the increasing level of harmonisation of the law of international
commercial  arbitration can be read as a process leading to the creation of a hybrid legal  order,
combining both a state-centric system  (organized essentially around the New York Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the various national arbitration laws)
and a multi-centric system made up of a complex network of private contracts, non-national norms
elaborated by formulating agencies and international arbitral institutions, as well as customs and
general principles of law.
Finally, this work briefly examines the issue of the legitimacy of this hybrid legal order by applying
the  two  different  approaches  to  legitimacy  outlined  in  the  first  chapter.  It  is  argued  that
10
accountability  of  international  commercial  arbitration  is  ensured  through  the  instrument  of
delegation:  the increasing use of soft law and the wide scope of party autonomy in arbitration are
indicators that states are delegating to international organisations and non-state actors the task of
determining the most appropriate standards for the conduct of arbitration, but at the same time they
continue  to  play an  important  supportive  and  supervisory  function  at  various  moments  in  the
arbitration process. Moreover, the involvement  of a wide range of outside experts and stakeholders
not belonging to state bureaucracy in the drafting process of the main formulating agencies is  an
attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of their harmonisation tools and facilitate their reception in
practice. Thirdly, the particular decision-making method followed by these formulating agencies,
largely  based  on  consensus  and  in  which  the  various  stakeholders’  interests  are  taken  into
consideration,  allows the adoption of widely acceptable solutions  founded on rational arguments
and therefore represents an example of legitimate governance in habermasian terms.
11
CHAPTER ONE: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
Globalisation1 has spurred the emergence of a new academic industry: “globalisation theory”.2 In
most disciplines – from the humanities, to the social sciences, but also to physical sciences –  this
process is stimulating major rethinking in several fields of knowledge.3
A common general theme across social sciences is that the processes of globalisation are profoundly
changing the significance of national boundaries and generally are making them less important.
This undermines the validity of “black box” theories, which consider nation states, societies or legal
systems as discrete, self-contained phenomena, which can be studied in isolation from one another4.
More  generally,  one  can  easily  argue  that,  in  analyzing  the  contemporary  world  –  whatever
approach or method one may adopt – it is not enough to concentrate only on the traditional, small
number of actors, i.e. sovereign states, official international organizations, and individuals.
The purpose of this chapter is to show how globalization has affected the study of two realms of
knowledge:  international  relations  and legal  theory.  In  the first  section I  will  outline the  main
opinions expressed in the state and globalization debate as conducted in international relations and
international politics. The most important finding stemming from this debate is the perception that a
new,  post-westphalian international  order  is  emerging,  no longer  centered  on states  as  the sole
actors in the international  scene.  International  relations,  which traditionally focused on relations
between  nation  states,  have  now  extended  their  purview  to  include  non-state  relations  across
frontiers and a wide range of non-state actors involved in any area and level of governance. The
legal consequences of this new conception of the international order are further developed by legal
theorists in the law and globalization debate, whose main features are sketched in section two, with
particular reference to the notion of legal pluralism. As new actors are emerging in the study of
international relations, one cannot give an adequate account of law in the modern world without
1
 For the various definitions of the term see the following paragraphs. 
2W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory,  Northwestern University Press, 2000, p. 6 
3W. Twining, op. cit, p. 50
4W. Twining, op cit., p.  8
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paying  any  attention  to  transnational  non-governmental  organisations,  to  organised  crime,
multinational companies, transnational law firms, which are setting up their own normative orders
somewhat independently of the sovereign state. The remaining part of  the second section  analyses
two theories of legal pluralism: Teubner’s concept of  “global law without a state” and the New
Haven  School  approach  to  transnational  legal  process.  Section  three  addresses  the  issue  of
legitimacy of global governance by illustrating two different approaches emerged in the literature: a
normative and a descriptive one; section four analyses how the origin and diffusion of norms in the
international system  is accounted for in International Relations theory. The conceptual framework
outlined in this chapter will then be applied in the remainder of the present work in order to explain
current developments of international commercial arbitration.
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SECTION I:  THE STATE AND GLOBALISATION DEBATE
 Sceptical and globalist accounts of globalisation
Globalisation is  one  of  the "buzzwords"  of  our  times1:  everybody speaks  about  it,  but  nobody
knows what it exactly means2. Despite its extreme vagueness, this concept has for two decades been
lying at the centre of one of the most heated debates in contemporary politics, which has generated
an  "exploding"3.  literature.  The  main  issue  of  this  debate  is  whether  the  alleged  existence  of
globalisation is  really bringing about  a profound reconfiguration of the organising principles of
social life, so as to subvert the current framework of the international political order. As we will see,
the various definitions of globalisation largely depend on the answers given to this issue.
Despite the heterogeneity of the views expressed in the debate, it is nonetheless possible to identify
two  main  schools  of  thought:  the  globalists,  who consider  globalisation  a  real  and  significant
phenomenon, and the sceptics, who consider it as a primarly ideological or social construction of
marginal explanatory value.4. 
The sceptical view
According to the sceptical view, globalisation does not pose a significant threat to the present state
of international political order: globalisation simply constitutes one of the main constraints states
have always faced throughout their history. In this sense, it is neither unprecedented nor historically
1Cfr  R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye Jr,  Globalization: What´s New? What´s Not? (And So What?) in D. Held and A.
McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2003, p.
75
2D. Held and A. McGrew,  The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction, in ID(eds), The Global Trasformations
Reader,  cit.,  p.  2  <<no  singular  account  of  globalization  has  acquired  the  status  of  orthodoxy;  on  the  contrary,
competing assessments continue to frame discussion>>.
3
 J.N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalisation, Ch 1: An Emergent Epoch, Princeton University
Press, 2003, p. 13
4
 D. Held and A. McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction, in ID (eds), The Global Trasformations
Reader, cit., p. 2
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unique and therefore it  is not  able to undermine the deep structure of the international  system,
which remains founded on state sovereignty. Far from being hollowed out, state regulatory power is
growing in the context of globalisation: the increase in international activities is dependent upon
international cooperation - where possible - or more often upon the excercise of hegemonic power.
According to this view, globalisation is but the product of the policy of hegemonic powers to create
the  necessary  conditions  for  a  liberal  international  political  economy  based  on  free  trade.
Globalisation is a convenient myth which helps to justify and legitimise  the creation of a global
free market and the consolidation of Anglo-american capitalism within the world´s major economic
regions. The internationalisation of economic and social relations is a reflection of the policies and
preferences of the great powers of the day, since only they have sufficient military and economic
strength to create and maintain the conditions necessary for a prosperous and liberal international
order. In sum, states are not "passive victims" or "transmission belts" of globalisation, but, on the
contrary, its primary architects.5
The globalist view
 On the contrary, according to the second group of theories, globalisation is eroding or hollowing
out  state  sovereignty,   undermining  the  traditional  westphalian order  of  territorial,  independent
sovereign states. The so-called westphalian order is the international order that was established in
Europe pursuant to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which brought to an end the Thirty Years War.
This  peace  settlement  is  commonly regarded  to  have  laid  down the  foundation  of  the  modern
international order: the international system of sovereign states. The westphalian order is based on
four  main principles6.  The  first  is  territoriality,  according  to  which  states  have  fixed territorial
boundaries defining the limits to their jurisdiction and scope of their political authority.  On this
reading,  territoriality is  a crucial principle of modern political organisation: humankind is divided
into political units defined in terms of fixed and exclusive territorial realms.7  The second principle
is internal sovereignty, whereby states, within their territory, can claim effective supremacy, since
they represent the ultimate and undisputed source of legal and political authority. Accordingly, in
the westphalian order mankind is organised into a limited number of sovereign territorial states,
which recognise no higher  legal or political authority than themselves. The third is autonomy or
5
 D. Held and A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton,  The Globalization Debate,  in ID,  Global Transformations:
Politics, Economics and Culture, Polity Press, 1999, p. 6
6A.  McGrew,  Globalization  and  Territorial  Democracy:  an  Introduction,  in  ID  (ed),  The  Transformation  of
Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, ch 1, Cambridge University Press, 1997,p. 3 
7Ibidem
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external sovereignty, whereby states are entitled to conduct their internal and external affairs in a
manner  which  only  they  are  competent  to  decide,  free  from  external  intervention  or  control.8
Finally, the fourth principle is legality, which provides that there is no legal authority above and
beyond the state, able to impose legal duties upon it or its citizens. Relations among sovereign states
may be subject to international law, but only to the extent that each state agrees to being so bound.
 According to the globalist  thesis, globalisation fundamentally compromises the principles upon
which  the  westphalian  order  was  constructed.   On  this  reading,  globalisation  is  essentially
conceived as the growing interconnectedness of social activities across the globe, occurring as more
and  more  people,  goods,  capitals,  technology  flow swiftly  and  smoothly  across  borders.  This
growing interconnectedness poses three main constaints on state sovereignty. The first is  mutual
vulnerability  among  states:  events  originating  in  one  state  or  part  of  the  world  can  have  an
immediate and direct effect on individuals and communities residing in distant part of the globe.
Accordingly,  globalisation erodes the boundaries between what is foreign and what is domestic,
what is national and what is international. For example, pollution generated in UK contributes to the
acid rain, which spoils forests in Norway or Sweden: it is therefore at the same time a domestic and
international  matter.  The  second  is  the  emergence  of  forms  of  social  activities  which  are
transnatonal  in  character  that  is  transcend national  borders,  the most important  of  which is  the
organisation of global industrial production carried out by multinational corporations. Economic,
social  and  political  activities  are  increasingly  "stretched"  across  the  globe:  they  are  no  longer
primarily or solely organised according to a territorial  principle.9 The third is the emergence of
global  problems and threats (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global  warming and
pollution, terrorism), which in no way can be solved by a single government alone, but only through
multilateral  or  international  cooperation.  New  global  limits,  especially  environmental  and
population threats have become too broad and too menacing to be handled by nation-states alone10.
The proliferation of multilateral  institutions and international regimes designed to manage these
new common problems compromises further the state´s autonomous capacities. Governments and
8
 Internal and external sovereignty are two diametrically opposed concepts. The former is the state power to impose an
order that allows individuals to peacefully coexist within the state territory, the latter means independence of any other
outside authority.  Accordingly,  internal  sovereignty is based on the concept of supreme authority;  on the contrary,
external  sovereignty  presupposes  the  lack  of  supreme  authority  and  therefore  the  independence  of  states  in  the
international systems. On this point see W. Reinicke,  Globalization and Public Policy: An Analytical Framework, in
ID, Global Public Policy: Governing without Goverment?, Brookings Institution Press, 1998, p. 56-58
9
 D. Held and A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, cit.,
p. 28
10M. Mann, Has Globalizaton Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?, Review of International Political Economy,
1997, 4-3, p.  473
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societies across the globe need to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction
between international and domestic.11
 The result of these constraints is that national governments have lost control on an increasing range
of  activities  occurring  within  their  territory;  on  the  other  hand  a  new  set  of  arrangements  is
emerging in which states, institutions and non-state actors combine in order to regulate new global
issues.  National  governments  are  no  longer  able  to  control  an  increasing  range  of  activities
occurring within their territories (free flows of capitals, information, goods, technology). This wide
range of transnational activities fosters the emergence of global and transnational networks linking
people  and  organisations  in  different  parts  of  the  world  (e.g.  multi-national  corporations,
transnational groups). As a consequence of these new emerging forms of economic and political
organisation at  global level restricting the scope for the exercise of state sovereignty,  the world
order  is  a post-wesphalian order,  in the sense that is no longer state-centric.  World order is  no
longer composed by independent states exerting their sovereignty within their fixed territory; states
are forced to share their sovereignty with other actors in the international system in order to regulate
phenomena lacking a defined territorial scope. Globalisation, globalist thesis supporters conclude, is
thereby demolishing the pillars of the westphalian temple . Consequently, globalisation is not only a
process involving transnational flows of people, goods and capital across national boundaries. It
denotes  a  significant  shift  in  the  social  organisation  and  activity  of  mankind:  a  trend  towards
transnational patterns of relations, interactions and excercise of power. Globalisation is a powerful
transformative  force  which  is  responsible  for  a  massive  shake-out  of  societies,  economies,
institutions of governance and world order.
At the core of the globalist  thesis lies the idea of a transformation of the relationship between
sovereignty, territoriality and state power12. As economic, social and political activities increasingly
transcend national  frontiers,  a direct  challenge is launched to the territorial principle of modern
social  and  political  organisation.  Globalisation  disrupts  the  correspondence  between  society,
economy and polity within an exclusive national territory: social, economic and political activities
can  no  longer  be  understood  as  having  the  same  scope  and  extension  as  national  territorial
boundaries.13 This does not mean the demise of the state  as an effective political organisation  (the
"hyperglobalist" views14, which prophesised the end of the state, regarded it as an unnecessary unit,
11
 D. Held and A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton,  Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,
cit., p. 7
12
 J. G. Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond, IO, 1993, 41, p.  14
13
 D. Held and A. McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction, in Id  (eds), The Global Trasformations
Reader, cit., p. 8
14
 The best-known supporter of the hyperglobalist thesis is Susan Strange. In her famous book the Retreat of the State
(The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy,   Cambridge University Press, 1996), she
argues that the impersonal forces of world markets are now more powerful than states, whose  authority and legitimacy
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as  a  passive  victim  of  globalisation,  have  now  been  set  aside):  globalisation  leads  to  a  re-
construction of the power, functions and authority of national governments. Territorial boundaries
have become increasingly problematic: although states formally retain the ultimate legal claim to
supremacy over what occurs within their territory, their effective control must come to terms with
the expanding jurisdiction of complex global systems, global infrastructures of communication and
transport,  institutions  of  global  governance,  which  support  new forms  of  economic  and  social
organisation, transcending national boundaries. What is at stake is not the legal concept of state
sovereignty, since formally states remain sovereignty entities: globalisation challenges operational
or de facto sovereignty, that is to say the ability of states to practice this concept in the daily affairs
of politics15.  In  this context, the notion of the nation-state as a self-governing, autonomous unit
appears to be more a normative claim than a descriptive statement.16  The forms and functions of the
state need to adapt to this changing global order: rather than bringing about the end of the state,
globalisation has  encouraged  a range  of adjustment strategies  to manage the growing arrays  of
cross-border  issues.  In  this  new context,  the  power  of  national  governments  is  not  necessarily
diminished, but is being reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing complexity of
processes of governance.
 Striking a balance between sceptical and globalist views of globalisation
In  more recent times participants to the globalisation debate have attempted to strike a balance
between  these  two opposite  views.   They  argue  that  neither  of  these  views  fully  captures  the
complex relationship between state and globalisation. 17  The more enthusiasts among the globalist
are in decline. In Strange's view,  the governments and their ministers have lost the authority over national societies and
economies that they used to have. Where states were once the masters of markets, now it  is  the markets which, on
many  crucial  issues,  are  the  masters  of  the  governments  of  states.  To the  declining  authority  of  the  states,  it  is
juxtaposed a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and organisations, and to local and regional bodies.
Competition for world market shares has replaced competition for territory , or for control over the natural resources of
the  territory.  In this  new kind  of  “war”,  the  search of  allies  is  not  confined  to  other  states  or  inter-governmental
organisations,  but  is  extended  to  multi-national  firms.  States  are  engaged  in  a  regulatory  competition  in  order  to
persuade such firms to locate production of goods and services in their  territory. Globalisation sparks a race to the
bottom in states structures, as they adapt national political and economic life to the global economy in order to secure
the national economy's survival. In sum, the authority of governments of all states has been weakened as a result of the
accelerated integration of  national  economies  into  one  single  global  economy.  Consequently,  a  serious  vacuum is
opening up in international order: a vacuum not adequately filled by inter-governmental institutions or by hegemonic
power. The diffusion of authority away from national governments has left a gap of non-authority.
15W. Reinicke, Globalization and Public Policy, cit.,  p. 56
16
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thesis supporters seem to exaggerate state's decline; on the other hand, the staunchest defenders of
the sceptical view seem to downplay the importance of international and transnational relations18.
The main flaw with these two opposite views is that they both consider states and global networks
as  separate  realms  involved  in  a  zero-sum  game:  either  globalisation  is  considered  weak  and
consequently  states  have  all  the  power,  or  globalisation  is  considered  strong  and  states  are
considered to be losing power. In doing so, they exaggerate the power of one realm over the other
and end up providing a reductionist explanation, showing only one side of the coin.19  In the sceptic
view, globalisation remains weak to the extent that the national sovereign state remains strong.
Globalisation is conceived as a weak, even redundant phenomenon, unable to replace or constrain
the state. The state has defensive power which allows it to resist globalisation's imperatives and
conduct policies free of global constraint. Globalisation becomes a product of state action, which
creates a permissive environment within which global structures develop. In contrast, the globalist
view emphasises the overwhelming constraints imposed by globalisation, which are weakening or
even  hollowing  out   the  states.  States  have  no  or  little  power  with  respect  to  globalisation:
globalisation is conceptualised as the realm of necessity to which states are forced to adapt. Both
views fail to consider that the global and the national realms are at the same time intertwined and
provided with a certain degree of autonomy. In highlighting the global realm, globalists ignore the
autonomous  power  of  domestic  structures;  in  privileging  state's  autonomy,  the  sceptics  do  not
sufficiently enquire to what extent the state is embedded and influenced by the global level.
The main task is to establish to what extent the nation-state is being transformed, to what extent it is
declining, or on the contrary still growing.  How do states react to globalisation and any potential
challenge raising from it? How does globalisation challenge a government’s  sovereignty?  Have
governments different options in responding to globalisation? What are these options, how do they
differ,  and  what  will  be  their  consequences?20 According  to  most  writers,  globlisation  is  a
contradictory process, which entails both state-weakening and strengthening tendencies. There are
as many arguments supporting “high stateness” as those supporting “low stateness”.21 On the one
hand,  there  are  arguments  supporting  the  thesis  that  the  intensified  development  of  economic
transactions that cross national boundaries has significantly marginalised state power. For example,
one  can  argue  that  wealth  is  now mostly  generated   by transactions  occurring  across  national
borders rather than within states and that in this context the most economically empowered actors
18M.  Mann,  Has  Globalization  Ended  the  Rise  and  Rise  of  the  Nation  State?,  Review  of  International  Political
Economy, 1997, 4-3, p. 494
19J.M. Hobson and M. Ramesh, Globalisation Makes of States What States make of It: Between Agency and Structure in
the State/Globalisation Debate, cit., p. 7
20W. Reinicke, Globalization and Public Policy, cit.,  p. 53
21P. Evans, The Eclipse of the State: Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization, World Politics, 1997, 50, p. 64
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are multinational corporations, which consider the productive resources of the world as a whole,
and  locate  various  stages  of  production  at  points  of  greatest  cost  advantage22.  Consequently,
whether a given territory is included in this global production network depends on the decision of
these  private  actors  rather  than  the  states23.  Moreover,  one  can  emphasise  the  “dictatorship  of
international  financial  markets”  and  maintain  that  states  have  lost  control  over  capital  flows.
Accordingly, if a state engages in policies deemed unwise by private financial traders, it will be
punished by an outbound capital drain. 24 
On the  other  hand,  there  are  data showing that  globalisation  has  brought  about  an  increase  in
stateness. Global capitalist economy, which arguably represents the strongest challenge to state's
authority,  does  not  constitute  a  “pure”  global  network.  On the  contrary,  capitalist  relations  are
profoundly  mixed,  based  on  the  interaction  between  national,  international  and  transnational
networks. The nation state still structures many economic networks, since 80% of world production
is for the domestic market.25 True,  financial trading is largely transnational. But company shares
tend to be connected to particular national stock exchange markets, national corporate laws and
accountancy practices26. In addition, since financial markets are highly unpredictable and risky, they
need  state or interstate public regulation able to ensure fair competition and limit the damage of
reckless speculation. Therefore, if state intervention in financial markets were completely excluded,
the  operation  of  the  international  financial  system  would  quickly  degenerate  into  chaos.27
Moreover,  national  states  still  play  an  important  role  in  capitalism,  especially  by  providing
disadvantaged citizens with protection from the undesidered consequences  of capitalism. In  this
respect, the existence of a large public sector is crucial for the protection of the population from
external  traumas induced by the state's  dependency on international  economy.  28Thus, capitalist
economy can be better understood as an “impure” network, a combination of national, international
and transnational social relations29. By the same token, new social issues like abortion, children and
women protection  have led states to pass new legislation in the private realm. On the one hand,
such cultural struggles are often prompted by transnational and global pressure groups, but on the
other hand most contending actors use these global networks in order to demand more regulation in
their own nation state. This is because authoritative social regulation still remains for the most part
22
 R. Cox, The Global Political Economy and the Social Choice, in R. Cox and T. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order,
ch 10, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 192
23P. Evans,  The Eclipse of the State: Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization, cit., p. 66
24
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25M. Mann,  Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation State?, cit., p. 479
26Ibidem
27P. Evans, The Eclipse of the State: Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization, cit., p. 72
28P. Evans, The Eclipse of the State: Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization, cit., p. 68
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a nation state competence: accordingly, the emergence of new social issues in need of regulation
may ultimately enhance  the  state's  role30.  In  conclusion,  the patterns  of  social  relations  in the
present context of globalisation are too varied and contradictory to  simply  argue that  the state
system  is  either  weakening  or  strengthening31.  On  the  one  hand,  global  networks  are  indeed
strengthening,  but  on the other  hand  such networks  do not  have the power to impose a single
uniform model of social and economic relations: they are shaped by the particularities of nation
states and mediated by international relations.
State and globalisation: a collective-sum approach
 The contradictory patterns of globalisation processes have led some authors to develop a theory of
the relationship between state and globalisation which somewhat reflects this contradiction. In this
view, the state is on the one hand bestowed with agential power, enabling it to adapt or react to
global  constraints, on the other hand it is considered as embedded within, and shaped by domestic
and global forces.  But in contrast  to the previous theories,  which forced to single out a winner
between the state and the global structure,  this theory is centred on the idea that the interaction
among local, domestic, international and global actors can lead to potential gains for all the parties
involved.  Whereas mainstream theories conceive the relationship between state and globalisation in
terms of a zero-sum game, this new view adopts a collective-sum approach: each actor can enhance
its power by interacting with the others at various levels. In  particular,  states can increase their
power by working with social forces at domestic, regional, and global levels. By postulating state
interaction at different levels, this theory no longer conceives states as “territorially fixed” entities,
able  to  exert  their  power  only  within  their  domestic  territory.  On the  contrary,  states  become
“spatially  promiscuous”:  although  they  cannot  physically  move  across  territory,  they  are
nonetheless able to act and to exert their power both at global, domestic and local levels, in order to
pursue  their  interests.  More  specifically,  states  are  both  constitutive  and  adaptive  actors:
constitutive, because they are able to circumvent or even shape global, domestic, local constraints;
30M. Mann,  Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation State?, cit.,p. 491-482
31Some even argue that, although the technological revolution that has driven the current wave of globalisation will
continue, globalisation has nonetheless passed its peak, since signs of its slowdown have been obvious for some time:
the institutional foundations of globalisation (i.e. the set of rules and institutions which oblige governments to keep their
markets open) have weakened considerably in the past few years; politicians and their constituencies in the major world
´s economies (United States, Europe, China) have grown increasingly reluctant about letting capital, goods, and people
move freely across their borders; energy- the ultimate global commodity unparalleled in importance - has become the
object of intense protectionism. cfr R. Abdelal and A. Segal, Has Globalization Passed Its Peak? Foreign Affairs, 2007,
86, 1, p. 104.
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adaptive,  because  sometimes  they  adapt  their  structures  to  pressures  stemming from the  same
levels.  For example, states can often decide to bind themselves to international agreements in order
to overcome opposition from powerful domestic groups (as in the case of WTO membership, which
enabled states to overcome domestic demands for protectionism by industrial groups).  Far from
eroding state sovereignty, international institutions are in this way used as “scapegoats” in order to
pursue a precise  domestic strategy.  By the same token, European  states  have jointly agreed  to
implement measures preventing regulatory tax competition among them, in order to hamper global
constraints stemming from multinational corporations,  which tend to allocate their production on
the basis of better fiscal conditions. So,  states can sometimes act on the national level, in order to
mitigate the negative effects of globalisation: they can decide to increase labour costs in order to
discourage systems of production based on law wages, or decide to limit tax benefits only to highly-
technological  firms.  On  the  other  hand,  states  are  not  totally  free  from  domestic  and  global
constraints. In many cases states create the domestic political-economic environment (developed
industrial infrastructures, low tax regimes, disciplined and cheap labour force) hospitable to MNCs.
In pursuing this constitutive and adaptive strategies, states help to promote the interaction among
the regional, national, global levels, thus enabling the development of an increasingly integrated
global architecture. 
The concept of global governance
One of the most important issues in the globalisation debate is the alleged emergence of a global
governance, that is to say the creation of a political order at the global level in the absence of a
supranational  state  with  a  legitimate  monopoly  over  the  use  of  force  and  the  capacity  of
authoritatively enforcing the law or other rules32. According to the globalist thesis, the problems
facing the contemporary world cannot be solved either  by leaving everything to the actions of
individual  states,  or  to  the  workings  of  the  market:  existing  decision-making  mechanisms  are
insufficient to deal with them33. The progressive development of a global economy, the expansion
of transnational social relations which generate new forms of  collective decision-making, the rise
of  intergovernmental  and  quasi-supranational  institutions,  the  intensification  of  transnational
communication systems are all factors leading to the emergence of a “global governance”, that is a
32T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2, p. 289
33F.  Halliday,  Global  Governance:  Prospects  and  Problems,  in  D.  Held  and  A.  McGrew  (eds),  The  Global
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate., cit., p. 489
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new system of  institutions, rules and mechanisms which would provide a framework of  regulation
across the globe.34  Although globalists agree that globalisation heralds the end of the dominance of
the nation state as the proper model for political organisation, there is no agreement on what lies
beyond the state, which alternative  form of global political order35 is likely to emerge, how this
“world domestic policy without a world government”36 will be shaped. There is also no guarantee
that anything better will replace the modern state37. 
In this respect, some globalists argue that the emerging global governance is shattering the unitary
structure of the state: the national government apparatus is no longer regarded as the sole centre of
legitimate power within state's borders. According to the traditional view of international relations,
states are unitary actors on the international stage and speak with one voice through the mouth of
their heads of state, who act as “gatekeeper” of  all domestic and international instances38. Now –
globalists  contend -  states need to be rearticulated with, and relocated within, this overarching
political  framework,  which  undermines  the  idea  of  sovereignty  within  fixed  borders  and
territories39.  Accordingly,  the  state  is  disaggregating  into  its  component  institutions  and  global
governance networks are emerging40. At  international and global level ministries, heads of state,
but also  government institutions which shape domestic politics (administrative agencies,  courts,
legislatures)  are  all  networking  with  their  foreign  counterparts41.  In  these  interactions,  each
institution represents not only the unitary “national interest”, but also a subset of interests which are
likely to be shared by its foreign counterpart. The resulting model of global governance is therefore
horizontal rather than vertical, composed of national government officials rather than international
bureaucrats, decentralised and informal rather than organised and rigid. On this reading, the concept
of global governance denotes an irreversible process where authority in the international order is
34D. Held and A. McGrew,  World Orders, Normative Choices: Introduction, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The
Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate., cit., p. 483-484
35H.  Bull,  Beyond the States System? in D.  Held and A.  McGrew (eds),  The Global  Transformations  Reader:  An
Introduction to the Globalization Debate., cit, p. 577
36J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader:
An Introduction to the Globalization Debate., cit, p. 545
37D. Held and A. McGrew,  World Orders, Normative Choices: Introduction, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The
Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, cit., p. 486
38A.M. Slaughter,  Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds),
The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, cit., p. 189
39D. Held and A. McGrew,  World Orders, Normative Choices: Introduction, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The
Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, cit., p.484
40A.M. Slaughter,  Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds),
The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate , p. 190
41This is for example much evident in the European Union's  system of decision-making,  where in the thousands of
councils, committees, and working groups national ministers often find themselves to interact with their counterparts
from other member states to oppose collegues in their own goverment: in this sense the EU system weakens to some
extent the internal unitary structure of its member states. Cfr J.T. Mathews, Power Shift, in  D. Held and A. McGrew
(eds), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate , cit., p. 211
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increasingly  disaggregated  and resulting in  a  system that  comprises  more  and more  centres  of
authority in every corner of the world and at every level of community.42
A similar model can be considered also the neo-medieval order,  that is the secular and modern
equivalent of the kind of universal political organisation that existed in Western Christendom in the
Middle Ages43: a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyality. Just as in medieval times no
political body could claim supreme power over a given territory and a given part of the christian
population,  in  the  neo-  medieval  form  of  universal  political  order,  states  need  to  share  their
authority over their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, with sub-state, regional
and world authorities. The global governance structure is thus constituted by overlapping authorities
and loyalties that hold peoples together in a universal society. 
Another model of global governance is the Empire, as radically reinterpreted by Hardt and Negri.
They argue that the present phase of global capitalism is creating a new global order which entails a
shift towards a new model of sovereignty44. This model of global governance is best described as an
Empire,  not  in  the traditional  sense  of  imperial  domination by a Great  Power  over  subjugated
territories and peoples, but rather as systems of global regulation which have no boundaries, but
which nonetheless embody relations of domination and subjugation45.  As the primary factors  of
production and exchange – money, technology, people, and goods – move increasingly smoothly
across national borders, the nation state has less and less power to regulate these flows and impose
its authority over the economy. Sovereignty has therefore taken a new form, composed of a series of
national  and supranational  organisms united under  a  single  logic rule.  This new logic  rule,  the
political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs
the world is the Empire46.  This new system of governance is different from imperialism. In the
imperialist system, the nation states were the centre of power from which sovereignty was exerted
over  external  foreign  territories.  Imperialism  was  an  extension  of  European  nation  states'
sovereignty beyond their own boundaries and nearly over the  whole world: the entire world map –
Hardt and Negri observe -  could be coded with European colours. In contrast to imperialism – they
argue – the Empire's new form of sovereignty has no territorial centre of power and does not rely on
fixed  boundaries.  It  is  a  decentred  and  deterritoriailizing  apparatus  of  rule  that  progressively
incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. In this new Empire, the
42J. N. Rosenau,  Governance in a New Global Order, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations
Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, cit., p. 224
43H. Bull, Beyond the States System? , cit.  p. 580
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USA retains a privileged position, but no single state can be the world leader in the way modern
European nations were, since the age of Imperialism is over. The distinct national colours of the
imperialist map of the world – Hadt and Negri conclude -   have merged and blended in the imperial
global rainbow.47
Rosenau's model of global governance bears a  resemblance to the notion of living law48 and is also
very useful in order to understand the concept of legal pluralism49. He theorises the existence of a
bifurcated system – which can be called the two worlds of world politics –: the government and the
governance system. The former is the interstate system of states and their national governments,
the latter is a multicentric system of diverse types of other collectives that sometimes cooperate,
often compete with and endlessly interact with the state-centric system (the governance system).50
Governance systems can be found in non-governmental  organisations, corporations, professional
and business associations,  advocacy groups,  and many other types  of collectivities  that  are  not
considered to be governments. Both government and governance consist primarily of rule systems,
but whereas the former acquires authority through formal means such as coercive sanctions, the
latter does it through repeated practices that are regarded as authoritative, even though they may not
be constitutionally sanctioned.  Nonetheless,  what  in both systems makes rules effective is  their
sphere of authority, that is to say their capacity to generate compliance. It follows that, viewed from
their compliance-generating capacity, governance rules may be just as effective (or ineffective) as
government rules.  On the face of it, it  may seem that state governments have an advantage in
ensuring compliance, since they have the legitimate power to use force wherever their citizens fail
to  comply.  Yet,  Rosenau  argues,  compliance  is  essentially  rooted  in  habit,  in  an  instinctive
readiness to respond to directives issued by authorities to which one feels committed and loyal.
Authority  is  essentially  relational:  it  links  those  who  issue  directives  and  those  for  whom the
directives are intended. If people ignore, avoid or otherwise do not heed the compliance sought by
the authorities, then it can be said that for all practical purposes the latter are authorities in name
only, that their authority has evaporated.51 With the emergence of alternative authorities to which
people can transfer their compliance habits, Rosenau concludes, states are less and less able to rely
on the effectiveness of their directives. 52 Consequently, global governance today is characterised by
an  extensive  disaggregation  of  authority  that  immensely  complicates  the  tasks  of  coordination
necessary to establish order in world affairs.
47M. Hardt and A. Negri, Globalization as Empire, cit, p. 117
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 On this concept see next section of this chapter p. 33
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51J. N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order, cit, p. 230
52J. N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order, cit , p. 227
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SECTION II: THE LAW AND GLOBALISATION DEBATE
The main themes of the law and globalization debate
 Globalisation is stimulating a fundamental rethinking also of legal theory. One common refrain in
this literature is that the study of law should not be restricted only to domestic state law and public
international law, but needs to take into account multiple levels of social and legal ordering1. A
sound legal  theory aiming at providing a total picture of the law in the modern world needs to
include not only municipal legal systems and traditional international law, but also global, regional,
transnational, and local orders,  in an attempt to explain the relations among them. Globalisation
enlarges the traditional focus of international law2. Scholars studying the law on the world stage
have so far considered the nation states as the only relevant actors on the international scene and the
law as the sole product of official, state-sanctioned entities3. Accordingly,  they have focused on
only  two  types  of  normative  systems:  those  enacted  by  nation  states  (national  law)  and  those
enacted  among nation states  (international  law).  Law  and  globalization scholars  argue  that  the
conception of law founded on this dichotomy is inadequate to capture new regulatory phenomena
occurring on a global scale. Studying law and globalization allows to expand the scope of what
counts as law, thereby recognizing many non-governmental fora where legal or quasi-legal norms
are articulated and disseminated4.
 A theme linked to this big issue is the disengagement of law and state: the law becomes more and
more  detached  from  nation  state  legislation5.  Law  and  globalisation  scholars  have  noticed  the
emergence of a wide number of non-state communities (“jurisgenerative communities” or “moral
entrepreneurs”6),  whose  structure  does  not  seem  to  fit  the  classic  model  for  international
1W. Twining, Reviving General Jurisprudence, in M. Likosky (ed), Transnational Legal Processes, Butterworhs, 2002,
p. 7
2
 P. Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2005,
43, p. 490
3
 P. Schiff Berman, From International Law, cit, p. 485
4
 P. Schiff Berman, From International Law, cit, p. 490
5K. Günther,  Legal Pluralism and the Universal Code of Legality: Globalization as a Problem of Legal Theory, p. 8,
paper presented at the 2003 Colloquium in Legal, Political and Social Philosophy at NYU School of Law available on
the internet at www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2003/readings/gunther.pdf  (October 2007)
6
 E.A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society, IO, 1990, 44, p. 482
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organisations: they are neither made up of states nor constituted by treaty, they do not enjoy legal
personality  and have  no  physical  headquarters  or  stationery7.   Such non-state  communities  are
increasingly producing new forms of regulation  (such as human rights law and the lex mercatoria)
somewhat outside state control. Accordingly, the nation state ceases to be the only player in the
public international law arena: the prerogatives of nation- state sovereignty may be affected and
limited by this great variety of norms (sometimes encompassed within the amorphous category of
non-state  law)  articulated  and  disseminated  by  non-state  actors8.  In  this  changed  regulatory
scenario, the notion of  state sovereignty itself is profoundly affected: it is no longer independence
of  any  external  influence,  but  on  the  contrary  the  capacity  to  participate  to  a  wide  range  of
international and transgovernmental regimes, networks and institutions, all of which have become
necessary for governments to accomplish what they once could do on their own within a defined
territory.9 In a world of global markets, global information, of weapons of mass destruction and
looming environmental disasters of global magnitude, states operate within an increasingly dense
network involving other states, inter-governmental  institutions, multinational corporations, and a
whole  range  of  cross-border  groups.10 But  the  coexistence  of  a  plurality  of  normative  orders
somewhat affecting the exercise of national sovereignty does not mean the demise of the state at
global level. On the contrary, the situation of normative pluralism is an indication that none of them
is  capable  of  providing  legal  certainty  alone:  globally,  legal  and  social  structures  compete  in
offering  better  solutions11.  It  is  therefore  reasonable  to  assume that  these  normative  orders  are
somehow incomplete: legal certainty emerges just from their interaction. 
 Another shared opinion in the law and globalization debate is that most concepts used in legal
theory  need  no  longer  be  considered  as  distinctively  legal,  since  they  are  shared  with  other
disciplines, such as sociology, philosophy, economics, and political science. Legal systems are no
longer conceived as “self-contained black boxes”, i.e. as closed, impervious entities which must be
studied in isolation12. The idea of legal science as an arcane discipline which can be understood only
in terms of its own internal categories and without reference to the social environment within which
it develops13 is becoming less and less popular. By contrast, global legal theory becomes more and
7
 A-M. Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, Mich.
J. Int’l L. 2003, 24, p. 1046-48
8
 P. Schiff Berman, From International Law, cit, p. 524
9
 A. Chayes and A. Chayes,  The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements,  Harvard
University Press, 1995, p. 4
10
 A. M. Slaughter,  Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks,
Government and Opposition, 2004, p. 162; J. Meritus,  Considering Non-state Actors in the New Millennium: Toward
Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application, NYU Journal of Int’l L and Pol., 2000, 32, p. 553
11V. Gessner,  Globalization and Legal  Certainty,  in  V.  Gessner  and A.C.  Budak (eds),  Emerging  Legal  Certainty:
Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law, Adelshot, Dartmouth, 1998, p. 444 
12W. Twining, Reviving General Jurisprudence, in M. Likosky (ed), Transnational Legal Processes, cit, p. 4
13R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: an Introduction, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 18
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more interdisciplinary: its main purpose is to map the relations between law and other disciplines14.
Global law scholars seeking to understand the changing world in which legal rules operate need to
look  beyond  their  own  academic  discipline  to  embrace  the  vast  literature  on  anthropology,
sociology, geography, and cultural studies concerning globalization. This literature challenges the
idea  of  nation  state  as  the  only  relevant  form  of  social  aggregation,  questions  the  assumed
naturalness of territorial borders and helps to reveal new ways in which norms are articulated and
disseminated among multiple, often overlapping, communities15. Only through an interdisciplinary
approach to globalisation is it possible to conceptualize a world populated not only by states, but by
a wide range of communities each producing its own set of rules. This interdisciplinary approach
also entails a broader conception of law which allows to consider the importance of  these sets of
rules and their interpenetration in official legal regimes16.
Combining international law and international relations theory: the US
perspective
In  the  wake  of  these  interdisciplinary  claims,  American  scholarship  has  recently  attempted  to
integrate  International  Relations  theory  (IR)  and  International  Law  (IL),  in  order  to  gain  new
insights into the study of organised cooperation among states. Each discipline can contribute to the
analysis  of state cooperation in various ways.  It  has for example been observed that IR theory
emphasises the importance of broadening the range of subjects to be examined beyond states and
international organisations (the so-called non-state actors)17. Besides,  IR theory shows that legal
arrangements are only one of many ways by which states structure cooperation, other forms such as
international  regimes,  spheres of influence,  political commitment being possible and even more
important than treaties in some fields18. On the other hand, IL, by focusing on the analysis of norms
and their application, can bring to the table a wealth of data on legal  practices and procedures,
14R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: an Introduction, p. 17
15
 P. Schiff Berman, From International Law, cit, p. 511
16
 P. Schiff Berman, From International Law, cit, p. 556
17
 K.W. Abbott,  Elements of a Joint Discipline, in International Law and International Relations Theory:  Building
Bridges, ASIL Proceedings, 1992, 86, p. 169
18
 Ibidem
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interpretation and application of norms at a level of detail which IR, normally more focused on a
theoretical perspective, has so far rarely addressed19.
But the field in which combined studies of IR and IL can produce more interesting results is what
Alcott calls the explanatory function, that is to say the explanation of why states set up, maintain,
expand, comply with, and try to enforce international cooperation20. In this respect, IR theory can
offer interesting alternatives to the classical view of the state as a unitary, self-interested, rational
actor  which is  implied also in many approaches  to international  law. Liberal  and constructivist
theories  of  IR  emphasise the role  which  values  and  ideas  on  the  one hand,  and  domestic  and
transnational stakeholders on the other hand play in shaping states’ interests and preferences21. On
this reading, the norms, values and social structure of international society help to form the identity
of actors who operate within it. 22States can learn from society: new knowledge or new belief (e.g.
emerging awareness in civil society towards environmental and human rights issues) can change the
state’s  entire  approach  to  a  specific  issue.  Groups  of  individuals  with  particular  bodies  of
knowledge (the so-called epistemic communities) identify problems, develop policy alternatives to
solve them, and communicate their positions around the world and convince governments to take
action on them23.
But this interdisciplinary approach is not devoid of criticism. The most recurrent one is that law and
social sciences constitute not only two distinct disciplines, but even two distinct cultures, since they
are based on entirely different languages and methods of reasoning24. Such remarkable differences
frequently cause big communication problems which are difficult to handle. The most important
language  problem is  constituted  by  the  different  ways  of  meaning  the  concept  of  law.  Social
sciences -  IR included -  generally adopt a very broad concept of law, encompassing the full range
of mechanisms of social control, whereas international law is still for its most past centred on the
positivist view identifying the law with state law. Although there are a wide number of approaches
seeking to go beyond the black- letter rules and analyse new forms of law, they are nonetheless
flawed with a fundamental methodological problem: they fail to draw the line between the enlarged
conception of law they propose and other social norms25.
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As to the  different modes of reasoning,  social scientists are fundamentally concerned with the
formulation of generalisation: they build models of collective action and ask themselves to what
extent empirical reality can fit into these generalisations. By contrast,  legal method is not based on
the construction of a theory or model to apply to reality. Legal reasoning has a distinctive dialectical
quality: on the one hand it uses principles and rules to understand cases; on the other hand it uses
cases to derive principles26. 
It is because of these differences in language and method that the two disciplines or cultures often
end up asking different  questions  and providing different  answers27.  Social  scientist  are  mostly
concerned  with  finding  explanations  and  predictions.  Thus,  they  ask  questions  like:  what
determines success or failure of international cooperation in international society? What is the role
of hegemonic powers in the creation of international institutions or regimes? Instead, lawyers adopt
a doctrinal approach to reality:  they analyse norms and seek to apply them to facts. Thus, their
typical researchable questions are for instance: what is the evolution and development of principles
of  state  responsibility  regarding  international  environmental  issues?  How has  the  catalogue  of
human rights in the post Cold War era changed?
The main tenets  of legal pluralism
 One  of  the  most  important  theories  supporting  the  existence  of  a  global  legal  order  is  legal
pluralism. The terms normative and legal pluralism refer more to a certain approach  to social facts
than to a systematic, structured theory28. To some legal pluralism is not even a doctrine, but simply
the description of a certain state of affairs, the attribute of a specified social group29. The concept, in
broad terms, refers to the coexistence of different systems of norms  in the same geographical or
social space; but over the time two different versions have developed. Initially, the term designated
the  coexistence  of  different  systems  of  norms  in  former  colonial  countries:  local  legislation,
religious rules, customary law, were all different sources of law recognised by the state and forming
part  of  a  single  national  legal  system.  In  such  countries,  the  state  recognised  the  existence  of
different rules for specific categories of persons, applicable in specific aspects of social life, such as
inheritance, family and land law.
26
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  In a second wave of legal pluralism studies, the basic tenet of this approach has been adapted to
the context of globalisation.  This new wave of legal  pluralism has focused on non-state law in
modern societies. The idea of legal pluralism has thus been used as an instrument to challenge state
centralism, that is the idea that the state has a monopoly of lawful power within its own territory.
Legal pluralists maintain that legal centralism is a fiction, a myth, a product of ideology. They also
argue that legal centralism constitutes the main hindrance to an accurate, empirical observation of
the legal phenomenon. The legal reality of the modern state- they contend – is not at all the tidy,
consistent, organized ideal so nicely captured in the common identification of the law with state
law.  Rather,  empirical  observation shows that  the legal  field  constitutes an unsystematic  set  of
inconsistent and overlapping parts.30
In contrast with the idea of legal centralism, they suggest that all societies have a diversity of legal
orders,  of  which official  state  law is only one,  and not  necessarily the most powerful.  On this
reading, globalisation creates a multitude of decentered law-making processes in various sectors of
civil society, in relative insulation from nation-states31. Technical standardization, professional rule
production, intra-organisational regulation in multinational enterprises, the lex mercatoria32 are all
forms of private rule-making on a global  scale,  which have come into existence not by formal
recognition of nation-states, but by acts of self-validation33.
  This  last  version  of  legal  pluralism  challenges  the  traditional,  positivist  conception  of  law.
According to the traditional doctrine of legal sources, all forms of legal pluralism are no more than
social  rules,  customs, usages,  contractual  obligations,  intra-organisational  agreements,  but  in no
way can they considered as law. This is because positivism bases the distinction between law and
not-law on a hierarchy of legal rules where the higher rules legitimate the lower ones. Normative
phenomena outside this  hierarchy  are  not  considered  law,  but  merely facts.  At  the  top of  this
hierarchy lies the constitution of the nation-state, which is the highest product of the democratic
legislative  process  and  therefore  the  ultimate  legitimation  of  legal  validity.  On  this  reading,
contractual rule-making, as well as intra-organisational rule production, is either seen as non-law or
as delegated law-making, which needs recognition by the national legal system.
Legal  pluralism  supporters  suggest  that  globalisation  is  breaking  this  hierarchy.  In  their  view,
political law-making has lost its leading role in the globalisation process34: sovereign states are not
able to agree on certain legal principles which may guarantee the development of a just  legal order
30J. Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, cit.,  p. 4
31A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Standford University Press, 1990, p. 70 
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for mankind. The political process has reached only a proto-globality in international relations35. On
the  other  hand,  legal  pluralism  supporters  maintain  that  various  sectors   of  civil  society  are
developing a global law of their own, somewhat independently of nation states, the latter appearing
too weak  on  a  global  scale.  The difference  between  a  highly globalised  society and  a  weakly
globalised politics is pressing for the emergence of a global law that is not a product of the nation
state's  legislative  process  and  is  not  dependent  upon  any  political  constitution  and  politically
ordered  hierarchy  of  norms:  in  Teubner’s  terms,  a  global  law without  a  state.36 This  makes it
necessary  to  rethink  the  traditional  doctrine  of  the  sources  of  law.  Globalisation  breaks  the
hierarchy  within  this  order,  moves  the  national  law-making  process  away  from  its  privileged
position and puts it on an equal footing with other types of social law-making.
 The idea of legal pluralism entails a different approach to the analysis of legal systems.  Unlike the
lawyer's standpoint -  who has a traditional, monistic view of the legal order and tends to equate the
concept of law with that of state law, the legal pluralist’ s standpoint is that of an external observer
or of an individual who finds himself or herself governed by a variety of regulatory orders, which
overlap,  interact,  and  often  conflict.  On  this  reading,  law  is  described  in  other  ways  than  a
hierarchical set of rules backed by coercive sanction. Law is viewed as a language, a system of
communication, a way of interpreting or even misreading37 reality. Law is best understood not as an
autonomous system of official rules, but rather  as a distinctive manner of imagining the real, a
constitutive part  of culture,  shaping and determining social  relations38.  Legal  pluralism scholars
emphasise the necessity of looking at the subjective side of law: they stress the significance of legal
consciousness,  that  is  the way in which ordinary citizens think about the law and transform or
subvert official legal statements, thereby “constructing” law on the ground.39
The concept of living law and the sociological approach to law
The  distinction,  drawn  by  the  Austrian   Law  Professor  Eugen  Ehrlich  in  the  1930s,  between
“lawyer's law” (or “norms for decision”) and living law, constitutes an essential starting point for
35G. Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, cit. p. 6
36G. Teubner, Foreword: Legal Regimes of Global Non-state Actors, cit. p. xiv
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those writers emphasising the legal pluralism of modern Western societies40. The theory of “living
law” entails an approach to the study of law largely different from that followed in traditional legal
studies.
 Generally speaking, legal doctrine seeks to explain the character of law by focussing essentially on
the relationship between rules, principles, and values incorporated explicitly or implicitly within the
legal system41. Pure legal analysis looks essentially at the rules, principles, and concepts set out in
law books and authoritatively stated in legislation or deduced from judicial decisions42.  On this
reading, law is essentially conceived as “lawyer's law”: law is the law of the state as recognised by
lawyers, and applied or interpreted by courts or other legal authorities.  According to the lawyer's
law viewpoint, other normative systems in a society may be seen as derived directly or indirectly
from state law, or as as created or maintained by delegation from it, or as sources influencing the
content of law. They are, however, distinct from and ultimately subordinate to it.
 Conversely, the numerous approaches to legal analysis which can be classified as sociological in
the broadest sense are unified by their deliberate self-distancing from the professional viewpoint of
the  lawyer.43 Law  is  always  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  an  external  observer  of  legal
institutions,  doctrine  and  behaviour,  rather  than  that  of  a  participant,  although  participants'
observation may be taken into account as data for the observer. On this reading, whereas “lawyer's
law” refers exclusively to actions by legislators, judges, jurists and other legal officials,  “living
law”  primarily consists  in  the rules actually followed in  social  life44,  the norms recognised as
obligatory by citizens as members of social groups45.  According to Ehrlich, a scientific conception
of law must concern itself with the rules which live in human society, not only in state institutions.46
Much  evidence  shows  –  Ehrlich  suggests  –  that  extremely  powerful  systems  of  normative
regulation distinct from the official lawyer's law govern  important areas of social life, with little or
no reference to the norms of decision.  The state is not the only association that exercises coercion;
there is an indefinite number of associations in society that exercise it much more forcibly than the
state.47 According to Ehrlich,  much of human life is lived in voluntary associations which assign to
each member  his or her own position within it and the rights and duties attaching to that position.
It  follows  that  the  obligatory  character  of  a  norm  is  neither  exclusively  nor  preponderantly
40D. Nelken, Law in Action or Living Law? Back to the Beginning in Sociology of Law, Legal Studies, 1984, 4, p. 171
41R. Cotterrell, The Sociological Concept of Law, J. Law & Soc., 1983, 10, 2, p. 241
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determined by the courts. It is the social association that is the source of the coercive power, the
sanction of all social norms, of law no more than of morality, religion, honour, etiquette, fashion48. 
Relying on the concept of living law, sociological legal approaches seek to explain the character of
law in terms of historical and social conditions and treat doctrinal and institutional characteristics of
law  emphasised  in  legal  theory  as  explicable  in  terms  of  their  social  origins  and  effects.
Contemporary theories  of  legal  sociology maintain  that  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of  law
requires not only the analysis of legal doctrine – in terms of concepts, principles and rules – but also
the empirical knowledge of the society and the environment in which such elements acquire their
meaning.49 Living law is far wider in scope than the norms created ad applied by state institutions.
At the core of normative pluralism lies the idea that state or lawyer's law is only one form of law
and is not necessarily to be seen in sociological terms as dominant, or at least exclusive. Legal
pluralists encompass within the concept of law  numerous forms of normative systems (customary,
mercantile, personal, religious),  whose creation, interpretation and enforcement occurs somewhat
independently on state agencies' activity.  According to this view, law exists in various layers or
levels: it may exist in associations, institutions or other social systems of various size and nature.
This broader conception of law derives from the empirical observation of social reality: sociologists
supporting the legal  pluralist view argue that legal ideas and the fundamental problems of legal
regulation50 with which lawyers are familiar pervade in fact almost every aspect of social life and
not only the institutional activity of state agencies. Whereas the state law conception emphasises the
relationship between law and the power of state, the legal pluralism conception tends to stress the
pervasive  social  importance  of  legal  ideas  as  responses  to  fundamental  problems  of  social
interaction occurring at every level of society51.
 
Santos’ concept of interlegality
One of the best-known account of legal pluralism in a globalised society is constituted by Santos’
notion of  interlegality.  The Portuguese  legal  theorist  maintains  that  modernity  has  fostered  the
48
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emergence of a new paradigm for understanding law52. Like all legal pluralists, he criticises the
positivist conception of law as a fiction. In order to function adequately, state law needed to affirm
itself as the only legal source within its territory and revoke all the previous formal and informal
laws (behavioural codes, customary laws, etc.), which might interfere with its application. This is,
according to Santos, a misreading of reality: since law and society are mutually constitutive, the
previous laws, although formally revoked, have nonetheless left their imprint on the social relations
they used to regulate. Though revoked, they remain present in people´s memories: legal revocation
is not social eradication.
In a typical legal pluralist fashion, he juxtaposes the fictitious notion of hierarchical positivist law to
the new notion of interlegality.  In his view, the global legal order consists in a constellation of
different legal systems operating in local, national, and transnational contexts. In order to describe
this  situation of  pluralism, he uses  the neologism of  “interlegality”:    a  situation in which the
different legal orders are not conceived as separate entities coexisting in the same political space,
but rather as superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds as much as in our actions53. In
this condition of interlegality, each normative order aspires to to be exclusive, to have the monopoly
of the regulation and control of social action within its territorial scope. But - Santos observes -
each normative order, by representing reality according to its own code, constitutes only one of the
many possible ways of imagining the real.  Therefore,  by claiming a monopoly,  each normative
order seeks to impose its own vision of reality and ends up distorting it. In particular, the code law
uses to represent reality is similar to that used by maps: consequently, the distortive effects of law
are similar to those produced by maps on reality.
The most important mechanism of representation/distortion of reality that laws and maps use is
scale. Scale is the degree of  details laws and maps choose to represent reality. Like maps are a
miniaturised version of reality, like map-making involves the filtering of details, so laws represent
reality by selecting a number of relevant  details  (i.e.  social  action or  behaviours)  they want  to
regulate. What makes law so useful to social regulation is its selection of what it consideres legal
and what illegal, the catalogue of actions which one can or cannot do. Legal orders often regulate
the same kind of social action, but on a different scale (large, medium, small scale): in other words,
they use  different  criteria  to  determine  the  meaningful  details  and  the  relevant  features  of  the
activity they intend to regulate. If we take as an example the social behaviour represented by  labour
conflict, we find that the factory code (that is a form of local law) regulates this behaviour in great
detail, in order to settle or even prevent labour conflicts. In the wider context of the national state
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law, labour conflict is only a dimension, although important, of industrial relations, whereas in the
widest context of world legality labour conflict becomes a small detail in international economic
relations. As we can see, each of these legal  orders has  a different  detection threshold, which
determines the smallest details of  the social object that will be considered for regulation. Local law
regulates the labour conflict in great detail (it acts on a large-scale legality), where the national law
regulates the labour conflict only in general terms ( it acts on a medium-scale legality). Finally at
the  international  or  world  level,  labour  conflict  is  hardly worth mentioning:  the  world  legality
operates on a large scale legality which is poor in details and features, describes behaviours and
attitudes, reducing them to general types of action. In this context, labour conflict does not even
reach the regulation threshold and therefore does not belong to the realm of law. 
The  second  mechanism law and  maps  use  to  represent/distort  reality  is  projection,  that  is  the
ideology and cultural tradition of the cartographer or legislator. In each historical period, maps are
drafted according to a fixed point around which the space is organised: medieval maps used to put a
religious site at the centre (Jerusalem in the European maps, Mecca in the Arab maps); modern
maps usually put the European continent at the centre. Likewise, the liberal bourgeois legality is
centred upon the concept  of contract:  not  only does the contractual  perspective regulate private
economic law, but it is also exported in other legal fields such as constitutional, administrative and
even criminal law. By contrast, some forms of local law are centred upon the idea of land: this is the
case for example of the law of the squatter settlements in Rio, where any dispute is  settled with
connection to land concepts and terminology. 
 In sum, legal orders, albeit regulating the same phenomena, use different criteria to determine the
relevant actions they intend to regulate: they represent reality in different ways, they create different
legal realities. However, different legal orders operating on different scales do not exist in isolation,
but rather interact in different ways. As a result of these interactions among legal orders, one cannot
speak properly of law and legality,  but rather of interlaw and interlegality.  In a context of legal
pluralism, legal orders are not conceived as separate entities coexisting in the same political space.
Our legal life is constituted by an intersection of different legal orders mixed in our minds as much
as in our actions, that is by interlegality.
Despite its vagueness and ambiguity, the concept of interlegality may provide a radical change of
perspective  in  the study of  law.  Interlegality  suggests  that  understanding a legal  order  requires
multiple viewpoints and perspectives54. Constructing whole views of law in the world is difficult
because there are many kinds of normative orders, with different cultural and historical background,
that  overlap  and  interact  in  complex  ways  in  the  same  geographical  space.  That  is  why,  in
54W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory, cit. p. 235
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understanding a legal order, it is not enough to concentrate only on the  “state-citizen relations”
perspective: for every field of social relations (the workplace, the household, the marketplace and
the  global  setting)  there  are  not  only  different  branches  of  state  law,  but  also  different  social
orderings interacting at various levels. Interlegality designates the complex relations among legal,
quasi-legal and social orders co-existing in a more or less independent way from official state law.
Teubner’s theory of legal pluralism and its sources
The so far most elaborated account of legal pluralism is  Teubner’s theory of reflexive law. In order
to understand his arguments,  one has first to recall  its main sources  of inspiration, namely the
globalist view of  globalisation and the concept of autopoiesis.
The globalist view of globalization
  As we have seen in section one of this chapter55, globalists argue that  one of the most powerful
effects  of  globalisation is  the  re-structuring  of  economic  relations  across  the  world.  Economic
activities that previously took place between national markets, that is between distinct economic
and political units, are now carried out independently of national boundaries. National economies
no  longer  function  as  autonomous  systems  of  wealth  creation,  since  national  boundaries  are
increasingly  marginal  to  the conduct  and  organisation  of  economic  activity56.  Capital  has  been
liberated from national and territorial constraints, while markets have become so interconnected that
domestic economies constantly have to adapt to global competitive conditions: it is global capital,
rather than states, - globalists contend- that exercises decisive influence over the organisation and
distribution of economic power and resources  in the contemporary global  economy57.   In  short,
globalists argue that the transnational organisation of finance, production and commerce is creating
a “borderless world economy”: as the dividing line between domestic and foreign politics blurs, by
the same token is the distinction between domestic economic activity and global economic activity
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increasingly difficult to sustain58; the transnational organisation of economic power now outstrips
the  regulatory  capacity  of  states59.  One of  the  strongest  challenges  to  state  power  is  therefore
represented  by  a   gap  between  the  state  and  the  market:  globalist  emphasise  the  increasing
discrepancy between a global market and national, discrete units of policy-making and regulation60.
There  is   a  mismatch  between  market  regulation,  which  is  still  state-centred,  and  market
organisation, which no longer works on a state-centred basis. Accordingly, states are in practice no
longer able to regulate this transnational organisation of production, which largely operates beyond
their national boundaries. States are limited by territorial boundaries, whereas markets no longer
depend on boundaries:  territorially bounded governments can no longer project  their power and
policymaking capacity over the space within which a global industry operates61 .
Teubner’s theory is in line with the main argument of the globalist view of globalisation, namely
the  mismatch  between  a  poorly  developed  international  law  and  a  highly  sophisticated  self-
regulation at global level. Nonetheless, Teubner refuses to reduce globalisation to a mere economic
phenomenon: not only the economy – he warns – but also the other sectors of an emerging world
society  (sport,  ecology,  terrorism)  are  organising  themselves  beyond  regional  boundaries  and
developing a global law of their own62, although he admits that it is in the global economic realm
that the most developed examples  of a  global  law without a  state (lex mercatoria,  the internal
regimes  of  multinational  enterprises,  the  lex laboris internationalis,  technical  standardisation of
industrial products) are to be found63.
Luhmann’s autopoiesis
The theory of autopoiesis was elaborated in the 1990s by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann.
Autopoiesis expresses a polycentric vision of society,  a society  no longer governed by a single
control centre, but  made up of a number of autonomous – or better: “autopoietic”64 -  sub-systems.
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Luhmann displays a vision of a modern society as differentiated into autonomous, self-referential
sub-systems,  each  with  its  inherent  logic  of  communication.  Consequently,  there  is  no  central
overarching perspective of society as a whole, but only a multiplicity of perspectives corresponding
to the different sub-systems. The starting point of Luhman's theory is its “system differentiation”65
approach to the analysis of society. Unlike most of sociological theorists which have preceded him,
Luhman's primary unit of analysis is not the individual or groups of individuals, but social systems.
And these systems consist not of people, but are conceived as systems of meanings66. Sociologists
are observers not of people, or groups, governments, states, but of society; and by society Luhman
means any social system which gives meaning to the world. The sociologist - he maintains- is an
observer of observations, that is to say an observer of all theories, concepts and beliefs people use to
understand events, attribute causes, make predictions: in a word, to make sense of reality67. The
underlying idea of this “second-order observation” is that one can come to see how meaning is
attributed to events or objects, only by observing how they are observed. Second-order observation
leads Luhmann to argue that each social system gives its own meaning to the world through its
own, inherent logic of communication. A social system is a system of communication: it makes
sense of reality only through its inherent logic of communication. This logic of communication
functions as  a  sort  of binary code: it  interprets events by assigning them either a positive or a
negative  value.   For  example,  the  legal  system's  code  classifies  events  in  terms  of  lawful  or
unlawful, the political system in governing or governed. Through the logic of communication, the
system operates therefore a distinction between what belongs to the system and what does not.
According to Luhmann, it is this distinction that constitutes the system. At the same time, the logic
of communication, by establishing which events belong to the system, creates a distinction between
the system itself and the external environment. This particular way in which social systems work
brings Luhmann to argue that each social system is an autopoietic system. An autopoietic system is
a system that reproduces itself  exclusively through its elements, that is its logic of communication.
Each system can observe only what its own code renders visible and cannot use the codes of other
systems in its logic of communication: communication occurs only within systems, not between
create.  Moreover,  the notion of autonomy,   as being founded on causal  relations  of dependence and independence
among systems, has a weak explanatory character. Autonomy in terms of causal relations means that each system is
more or less insulated from outside interferences, whereas autopoiesis shows that the differentiation occurs not so much
among systems,  but rather within them.  The differentiation of the various subsystems lies in their  diverse logic  of
communication,  which  is  an  inherent  characteristic  thereof.  Cfr  N.  Luhmann,  Law  as  a  social  System,  Oxford
University Press, 2004, p. 137-138; N. Luhmann, Closure and Openness: on Reality in the World of Law, in G. Teubner
(ed), Autopoietic Law: a New Approach to Law and Society, Walter de Gruyter Publishing, 1988, p. 345
65
 N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, cit., p. 137
66M. King, The Truth about Autopoiesis, Journal of Law and Society, 1993, 20, p. 219
67
 M..King and C. Thornhill (eds), Niklas Luhman's Theory of Politics and Law, Palgrave Macmillian, 2005, p.2
40
them  68.  Moreover,  the  autopoiesis  of  the  system  requires  the  continuing  production  of  new
meanings, the continuing interpretation of new events. The next event, however, can rely on already
generated  meanings.  The  continuing  autopoietic  operations  build  upon  the  system´s  previous
operations: this leads to a situation of operational closure.  Each system is, in Luhmann´s language,
operationally close: in its continuing autopoietic reproduction, it builds upon the structure generated
by its previous operations. Systems are operationally closed in the sense that the communication of
meaning within the system is defined solely in terms of the system´s own language. Each system is
therefore a closed system of communication that can only make further  communications out of
existing  ones69.   Each  act  of  communication  within  the  system  is  a  link  in  a  chain  of
communications:  it  refers  back  to  earlier  communications,  and  it  can  in  turn  trigger  further
communications. But this does not mean that each system is closed to other system’s influence:
autopoietic  closure  does  not  mean  isolation70.  In  Luhmann’s  language,  each  system  is  also
cognitively open to the others. Each system combines closure and openness: it reproduces itself
autopoietically, but at the same time it constantly exposes this process to the external environment71.
This means that each system can register information coming from other systems, only in so far as
they can be translated into its own language.  
 Autopoiesis has important implications for law. Autopoiesis challenges the traditional, positivist
conception of law as a body of commands backed by force. Moreover, law seen as an autopoietic
system no longer consists of a network of rules and decisions emerging from statutes and courts as
well as the activities of  legal  personnel (judges,  lawyers,  police and so on) in interpreting and
enforcing these rules and decisions. If we move to an autopoietic theory, we find another definition
of law, where the threat of force or sanctions no longer represents its defining feature72. Here social
systems consist not of individual or organised units, but of communications. In the legal system
social  events  derive  their  meaning  through  the  law's  proper  binary  code  of  lawful/unlawful,
legal/illegal;  that  is,  the  continuous  necessity  of  deciding  between  legal  right  and  wrong73.
Consequently,  any  classification  of  social  acts  and  events  according  to  this  binary  code  of
lawful/unlawful may be regarded as part of the legal system, no matter where it was made or who
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made  it.  On  this  reading,  the  legal  system   is  not  confined  to  the  activities  of  formal  legal
institutions: also scholarly interpretation of legal norms in law schools is for example considered
law.  By the same token, also social workers who investigate cases of child abuse with a view to
possible court action are treated as part of the legal system. All these acts are instances of social
facts and events being classified as lawful or unlawful and the communication of statements based
on such classification. Conversely, not all communications made by judges, lawyers, police officers
and so on are legal  communications.  When a judge,  for  example,  discusses  with a lawyer  in a
courtroom on the possibility of costs being saved by a negotiated settlement, he or she may well do
so without any reference to the respective claims of legality of the competing parties. This form of
communication can thus be regarded as economic rather than legal. It will only become part of the
legal system if the judge makes reference to the classification of events as lawful or unlawful, for
example if he or she adds that one or other of the parties would be likely to lose the case if no
compromise solution is agreed upon. 
 Global law without a state
The concept of autopoiesis has been further explored by Teubner with regard to law. In particular,
he has focused on those forms of self-regulation existing independently of state authority, which he
has grouped under the label of  “emerging global law without a state”. The starting point of Teubner
´s thought is that the “official” legal system is in close relationship with the other social systems: it
is a semi-autonomous social field74.  Various sectors of world society are developing  global rules of
their own (which Teubner emphatically calls “global law without a state”), in relative insulation
from the state, official international politics and international public law. Examples of this emerging
sectors  of  a  global  law without a state  are constituted by the internal  regimes  of  multinational
companies,  non-governmental  organisations  drawing  up  human  rights  codes  addressed  to
multinational firms, and, last but not least, the lex mercatoria.75 This global law without a state has
its own peculiar characteristics distinguishing it from the traditional law of the nation states. Such
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different characteristics are rooted in the particular features of the globalisation process. According
to Teubner, globalisation does not entail the emergence of a world society under the leadership of
inter-state  politics; on the contrary,  globalisation is occurring in an institutional  vacuum, where
politics and positive law are particularly weak. It is just the difference between a highly globalized
economy and a weakly globalized politics which fosters the emergence of a global law with no
legislation, no political constitution, no politically ordered hierarchy of norms76.  Legislation on a
world scale is a cumbersome process. A global administration scarcely exists, and there are few
signs of a strong, independent, large scale, global development of genuine legal institutions. In this
regulation vacuum, civil society is self-organising at the global level: global law grows mainly from
the social peripheries (i.e. the various sectors of society), not from the political centres of nation
states and international institutions. Global law is also highly fragmented and contradictory, because
such is the development of the global civil society. Not only the economy, but also science, culture,
technology, health systems, social services, the military sector, transport, communication, media,
etc are nowadays autonomous social systems developing their own self-regulation at global level.
Such  social  systems  are  starting  to  form  an  authentic  global  society,  or  rather,  a  fragmented
multitude of diverse global societies. 
  Globalization  breaks  the  hierarchical  structure  of  the  law:  at  the  global  level  there  is  no
supranational authority, but a vacuum of authority, a regulatory anarchy. In this context, legislation
moves away from its privileged place at the top of the norm hierarchy and is placed on a equal
footing with other types of social law making77. Accordingly, it makes no longer sense to define law
as  a chain  of  hierarchically  ordered  acts,  because  there  is  no  overarching  authority  which can
legitimate such chain. The traditional view of law as an exclusive product of the state is inadequate
to understand self-regulation phenomena occurring at global level, a context in which the state has
lost its law-making monopoly.  The emergence of  private regimes at global level is challenging the
traditional basic principles of the positivist order, such as the derivation of validity of legal norms in
a hierarchy of sources of law, the legitimation of law through a political constitution, the making of
law by  parliamentary  bodies78.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  conceive  of  the  law in  a  different,
“heterarchical” way. A new terminology, a "linguistic turn" is needed, which presupposes a new
perspective on law. The traditional terminology of legal doctrine is in itself inadequate, since it has
developed exclusively with reference to state law.  And indeed, these global private regimes do not
fit into the traditional category of customary law. Although both customary law and new global
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private regimes have in common the origin in society’s spontaneous regulation, the latter do not
simply result  from repeated interactions among individuals:  they are the product of formal  and
complex law-making processes occurring in specialised organisations which mirror the law-making
process in national parliaments.79
According  to  the new concept  of  law proposed  by Teubner,  sanctions  and rules  are  no longer
essential elements. Law is no longer conceived as a system of rules endowed with state sanctions:
law turns from a system of rules to a system of communication, which makes sense of the world
through the binary code legal/illegal. In other words, whenever we can identify in civil society a
system of communicative events and acts which operate according to the legal logic, we have a
legal  system.  At global  level,  we have a situation of legal  pluralism, whereby state law has to
coexist with other forms of law-making processes using the same language, the same binary code
which law uses. By looking at the law as a system of communications,  global legal pluralism is no
longer  considered  as  a  situation  of  conflicting  social  norms,  but  as  a  multiplicity  of  diverse
communicative processes in a given social field that observe social action under the same binary
code legal/illegal80. Each normative order, being based on the same universal code of legality, does
not function in isolation, but on the contrary can easily be connected, and is actually interconnected
in many ways, with the others. Teubner juxtaposes to the old hierarchical legal order the distinction
between centre/periphery in legal law making. Globalization shows that positivism is too rigid in
defining  the  boundaries  of  law.  The boundaries  of  law are  not  so tightly  closed as  positivism
outlines them, because there is a continuous interchange between law and society. The frontiers of
law are fluid because there are some areas thereof which lie at the border between law and other
social systems. At the centre of the legal system lies the official law as applied by the courts (law in
the narrow sense), whereas at the periphery lie a wide range of normative orders of a hybrid or
quasi legal nature. These normative orders, which are the product of society’s self-regulation, are
made up of both legal and social norms and lie at the periphery in the sense that they constitute a
sort of grey zones between the legal and the other social realms : in Teubner’s words, <<they are
produced in the periphery of the legal systems in structural coupling with external social processes
of rule-formation>>81
Lex  mercatoria is  the  most  important  example  of  these  hybrid  normative  orders  lying  at  the
periphery  of  the  legal  system.  It  was  originally  (and  in  part  still  is)  a  product  of  the  societas
mercatorum,  that  is  a  set  of  customs  and  usages  merchants  had  developed  to  regulate  their
economic transactions.  As an expression of  self-regulation,  lex mercatoria belongs more to the
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socio-economic  realm  than  to  the  legal  system.  But  especially  through  its  application  in
international arbitration – Teubner observes – lex mercatoria is moving from the periphery to the
centre of the legal system.  Lawyers are transforming lex mercatoria into proper law by translating
its  socio-  economic  rules  into  legal  language.  They  have  <<constructively  distorted  economic
realities  by reading legal  rules  into them>> and therefore  they <<have actually  enacted  a new
positive law which is unambiguously law and nothing else>>82. Accordingly, the language, the code
lex mercatoria uses to interpret reality resembles now more and more that of the official court’s
law.
Arbitration is also providing lex mercatoria with an autopoietical structure through the introduction
of the practice of precedents83.  In  solving commercial  disputes, arbitrators are claiming that old
previous cases constitute precedents for them and begin to distinguish and to overrule. Accordingly,
lex mercatoria is given its recursive structure characterising the legal realm as a system. What is
more,  quasi-legislative institutions are emerging (formulating agencies such as UNCITRAL, the
ICC, the ILA) which produce ad hoc rules for transnational commercial transactions. In conclusion,
exploiting the vacuum of authority at global level, private autonomy is creating an “institutional
triangle”, a set of private institutions which reflect the traditional forms of regulation in the national
context: “adjudication”, “legislation” and “contracting” (that is private authonomy).84
In conclusion,  lex mercatoria's very existence and application in international practice breaks the
taboo about the necessary connections between law and state.85 It demonstrates that valid law may
spontaneously emerge on a global scale without the authority of the state, without its sanctioning
power,  without  its  political  control  and  without  the  legitimacy  of  democratic  processes.
Nonetheless, Teubner acknowledges that a main problem with this non-positivist notion of law is its
legitimation. In the absence of an overarching political authority and global legal institutions, who
establishes the binary code? who decides what is legal and what is not? According to Teubner, the
answer lies in the concept of self-legitimation. As seen above, the global context is somewhat an
unchartered territory, characterised by a vacuum of authority. This vacuum is so to say colonised by
private autonomy through self-regulation. In a context where no pre-existing legal order can be said
to be the source of validity of global contracts, contracting itself becomes a source of law, which
stands on equal footing with judge made law and with legislation. According to Teubner, we are
faced with a self-legitimating situation comparable only to the authentic revolution imposing a new
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regime with the use of  force,  with  the  sole difference  that  in  this  case  lex  mercatoria  is  self-
imposing in a peaceful, silent way86.
 
New developments in the autopoiesis theory
Luhmann's and Teubner's discourse has been further developed in a recent paper by G. P Calliess
and M. Renner “ From Soft Law to Hard Code: the Juridification of Global Governance”87.  In
particular, they have tried to draw a distinction between legal and social norms in the context of
globalisation. Relying on Luhmann's thought, they distinguish between performance and function of
law in modern societies. The former, which essentially consists in providing behavioural control
and dispute resolution devices, is  carried out by the legal  system in competition with the other
social systems88 (for instance, the behaviour of economic actors can often be better regulated by
social, self-regulation norms rather than legal norms and mediation and conciliation practices are
good examples of resolution of social conflicts outside the legal system). The latter, which consists
in the stabilization of normative expectations, is carried out by the legal system alone and therefore
distinguishes it from the other social systems89. Moreover, this function constitutes the mechanism
by  which  the  legal  system  operates  as  an  autopoietic  system:  in  order  to  stabilize  normative
expectations, the legal system has  to select those social expectations which are worth protecting90,
i.e. those which are deemed to acquire the status of legal norms; this selection is carried out through
an autopoietic process, that is a network of legal communications perpetually referring to previous
legal  communications91 (for  example,  in  common  law systems  the  selection  of  legal  norms  is
guaranteed by reliance on judicial precedents and the doctrine of  stare decisis which acts as the
invisible hand of the system by making sure that adjudication orients itself along the lines of a few
leading cases that act as points of reference for later decisions). 
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46
Callies and Renner argue that a number of global governance regimes are crossing the line from
non-legal to legal forms of regulation, by  developing  two devices which allow for the autopoietic
generation of legal communications, namely an impartial dispute-resolution procedure allowing for
the verbalisation of conflicts (i.e. the communication of a social conflict in terms of legal/illegal and
vis à vis a third party) and the publication of past decisions, so that earlier legal communications
can serve as reference point for later ones92.  This is the case of arbitration and ADR related to
international trade disputes (which they call  lex mercatoria) and, to a larger extent, the  Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN), an online dispute resolution procedure for domain name issues. In the former, the
development of an autonomous legal system proceeds at slower pace, given the inchoate practice of
precedents,  the  scarce,  albeit  increasing,  publication  of  arbitral  decisions  and  the  lack  of  any
institutionalised court hierarchy93. In the latter the enabling conditions for the development of an
autonomous legal system are fully met: not only is an impartial arbitral panel set up, but also panel
decisions are published on the internet;  although the URDP Rules do not envisage the binding
nature of precedent, in practice the URDP Panel decisions often refer to earlier cases employing the
well known common law techniques of analogical reasoning94.
Legal pluralism in US Scholarship: the New Haven School of transnational legal
process
The New Haven School at Yale University is developing a particular version of legal pluralism,
which, starting from analogous premises as the European counterparts, finds its originality in the
application of the legal process approach to the globalization context.
The starting point of the New Haven discourse is the classical legal  pluralism refrain: the most
important  effect  globalisation has  exerted on the legal  realm is  the marked decline of  national
sovereignty and the concomitant proliferation of international regimes, institutions, and non- state
92G. P Calliess and M. Renner, op. cit, pp. 11-13 
93G. P Calliess and M. Renner, op. cit, p.  24; G. Teubner, , Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in G
Teubner (ed), Global Law Without a State , Aldershot Publishing, 1997, p. 18.
94G. P Calliess and M. Renner, op. cit, p. 23
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actors95. These two trends have radically restructured the context in which law is produced and have
inaugurated  the  era  of  transnational  relations,   that  is  the  regular  interactions  across  national
boundaries arising when at least one actor is a non-state actor or does not operate on behalf of a
national  government  or  an  intergovernmental  organisation96.  Transnational  relations  are
increasingly  regulated  by  a  new  form  of  law  which  cannot  be  encompassed  in  none  of  the
traditional categories of national and international law.  On this reading, transnational law embraces
all law which regulates actions or events which transcend national frontiers, including both public
and private international law and other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories97.
Transnational  law-making process,  they argue,  is  characterised  by a high  degree  of  hybridism:
public  and  private  actors,  including  nation  states,  international  organisations,  multinational
enterprises, non-govermental organisations, and private individuals, interact in a variety of public
and private fora, to make, interpret, internalise and enforce rules of transnational law98.
The post-Cold War era has witnessed a wide expansion of transnational relations and transnational
law, so that the latter concept appears somewhat substituting the old international law, which is no
longer able to explain the changed scenario of international relations. As sovereignty has declined
in importance, global decision-making functions are now executed by a complex network of nation
states, intergovernmental organisations, and informal regimes.  It  follows that the divide between
national,  international  and  transnational  law  wears  thinner  and  thinner:  not  only  does  public
international law now comprise a complex blend of customary, positive, and soft law, but the whole
international  legal  order  is  becoming  “neomonistic”,  with  new  channels  opening  for  the
interpenetration of international and domestic law99. 
In  this changed  scenario,  American  theorists  of  legal  process  study how the transnational  legal
process  is  carried  out  in the various  areas  of  international  society:  international  human rights,
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international  trade,  international  organisations,  arms  control  and use of  force100.  Central  to  this
approach  is  the  criticism  against  the  traditional  positivist  notion  of  law as  a  set  of  sovereign
commands reflecting the unitary interests of nation states101. Instead of looking at the law as a rigid
set of rules unilaterally reflecting state will onto social  behaviour, these authors argue that it  is
necessary to focus on the interplay between rules and social process in enunciating the law.  The
analysis of the law-making process at transnational level shows that a large variety of actors beyond
simply  unitary  sovereign  states  is  involved  in  this  process.  In  particular,  they  emphasise  the
emergence of a large number of non-state communities with a “juris-generative” power (multi-
national corporations and industry groups, NGOs, religious organisations, private regulatory bodies,
networks of activists, and so on), that is to say the power of generating norms in relative autonomy
with respect  to state control. Although such norms are not bestowed with coercive power,  they
nonetheless  exert  a  significative  influence  in  the  transnational  and  even  national  law-making
process.  Such  juris-generative  communities  seek  to  inculcate  their  norms  at  transnational  and
national  level  through  a  number  of  persuasive  techniques,  such  as  political  lobbying,  industry
standard setting, soft law102. Law-making both at national and transnational level becomes like a
“dialectical dance” of multiple communities, each assessing jurisdiction over the same activities103.
The “transnational legal process” approach to law consists therefore in the study of how public and
private actors,  including nation-states, international organisations, multinational enterprises,  non-
governmental  organisations,  and  private  individuals  interact  in  a  variety  of  public  and  private,
domestic and international fora to make, interpret,  internalise,  and enforce rules of transnational
law.104 
In this respect, many examples may be provided in order to show how the transnational process
works.  One  is  represented   by the  Spanish  extradition  orders  issued  in  2003 in  an  attempt  to
prosecute  dozens  of  Argentine  citizens  for  human  rights  abuses  committed  under  the  military
dictatorship  of  the  1970s.  Spanish  extradition  requests  were  illegitimate  from  the  sovereign
Argentine legal order’s standpoint: Argentina had previously conferred amnesty to those who had
been  involved  in  the  military  regime.  Therefore,  although such  measure  was  vividly contested
within the country,   any prosecution in Spain would infringe on Argentina sovereign’s choice to
grant  amnesty.  Nonetheless,  Spanish  extradition  requests  gave  the  Argentinian  President  more
leverage in his struggle against amnesty laws: he could use Spain’s extradition requests to increase
pressure both on Argentina’s Parliament and Supreme Court to officially overturn amnesty laws.
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And indeed, just one month after Spain’s request, the Argentine Congress voted by large majority to
annul the amnesty laws; in 2005 the Supreme Court stroke down the amnesty laws, thus clearing the
way for domestic human rights prosecutions.
Another  example is  constituted by the efforts of  US individual plaintiffs  to hold multi-national
corporations  responsible  for  violations  of  international  law  in  front  of  national  courts105.  By
pleading  such  cases  in  front  of  national  courts,  private  individuals  seek  to  “seed”  domestic
institutions  with  international  legal  principles106.  As  the  United  States  appears  increasingly
indifferent  to the development of international  legal  norms107,  private citizens are becoming the
agents for internalizing international law in the domestic legal system. By so doing, private actors
are  also  focusing  international  law  on  private  actors  (i.e.  the  multi-national  corporations):
international law is becoming privatised in the sense that increasingly individuals are both agents
and addressees of international law108. Accordingly,  the application of public international law to
multi-national corporations blurs the traditional distinctions of public versus private international
law and municipal versus international law109.
 A third example, which also shows how in the transnational legal process normative orders are
overlapping since each claims exclusive jurisdiction over the same range of activities, is constituted
by the  Yahoo!  case110.   In  2000 France  tried  to  prosecute  the  internet  multinational  enterprise
“Yahoo.com” for allowing French citizens to buy Nazi memorabilia and download Holocaust denial
material  from  sites  accessible  through  the  US  search  engine.  Nazi-related  materials  were  not
available  on  Yahoo.fr  (Yahoo.com’s  French  subsidiary),  because  French  Law  prohibited  Nazi
propaganda. But French citizens could easily circumvent this ban by accessing, Yahoo’s  American
site Yahoo.com. According to Yahoo. com, in order to comply with the injunction, it would need to
remove the pages  from its  servers  altogether  and not just  for  the French  audience.  This  would
amount to denying such material also to non-French citizens, many of whom had the right to access
the materials under the laws of their countries (in particular under the freedom of speech and the
freedom of press principles enshrined in the First amendment of the U.S. Constitution). Thus the
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U.S.-based “Yahoo. Com” argued that the French assertion of jurisdiction was an impermissible
attempt  by  France  to  impose  global  rules  for  internet  expression.  But  “Yahoo.com “argument
implied in turn an extraterritoriality claim: if France was not able to prevent the access of French
citizens to prohibited material, then the national orders with more permissible rules (in particular
the  US  law)  were  able  to  impose  their  rules  to  French  legal  system,  thereby  displaying  an
extraterritorial effect.
In this changed context, coercive sanctions can no longer constitute the distinguishing element of
the law. At the transnational level an overarching authority is lacking, and therefore compliance
cannot be ensured through coercive sanctions. The analysis of the transnational legal process shows
that the enforcement model based on coercion is usually doomed to failure: a sanctioning authority
is rarely granted by a treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used.111 As
a result,  an alternative model explaining compliance is proposed,  which is founded on the repeated
participation  of  the  various  actors  to  the transnational  legal  process.  Transnational  actors  obey
transnational law not because they fear the threat of a coercive sanction, but as a result of repeated
interaction with other actors in the transnational legal process. According to this model, reciprocal
interactions among transnational actors lead to the enunciation or the interpretation of a global norm
applicable to a particular situation. In the course of this interaction, each party seeks to inculcate the
new norm (or its new interpretation) so created into the other party’s normative system. In so doing,
the aim is to persuade the other party to obey the norm as part of its internal value set. Such new
norm will then guide future transnational interactions between the parties and future transactions
will further internalise these norms. Eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to
shape the interests and identities of the participants in the process112. In particular, three forms of
internalisation  are  distinguished.  Social  internalisation  occurs  where  a  norm acquires  so  much
public legitimacy, that there is a widespread general obedience to it. Political internalisation occurs
where  political  elites  accept  a  norm  and  adopt  it  as  a  matter  of  government  policy.  Legal
internalisation occurs where a transnational norm is incorporated into the domestic legal  system
through  executive  action,  judicial  interpretation,  legislative  action,  or  some combination of  the
three113.
Transnational legal process leads to a shift in the meaning of the term “jurisdiction” which appears
closer to the original Latin meaning “to speak the law”. Jurisdiction is no longer meant as the power
to  enforce  legal  norms,  but  as  the  ability  to  articulate  them.114 Embedded  in  the  notion  of
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transnational  legal  process  is  the  idea that  the state  does not  hold the monopoly on normative
assertions, but rather a variety of non-state communities are articulating alternative norms which, by
force of persuasion, may take hold over time115. From this perspective, jurisdiction becomes the way
a community manages to persuade the other communities to adopt a given set of rules
The downsides with legal pluralism
The literature on legal pluralism has been severely criticised by many commentators. Much of the
debate has centered around the defects of legal pluralism as a scientific concept. Its broad notion of
law, it has been argued, makes it difficult to draw the line between legal and non-legal phenomena,
between legal orders, traditions and cultures. As Klaus Günther and Ralph Michaels put it: “when
the distinction between law and other social  norms disappears,  when every social  actor  who is
creating social norms and who has the power to execute them is treated as a legislator, when the
validity of positive law goes side by side with other types of  social acceptance (e.g. persuasion or
factual acceptance by a majority)”116, then  “where do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves
simply describing social life?”117
Another  criticism  is  that  legal  pluralism  fails  to  reconstruct  the  complex  interactions  among
coexisting normative and legal orders. According to a legal pluralist view, law is concerned with
relations among agents  or persons at a variety of levels, not just relations within a single nation
state or society.  Any conception of law that is restricted to the domestic law of nation states and
classical public international law is extremely narrow and inadequate to cope with the complexity of
social reality.  But how are we to account for the interactions among these different levels? Terms
such as interpenetrating,  intertwined, superposed, overlapping,  mutually constructive, dialectical,
undoubtedly offer only a vague answer to the complicated connections between the social and the
legal fields118.
Finally,  it is often suggested that legal pluralism concerns more anthropologists and sociologists
than jurists and also that it is only marginally relevant to the practicing lawyer's interests, being a
pure  academic  discourse.  Nonetheless,  all  lawyers  dealing  with  transnational  transactions  and
alternative dispute resolution are operating in contexts of normative pluralism, involving non-state
law as  well  as  official  state  law.  Moreover,  with  the  growing  conciousness  of  issues  such  as
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minority rights and refugees' protection, lawyers are increasingly involved with complex problems
of interlegality. 
In  conclusion,  despite  theoretical  difficulties  as  well  as  emphatic  claims  embedded  in  legal
pluralism, its main idea - the emphasis on the coexistence of multiple normative and legal orders
within the same social space - remains an important caveat to the jurist.
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SECTION  III:  THE  CONCEPT  OF  LEGITIMACY  IN  GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
The concept of legitimacy in social sciences
Legitimacy may be defined in general  terms as a state of appropriateness ascribed to an actor,
object,  system,  structure,  process,  or  action  resulting  from its  integration  with  institutionalized
norms, values, and beliefs1. Referred to the normative field, legitimacy is commonly conceived as a
facilitator of rule compliance2: it presupposes  a consensus among the addressees of a given system
of governance in the rightfulness of authority, which facilitates the excercise of power over them.
Legitimacy makes commands,  rules, and decisions acceptable to individuals and motivates them to
comply with them.3
Legitimacy is a crucial but often vexing concept in social sciences4. It is crucial, because it explains
one of the most important issues in social sciences, namely how social order can be maintained; it is
vexing because,  although it has always been the object of  extensive debate and discussion, no
common acceptable definition thereof exists5. Despite this uncertainty, it is possible to identify in
the literature two different approaches to this concept: a normative and a descriptive one6. The first
is used in order to identify the standards by which a regime, an institution or an action can be
considered  as  legitimate.  Following  this  approach,  scholars  have  analysed  the  conditions  under
which the domination of human beings over others should be called legitimate: legitimacy in this
context is a normative quality that is attributed by theorists to certain political systems and does not
1L. Troyer,  “Legitimacy”,  in G. Ritzer (ed), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, vol VI, Blackwell, 2007, p.
2584
2J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations: from State Compliance to Citizen Consensus, in  A. Hurrelmann, S.
Schneider and J. Steffek (eds), Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, Palgrave Macmillian, 2007, p. 179
3J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit, p. 178
4Legitimacy: Political,  in N.J.  Smelsen,  P.B. Baltes (eds),  International  Encyclopedia of the Social  and Behavioral
Sciences, Elsevier, 2001, p. 8704
5Cfr  J.  Steffeck,  The  Legitimation  of  International  Governance:  A  Discourse  Approach ,  European  Journal  of
International Relations, 2003, 9, 2, p. 252:<< this debate, as viewed as a whole, is a mix of voices speaking to different
audiences and addressing the same topic in quite different terminologies>>.
6Cfr e.g. M. Zurn, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2, p. 260
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explain why people accept a social order in fact7. This is the approach followed by IR theorists in
the debate on the legitimacy of global governance: in this context scholars often prefer to use the
term  “accountability”,  rather than legitimacy.  The second approach attempts to explain why or
when people obey or accept a given regime or institution. This reading of legitimacy investigates
the specific empirical motives for obedience: it does not attempt to evaluate political regimes, but
rather to provide reasons for a particular social action, namely obedience to a regime or institution.
The  starting  point  of  this  approach  is  the  identification  of  three  categories  of  reasons  of  rule
acceptance8: coercion, self-interest and legitimacy. In the first situation, acceptance is motivated by
the fear of punishment from a stronger power9 ; in the second it is the result of an instrumental and
calculated  assessment  of  the  net  benefits  of  compliance  versus  non-compliance,  whereby
individuals  find  compliance  the  most  rationally  attractive  option,  which  can  best  satisfy  their
egoistic  interests10.  Both mechanisms of compliance are  “situation-bound”:  they can trigger  the
acceptance of a rule only in the presence of a threat or incentive and a tight system of compliance
control11.  As  soon  as  the  threat  or  material  incentive  for  compliance  disappears,  the  level  of
compliance decreases. Accordingly, these two mechanisms are not suitable for maintaining order in
the long run. Although it may be immediately effective, coercion reduces the likelihood that the
individuals will comply without coercion in the future: since it operates against their will, it may
create resentment and resistance. Self-interest devices imply that actors are constantly recalculating
the expected pay-off to remaning in the system and are ready to abandon it immediately should
some alternative provide greater utility. Accordingly, self-interest devices are by definition inclined
to revisionism rather than to the status quo.  
The third motive for compliance is legitimacy, that is to say the obedience to a norm because it is
believed by individuals as valid and just. Legitimacy is a mechanism of compliance which is based
on an  inner  reason  for  an  actor  to  follow a  rule.  When an  actor  believes  a  rule  is  legitimate,
compliance is no longer determined by an external factor, such as fear of punishment or expectation
of a benefit. Compliance derives from an internal sense of moral obligation: the rule is perceived as
legitimate to the extent that it is approved or regarded as right, that the behaviour provided for in the
rule is felt as desirable, proper, or appropriate12. Legitimacy is commonly considered as a powerful
device  of  social  order,  having  long-run  efficiency  advantages  over  coercion  and  self-interest.
7J. Steffeck,  The Legitimation of International Governance, cit,   p. 253
8I. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, IO, 1999, 53, 2, p. 383
9I. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, cit., p. 383
10I. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics , cit., p. 385
11J. Steffeck, The Legitimation of International Governance,, cit.,  p. 254
12M. Suchman,  Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,  The Academy of Management Review,
1995, 20, 3, p. 574
55
Firstly, because the actor internalises the rule, so that compliance becomes habitual to him, and it is
non-compliance  that  requires  a  special  consideration  and  a  psychic  effort.  Secondly,  since
individuals obey not because they are forced to, but because they believe it to be just, legitmacy
makes compliance a sort of spontaneous act, increasing the freedom of subordinates. But why and
when is a given rule considered as legitimate? Why and when do individuals consider a given rule
as valid, right or just? The classical answer to this problem is provided by Max Weber in his treatise
“Economy and Society”.  Weber lists three sources of legitimization used to justify the power of
command13. The first is traditional authority, which rests on an established belief in the sanctity of
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those excercising authority under them; the second is
charismatic authority,  which rests on devotion to the exceptional sanctity,  heroism or exemplary
character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by
him; the third is rational-legal authority, which rests on the belief of enacted rules and the right of
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. According to this mechanism of
compliance, a rationally constructed system of legal rules is used to produce legitimacy. A rational
legal system is made up of inter-related neutral and abstract rules which specify what must, may, or
may not be done. Legal rules are applied by  an impartial bureaucracy working according to formal
procedural rules. Rules also specify the tasks of each official, in particular his right and duty to
issue any valid command. Finally, rules state how authority positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy
can be occupied. In sum, under conditions of rational-legal authority, authorities are subject to the
rules just as are the people they control. Weber emphasises an evolutionary concept of legitimacy:
he argues that the emergence of modernity in the West entails that the traditional and charismatic
authority is progressively replaced by rational-legal authority. Rational-legal authority is considered
superior to the other grounds for legitimacy on account of its univeral orientation: when people rely
on the rational-legal authority of a rule, they obey the law rather than the person. In order to be
considered as legitimate, the command must be in accordance with the legal system and those who
hold power get their authority from their institutional role. As such, they are also subject to rules
which determine their competence14.  The superiority of rational-legal authority is premised on the
fact that the law is supposed to be equal for everybody and is clearly differentiated from the person:
rational  legal  authority expresses the absolute predominance of valid law, safeguarding citizens
against arbitrary excercise of power and requires the equal subjection of all, including officials15.
13M. Weber, Economy and Society, University of California Press, 1978 (1914), pp. 215-216
14M. Weber, The Three Pure Types of Legitimate Rule in S. Whimster (Ed), The Essential Weber: a Reader, Routledge,
2004, p. 133
15A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of  the Law of the Constitution, Macmillian, 1939, p. 188
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Moreover,  it  tends  to  a  homogeneous  vision  of  legitimacy  throughout  the  world,  trascending
cultural pluralism.
Weber's theory  is commonly considered as a value-free, formal theory of legitimation: the rational
authority of law implies no causal relation between socio-cultural values and legitimacy16. Rules
will be regarded as legitimate as long as they are in accordance with the formal procedures of the
existing  legal  system17.  The  precise  content  of  law  is  largely  irrelevant:  what  matters  is  its
consistency (similar cases are treated alike, and there are largely predictable consequences arising
from breaking the law) and workability (law must be effectively be enforceable). Accordingly, any
legal norm can be created and changed without endangering the legitimacy of the legal system by a
procedurally correct enactment. This is because it is the logical structure of the law which provides
it with the legitimacy it needs: law frees itself from the sources that could change its legitimacy18.
Building on Weber, other authors have attempted to provide an updated conception of rational-legal
authority, with a view to bringing it more in line with the changed circumstances of social reality.
The most important account of legitimacy based on Weber's formal theory has been developed by
Luhmann, whose concept of legitimacy is strictly connected to his autopoiesis theory which has
been examined in the previous section19. As we have seen, autopoiesis, in conceiving society as
essentially  composed  by  systems,  admits  the  disapperarence  of  modern  human  subjects  in
contemporary social  conditions20.  It  follows that  law,  as  a  social  system,  is  independent  of  the
concrete conditions and values embodied in a given political or ethical system21.  A key element of
autopoiesis is the normative closure of the different sub-systems of which society is made up: they
function  self-referentiailly,  according  to  their  own internal  logic,  reproducing  their  constitutent
elements by referring to themselves. Consequently, normatively closed sub-systems do not allow
external interference in their internal normative operations; they do not refer to norms of procedure
outside their own system when they are functioning. Law, as a social sub-system, is normatively
closed and enjoys  total  autonomy with respect  to  other  sub-systems,  not only in relation to  its
functioning, but also to its legitimacy. The legal sub-system is therefore self-legitimizing: it does
not depend on political, social or ethical forces for authority; its rules are accepted simply because
they  are  legal22 .  Luhman  rejects  any  psychological  or  moral  explanation  in  the  question  of
legitimacy of law: the sources of legitimacy of law can be sought only within the framework of law
16R. Cotterrell, Law's Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective,  Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 134
17M. Weber, The Three Pure Types of Legitimate Rule, cit., p. 133
18R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction, Butterworths, 1992, p. 152
19See supra pp. 39ff.
20J. Priban, Beyond Procedural Legitimation: : Legality and its “Inflictions”, J. Law and Society, 1997, 24, 3 , p. 335
21J. Priban, Beyond Procedural Legitimation, cit,  p. 336
22R. Lempert and A. Arbor,  The Autonomy of Law: Two Visions Compared, in G. Teubner (ed), Autopoietic Law: a
New Approach to Law and Society, Walter de Gruyter, 1987, p. 157
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itself.23 Individuals  cannot  make  their  own judgements  about  every   legal  case  or  problem by
relying  on  extra-legal  benchmarks  such  as  truth,  charisma,  tradition:  legitimacy  is  a  general
readiness to accept decisions which are still without content. All law is valid law and law which is
not valid is not law reads a very much quoted statement of Luhmann's24. By these words he means
that  validity  is  a  value  that  is  constituted  by  the  recoursive  performance  of  the  system's  own
operations25: validity rests on the system's  internal coherence that is its capability of  delimiting its
own  boundaries,  differentiating  itself  from  the  other  systems  and  ultimately  functioning
autopoietically26.
In  contrast  to  Luhmann's  value-free  account  of  legitimacy,  Habermas  develops  a  theory  of
legitimacy based on the idea of a universal morality determined by the universal binding validity of
argumentation and rational discourse, which must be implemented in political and legal systems.27
 Habermas develops further an aspect which was already present in Weber's account of rational-
legal legitimacy:  the idea that a rational rule-making not only must be based on reason; what is
more, these reasons must also be rationally debatable28. According to Habermas, modern legitimacy
is  derived  from the  authority  of  reason:  law  is   legitimate  if  it  can  be  backed  by  a  rational
justification29. On this reading, legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a legal order's
claim  to  be  recognised  as  right  and  just.  Legitimacy  means  a  legal  order's  worthiness  to  be
recognised30  : it does not imply a mere acceptance of the law, but rather the possibility of rationally
justifying it31. Therefore, norms are legitimate when they are accepted by the individuals who are
potentially affected by these norms32, and if this acceptance is based upon rational discourse, i.e. a
decision-making process guaranteeing <<a non-partisan formation of opinion>>33 through an open
23N.  Luhmann,  The  Coding  of  the  Legal  System,  in  A.  Febbraio  and  G.  Teubner  (eds),  State,  Law,  Economy  as
Autopoietic Systems, Giuffrè, 1992, p. 145
24N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 125
25Ibidem
26N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, Routledge, 1985, p. 201
27J. Priban, Beyond Procedural Legitimation: Legality and its “Inflictions”, cit., p. 333
28J. Steffeck,  The Legitimation of International Governance, cit,  p. 262. cfr Weber,  Economy and Society, cit, p. 979
<<the only decisive point for us is that in principle a system of rationally debatable reasons stand behind every act of
bureaucratic administration, namely either subsumption under norms or a weighing of ends and means>>.
29A. Edgar, Habermas: The Key Concepts, Routledge, 2006, p. 86
30J. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Heinemann, 1979, p. 178
31A. Edgar,  Habermas: The Key Concepts, cit.,  p. 81; cfr  J. Habermas,  La Crisi  della Razionalità nel Capitalismo
Maturo, Laterza, 1975, p. 112: <<questa validità normativa si fonda sul presupposto che all'occasione la norma possa
essere giustificata e difesa contro la critica>>
32J.  Habermas,  Fatti  e  Norme:  Contributi  per  una  Teoria  Discorsiva  del  Diritto  e  della  Democrazia,  Guerini  e
Associati, 1996, p. 131; cfr also J. Habermas, La Crisi della Razionalità, cit, p. 116: <<il modello adeguato [di validità
delle norme] è piuttosto una comunità di comunicazione degli interessati, che in quanto partecipi di un discorso pratico,
verificano  la  pretesa  di  validità  delle  norme  e,  nella  misura  in  cui  l'accettano  con  dei  motivi,  prevengono  alla
convinzione che, nelle circostanze date, le norme sono giuste. La pretesa di validità delle norme non si fonda sugli atti
di  volontà  irrazionali  dei  contraenti,  ma  sull'accettazione  razionalmente  motivata  di  norme  che  può  venir
problematizzata in ogni istante>>.
33
 D.M. Rasmussen, How is Valid Law Possible?, in D..M. Rasmussen & J. Swindal, Jürgen Habermas, Sage, 2002, p.
146.
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and free debate,  where agreement depends on the strength of the better  argument34.  The public
debate  in  which  citizens  rationally  discuss  their  interests,  values  and  identities  occurs  in  what
Habermas calls the “public sphere”. The latter consists in the range of social institutions that allow
for open and rational debate among citizens in order to form public opinion35. The public sphere is
not conceived as a fixed institution, an identifiable assembly of autonomous citizens, but rather as a
network  of  subject-less  communication  circuits  of  fora  and  associations  in  which  the  flows  of
communication are filtered and synthetized in such a way that they condense into public opinions
clustered according to themes36. Formal institutions and informal forums and circuits in the public
sphere represent the channels (the “sluices” in Habermas' language37) through which public opinion
is transformed into communicative power, that is to say the influence that citizens may exert upon
the State.
Normative approaches: the concept of accountability
Following a normative approach to legitimacy, part of the literature in IR theory has discussed the
issue  of  the  accountability  of  global  governance,  i.e.  the  characteristics  which  make  a  given
institution  or  regime  responsible  to  the  people  subject  to  it38.  The  common  feature  of  these
approaches  is  the  emphasis  on the  need  for  appropriate  procedural  requirements  to  ensure  the
accountability of international institutions to the communities concerned, through the inclusion of a
34A. Edgar, Habermas: The Key Concepts, cit., p. 84. J. Habermas, Fatti e Norme, cit, p. 148-149  also lists a number of
basic rights which the law should guarantee in order to allow citizens to exert their communicative power i.e. the power
they exert in processes of debate and political participation. The first is the greatest possible measure of equal subjective
freedoms so that every citizen is free to do what he likes, until his freedom of action does not undermine the freedom
and well-being of others; the second is the right to membership in a free association of citizens, the third is the due
process of the law, so that all citizens have legal recourse, should their rights be violated;the fourth, which is the most
distinctive as far as the aspect of legitimation of the legal system is  concerned, is the right  of participation in the
political debate. Only where every citizen has equal access to processes of public opinion and will-  formation can
legitimate  legal  rules  be  enacted.  The  fifth  is  the  right  to  achieve  minimum  conditions  of  life  (right  to  pension,
education, minimum wage and so on), which represent the basic premise to exert the previously mentioned rights.
35A. Edgar, Habermas: The Key Concepts, cit., p. 124
36J. Habermas, Fatti e Norme, cit., p. 427
37J. Habermas, Fatti e Norme, cit, p. 355
38More precisely,  Keohane  (R.O.Kehoane,  The Concept  of  Accountability  in  World  Politics and the Use of  Force,
Michigan  Journal  of  International  Law,  2003,  24,  p.  1124)  defines  accountability  as a  relational  term,  denoting  a
relation between a power wielder and the accountability holders to which the former is held accountable.  As far as the
content of the definition of accountability is concerned, Kehoane identifies two essential elements: information and
sanctions.  For a relationship to be one of accountability, there must be some provision for interrogation and provision
for information, and some means by which the accountability-holder can impose costly sanctions on the power-wielder.
To be accountable means to be compelled to answer or give explanations for one's action or inaction and, depending on
the explanation, to be exposed to potential sanctions, both positive and negative.
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transnational  society  in  the  global  decision-making  process.  The  purpose  of  this  debate  is  to
conceive of models of accountabilty which are different from the traditional democratic or electoral
accountability  typical  of  the  nation  state.  In  the  absence  of  a  “demos”,  i.e.  a  global  political
community – it is argued – it makes no sense to hold global institutions to domestic democratic
standards39. According to Kehoane and Nye accountability has different features depending on the
model  of  global  governance  employed.  In  particular,  they identify three  ideal  types  of   global
governance which are alternative to the westphalian model of independent states.  The first is the
international organisation model, according to which global governance occurs essentially through
the action of international organisations. Here, accountability is ensured through the instrument of
delegation: states delegate a number of tasks to international organisations, but retain at the same
time the power of supervising their behaviour and instructing their representatives40. The second is
the  transnational  actors  model,  which  is  centred  on  the  activity  of  non-state  actors,  such  as
multinational corporations or industry organisations. Within this model, accountability principally
takes the form of market and reputational accountability. For example, international firms rely for
their  success  on  their  reputations  with a  variety  of  constituencies,  including  financial  analysts,
customers, and their own employees41; rating agencies help to consolidate and publicize. The third
is the policy-networks model of governance. This model is characterised by spontaneous networks
outside formal inter-govermental agreements: members tend to operate with a minimum of physical
and  legal  infrastructure  and  according  to  few  agreed  objectives  and  by-laws;  nothing  they  do
purports  to be legally  binding and there  are few mechanisms for  formal  enforcement42.  In  this
model, there is no defined centre of authority like in the previous two (international organisations or
non-state  actors):  decisions  are  taken  through  a  continuous  interaction  among  members  of  the
network  involving  subjects  belonging  to  the  three  categories  of  international  actors  (states,
international  organisations,  non-state  actors).  Here,  accountability  is  more  problematic,  since
authority  is  dispersed  through  the  network  members:  policy  is  the  responsibility  of  no  one
institution  but  emerges  from  the  interaction  among  network  members.43  In  the  absence  of  a
hierarchical structure, reputational accountability becomes crucial: without credibility, actors cannot
become accepted as participants and cannot maintain their position in the network. In particular,
39R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability for Global Governance, in M. Kahler and D. A. Lake (eds),
Governance in a Global Economy, Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 386
40R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability, cit., pp. 399-400
41R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability,  cit., p. 400
42A.M.  Slaughter,  Global  Government  Networks,  Global  Information  Agencies  and  Disaggregated  Democracy,
Michigan Journal of International Law, 2003, 24, 4, pp. 1052-1053
43R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance, Open University Press, 1997, p. 21 
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reputational accountability takes the form of compliance with professional or scientific standards,
epistemic communities44'criticism and judgements, media inquiries.
Two  variants  of  the  network  model  of  governance  are  represented  by  the  “international
organisation-based  clubs”  and  “contested  issue  networks”.  The  difference  between  these  two
models rests on the degree of informational transparency and openness to new members. The first
model involves a closed, selected group of actors (units of states, international organisations and
transnational  actors)  focused  around  an  international  regime:  a  set  of  rules,  standards  and
procedures established to govern a set of issues. In this model of governance, cabinet ministers,
heads of state or the like negotiate in secret a given set of rules, which is then reported to national
legislatures and publics as a fait accompli45. By contrast, contested issue networks are open to new
members, whether the established participants welcome them or not. Contested issue networks are
likely to be more transparent to non-participants through the media46.  In IO-based clubs lack of
transparency to outsiders is a key to political efficiency: membership is closed, activities take place
largely  in  secret,  agents  in  these  networks  cannot  easily  be  removed  or  sanctioned  through
democratic processes; accordingly, protected by this lack of transparency, members of the network
are able to establish very quickly complex sets of rules which are difficult to disaggregate or even to
understand.47.  The  strongest  lines  of  accountability  within  IO-based  clubs  are  to  interest  clubs
within  issue-areas,  and  only  indirectly  to  national  law-makers  influenced  by a  broad  range  of
interest groups48. Public opinion is rationally ignorant about many issues and does not expect or
even desire to be consulted in these issues. Contested issue networks represent a development of
IO-based clubs in the context of globalisation.  The former are much more transparent  than the
latter: new members are able to “ambush” negotiations by attracting media attention on network
processes which would otherwise be kept secret. An example is represented by the proposed OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which illustratets the shift from an IO-based club to a
contested issue network model of governance. In 1998, more than 600 organisations in nearly 70
countries  formed  an  internet-based  network  of  opposition  to  this  agreement,  which  had  been
negotiated secretly within OECD. These new participants broke into the decision-making process
all of a sudden, they “ambushed” negotiations, so that the agreement became known to the public
and remained dead letter. They helped to create a contested issue network where earlier there was
44On this concept see infra pp. 75ff
45R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr,  The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the World Trade Organization:
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, Working Paper n. 4, The John F. Kennedy School of Government,  Visions of
Governance in the 21st Century, p. 3 available at www.hks.harvard.edu/ visions/ publication/ keohane_nye.
pdf (July 2009)
46R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability, cit., p. 403
47R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability, cit, p. 404
48R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability, cit, p. 405
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only  a  closed  IO-based  club49.  Yet,  the  accountability  which  is  emerging  in  contested  issue
networks is not devoid of criticism.What makes accountability problematic in both IO-based clubs
and contested issue networks is their disaggregated structure: they lack a focal set of institutions in
which interests are aggregated, bargains are struck and authoritative decisions are taken. What is
more, they lack actors able to intermediate between network members and constitutencies in civil
society.  Intermediating politicians should aggregate interests,  articulate policy themes and select
relevant issues in ways that are attractive to domestic and transnational constitutencies. This would
strengthen the accountability of such networks, because it would ensure an indirect influence of
constituencies over its members. A further drawback in contested issue networks is that their wider
transparency  and openness  may easily lead  to a  deadlock  in  cooperation,  since  these  networks
mainly arise in order to contest a given set of rules and institutions. Accordingly, governments and
international organizations may be held accountable for their actions, but may not be held equally
accountable for inaction50. In conclusion, IO- based clubs and contested issue networks appear two
complementary modes of governance:  the former represent  a very effective and rapid decision-
making  process  occurring  at  the  expenses  of  accountability  and  transparency;  the  latter   are
relatively more transparent and accountable, but lack frequently capacity for decision. That is why a
combination of these two modes of governance seem to be auspicable, in order to merge openness
and contestability with the capacity to make decisions.51
Another  suggested  way of increasing transparency and accountability of  policy networks is  the
establisment  of   a  global  equivalent  of  EU “information  agencies”.52 Information  agencies  are
governance  structure  whose  decision-making  process  relies  on  the  so-called  “regulation  by
information”.  Unlike  direct  regulation,  which  relies  on  a  variety  of  command  and  control
techniques, such as orders and prohibitions, regulation by information operates by attempting to
change  behaviour  indirectly,  essentially  by  supplying  the  different  policy  actors  with  suitable
information: access to credible information can change the calculations, choices and interests that
different actors make53 within the context of European governance.  Information agencies such as
the European Envirornmental Agency, the European Agency for Health and Safety at Work and the
Lisbon Drug Monitoring Centre represent  quintessential examples of regulation by information.
Their purpose is to collect, coordinate, and spread information needed by policy-makers. They lack
49
 R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability, cit, pp. 406-407
50R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability, cit, p. 407
51R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability, cit, p. 411
52A.M. Slaughter, Global Government Networks , cit, p. 1057
53G. Majone, The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information, J. Eur. Pub. Pol., 1997, 4, pp. 262-265. As we
can see, the regulation- by- information model bears resemblance to the process of national interest shaping performed
by epistemic communities as described by Haas (see infra pp. 75ff). 
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decision-making authority, let alone coercive enforcement power. Their power rests solely on their
ability to exercise influence through knowledge and persuasion. They set up a permanent technical
and  administrative  secretariat,  which  tries  not  only  to  collect  and  disseminate  necessary
information, but also to encourage horizontal cross-fertilisation (i.e.  exchange of  best  practices)
among counterpart national officials54. Relying on the European pattern, it has been suggested to
create  global  information  agencies  for  every  relevant  issue  of  global  governance,  made  up  of
independent experts providing necessary information to national officials and helping to coordinate
relations  among  them.55.  These  global  information  agencies  would  facilitate  the  functioning  of
transgovermental networks and help to legitimise them, by highlighting their existence and their
importance in global governance and, ultimately,  their degree of transparency. Furthermore, they
may  become  important  vehicles  of  expansion  of  the  network  to  private  non-state  actors  and
mobilise public participation to check and improve global governance performance56. 
In conclusion, legitimacy in global governance seems to possess a fluid or evolutionary character57,
in the sense that it is highly contextual, based on historical understandings of legitimacy and the
shared norms of the particular community granting authority.  As globalization grows more and
more  complex,  global  regulation  has  been  required  to  penetrate  more  deeply  into  national
societies58.  The  more  intrusive  this  has  become,  the  greater  call  for  accountability:  the  old,
traditional model of accountability through participation of states in international organisations is
no loger sufficient to meet contemporary world’s society needs.59 World society, which comprises
the  non-state  world  of  people  (individuals,  transnational  movements,  advocacy  networks,
international  non-governmental  organisation),  has  brought  the  new  issues  of  consent,
representation,  accountability  transparency  and  reponsability  into  the  legitimacy  agenda.  These
ideas have little in common with the legitimacy test which have developed within the traditional
international  society of states60.  The particular  features of legitimacy result from the interaction
between world society, which sets new legitimacy objectives and the international society of states
54R. Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European Agencies, J. Eur. Pub. Pol.,
1997, 4,  p. 260
55A.M. Slaughter, Global Government Networks , cit, p. 1063
56A.M. Slaughter,  Global Government Networks ,  cit, p. 1065. In this sense, the former UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan has recognised the importance of the United Nations as a convener of global policy networks designed to bring
together all public and private actors on issues critical to the global public interest (see K. A. Annan, We The Peoples:
The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, UN Doc DPI/2103 (2000), p. 70 ).
57
 I.  Clark,  Legitimacy  in  International  or  World  Society?, in  A.  Hurrelmann,  S.  Schneider  and  J.  Steffek  (eds),
Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, Palgrave Macmillian, 2008,  p. 197
58
 M. Zurn, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2, p. 266
59
 I. Clark, Legitimacy in International or World Society?, cit, p. 207
60
 I. Clark, Legitimacy in International or World Society?, cit, p. 197
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which  serves  as  the  principal  instrument  of  realisation  of  the  newly-defined  world-society
objectives.61 
Descriptive approaches
The second approach to legitimacy focuses on the issue of what mechanisms motivate states and
other  actors  in  the  international  arena  to  follow international  norms,  rules  and  commitments62.
Legitimacy  is  conceived  essentially  as  a  product   of  consensus  among  all  actors  involved  in
international affairs, both the old “statist ” and the “new” private actors.63  Consensus is understood
here as the fundamental belief of the members of the international society to be bound to its rules64.
Accordingly,  descriptive  accounts  of  legitimacy  in  global  governance  investigate  on  the  most
fundamental  rules on which international political  practice relies, as well as on the mechanisms
which make such norms legitimate. A common idea in these accounts is that mainstream realist and
liberalist  views are not always  satisfying in explaining compliance with international  norms. In
particular, these mainstream views are unable to solve the so-called Henkin's puzzle65, whereby,
even in the absence of an overarching authority in the international system, <<almost all nations
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time>>66.  This  is  particularly  evident  with  respect  to  the  sovereignty  principle,  which  is
undoubtedly the most fundamental  of international  rules and has been regarded by many as an
important  evidence  of  denial  of  international  authority  and  the  quintessence  of  the  “self-help”
international system67. The realist model, according to which states respect other state's sovereignty
merely on grounds of fear of physical coercion, may explain the situation with regard only to some
of the world's international borders68. But this view cannot explain why most of them are largerly
61
 I. Clark, Legitimacy in International or World Society? cit, p. 195
62I. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, cit, p. 379
63I. Clark, Legitimacy in a Global Order, Review of International Studies, 2003, 29, 1, p. 94-95
64I. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 24-25.
65J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit, p. 181
66L. Henkin,  How Nations Behave, Columbia University Press , 1979, p. 47
67I. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, cit, p. 382
68For example, the boundary between Iran and Iraq through the 1970s and 1980s and that between Serbia and Bosnia in
the 1990s actually wavered according to the balance of forces between the two states.
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undefended69 or  indefensible70 and  notwithstanding  not  threatened.  The  liberalist  account  of
sovereignty, according to which states would respect this principle only where its violation is not in
their self-interest, implies a constant, instrumental calculation of the costs and benefits of respecting
and ignoring the sovereignty of other states. But, again, international practice contradicts this view:
instrumentalism still reigns over many state choices, but not over all.71 International practice shows
that it is extremely rare for a state's foreign office to consider whether or not to reject the institution
of  sovereignty.  On the  contrary,  there  is  a  heavy  bias  in  favour  of  the  status  quo.  Given  the
inadequacy of these models, a strong indication exists that the institution of sovereignty exhibits the
stability that it does because it is widely accepted among states as a legitimate, internalized norm72.
The internalization of the sovereignty principle helps to explain the reason why many borders are
not threatened, even if they are not defended or indefensible. It can also explain why we generally
do not see states calculating at every turn the self-interesested pay-off to invading their neighbours.
If some authoritative institutions and rules exist, which are accepted by states as legitimate, the idea
of  an  international  system  as  entirely  dominated  by  anarchy  can  be  called  into  question:  the
Henkin's puzzle can hardly be explained without assuming that international institutions and norms
are  perceived  as  legitimate  by  the  rule  addressees73.  Following  this  rationale,  the  debate  on
international norms has attempted to explain in much detail how the process of internalization of a
norm  occurs.   In  this  context,  particular  importance  has  been  attached  to  the  concept  of
“socialization”, i.e. the spread of believes about correct or appropriate behaviour in the international
society.  Socialization is achieved through a process of arguing, reasoning and persuasion which
leads the actors of the international arena to adopt key values and principles and therefore adopt a
common course  of  political  action74.  Relying  on  the  idea  of  socialization,  some  scholars  have
attempted to provide an alternative account of international relations, by relying on a combination
between Weber's and Habermas' concepts of legitimacy. They argue that citizens are the ultimate
adressees of international rules and judges of their legitimacy75. Accordingly, legitimacy of global
governance must rely essentially on the persistence of a transnational societal consensus76. In the
absence of democratic forms of participation and control beyond the state this consensus may be
reached only by subjecting international  relations to justificatory discourse77:  people will accept
69These presently include many of the once most fought-over borders in history, such as those of Western Europe.
70For example, even the most ambitious Canadian defense program would be easily swept aside by a U.S. invasion
71I. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, cit, p. 397
72I. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, cit, p. 397
73J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations,  cit.,p. 182
74J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit, p. 185
75J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit., p. 190
76J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit, p. 187
77J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit, p. 188
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rules and institutions of global governance only in so far as they accept the aims and the principles
according to which they function.78 On this reading, legitimacy becomes the people's belief in the
validity of  the procedure  by which a rule has  been worked  out79.  Habermasian  communicative
action80 is regarded as a significant tool for non-hierarchical steering in global governance, which
may improve both its legitimacy problems by providing voice opportunities to various stakeholders
and  the  problem-solving  capacity  of  its  institutions  through  deliberation.81  Legitimacy  in
international  affairs  is  a  process  trascending  intergovermental  settings  and  involves  also  the
transnational  public  sphere:  citizens,  not  only  as  individual  activists,  but  especially  as  people
organized in non-govermental actors and social movements, play a decisive role in debating and
challenging the legitimacy of international governance82.Global governance is thus conceived as a
decision-making process aimed at reaching a reasoned consensus among actors. Actors' interests
and preferences are no longer fixed, but subject to discoursive challenges: participants in this global
discoursive process are open to be persuaded by the better argument. Accordingly, relationship of
power  and  social  hierarchies  recede  in  the  background83.  An example  of  how this  discoursive
process   of  legitimation  of  global  governance  takes  place  in  practice  is  represented  by  the
developments  occurred  within the  GATT and  WTO trade  regimes.  The original  GATT regime
based its legitimacy on the consensus that international economic exchange could lead to economic
growth and world peace84. Therefore, it was very narrow in its scope, focusing almost exclusively
on the liberalisation of international commercial exchange through the reduction of tariffs and the
abolition  of  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade85.  Starting  from the  late  1950s,  a  group  of  developing
countries embarked on a deligitimation campaign against GATT. Their main argument was that
GATT's narrow focus on trade liberalisation neglected the development of Third World countries
and ended up promoting a de facto uneven development in the various regions of the planet. This
delegitimation  campaign  led  to  the  creation  of  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and
Development  (UNCTAD),  which was  conceived  as  a  forum devoted  explicitly to  development
issues, thus filling a lacuna in the GATT agenda. The current criticism against GATT's successor –
the WTO- mirrors the arguments of the late 1950s' wave of criticism: it is argued that WTO  leads
to  an  uneven  promotion  of  global  welfare  and  that  its  scope  is  too  narrow,  since  it  does  not
encompass  important  issues,  such  as  the  establishment  of  minimum  environmental  or  labour
78J.Steffeck, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,  cit., p. 250
79T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2, p. 293
80
 On this concept see infra pp. 77 ff.
81T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, pp. 288-289
82J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit, p. 188-189
83T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, cit, p. 294. On this point see in more detail infra pp  77 ff.
84J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit p. 268
85Ibidem
66
standards.86 What is  new is that  the criticism does not stem from within,  but from without the
organisation: NGOs and unorganized protesters use demonstrations as channels to attract  media
coverage and bring their claims directly onto the public agenda. Accordingly, they engage the WTO
in a justificatory discourse with civil society87. In conclusion, the case of GATT/WTO shows that
both critics  and  international  organisations  seek  to  persuade  the public  of  the  validity  of  their
arguments for or against  global governance and this is  because in political  practice the rational
justification of international governance is its most important legitimacy resource.88
On the other hand, communicative action patterns as instruments enhancing the legitimacy of global
governence  have  raised some concerns89.  Involving  the  public  sphere  in  international  decision-
making processes is easier said than done, because it is often unclear what the public sphere is,
which its constituencies are and to whom they are accountable. Whom to include, whom to exclude
and who actually decides about inclusion and exclusion represent major hurdles to the development
of  a  legitimate  global  governance  enlarged  to  the  public  sphere.  Moreover,  once  stakeholders
representing  the  public  sphere  are  admitted  to  international  law-making  processes,  a  further
problem is to determine efficient decision-making procedures  allowing the logic of arguing to work
properly.  International  practice  has  shown  that  arguing  and  persuasion  work  particularly  well
behind closed doors, i.e.  outside the public sphere. But when actors are required to justify their
change of position in front of critical audiences, they may not be ready to do so and prefer to stick
to their own stances. Finally, it must be considered that often actors in international negotiations
have a mandate from their principals – be it states, international organisations or NGOs -  and thus
they are accountable to them for the decisions taken during negotiations. Accordingly, a sea change
during negotiations may sometimes go beyond the mandate they have been given. This may entail a
process of “two level arguing”, by which negotiators persuaded to change their position seek in turn
to persuade their principals that they should change their preferences too90.
 Other  descriptive  approaches  conceive  legitimacy as  a  number  of  inherent  characteristics  that
norms should exibit in order to exert a strong pull on states to comply with their commands91. These
86J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit,  p. 269
87Since  the  unprecedented  protests  of  the  late  1990s,  the  WTO has  directed  its  efforts  towards  a  more  effective
communication  strategy  of  pro-trade  arguments.  It  has  for  example  published  a  number  of  booklets,  such  as  “10
Common Misunderstandings  about  the WTO”, or “10 Benefits  of the WTO Trading System”;  it  has enhanced the
amount  of  information on the  organisation on its  website  and has  organised,  in  1992,  a  civil  society  symposium
involving some 500 organisations. See also A.M. Slaughter (  Global Goverment Networks, cit, p. 1055), who argues
that in the wake of public doubts and suspicion about their activities, organisations such as the WTO, the UN and the
OECD have instituted a raft of “outreach effort” to global civil society, enhancing transparency, hosting NGO meetings,
and acknowledging and promoting global policy networks.
88J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, cit, p. 270
89T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, cit, p. 311-313
90T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, cit, p. 312. This has happened for example in the case of the
reception of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in Germany: see infra pp. 246ff
91T.M. Frank, Legitimacy and the International System, Am J Intl Law, 1988, 82, 4, p. 712
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indicators  of  legitimacy  are  commonly  found  in  textual  determinacy,  symbolic  validation  and
coherence. The first feature consists in the ability of the text to convey a clear message, so that one
can clearly discern its meaning92: the more determinate a rule, the more difficult it is to resist its pull
to compliance and to justify non-compliance. Conversely, vagueness of a rule makes it harder to
know what behaviour is expected and consequently makes it easier to justify non-compliance93. The
second feature  consists  in  the enhancement  of  a  rule's  authority  marked by the use of  a  given
symbol or ritual94. The singing of the national anthem is a vocal and visual signal symbolically
reinforcing the citizen's relationships of rights and duties vis à vis the state. Likewise, UN's blue
helmets and flag symbolize a  growing body of rules applicable to peace-keeping operations.  A
particular form of symbolic validation rests on the emphasis of a rule's historical origins or cultural
and anthropological deep-rootedness95. For example the idea of a “new” lex mercatoria related to
the  “old”  medieval  one,  has  greatly  contributed  to  the  legitimacy  of  a  growing  body of  rules
governing transnational trade transactions96. The third feature consists in the coherent application of
the  rule  to  all  situations  to  which  it  may be  referred  and  according  to  general  and reasonable
principles.  The application of the rule of self-determination represents  an important example of
incoherence which has ended up in seriously undermining its legitimacy in international practice.
Incoherent application of this rule began after World War II97. On the one hand, self-determination
allowed former colonies, such as India and Algeria to gain independence; on the other hand, such
rule was denied in Eastern Europe, where territories largely inhabited by Latvians, Poles, Germans,
Romanians,  Hungarians  and  Slovaks  were  arbitrarily  annexed  by  neighbouring  states.  Even  in
contemporary  international  practice  there  are  no  general  principles  that  would  justify  the
inconsistency  with  which,  for  example,  Kosovo  may  rely  on  self-determination  and  Northern
Ireland may not.  
92T.M. Frank, Legitimacy and the International System, cit, p. 713
93T.M. Frank, Legitimacy and the International System, cit, p. 714
94T.M. Frank, Legitimacy and the International System, cit, p. 725
95T.M. Frank, Legitimacy and the International System, cit, p. 726
96See infra pp. 85ff
97T.M. Frank, Legitimacy and the International System, cit, p. 744-745
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SECTION  IV:  THE  DIFFUSION  OF  NORMS  IN  INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY
Introduction
The debate on the globalisation of the law is almost exclusively focused on the identification of a
new concept of law which may overcome the old positivst definition and encompass new forms of
rule-making  not  stemming  from  state  authority.  This  agenda  risks  to  lose  sight  of  the  most
important  implications of  the phenomenon of the law beyond the state:  what  is  lacking in this
debate is a theory explaining how norms emerge and spread in the international system, as well as
the mutual interactions between state and non-state law. International Relations theory can bring an
important contribution to this discussion: both rational theories and constructivism have recently
developed  detailed  analyses  of  such  issues,  namely  the  origin  and  diffusion  of  norms  in  the
international system. However, such accounts tend to consider the states as the main addressees of
norms,  whereas  in  the  field  of   the  globalisation  of  the  law  -  and  especially  in  international
commercial arbitration  - also non-state actors (the parties, the counsel, the arbitrators) are important
addressees. Nonetheless, International Relations analyses of norm diffusion can be adapted to the
field of international  commercial  arbitration and therefore may represent a  useful  tool  to better
understand the diffusion of uniform rules in this realm. 
The rationalist account of norm diffusion: the concept of legalization
 Rational  theories  of international  relations (realism and liberalism) are founded on three  main
assumptions:  actors  are  self-interested,  i.e.  concerned  primarily  with  the  pursuit  of  their  own
interests; actors are rational, i.e. they seek the most effective and efficient way allowing them to
maximise  their  interests;  state  interests  are  fixed  and  exogenously  determined,  i.e.  they  exist
independently of the particular conditions and values characterising a given social environment1 .
1C.  Reus-Smit,  Constructivism,  in   S.  Burchill,  A.  Linklater,  J.  True,  M.  Patterson,  and  R.  Devetak   Theories  of
International Relations, Palgrave,  2001, p. 213. 
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Accordingly, the behavioural logic underlying rational theories of international relations is the so-
called logic of consequentialism, whereby actors strategically conform to norms because  norms
help them to better satisfy their interests2.
The most important rationalist model of norm diffusion has been developed  with reference to the
notion of legalization3. Legalization is a concept envisaged by a number of political scientists in
order to provide an alternative to the positivist view of law which identifies the law only with norms
bestowed with enforcement by a coercive sovereign4.  This concept serves the main purposes of
accounting for the importance of international norms in influencing state behaviour and interests as
well as bridging the divide between the legal and political analysis of international norms5. 
Legalization is a set of characteristics which a given set of norms may or may not possess, namely
obligation (the addressees are legally bound by the given rule, in the sense that their behaviour is
subject to scrutiny under the procedures and discourse of international law: challenges to such legal
obligations can occur only through legal procedures and legal reasoning; a state cannot depart from
such rules on the ground that they do not comply with its own interests: it must adduce reasons
stemming from the interpretation of the norm justifying possible exceptions); precision (the rule
specifies clearly and unambiguously the behaviour it requires, authorises or interdicts); delegation
(third parties are granted authority to implement, interpret and apply the rules, as well as to solve
disputes)6.  Each  characteristic  is  conceived  as  a  continuum,  ranging  from  a  minimum  to  a
maximum, so that  for  each  set  of norms it  is  possible to identify a  higher  or  lower degree  of
obligation, precision and delegation7.  For  example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property and most European Union legislation represent ideal types of full legalization,
close to highly developed domestic legal systems, where all the three dimensions are present at the
highest level. At the opposite end we find extremely vague rules such as “balance of power” or
“spheres of influence” in the context of international politics, characterised by the lowest level in
the three dimensions, which do not constitute legal institutions in any legal sense. In the middle we
find soft or intermediate forms of legalization: the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
2T. Risse, Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversations across Paradigms, in I..Katznelson and
H.V. Milner (eds), Political Science: State of the Discipline Palgrave , 2002, p. 600; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink,
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, IO, 1998, 52,4, p. 912. By contrast, constructivists rely on the
different behavioural logic of appropriateness: see infra
3K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, IO, 2000, 54, 3,
pp. 401-419
4
 K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 402. See also P. F. Diehl, C. Ku,
D. Zamora, The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems, IO, 2003, 57,1,
p. 49 <<There has also been an expansion in the forms of law. This had led to thinking about law as a continuum
ranging from the traditional international legal forms to soft law instruments (...)The concept of a continuum is useful
because these modes are likely not to operate in isolation, but  rather to interact with and build on each other>>.
5K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, op. cit., pp. 418-419
6K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 401
7K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 404
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Ozone Lawyer, which imposes binding obligations but expressed in general or even hortatory terms
and  not  connected  to  an  implementing  authority,  or  the  Agenda  21,  adopted  at  the  1992  Rio
Conference on Environment and Development, which envisaged detailed norms on numerous issues
but  clearly intended not to  be legally  binding and whose  implementation was  delegated  to  the
relatively weak UN agencies. The advantage of this conceptual framework is that there is no bright
line dividing legal from non-legal norms in positivist terms: this traditional and obsolete distinction
is replaced by a continuum from hard law through varied forms of soft law, each with its individual
mix of characteristics, to situations of absent or very low degree of legalization. Accordingly, the
concept  of  legalization can  better  capture  the  actual  development  in  the notion  of   law in  the
contemporary globalization era,  characterised by an ever  more evident interpenetration between
state and non-state norms.
In developing further the paradigm of legalization, these scholars have applied it to a number of key
issues of  international  relations,  such the establishment  and development  of  the regimes of  the
World  Trade  Organization,  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  the  North  American  Free  Trade
Agreement, and the European Union, and have found that legalization is a complex phenomenon
varying across time, space and issue areas8. If on the one hand in some areas we note a shift toward
higher levels of legalization (for example, the ozone depletion regime was established in 1985 with
a  binding  but  otherwise  weakly  legalized  convention;  two years  later  legalization  in  this  area
increased by virtue of the more precise and highly elaborated Montreal  Protocol),  in others the
degree  of  legalization seems to  decrease over  the years  (for  example the exchange-rate system
under the International Monetary Fund has failed to return to the levels of obligation and precision
that it enjoyed three decades ago); by the same token, regions of high legalization (Europe) coexist
with other regions which have largely rejected legalized institutions.
Scholars  have  provided  a  number  of  different  explanations  for  the  uneven  development  of
legalization.  One  account,  focusing  on  a  rational-choice  approach  to  state  behaviour,  has
emphasised that the choice for a higher level of legalization depends on a tradeoff between the
benefits  of more credible commitments and the costs of sovereign loss and future uncertainty9.
Higher  levels  of  legalization  entail  more  precise  and  more  credible  commitments;  delegated
authority to interpret those commitments may also strengthen compliance. But, on the other hand,
harder legalization entails greater “sovereign costs”, i.e. a greater loss in the state's rule-making
autonomy,  as well as “future uncertainty”  costs, i.e. difficulties in departing from or modifying
these strong commitments in case of unexpected change of circumstances or overall  uncertainty
8M. Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, IO, 2000, 54, 3, p. 661
9M. Kahler, op cit, pp. 663-665
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within the given area. Accordingly, in issues were sovereignty costs are high, such as those related
to national security,  the incidence of legalization is correspondingly low: for example, in NATO
delegation  is  moderate,  in  the European  Union security  arrangements  have lagged  behind  and
bilateral  arms  control  arrangements  lay down  precise  legal  obligations  but  are  only minimally
institutionalized10. International trade issues are more complex: in some technical matters, such as
international transportation or food standards, there are lesser conflicts of interests among states and
also a strong domestic support  from interest  groups benefiting from legalization. Consequently,
sovereign  costs  are  low and  the  incidence  of  legalization is  correspondingly high.  In  addition,
technical complexity makes it hard to adapt agreements rapidly without some coordinating authority
and therefore a significant level of delegation is also common, as in the case of the International
Organization for  Standardization (ISO).  Other  matters,  such as  investment  policy and security-
related export controls, remain sensitive and have not been legalized to the same extent.  In sum, in
finding the proper degree of legalization of a certain issue-area, states must strike a balance between
the need to bind themselves tightly enough to avoid cheating and the need to allow the flexibility to
deal with uncertainty and unexpected shocks11.
 In  other  circumstances  the  choice  (or  non-choice)  of  legalization  is  explained  by  power
asymmetries, i.e. the fact that in the international system there are states which are more powerful
than others (in terms of resources, size or bargaining power)12.  As a general rule, small states seek
hard legalization, because it offers them protection from powerful states; by contrast, the latter tend
to avoid hard legalization, because they have greater control over international outcomes,  are less
in  need  of  protection  and  face  higher  sovereign  costs  in  negotiating  hard  agreements.  Yet,
sometimes powerful states may agree to participate in the drafting of soft law instruments in order
to  show a  cooperative  attitude  without  being  bound to  formal  compliance;  on  the  other  hand,
weaker states may accept soft law on matters they deem in their interests, realistically accepting it
as  the  best  they  can  achieve  and  in  the  hope  it  might  gain  greater  force  over  time13.  Power
asymmetries  are  particularly  evident  in  the  area  of  dispute  resolution:  agreements  with  high
economic asymmetries among members do not have in general highly legalized dispute settlement
procedures;  more  powerful  states  tend  to  avoid  them,  since  they  can  often  obtain  more
advantageous outcomes through ad hoc bargaining. As a consequence, such agreements generally
provide  for  limited  delegation  to  administrative,  rather  than  judicial  bodies,  in  order  to  allow
powerful states to retain control on the implementation and interpretation of the agreement.   
10K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, Hard and Soft law in International Governance, IO, 2000, 54, 3, p. 440
11K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit, p. 441
12M. Kahler, op cit, pp. 665-666
13C.  Chinkin,  Normative  Development  in  the  International  Legal  System, in  D.  Shelton  (ed),  Commitment  and
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in The International Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 34.
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 In  other  cases preferences  of domestic  actors play a decisive role in the choice for or against
legalized institutions14. The legal profession has an overall interest in the promotion of virtually any
kind of hard legalization process, since highly legalized institutions reflect the professional norms
of lawyers, foster the influence of lawyers on policy and increase the demand for legal services. By
the same token, business circles engaged in international trade demand a stable policy environment
guaranteed by legalized commitments and prefer  predictable dispute settlement procedures  over
intergovernmental bargaining. It is thus not surprising that these two domestic constituencies within
the  main  trading  nations  have  exerted  a  strong  influence  in  the   legalization  of  the  General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization.
The constructivist analysis of norm  diffusion
But   most  accounts  of  norm diffusion  in  International  Relations  theory follow a  constructivist
approach. Constructivism is an approach to International Relations which emerged in the academic
debate at the end of the 80's, after all mainstream theories (realism and liberalism) had failed to
predict and account for the big transformations reshaping the world order following the end of the
Cold War15. 
 Constructivism is founded on the idea that  relations within the international  system cannot  be
explained without reference to the agents and the way they construct  and perceive reality.  The
system of shared norms, values and beliefs ( which they collectively call “normative and ideational
structures”  or  simply “structures”16)  prevalent  in  the  social  environment   in  which actors  find
themselves defines (constructs) who they are as social beings (their social identities)17. At the same
time,  human agency  creates  and  changes  the  social  environment  through  daily  practices:  these
structures would not exist if it were not for the practices of these actors who play a crucial role in
maintaining  and  transforming  them18.  Consequently,  whereas  other  mainstream  international
relations theories, such as realism and liberalism, are based on the assumption that international
actors behave according to fixed and immutable interests (be it  military or economic power, or
security), constructivism is based on the assumption that actors' interests are shaped by the mutual
interaction between the structure (that is the historical, cultural, political and social environment in a
given  time and space)  and  actors'  social  practices;  by the same token,  whereas  in  realism and
liberalism society is conceived as a strategic realm in which actors come together to pursue their
14M. Kahler, op cit, pp. 667-670
15C.  Reus-Smit, Constructivism,  in  S.  Burchill,  A.  Linklater,  J.  True,  M. Patterson,  and  R.  Devetak,   Theories  of
International Relations, Palgrave, 2001, p. 216
16J.T. Checkel,  The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, World Politics, 1998, 50, pp. 324-348;  T.
Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, 1998, 23,1, pp. 171-200 
17T. Risse, Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversations across Paradigms, cit., p. 599
18C. Reus-Smit, Constructivism, cit., p. 218
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pre-defined interests, constructivism sees society as a constitutive realm, the place where  actors'
interests are shaped but at the same time actors themselves are able to influence the formation of
those identities which lie at the basis of their interests. 19 
In the constructivist analysis, norms have a fundamental importance: not only do they regulate or
constrain  behaviour,  but  they  also  constitute  the  identity  of  actors,  providing  them  with
understanding of their interests20.  It  is thus not surprising that most accounts of norm diffusion
follow this approach. In particular, constructivism has investigated three aspects of the norms: their
origin (how do we know  that a norm is a norm? Where do norms come from?), the mechanisms by
which they exert influence on state and non-state actors' behaviour and the conditions under which
norms will be influential in world politics. This analysis  relies on a wider definition of the concept
of norm than  that generally considered by lawyers: whereas the latter deal essentially with legal
norms supported by coercive sanctions, constructivists consider  a norm as a standard of appropriate
behaviour for actors with a given identity21. The essential characteristic of a norm is its prescriptive
quality: it lays down the appropriate behaviour with reference to a particular situation according to
the  judgments  of  a  given  society  or  community.   This  definition  stems  from  a  particular
philosophical view of the behaviour of human beings, which is called “logic of appropriateness”:
actors tend to do what society expects from them in any given situation and such social expectations
are  embedded in  social  norms which have constitutive effects;  they establish what is  the most
appropriate behaviour in any given situation, i.e they represent collective expectations about proper
behaviour  in  any  given  situation  and  therefore  they  associate  particular  identities  to  particular
situations22  But, on the other hand, actors also constrain social structures: the latter would not exist
without the practice of social actors who consider these norms appropriate and therefore comply
with  them;  moreover,  structures  are  themselves  being  reshaped  by  the  activities  of  purposeful
agents,  who may lead to the emergence of new norms or to a modification of new interpretation of
their contents23. 
 In order to account for the influence of norms on the international system, Finnemore and Sikkink
have theorised a norm “life cycle”, which comprises three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade
and internalization24. In the first stage new norms emerge as a result of a persuasion effort carried
out by “norm entrepreneurs” (also known as “epistemic communities” or “meaning managers”),
19C. Reus-Smit, Constructivism, cit, p. 219
20J.T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,  cit, p. 326; A Wendt, Anarchy is What States
Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, IO, 1992, 6, 2, p. 398. 
21M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, IO, 1998, 52,4, p. 891
22T. Risse, Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversations across Paradigms, cit., p. 600-601
23J.T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,  cit, p. 341
24
 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, cit.. p. 895
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that is groups having strong notions about appropriate and desirable behaviour in their community25.
These groups challenge existing rules laying down certain standards of appropriate behaviour and
try to persuade the rest of the community to replace the old standards with the new ones. If these
norm entrepreneurs are successful and thus a “critical mass” of states are persuaded to adopt the
new norms, the second stage consists in the norm cascade, whereby the “norm leaders” (i.e. the
avant-guarde of states which have adopted the new norms) try in turn to persuade  the other states to
become norm followers. At the far end of the norm-cascade stage, norms may become so widely
accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a “taken-for granted” quality that makes
compliance with the norm almost automatic. Consequently, internalized norms are both extremely
powerful (because behaviour according to the norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because
actors do not seriously consider or discuss whether to conform)26.
Epistemic communities and communicative action
Other constructivists have investigated in more detail the conditions under which new norms are
more likely to emerge and become prominent and diffuse in the international system. Some have
tried to do so by “bringing agency back in”, that is by emphasising the role of agents' practices in
the emergence of new norms and modification of existing ones27. A very influential literature in this
field  is that on epistemic communities and communicative action.   
The concept of epistemic communities has been used in international relations theory in order to
explain  how  states  define  their  interests  and  formulate  their  policies  in  a  context  of  growing
complexity.  The international scenario in which states are called upon to take their decisions is
characterized by an increasing uncertainty. The main reason for this is the growing complexity of
the international arena. Not only is the international agenda continuously widening, encompassing
an  ever  broader  range  of  issues,  often  of  a  technical  nature  (monetary,  macroeconomic,
technological, environmental, health and population issues); but also new international actors came
to the fore, with a consequent growing complexity of the potential interactions in the international
system.  Such  complexity  complicates  decision-making,  since  states  are  often  unable  to  deduce
preferences from circumstances or to choose between a wide array of available options. In addition,
they are often uncertain about their ultimate goals and how to achieve them28.  Forced to deal with
25
 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, cit., pp. 896-897
26Ibidem
27J.T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,  cit, p. 340
28P.M. Haas, Encyclopedia, p. 2
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this growing complexity, decision-makers have turned to specialists with a view to understanding
the new international issues more thoroughly, anticipating future trends and ultimately overcoming
this uncertainty29.   The group of experts to which  decision-makers resort  present a number of
recurrent characteristics, which are embedded in the notion of epistemic community. An epistemic
community is  defined by Haas as a << network of professionals  with recognised expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within
that domain or issue-area>>30. Decision-makers can resort to experts on a number of grounds. First,
because they may help them to assess the possible approaches to a certain issue, since they can
elucidate  cause-effect  relationships  and  accordingly  provide  advice  about  the  likely  results  of
various  courses  of  action31.  For  example,  experts  can  clarify  the  relationship  between
chlorofluorocarbon and environmental damages, and help decision-makers to decide upon the ban
of this substance. Second, experts can shed light on the complex interlinkages between issues and a
certain chain of events which may proceed either from a failure to take action, or from the decision
to take action. This was the case of liberalisation of trade services under the framework of GATT.
When  the  question  of  liberalisation  of  trade  services  first  arose,  most  governments  did  not
understand the implications this issue might have on the world economy as a whole and seemed
contrary to liberalisation32. The epistemic community which was formed under the framework of
the  OECD  was  able  to  convince  states  that  removal  of  non-tariff  barriers  could  display
advantageous effects both to developed and developing countries  Third, they can help formulate
policies and shape interests, either by redefining preconceived interests or by identifying new ones.
This may again  be observed in the case of  service  liberalisation under  GATT: by showing the
importance service liberalisation had in global economy, the epistemic community redefined states'
perception  of  the  nature  of  services  and the objectives  and principles  according  to  which they
should be governed33 The re-framing of state interests is more likely to occur in less politically
29P.M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, IO, 1992, 46, 1, p. 12-13
30
 P.M. Haas,  Introduction: Epistemic  Communities  ,   cit,  p.  13.  The concept  of  epistemic  communities  does not
coincide with the broad scientific  community  in a given field  of knoweldge At the same time, not every group of
scientists or professionals can be considered an epistemic community. The essential feature of an epistemic community
is its  normative commitment:  its members agree on a well-defined regulatory approach to a given issue. It is this
normative committment  which enables the members of the epistemic  community  to state authoritative  claims over
specific  issue  areas.  Haas  identifies  four  essential  characteristics  of  this  normative  commitment:  1)  the  epistemic
community's approach to the issue can be traced back to a number of principles and values on which the social action of
its members is based; 2) a common view as to the causes of a given problem: this is an essential component of the
community's approach, because it constitutes the starting point to identify the linkages between possible policy actions
and the desired outcomes; 3)  a shared notion of validity, that is common criteria to assess the knowledge in the domain
of their expertise; 4) a common policy enterprise, that is the commitment to direct the community's expertise to the
resolution of a particular set of problems, with the belief that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. 
31P.M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities,cit, p. 15
32W.J. Drake and K. Nicolaidis, Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalisation: Trade in services and the Uruguay Round, IO,
1992, 46, 1, p. 38
33Ibidem
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sensitive  cases,  where  experts  have  greater  room of  maneuver  in  the  decision-making process,
including the introduction of policy alternatives, selection of policies, and the building of national
and international colations in support of the policies.34
As a result of the rapid diffusion of ideas and the easiness with which common expertise can be
shared throughout the world, the scope of  epistemic communities' activities is becoming more and
more transnational. In this respect, international organisations act as a sort of resonance box for the
epistemic communities'  influence over  states:  epistemic community's  ideas  may take root  in an
international organization or in various state bodies and from there they are diffused to other states
via the decision-makers who have been influenced by their ideas.35  
 Epistemic communities' scholars have used the theory of communicative action as developed by
Habermas in order to explain the influence they may exert on national and international policy-
makers36. In an attempt to draw up the paradigm of the perfectly rational communication (the so-
called “ideal  speech situation”), the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas envisages a situation
where all  individuals  discussing a given issue aim at  reaching a consensus based on the better
argument, i.e. which can be better justified in rational terms37: this is essentially what Habermas
means by communicative action38. Communicative action implies that participants’view on a issue
are not fixed, but are subject to discursive challenges, i.e. actors are open to being persuaded to
change them in view of the better argument. Where better arguments prevail, actors do not seek to
satisfy  their  given  interests  and  preferences,  but  seek  a  reasoned  consensus.  In  order  to  fully
understand the scope of this concept, it may be useful to distinguish it from two other forms of
communication,  namely  bargaining  and  rhetoric  action39.  In  bargaining,  actors  have  fixed
34P.M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities . cit,  p. 16
35P.M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities ,  cit, p. 17
36E.  Adler  and  P.M.  Haas,  Conclusion:  Epistemic  Communities,  World  Order,  and  the  Creation  of  a  Reflective
Research Rrogram, IO, 1992, 46, 1, p. 389
37
 W. Outhwaite, Habermas: a Critical Introduction, Polity Press, 1994, p. 40
38
 More specifically, Habermas defines communicative action as an interaction among individuals discussing over an
issue whereby the use of language is directed towards two purposes: arriving at a shared interpretation of the issue, or
more generally reaching consensus over a situation, and coordinating the action plans of the actors involved in the
discussion.  Habermas  argues  that  the  agreement   at  the  basis  of  communicative  action  <<depends  on  rationally
motivated approval of the substance of an utterance>> (J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action ,
Polity Press, 1992, p. 134). Language has the ability to achieve mutual understanding and to coordinate action in a
consensual or cooperative way, only when it is supported by <<the rationally motivating force of accepting a speaker’s
guarantee for securing claims to validity>> (J. Habermas,  The Theory of Communicative Action, vol I, Polity Press,
1984, p. 302) i.e. when there is  the possibility of raising validity claims over an opinion and supporting it if challenged.
This is what Habermas calls the yes or no position toward a validity claim, i.e. the possibility to accept or reject it by
challenging its validity in terms of truth (the existential presuppositions of the propositional content hold true, i.e what
is said really exists in the external world), rightness (what is said is right or appropriate  in  a given normative or social
context and so the speaker had the right to say what he said), truthfulness (that the speaker’s manifest intentions are
meant in the way they are expressed, i.e. the speaker was sincere and really meant what he said) and meaning (what is
said is coherent and comprehensible). Cp. J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action , Polity Press,
1992, p. 136- 137. Cp. also S. K. White, The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, Cambridge University Press, 1995,
p. 120-123; A. Edgar, Habermas: The Key Concepts, Routledge, 2006, p. 21-23; 157, 164-165. 
39
 T. Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World politics, IO, 2000, 54, 1, p. 8
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preferences  and interests and they engage in communication with other  participants in order to
maximize  them  as  much  as  possible.  In  bargaining,  actors  exchange  information  about  their
preferences and make promises and threats with a view to better satisfying such preferences40. In
rhetorical action, one or more participants seek to convince the others that they should change their
views or preferences, but they are not prepared to change their own beliefs or to be persuaded by
the better argument41. In contrast to rhetorical action, in communicative action each participant is
prepared to be persuaded to change his views, if a better argument emerges.  This is because in
communicative action, the goal is not to maximize fixed preferences or to make one’s own view
prevail, but rather the achievement of a common understanding or reasoned consensus. It follows
that, in a communicative behaviour based on communicative action, interests and identities are no
longer  fixed,  but  subject  to  interrogation  and  challenges  and  thus  to  change42.  Accordingly,
relationship of power and social hierarchies recede in the background43 This latter point is important
because it underlines the fact that communicative action, like the opposite model of bargaining, is
an ideal  situation which is not found in reality in its pure form. Rather,  pure arguing and pure
bargaining represent opposite ends of a continuum, whereby most of the actual decision-making
processes take place somewhere in between44.  We may thus find processes in which bargaining
actors tend to justify their positions in terms of generally accepted norms as well as consensual
knowledge,  or  arguing  actors  who are  more  likely to  use  reasons  instead  of  force  in  order  to
persuade others of the validity and justifiability of their claims, but on the other hand are not ready
to  change  their  positions.  Apart  from the  classification  of  a  given  decision-making  process  as
arguing  or  barganing,  what  empirical  reasearch  is  primarily  concerned  with,  is  to  identify  the
conditions  under  which  arguing  leads  to  changes  in  actors'  interests  and  thus  influences  the
outcomes of negotiations45.
 An example  of  epistemic  communities  relying  on communicative  action  in  order  to  shape  or
change state interests is the mobilization of international public opinion, foreign governments and
other international organizations about the violation of human rights by a given state, as carried out
by international NGOs involved in human rights protection. What often happens in this situation is
that human rights-violating states  initially deny the validity of international human rights norms
40
 Ibidem. Cfr J. Habermas,  Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action  , cit., p. 133, who calls this behaviour
strategic action: <<if the actors are interested solely in the success, i.e. the consequences or outcomes of their actions,
they will try to reach their objectives by influencing their opponent’s definition of the situation, and thus his decisions
or motives, through external means by using weapons or goods, threats or enticements>>. 
41
 T. Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, cit., p. 8-9
42
 T. Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, cit., p. 10
43T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2, p. 294. 
44T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, cit, p. 299
45Ibidem
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and are not interested in engaging in a serious dialogue with their critics.46Then, under increasing
international pressures, they gradually shift toward the acceptance of the validity of international
norms  and  start  engaging  in  a  public  dialogue  with  their  critics,  so  that  the  logic  of  arguing
incrementally  takes  over.47 Sometimes  the  discussion  focuses  on  whether  violations  constitute
isolated incidents or are systematic in character; sometimes the government argues that, at the time
violations occurred, it was not fully in control of its own armed forces or its police; sometimes it
even recognizes that continuous human rights violations spoil the state’s image as a civilized nation.
But what matters is that in any case the government ceases to deny the validity of human rights
norms and starts  engaging with its  critics in a dialogue resembling the communicative action’s
model:  both  sides  accept  each  other  as  valid  interlocutors  and  try  to  establish  a  common
understanding of the human rights situation48. The outcome of this communicative action process is
that governments become convinced that human rights constitute part of their collective identities as
modern members of the international community49
The  logic  of  communicative  action  exerts  also  influence  on  the  membership  of  international
organizations, by allowing weaker parties to have a say in the decision-making process: assuming
that  the  materially more powerful  actors  do not  necessarily  monopolise the  formulation of  the
“better  arguments”,  we  should  expect  materially  weaker  actors  to  increase  their  role  the  more
arguing matters in a given institutional setting50. The best-known example is represented by the so-
called  “trisectoral  public  policy  networks”,  such  as  the  UN Global  Compact,  in  which  States,
international  organisations,  private  firms,  and  international  non-governmental  organizations
cooperate to seek common solutions in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and fight
against corruption51. The Global Compact is explicitly designed to operate as a learning network,
working through processes of arguing and persuasion: accordingly, within its membership we find
both actors endowed with vast amounts of material resources (states, international organizations and
private firms) and those whose assets consist more in intellectual resources, such as expert know-
how and moral authority (international non-governmental organizations).  Despite their status as
inter-governmental  bodies,   formulating agencies  in  the field  of  international  trade law usually
follow  a  decision-making  process  based  on  consensus,  which  closely  resembles  the  logic  of
46
 T. Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, cit., p. 29
47
 T. Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, cit., p. 29-30
48
 T. Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, cit., p. 32. The main difference with the model of the
ideal speech situation is that governments do not enter a process of arguing voluntarily, but are forced into a dialogue by
the pressure of mobilization carried out by transnational networks of NGOs and by the threat of economic or political
sanctions by the international community.
49
 T. Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, cit., p. 34
50T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, cit, p.  303
51
 Cp. Overview of the UN Global Compact on the website http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html
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communicative  action.  As  a  result,  it  is  very  frequent  that  also  non-state  actors  take  part  to
deliberations, albeit not as members but as observers. The reports of UNCITRAL’s last working
sessions show a steep increase in the participation of non-state actors as observers: for instance, at
the  12th Session  in  1979  only  four  non-governmental  organisations  attended  (Baltic  and
International  Maritime  Conference,  International  Bar  Association,  International  Chamber  of
Commerce), whereas at the latest 41st Session in 2008 their number was 28 (inter alia  Institute of
International  Banking  Law  and  Practice,  Instituto  Iberoamericano  de  Derecho  Marítimo,
International  Association  of  Ports  and  Harbors,  International  Bar  Association,  International
Chamber of Shipping, International Council for Commercial Arbitration, International Federation
of Freight Forwarders Associations).
The combined  notions  of  epistemic  communities  and  communicative  action  are  very  useful  to
explain the diffusion of uniform rules in international commercial arbitration, especially as far as
the diffusion of the UNCITRAL Model Law is concerned. As we will see in the following chapters,
this harmonisation tool can be considered as the product of a transnational epistemic community,
whose drafting process has mainly followed the logic of arguing rather than that of bargaining.
Moreover, its large success can be accounted for only in terms of its persuasive force as a rational
and systematic set of rules reflecting current arbitration practice and therefore able to modernize
outdated  national  arbitration  laws.  Finally,  it  may  be  observed  that  the  large  success  of  the
UNCITRAL Model Law has “entrapped” into the logic of arguing even those states which have
decided not to adapt their legislation to this harmonisation instrument. This is the case for example
of Great  Britain,  which will  be  analysed  in  more detail  in  the  following pages52.  This  country
decided  not  to  enact  the  Model  Law  essentially  on  grounds  of  self-interest,  i.e.  for  fear  that
departure  from its  traditional  legislation  would  have  undermined  its  ability  to  attract   arbitral
disputes into its territory. Yet, the large success of the Model law forced Great Britain to justify on
rational grounds the validity of its self-interest, by publishing in 1989 a detailed report – the Mustill
Report – in which the Model Law was thoroughly analysed and reasons were given why English
arbitration law should not conform to this harmonisation tool.
 
Which norm  characteristics foster diffusion?
52
 See infra pp. 279 ff.
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 Other authors have focused on the identification of the inherent characteristics of a norm fostering
its diffusion in the international system. This literature partly overlaps with that on legitimacy and
compliance of international norms which has been analysed above. As seen in the previous session,
Frank predicts a “compliance pull” of international norms, the more these norms have acquired a
consensual status of appropriate and legitimate behaviour in international society53.   
Another way of explaining  norm diffusion relies on an analogy between norms and genes54. Both
norms and genes are instructional units, in the sense that they contain information directing the
behaviour of their respective organisms (animals and human beings in the case of genes, individuals
and any type of social groupings in the case of norms) 55. Both are transmitted from one individual
to another through a mechanism of inheritance: norms are part of the set of beliefs and values which
are culturally transmitted from one generation to the next; this cultural transmission is a kind of
inheritance, an inheritance of pieces of information (namely behavioural standards) from one mind
or  social  organism  to  another,  just  as  genes  are  units  of  genetic  information  passed  through
reproduction  from  one  biological  organism to  another.  Both  are  contested,  that  is  they  are  in
competition with other  norms  or  genes  carrying  incompatible  instructions.  Both  are  subject  to
selection forces determining which of the contested norms will prevail or disappear. In particular,
three factors account for the successful diffusion of a contested norm, each being a necessary but
not  per  se sufficient  condition:  initial  prominence  (any  norm,  independently  of  its  inherent
effectiveness,  needs the effort  of some actors fostering its diffusion: such actors may be  either
individuals  and organizations  acting  as  “moral  entrepreneurs”  or   power  and  prestigious  states
directly  or  indirectly  persuading  other  states  to  comply  with  their  behavioural  standards56);
coherence (any new norm must fit with other prevailing norms with which it is not in competition,
since its legitimacy largely depends on its coherence with other norms and  its coherence in turn
engenders its legitimacy57)  and favourable environmental conditions (the norm needs to find an
hospitable environment, that is favourable environmental conditions for its diffusion: for example
Iraq's  attempts after the Gulf War to develop an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction was an
important  factor  leading  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention,  with  its
extraordinarily intrusive verification provisions58). 
53See supra p. 67
54A. Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, International Studies  Quarterly, 1996, 40, 3, pp. 363-389
55A. Florini, op. cit., p. 367
56A. Florini, op. cit. pp. 374-375
57A. Florini, op. cit., pp. 376-377
58A. Florini, op. cit., pp. 384-385 
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CHAPTER TWO: UNIFORMITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
From international trade law to transnational commercial law
In 1966 UNCITRAL1 Secretariat prepared a report entitled “Progressive Development of the Law
of  International  Trade”2 (the  so  –called  Schmitthoff’s  Report),  which  synthesised  the  most
important  achievements  and  underlined  the  greatest  hurdles  in  the  field  of  harmonisation  of
international trade law in the first half of the twentieth century. The report started with a definition
of international trade law which was subsequently adopted in most UNCITRAL documents and in
many doctrinal  writings.  According  to  the  report,  international  trade  law is  “the  body of  rules
governing commercial relationships of a private nature involving different countries”3.
Forty years after the publication of the Schmitthoff's report, a large number of scholars tends to
replace the notion of international trade law with that of transnational commercial law. This latter
concept may be defined as “the set of private principles and rules, from whatever source, which
governs international commercial transactions and is common to legal systems generally or to a
significant  number  of  legal  systems”4.  The  shift  from  international  trade  law  to  transnational
commercial law is the result of the new ideas emerged from the law and globalisation debate and in
particular from the various theories of legal pluralism5. Transnational commercial law represents a
challenging category within interdisciplinary research on globalization and law, since it breaks the
1For an outline of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) see infra pp. 132ff
2UN Doc A/6396 (1966). On this Report see infra pp. 134ff
3UN Doc A/6396 (1966), par. 10. The report attempts to clarify the scope of this definition. First, it provides examples
of topics falling within its scope, such as the international sale of goods, insurance, carriage of goods by sea, air, road
and rail,  industrial  property and copyright  (nowadays  we  would  say intellectual  property),  commercial  arbitration.
Thereafter, it explains that its scope does not extend to international commercial relations pertaining to public law, such
as those relating to the exercise of state sovereignty in regulating the conduct of trade affecting their territories (e. g.
GATT Treaties  and the Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community).  Finally,  it  points  out  that
international  commercial  relations  on  the  level  of  private  law  entered  into  by  governmental   bodies,  as  well  as
international conventions whose object is the regulation of a topic of international trade law, fall within the scope of the
definition (cfr par. 10-13).
4R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University
Press, 2007, p. 4  
5See supra pp. 31ff
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frames of traditional thinking about inter-state relationships by pointing to the myriad forms of
border-crossing relations among state and non-state actors6. 
Scholars have interpreted this broad definition of transnational commercial law essentially in three
ways7, each  reflecting a particular view of the concept of law and its role in  contemporary society: 
1)  as  the  legal  regime  generally  applicable  to  transnational  commercial  transactions,  that  is
transactions transcending national borders8
2) as a label pointing out the similarity among the various national laws applicable to international
commercial transactions
3)  as  a  term  denoting  an  autonomous  body  of  rules  applicable  to  international  commercial
transactions somewhat independently of national legal systems.
Scholars using the term transnational commercial law in the first sense merely stress the complexity
of legal sources applicable to international commercial transactions: not only the lex contractus, but
at least two and often more national legal systems have an impact on the contract.
The  first  definition  reflects  the  “sceptical”  and  “positivist”  view  of  the  law  and  globalisation
debate9:  globalisation  has  not  substantially  affected  the  role  and  functions  of  the  state  in  the
international arena and accordingly is still perfectly able to master all the events occurring within its
territory;  law is only what derives from state's sovereignty.  What we call globalisation is but an
increase in international  transactions  which implies  a wider  variety of  applicable national  legal
systems. The second definition is the essential idea of Schmitthoff's doctrine of  lex mercatoria10: if
we screen the norms of international trade belonging to the various national laws, we can single out
a number of principles which are internationally used or recognised in a uniform or similar way,
although they may stem from different legal systems11. This is because these common principles
were  once  an  autonomous  body of  universally  accepted  rules  (the  lex  mercatoria)  which  was
subsequently embodied in national laws during the codification era. One of the most outstanding
features of the legal development of the twentieth century is the re-emergence of international trade
law as a  separate  body of  rules  applicable to international  business transactions.   Schmitthoff's
doctrine does not break with the positivist dogma, although it recognises that modernity has led to
6
 P. Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in Jan Smits (ed.), Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing:
2006,  p.  738,  available  also  on the  internet  at  http://osgoode.yorku.ca/osgmedia.nsf/research/zumbansen_peer (July
2009)
7
 N. Horn, Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of International Commercial Contracts, in N. Horn, C. Schmitthoff and
J. Barrigan Marcantonio (eds), The Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions, Kluwer, 1982, p. 4 
8
 Cfr Jessup's famous definition of transnational law: all law which regulates actions or events that trascend national
frontiers” ( P. C. Jessup, Transnational Law, Yale University Press, 1950, p. 2).
9
 See supra pp. 14 ff.
10
 Cfr C.M. Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate, Sweet and Maxwell, 1981, ch 2
11
 C.M. Schmitthoff, The Law of International Trade: its growth, formulation and operation, in ID (ed) The sources of
the Law of international trade with specific reference to East-west trade, Steven and Sons Publishing, 1964, p. 3
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an important change in the law regulating international  transactions12.   When he referred to the
autonomous law of international trade law, he meant only that, under the authority given by states,
parties were free to subject themselves by contract to sources of law other than national laws.13
According to the third interpretation, the term transnational commercial law is meant as a body of
rules  of  universal  application  stemming  from  different  sources  (international  conventions,
international customary law, standard contract terms, rules drafted by formulating agencies14) and
produced,  interpreted  and  applied  somewhat  independently  of  national  legal  systems.  This
definition reflects the so-called globalist view of international relations. As explained earlier15, the
most important effect of globalisation on international policy is the states' loss of  their formerly
dominant position in international relations. State sovereignty’s decreased significance, especially
in the field of rule-making,  entails  a  reconsideration of the traditional  positivist theory of legal
sources. The traditional view of legal sources centred upon the notion of state sovereignty is being
replaced  by  <<legal  pluralism  which  accepts  that  society's  ability  for  self-organisation  and
coordination is  more than a mere factual  pattern without independent  legal  significance>>.16 In
other words, those social rules which once were a mere product of the principle of party autonomy,
in this new context of legal pluralism have a normative quality of their own.  Lex mercatoria, the
transnational law of business transactions, is the most important example of this phenomenon.
The concept of lex mercatoria
The concept of transnational commercial law is closely related to that of lex mercatoria, so much
that some authors equate the latter with the former17 . 
12Cfr L. Mistelis, Is Harmonisation a Necessary  Evil? The future of harmonisation and new sources of international
trade law, in I. Fletcher, L. Mistelis, M. Cremona (eds), Foundations and Perspectives of international trade law, Sweet
and Maxwell, 2001, p. 9
13R. Goode, Rule, Practice and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law, ICLQ, 2005, 54, p. 548
14
 The term “formulating agencies”  was invented by Clive Schmitthoff who used it for the first time in the first edition
of his well-known book , Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate (1977). With this term he referred to the
wide range of international organisations and institutions of various legal  status (private,  public,  intergovernmental,
non-governmental,  subsidised or non-subsidised by the governments  of the member  states)    and scope ( national,
regional or international), which are entrusted, delegated with or merely involved in the formulation of trade policy or
rules for the conduct of international commercial transactions. See also C. M. Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the
Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions,  in N. Horn, C. Schmitthoff and J. Barrigan Marcantonio (eds), The
Transnational  Law  of  International  Commercial  Transactions,  Kluwer,  1982,  p.  27-29  and   L.  Mistelis,  Is
Harmonisation a Necessary Evil?, cit, p. 15
15See supra pp. 15ff
16K. P. Berger,  The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place, in Id (ed) The Practice of Transnational Law,
Kluwer, 2001, p. 17
17R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, cit, p. 6
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Lex  mercatoria is  one  of  the  most  disputed  concepts  in  legal  science,  which  emerged  in  the
literature some thirty years ago.  After more than three decades,  opinions are still divergent as to its
definition, sources, and contents.
 The  concept  of  lex  mercatoria has  been  moulded  on  the  idea  of  the  old  lex  mercatoria,  the
customary  law  which  regulated  trade  transactions  between  merchants  in  the  Middle  Ages.
According to the lex mercatoria supporters, this body of law applied to a special class of people
(merchants) in special places (fairs, markets, seaports) and was neatly separated from other systems
of law in medieval Europe such as local, feudal royal and ecclesiastical law18. It was endowed with
special  characteristics  (transnational  in  character,  based  on  a  faithful  reflection  of  mercantile
customs, developed and applied directly by mercantile corporations and courts, involving speedy
and informal procedures), which made it perfectly apt to reflect the commercial need to promote
free  trade  and  recognize  the  capacity  of  merchants  to  regulate  their  own affairs  through  their
customs, usages and practices19. 
 Although the concept of the medieval  lex mercatoria has been largely “romanticised”20, the new
lex mercatoria supporters  relied initially on the authority of the old law merchant  to claim the
emergence  of  a  growing  body  of  uniform  and  non-national  rules  consisting  of  customs  of
international trade, principles and concepts which are common to all or most of the states engaged
in international trade, which are somewhat replacing national laws in the regulation of international
commerce21.
The  main  assumption  of  this  theory  was  that  national  laws  did  not  reflect  the  realities  of
international business life and therefore a new system of rules was emerging in business practice
which, like the medieval lex mercatoria, found its origins outside domestic legal systems and was
essentially composed of international sources of law, customs and self-regulatory rules22.
Originally, the debate on lex mercatoria was essentially a dispute between “mercatorists” and “anti-
mercatorists” arguing on its very existence and its qualification as a legal concept.
 Among  the  mercatorists,  three  main  views  could  be  identified.  According  to  the  first,  lex
mercatoria was an autonomous body of law, created by the international business community, and
disembodied  from  the  legal  system  of  any  given  country.  On  this  reading,  lex  mercatoria
18H.J. Berman and C. Kaufman,  The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria),  Harv. Int. L.J.,
1978, 19, p. 225 
19L. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law, Wm. S. Hein Publishing, 1983, p. 8
20
 Cfr R. Goode,  Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law,  ICLQ, 1997, 46,  p. 35 <<there is a
tendency to romanticise the law merchant and to treat it as an integrated corpus of universally applied law akin to any
local law and usage, when in truth it was never an organised body of rules at all>>
21
 The most important supporter of the new lex mercatoria was professor Berthold Goldman. Cfr B. Goldman, La Lex
Mercatoria dans les Contrats et l’Arbitrage International: Réalité et Perspectives, Journal du droit International, 1979,
106, p. 475
22F. de Ly, Uniform Commercial Law and International Self-Regulation, Dir. Comm. Int. , 1997, pp. 519-547
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constituted a neutral, third legal system alongside domestic and public international law, applicable
to international transactions23. Such a transnational legal order had its own sources and rules and
found in arbitration the preferred means of solving disputes.
According to a less extreme view, lex mercatoria was not an autonomous legal order, but a special
process  followed by the judge or the arbitrator when he is called upon to judge international trade
disputes.  When  parties  to  an  international  transaction  have  not  made  –  neither  explicitly  nor
implicitly – any choice about the applicable national law, or have subjected it to the international
customs and usages of international trade, the interpreter considers all the legal systems connected
to the matter of the dispute and selects those rules which appear to him the most appropriate and
equitable to solve the controversy. This judicial process, which is partly an application of rules and
partly a selective and creative process, is called the application of the lex mercatoria24. 
 Another  view regarded  lex mercatoria neither  as  an autonomous legal  order,  nor as  a judicial
process, but as a body of principles founded on common sense, equity and reasonableness, that the
judge or the arbitrator may use as a source of interpretation of obscure provisions or contractual
clauses25. A similar view considered  lex mercatoria as the part of transnational commercial law
consiststing of the unwritten customs and practice of merchants.26 On this reading,  lex mercatoria
should  be  kept  separated  from written  codifications  of  customs and  practice:  when  previously
unwritten rules are incorporated into, say, a contract or a convention, they change their nature, since
they derive  their  force  from the contract  or  the convention and cease  to be the product  of  the
spontaneous activity of merchants.27
23
 Cfr e.g. K.P. Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer Law International, 1999
24
 O. Lando, Some Featutes of the Law of Contract in the Third Millennium, Pace International Law Review , 13, Fall
2001, p. 368
25
  K. Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, Tulane Law Review,1989, 63, p. 613
26
 R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, .cit, p. 38
27Ibidem. The relationship between lex mercatoria and codification has been fully explored by Berger in his book The
Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria. He points out the existence of a codification dilemma: on the one hand,
codification gives  lex mercatoria more certainty and thus overcomes one of its major criticism; on the other hand, it
introduces a static element into this legal system which would contravene its character as law in action, that is as the
product  of the spontaneous activity  of merchants.  In order to solve this  dilemma,  he proposes a new technique of
codification, the creeping codification. This system consists in drafting an open list of principles of  lex mercatoria,
whose updating does not require  formalised procedures as in the case of a code or a restatement. The updating of the
list is based on a continuous comparison of the rules stemming from the various sources of the lex mercatoria: public
international  law,  uniform laws,  general principles of the law,  rules developed by formulating agencies,  uncodified
customs and usages, standard contract terms, published awards. The purpose of this comparison is to distil from this
raw material  the  general  rules  which  become  part  of  the  lex  mercatoria as  an autonomous  legal  system.  Once  a
generally accepted rule is found, it is included in a publicly accessible database. Each rule can then be modified with no
particular formal procedure, whenever it is felt that the transnational business practice has changed. According to the
creeping codification method, the restatements of lex mercatoria such as the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL are
not considered sources of  lex mercatoria in the proper sense, since they provide a first indication of the existence of
certain legal principles on the transnational plane. Accordingly, the creeping codification method is aimed at testing the
restatements' effectivity, that is to say it aims at verifying whether their rules effectively reflect transnational business
practice.
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Anti-mercatorists denied the legal nature of lex mercatoria and even its very existence, by pointing
out essentially two streams of criticism. The first was that it lacked any state authority from which it
could derive its binding force. Hence, a contract intended to be subject to lex mercatoria would be a
stateless  and  lawless  contract  floating  in  a  vacuum,  a  logical  impossibility,  and  an intellectual
solecism28. Consequently,  lex mercatoria could at best be considered as a reference to generally
accepted usages in international trade, which could acquire legal character only to the extent that
they were incorporated into a national legal system, either expressly or tacitly.  The fact that they
were available as a source of interpretation or amplification of contractual clauses could not in itself
make them law29.
The  second  argument  against  lex  mercatoria was  its  inherent  incompleteness,  vagueness  and
incoherence. Lex  mercatoria encompassed  such  a  great  variety  of  constituent  elements  (public
international  law,  rules  of  international  organisations,  standard  contract  terms,  arbitral  awards,
model laws, international customs and usages), that they ended up undermining the certainty and
predictability of its content. Obviously, the larger the number of sources encompassed in the notion
of  lex mercatoria,  the more difficult  for arbitrators  and judges  to apply it  and to determine its
contents. In addition, there was no code, statute or at least reference text helping the interpreter to
ascertain the rules of  lex mercatoria, and only very few decisions applying  lex mercatoria were
known:  consequently,  lawyers  fell  short  of  concrete  examples  in  which  this  concept  has  been
applied and were often unable to predict whether a tribunal will decide the dispute according to lex
mercatoria and what kind of lex mercatoria (as an autonomous legal order, as a judicial process as a
set of interpretation principles) will apply.
 In  conclusion,  lex mercatoria failed to provide the businessman with a set of rules which was
sufficiently accessible and certain to permit the efficient conduct of his transactions. The notion
lacked the essential requirements to be considered as a legal phenomenon, namely certainty and
predictability,  so that it has frequently been labelled as a “mere sociological phenomenon”, “trip
into legal weightlessness”, “disguise for the marketing of own solutions”30.
Lex  mercatoria supporters  in  turn  criticised  anti-mercatorists  views,  by  arguing  that  they  all
stemmed from an old-fashioned, posistivist mentality, according to which all law is derived from
the will of the sovereign state31. In contrast to this idea, mercatorists maintained that the binding
force  of  lex mercatoria did not depend on the fact  that  it  was made and promulgated  by state
authorities,  but  that  it  was  de facto recognised  as an autonomous legal  system by the business
28
  K. Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, Tulane Law Review ,1989, 63, p. 613
29Cfr F. Galgano, Diritto Civile e Commerciale, vol. I, CEDAM, 1993, pp. 89-90. 
30
 All these expressions are reported by K.P. Berger, The Creeping Codification, cit. p. 32
31Cfr e.g. F. K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, Va. J Trans. L, 1995, 28, p. 498 
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community and state  authorities32.  Moreover,  they argued that  also national  legal  systems were
incomplete and required gap-filling. Every decision based on law bears a certain degree of openness
and unpredictability. As such, lex mercatoria was much in line with the national legal systems33. On
the other hand, with time and application these principles could become more refined, complete and
better defined34. Hence, the temporary incompleteness of  lex mercatoria could not be taken as an
argument against its status as law and its applicability in international trade.  
Why do we need a lex mercatoria?
Despite  all  the  uncertainties  surrounding  this  concept,  in  recent  years  there  has  been  an  ever
increasing application of  lex mercatoria in international arbitration. Moreover, it nowadays enjoys
increasing  recognition  in  the  academic  literature.  As  de  Ly  has  put  it,  <<the  most  important
development in the 1990s is that the debate is to a certain extent not reduced to a religion with
believers  and  non-believers,  but  that  the  debate  acknowledges  somewhat  more  that  the  lex
mercatoria is  here  to stay as  a fact  of  life  and that  question is  more about the conditions and
circumstances under which it should be applied>>35.
Parties often refer to lex mercatoria or analogous expressions as the law governing their transaction,
and, even in the absence of an explicit or implicit reference,  a growing number of international
disputes has been and is being decided according to this notion.
Why do parties often opt for  lex mercatoria? The most common explanation is that they want to
avoid the  inadequacy of  national  legal  systems,  or  rules  which  are  unfit  for  their  international
transaction. Furthermore, they want to plead and argue on an equal footing, so that nobody has the
advantage of having a case pleaded and decided by his own law and nobody has the handicap of
seeing it governed by foreign law36. In order to overcome the uncertainties and inadequacies caused
by the application of domestic laws to international transactions,  a large number of scholars and
business  practitioners  have  called  for  the  elaboration  of  a  system of  neutral  rules,  not  directly
derived  from  any  national  body  of  substantive  law,  and  specifically  tailored  to  the  needs  of
international trade.  The concept of lex mercatoria represents an answer to these claims. Despite the
remarkable  differences  in  terms  of  definition,  sources  and  contents,  all  the  theories  on  lex
32O. Lando, The Lex Mercatoria and International Commercial Arbitration,  ICLQ, 1985, 34, 4, p. 752
33A. Lowenfeld,  Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View, in T. Carbonneau (Ed.), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, Juris
Publishing, 1990, p. 41
34K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration, Kluwer, 1993, p. 554
35
 F. de Ly, Uniform Commercial Law and International Self-Regulation, cit,  p. 570 
36
  K. Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, Tulane Law Review ,1989, 63,  p. 615
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mercatoria stem from a common desire: the desire to elaborate a uniform body of rules applicable
to international transactions and able to overcome the uncertainties and unpredictable effects caused
by the application of domestic rules, which are frequently inadequate to solve the manifold legal
problems  of  international  commercial  law37.  As  we will  see  in  the  following  paragraphs,   the
arguments in favor of the adoption and development of lex mercatoria in international trade overlap
with those supporting harmonisation of international trade law38.
The most important problem with lex mercatoria today is not related to its existence or definition as
“law”. Rather, it is whether parties may select lex mercatoria as the applicable law of the contract,
thus excluding the relevant national laws and especially the mandatory rules thereof39. A related
question is  whether  the judge may select  and interpret  lex mercatoria as  an independent,  non-
national body of rules with its own criteria of ascertainment and interpretation40. The choice of lex
mercatoria as the applicable law will be ineffective in those jurisdictions whose conflict of laws
rules  require  the  selection  of  a  national  legal  system.  This  is  for  example  the  situation  in  the
member states of the European Union, where choice of law in contract matters is regulated by the
Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, which expressly provides for the
selection of a national law41. Under this regime, the choice of lex mercatoria amounts to contractual
incorporation:  these  rules  will  enjoy  contractual  status  only  and  therefore  will  be  subject  to
domestic mandatory rules of the applicable national law42. In the field of international commercial
arbitration the situation is different. Generally speaking, arbitral laws provide arbitral tribunals with
wider powers than national courts. In particular, arbitral tribunals are less constrained in their use of
legal sources and enjoy a greater freedom in determining the applicable law in the absence of party
37K.P. Berger, The Creeping Codification, cit., p. 7
38
 See infra pp. 94 ff
39On this point see in more detail infra pp. 361ff.
40R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials,.cit, p. 24
41On July, 4 2008 the so-called Rome I Regulation has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This  Regulation,  which  supersedes  the  previous  regime  under  the  1980  Rome  convention  will  apply to  contracts
concluded after 17 december 2009. During the drafting process the question whether selection as the applicable law of
non-national rules should be permitted was raised but has encountered strong criticism. The final text has attempted to
reach a middle-ground position on this very controversial issue. On the one hand, the provision envisaged in the draft,
which  allowed  parties  to  choose as  the applicable  law the  principles  and  rules  of  the  substantive  law of  contract
recognised internationally or in the Community has been eliminated. This provision would not have authorised the
parties to choose non-national rules as such, but only those non-national rules enjoying a wide international recognition.
In practice, as it had been expressly stated in the travaux, this provision had been designed in order to allow parties to
apply to their contract the PECL or the UNIDROIT Principles. But on the other hand, the possibility for the parties to
select non-national rules remains, albeit not as the sole applicable law of the contract: the 13th recital provides that the
Regulation does not prevent parties from incorporating into their contract a non-state body of law or an international
convention. This means that non-state rules may be selected by the parties only within the framework of an applicable
national law and only in so far as they do not contravene the latter’ s mandatory provisions. Cfr O. Lando and P. A.
Nielsen,  The Rome I  Proposal,  JPIL,  2007,  3,  1,  p.  30-34;  R.  Goode,  H.  Kronke,  E.  McKendrick,  Transnational
Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, cit, p. 27
42R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, .cit, p. 27
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choice43. In the wake of this laissez faire approach to the regulation of arbitration, a number of legal
systems allow arbitrators to apply non-national rules, where so empowered by the parties. In this
cases, the arbitral tribunal may apply lex mercatoria as an autonomous system with no reference to
the mandatory provisions of the relevant national law. Nonetheless, it is still bound to the lex arbitri
rules of public policy44.
The concept of international unification of the law: unification v harmonisation
The notion of international unification of the law encompasses all the attempts aimed at overcoming
the differences  among a plurality  of  national  legal  systems through the elaboration  of  a  single
system of rules which is due to replace the existing national laws in the regulation of a given subject
matter.45
 This process is clearly different from the national unification of the law. The latter consists in an
internal unification aimed at overcoming the differences among the various local laws within the
realm of a single state. National unification is a typical 19th century phenomenon related to the idea
of codification.  Unlike the 19th century unification,  whose aim was to impose the authority of
national law as far as the national boundaries extended by the means of codification, the 20th and
21st century unification is  directed towards  a  contrary purpose:  reducing the impact of  national
boundaries46. 
 At present, the term unification of the law is most frequently used in an international context47, with
particular  reference to  the field on international  trade law.  This is  the  branch  of  law in which
unification is more urgently necessary and more easily attainable48. 
 Comparative lawyers tend to distinguish the term “unification” from the term “harmonisation”. The
former refers to the process whereby two or more different legal provisions or systems are replaced
with a single provision or a single body of norms49. The latter refers to the process of making the
43
 R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, cit, p. 27
44
 On this point see in more detail infra pp. 319 ff.
45
 M.J. Bonell, Unificazione Internazionale del Diritto, Enciclopedia del Diritto, Giuffrè, 1992, p. 720
46
 R.  Goode,  Reflections  on the harmonisation of  commercial  law,  in  R.  Goode & G.  Cranston,  Commercial  and
Consumer Law, Clarendon Press, 1993,  p.1 
47
 H. Kotz, Unification and Harmonization of Laws, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, North-Holland, 2000, p.
1013
48
 R.  David,  The  Legal  Systems  of  the  World:  Their  Comparison  and  Unification,  International  Encyclopedia  of
Comparative Law, vol II, ch 5, 1971, p. 45
49
  W.J. Kamba, Comparative Law: a Theoretical Framework, ICLQ, 1974, 23, p. 501
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legal rules of two or more legal systems more alike50, or, in a more articulated way, the process
whereby the effects of a type of transaction in one legal system are brought as close as possible to
the effects of similar transactions under the laws of other countries51.
 Whatever the definition,  the term harmonisation denotes a process implying a lesser degree of
convergence among legal systems: unlike unification, which aims at replacing various legal systems
with one single discipline so that the same problem receives the same solution in every country52,
harmonisation  aims  at  minimising  the  differences  among  the  laws  of  individual  nations.
Accordingly, the harmonisation process does not replace domestic systems, but renders the various
national laws of the world more similar to one another. Harmonisation presupposes and preserves
the diversity of the various legal systems to be harmonised. 53
 However, when the practical results produced by these allegedly different approaches in terms of
degree of uniformity are looked at, it is difficult two draw a line between them. An international
convention allegedly aimed at the unification of the law may provide contracting states with such a
wide  range  of  exemption  clauses  that  the  text  which  is  ultimately introduced  into  the  various
national systems ends in fact being affected by sensible differences. On the other hand, a model law
(which is in theory aimed at the harmonisation of the law) may, on account of its inherent value, be
spontaneously adopted by a number of states without any modifications.54 
 In more recent times comparatists have attemped to provide a more accurate definition of the term
“unification”, by introducing the distinction between uniformity in rules (or textual uniformity) and
uniformity in outcomes (or applied uniformity)55.  The drafting of uniform rules  does not always
create uniformity of outcome, that is uniformity in the application and interpretation of common
rules. This is because legal rules operate in a very particular social and political setting56: unless
there is a shared meaning and a common set of values, unification is unlikely to lead to uniformity
50
 M. Bogdan Comparative Law, Kluwer, 1994, p. 30
51
  J. Goldring, ., Unification and Harmonization of the Rules of Law,  Federal Law Review,1978, 9, p.289
52
 ibidem
53
 M. Boodman, The Myth of Harmonisation of Laws, Am J Comp L, 1991, 39, p. 699
54
 M.J. Bonell, Unificazione Internazionale del Diritto, cit., pp. 720-721
55
 C.  Baasch Andersen,  Defining Uniform Law,  ULR,  2007,  1,  p.  7.  The author  also  distinguishes  the concept  of
uniformity  from  those  of   “convergence”  and  “diffusion”.  Convergence  is  a  very  broad  term,  encompassing  all
processes by which legal systems become similar, regardless of the way in which this similarity is attained (whether
voluntarly or not). Diffusion is the process of legal convergence brought about by the influence of a legal system on
another, but not based on a deliberate aim and a shared instrument which is supposed to create similar effects or results.
By contrast,  unification is convergence resulting from specific  shared instruments  which deliberately aim to  create
similar  effects.  As  far  as  the  concept  of  “harmonisation”  is  concerned,  the  author  recognises  the  difficulty  of
distinguishing it from the term “uniformity”, since in the literature these two terms have been often used with a certain
arbitrariness.  Nonetheless,  she  considers  uniformity  as  a  sub-category  of  harmonisation  in  the  sense  that  those
harmonised  laws  which  reach  a  high  degree  of  similarity  in  the  effect  they produce  on their  respective  scope  of
application could be considered uniform.  
56
  A. Rosett,  Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commercial Law,
Am J Comp L, 40, 1992,  p. 687
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of  results57.  Accordingly,  some  authors  argue  that  the  proper  unification  process  should  be
considered only that which is able to bridge the gap between uniform rules and uniform results. On
this reading, unification is defined as  “the intentional substitution of two or more jurisdictions by a
single, international-based, body of norms, which is interpreted and applied uniformly so that, in
any dispute, the same solutions are achieved”58 This complex definition is based on three elements:
(i)  the  creation  of  a  single  law  or  text;  (ii)  the  uniform  application  of  the  given  law,  and
consequently  (iii)  the  production of  uniform results.  By contrast,  uniformity of  result  does  not
belong to the concept of harmonisation59. Harmonisation tolerates diversity among individual laws
to  be  harmonised,  not  only in  terms  of  rules  but  also  in  terms  of  different  interpretation  and
application  of  the  harmonising  measure.  So,  variable  results  are  entirely  compatible  with  the
process sought to be created. Whereas harmonisation is a flexible concept, requiring a degree of
similarity in the substantive law and its interpretation and application, unification is an absolute one,
requiring that the substantive law of states be made the same and that it be interpreted and applied
in a uniform manner in order to achieve uniform results.
The focus on uniformity of results poses an important problem of meaning. What is to be meant by
uniformity?  In  the common language, this term is related to something which is unchanging or
identical and which produces always the same result everywhere. But if we adopt this definition in
the legal realm, unification risks to become an ideal concept, <<something to be desired, rather than
achieved>>60.  Totally identical  legal  application with no variation whatsoever  is  an absurdity61.
There will always be differences in the application of the law, even within the same country or
jurisdiction, let alone the global context. Different courts of the same country may take different
views of the law; it is also extremely doubtful whether the same judge on different days, in different
moods and hearing slightly different arguments from counsel, will reach the same result in applying
the law62.  Accordingly,  it is necessary to soften the term and understand it as something which
creates similarity. On this reading, a uniform text is a text which  produces similar effects or results
in  its  application  and  interpretation.  The  degree  of  similarity  will  vary  from  instrument  to
57
 A. Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commercial Law, cit.,
p. 688
58P.J. Osborne, Unification or Harmonisation: A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods 1980, LLM Disseration, University of Hull,  2006, available at http: //www.cisg.law.
pace.edu /cisg/ biblio/ osborne.html (July 2009)
59P. Glenn,  Unification of Law, Harmonization of Law and Private International Law, in Liber Memorialis François
Laurent, 1989, p.783  quoted in M. Boodman, The Myth of Harmonisation of Laws, cit, p. 706
60A.L. Diamond, Conventions and Their Revision, in Liber Amicorum J.G. Sauveplanne, Kluwer, 1984, p. 45
61C. Baasch Andersen, Defining Uniform Law, cit, p. 7
62
 Ibidem
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instrument depending on a number of factors  such as the scope (national,  regional,  global),  its
object, the goals it is aimed at, the characteristics of the drafting body.63
A slightly different approach is that founded on the distinction between unification of rules and
unification of concepts. This approach starts from the premise that in many cases national laws
diverge not so much in terms of results or rules,  but  in terms of explanations,  that is  concepts
elaborated to explain common rules or results64.  What divides legal  systems most deeply is not
diversity of the rules which they comprise, but rather the concepts on which they rely, the methods
which  their  lawyers  use  and  the  standards  of  conduct  to  which  they  refer65.  Accordingly,  the
purpose  of  unification  is  neither  exclusively  nor  essentially  that  of  unifying  the  rules  of  law.
Unification must lead to a common understanding about the significance of certain concepts, on
certain modes of rule formulation and on the recognition of authoritative sources66.
 These two approaches may appear at first sight different, if not opposite, in the different value they
assign to the unification of results. But in truth they both stem from a common concern: unifying
the rules is merely one step of a larger process67. Unification of rules is useless if not supported by a
doctrinal work which, by elaborating a uniform terminology and uniform concepts, makes common
rules understandable by lawyers of all nations68 . This common concern is related to one of the most
important issues of the harmonisation process, the problem of uniform interpretation, which will be
dealt with later. 
Why do we need harmonisation of international trade law?
International trade law is the branch of law on which the greatest efforts towards unification are
currently being focussing.  As a general rule, international unification of the law becomes urgent
when  international  relations  occur  frequently  and  national  laws  fail  to  provide  an  appropriate
solution.  The  astonishing  development  of  globalisation69 over  the  past  decades  has  certainly
contributed to render harmonisation of international trade law an absolute necessity which can no
63
 C. Baasch Andersen,  Defining Uniform Law, cit, p, 53. But if uniformity of results means essentially similarity of
results, it is then difficult to distinguish uniformity from harmonisation. As said before, aware of this difficulty,  the
author considers uniformity as a sub-category of harmonisation, implying a high degree of similarity of results.
64
 R. Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, Am J Comp L, 2001, 49, p. 182
65
 R.  David,  Methods of Unification , Am J Comp Law, 1969-69., p. 15
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 Ibidem
67Ibidem
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 R.  David,  Methods of Unification , cit., p. 17
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 On the definition of the term globalisation, see supra pp. 14ff
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longer be overlooked. Globalisation has rendered international transactions more frequent and has
also shown the inadequacy of national laws as a regulatory instrument thereof. The new ease of
communication and transportation has supported the creation of world markets for many kinds of
goods and services. These commercial changes have fostered the convergence of legal practice in
trade transactions.70 Harmonisation of international  trade law has thus  become one of  the most
important challenges globalisation poses to the international lawyer.
   The growing interconnectedness among world markets, by reducing obstacles to the exchange of
goods, capital, and services across national boundaries, has fostered the emergence of an increasing
range of international and transnational transactions covering a great part of the world. This is the
case for example of transactions related to satellites and aircraft that move daily from one country to
another,  or multi national corporations’ industrial production systems which tend to allocate the
various stages of production in various places across the globe regardless of national boundaries,
but only according to the greatest advantages in terms of costs, taxes, and suitable labour71. Despite
the unprecedented development of integrated markets at the global level, international transactions
continue to a large extent to be regulated by domestic laws, which are often ill-suited for the special
needs of international trade72.
 The various national legal systems were conceived to be applied to domestic relationships only.
National  codes  were  modelled  on  internal  relations  and  were  not  enacted  for  the  purpose  of
governing international relations: state legislator is the defender par excellence of national interest
and particularism and cannot be expected to draft a legal system taking into account the particular
features  of  international  trade73.  Accordingly,   there  should  be  different  rules  for  internal  and
international trade, because international transactions have different characteristics from domestic
ones. For instance, distances between parties and the period of time necessary for the conclusion of
the  contract  may  not  be  identical  in  the  internal  and  international  contexts.  But  most  of  all,
international  trade  requires  special  rules  providing against  specific  events,  such  as  the  need  to
obtain a licence to import  or  export  goods or capital,  the effect  of  a  prohibition of imports or
exports,  of  devaluation  of  currency  and  so  on.74 Therefore,  in  view  of  the  special  nature  of
international  legal  relations,  it  is  necessary  to  devise  appropriate  rules  tailored  to  their  special
characteristics.
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 A. Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commercial Law, cit.,
p. 685
71Cfr R. W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press, 1995,  ch 10, pp. 192-193
72M.J. Bonell,  Why an International Restatement?,  in ID, An International  Restatement  of Contracts,  Transnational
Publishers, 1997, p. 9
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 Besides, the coexistence of domestic laws governing international transactions raises a problem of
conflict of laws, i.e. the problem of establishing which of the various legal systems having contacts
with a given transaction will eventually govern it75. The choice of the applicable national law, in the
absence of a specific choice made by the parties, is left to the device of choice- of-law rules, which
generally adopt criteria such as <<the proper law of the transaction>>, or <<the national law with
which the transaction has its closest link>>. Yet, there is no common understanding as what “proper
law” or “closest link” means: consequently, the application of the same conflict-of-laws criterion
may  often  lead  to  different  results  in  terms  of  applicable  law,  according  to  the  interpreter’s
discretion.  This  is  of  course  detrimental  to  the  uniformity  and  predictability  of  the  decision
concerning the applicable law to the transaction76. Not surprisingly, the application of conflict-of-
laws-rules has long since been criticized as a “jump in the dark”.77  What is more, conflict of laws
rules always entail the application of a national law to international transactions, without any regard
to the actual result which the selected law will produce in that case78. Conflict of laws rules require
the interpreter to apply  national law regardless of its content and the specific interests involved in
the international transaction79. The domestic character of these rules stands in sharp contrast to the
international character of the relations which are subject to them80: choice-of-law rules require the
application of the law of a particular nation state not designed for the resolution of international
disputes81.
 Finally, once the applicable national law has been identified, it may well happen that at least one
party to the transaction will be at a disadvantage, since he or she will have to bear a cost which the
party whose national law is applied will not: the cost of dealing with foreign law. This represents a
cost,  because the process  of ascertaining foreign  law is  normally difficult  and time-consuming,
75For the problem of conflict of laws rules in international arbitration see infra pp. 320ff
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especially where the law in question is expressed in an unknown language, let alone where it is also
uncertain, obscure and contradictory82. 
 Given these difficulties, it is no surprise that courts are often very reluctant to apply foreign law. In
many cases courts would have to apply a system which they do not know, is very difficult to find
out and would even seem sometimes contrary to their sense of equity and justice. As a result, when
they are  called  upon to  judge an  international  lawsuit,  courts  frequently  pay lip  service  to  the
application of foreign rules and end up in fact preferring the rules of the forum83.
 In  some  cases,  lawyers  have  tried  to  overcome  these  problems  through  the  elaboration  of
international conventions laying down uniform conflict-of-laws rules. Although this initiative may
to some extent help the interpreter, since he is at least guided by uniform rules in determining which
national law is to be applied, the problem still remains of ascertaining the substantive content of the
applicable national law84: when considering choice-of-law conventions, the interpreter knows which
nation state’s law is to be applied, but not the content of the law and how the case will actually be
resolved.85
 In  sum,  divergences  among  national  laws  applicable  to  international  transactions  represent  a
serious obstacle to the development of an ever more intertwined and globalised economy.  Each
state, relying on the dogma of sovereignty, has so far behaved as though it were in isolation from
the others  and without  realising the differences  between  internal  and international  transactions.
Everything would go much better in international trade, if, instead of applying differing national
laws to international commercial relations, judges in each state had to apply a truly international
law, whose principles would be the same in every country86.
Obstacles to harmonisation
Any  harmonisation  process  is  torn  between  two  contradictory  principles.  On  the  one  hand,
harmonisation serves what is the purpose of law itself, that is to guarantee certainty in relations
among human beings. Each unifying process aims at avoiding that a legal relationship is regulated
in  a  contradictory  way  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  It  also  aims  at  avoiding  the  injustice
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stemming from disparity of treatment and the uncertainties connected with conflicts of laws arising
when a transnational legal relationship is involved87. But on the other hand, law is undoubtedly
rooted in society: it is not independent, nor separated from other social phenomena88. And social
reality is undoubtedly characterised by a high degree of diversity. There are differences not only in
law,  but  also  in  languages  customs,  values  and  knowledge.  These  differences  constitute  the
distinctive features of the world’s cultural heritages.
The obstacles related to a large number of  harmonisation projects can be traced back to the clash
between the two principles of certainty and diversity. On the one hand it is commonly suggested
that harmonisation has the potential of bringing more certainty in international transactions, on the
other hand this alleged certainty risks to jeopardise the value of diversity inherent in every legal
system and culture of the world. That is why uniformity in law has been defined a mixed blessing89:
even if it  is in theory a praiseworthy objective,  the risks it  entails may in practice represent a
serious barrier to its achievement. There are at least four risks in subjecting transactions to a single
set of legal rules. First, a uniform law can increase the impact of inefficient rules in so far as it
replaces the various national laws which may foster a process of regulatory competition. The idea of
diversity is generally connected with that of evolution: the possibility of embarking on more than
one path is  the key to wealth  and quality of  life  in the real  world90.  On this reading,  where a
thousand different laws are in force in hundreds of different countries, there are different models
from which to choose the best solution and also wide possibilities for experimentation, imitation
and transplants among legal systems91. Once a single set of rules has replaced this variety of rules,
the chances for effective innovation are greatly reduced92. Second, in the absence of a supranational
organ capable of ensuring its uniform interpretation, there is always the risk that the uniform law
may  be  interpreted  differently  in  each  state93.  Likewise,  new  uniform  rules  may  bring  more
uncertainty  than  the  national  laws  they  are  meant  to  replace,  since  they  lack  an  adequate
background of case law on which the interpreter may rely.  Uniform law represents an unknown
entity, while national law is more familiar to its addressees, since it has accumulated a considerable
array of case law over the years.  Thirdly, reservation clauses and the different techniques employed
by  states  to  translate  uniform  law  into  domestic  law  may  end  up  significantly  distorting  the
87
 R. Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, cit., p. 179
88
 R. Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, cit, p. 172
89
  S. Walt, Novelty and Risks of Uniform Sales Law, Va J. Int L, 1999, 39, p. 672
90
 R. Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law,  cit, p. 174
91
 R. Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law,  cit, p. 178 
92
 R. Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, cit, p. 180
93
 M.J. Bonell, International Uniform Law in Practice – Or Where the Real Trouble Begins, Am J Comp L., 1990, 38,
4, p. 867
98
uniformity achieved with such effort at the international level94. Lastly, it may often happen that,
once a great amount of energies, time and money has been spent to work out rules which best meet
the practical needs of the time, the uniform law remains dead letter in practice , since those to whom
and for whose benefit it is principally directed (i.e. the businessmen) take no notice of it or, when it
is brought to their attention, do everything to escape its application.95 This is partly due to the lack
of  involvement  of  business  circles  in  the  harmonisation  process,  partly  to  the  business  class’
inherent conservatorism and partly to the bad drafting of uniform rules96. Practice has shown that,
generally  speaking,  the  more  or  less  favourable  impact  of  uniform law on  the  business  world
depends on the extent to which the latter participates in the preparation of the particular uniform law
in  question.97 But  business  circles  involvement  may  not  always  be  an  easy  task.  Where  the
harmonisation project concerns a specific sector of the law such as transport law, the interested
parties (carriers, insurers or bankers) have their own national or international representative bodies
and so it is easy to get them involved. But where the instrument is concerned with a more general
area of the law, such as the sale of goods, it is difficult to identify a related professional category
(anyone in trade can be at the same time “buyer” and “seller” of goods), let alone a representative
organisation98. In these cases, all becomes more difficult, if not impossible and the flaws related to
the lack of involvement of business parties appear insurmontable. But the principal difficulty in the
adoption  of  new uniform rules  rests  undoubtedly  in  the  strength  of  inertia  and  routine99.  It  is
traditional to point out lawyer and businessmen’s traditional attitude to the established rules, on
which  they  have  been  trained  and  with  which  they  are  familiar.  They  view  all  reforms  with
suspicion,  seeing  primarly  the  troubles  it  will  cause  rather  than  the  beneficial  effects100 .  In
particular,  they  are  reluctant  to  adopt  new  rules,  because  this  entails  constant  updating  and
adaptation to legal  texts drafted in a style and  with a terminology often unfamiliar and whose
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practical effects are not yet clear101. It follows that a badly drafted text, whose provision are unclear
and  give  rise  to  frequent  interpretation  disputes,  will  have  almost  no chance  to  be adopted  in
practice. Legal operators may bear the sacrifice of habits, only if they are convinced that the new
rules  will  provide for  a  better  solution102.  The success  of a  harmonisation measure  is  therefore
connected to its promotion: it is of crucial importance to emphasise the practical advantages of the
new uniform law as against the old national law, in order to win the business circles’ traditional
skepticism103. 
The problem of interpretation of uniform law
Interpretation  of  uniform  law  is  the  phase  of  the  harmonisation  process  in  which  the  above-
mentioned  contrast between the principle of certainty and that of diversity is most evident. On the
one hand, the mere adoption of a uniform legal text represents only a middle-ground step along the
path leading to unification of the law in a given field.104 It is only when a uniform law is widely and
uniformly applied and interpreted that the main objective of the harmonisation process is ultimately
achieved, i.e. providing certainty in a given area of the law at the international level. On the other
hand, certainty is severely undermined by the lack of internationally uniform rules of interpretation
and  of  institutions  ensuring  uniform  interpretation  at  the  transnational  level.  Accordingly,  in
interpreting uniform legal texts, there is a strong pressure to resort to national rules or methods,
which  vary  from  jurisdiction  to  jurisdiction,  with  the  risk  of  a  creeping  re-nationalisation  of
transnational texts.
The international community has drafted a number of international instruments which attempt to
overcome the problem of divergent interpretations of uniform legal texts. The most important one is
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which in articles 31 and 32 provides general
rules of interpretation representing a codification of customary international law105. In particular,
these articles lay down three essential criteria for the interpretation of international legal texts. The
101
 J. Carver, , Uniform Law and Its Impact on Business Circles: The Experience of the Legal Profession, cit., p. 411
102
 R. David, The Legal Systems of the World: Their Comparison and Unification, op.cit, p. 24
103
 On the issue of promotion of harmonisation instruments, see infra pp. 130ff
104Z. Yuqing, Principles of interpretation of a uniform law and functions of travaux preparatoires, commentaries and
case collections for the interpretation of a uniform law, in UNCITRAL(ed), Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-
First Century, United Nations Publication, 1995, p. 41
105Cfr I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International law, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 624
100
first  is  literal  interpretation:  a  treaty  shall  be  interpreted  in  good faith  in  accordance  with  the
ordinary meaning of the words used in the text and also with reference to the whole context of the
treaty.  The second is teleological interpretation: interpretation of the words should be consistent
with the treaty’s  object and purpose,  both the general  purpose of the treaty as a whole and the
specific  purposes  of  the individual  provisions  to be applied106.  The application of  this criterion
entails the important consequence that, since the general purpose of any treaty is to promote the
unification of law, courts should give preference to the interpretation which has been or is most
likely to be applied by the greatest number of countries, even if this interpretation is in contrast with
national or local criteria.107 The third is constituted by the supplementary means of interpretation,
that  is  recourse  to  the  travaux  preparatoires and  the  circumstances  in  which  the  treaty  was
concluded. Recourse to this means of interpretation is possible only in the exceptional cases where
interpretation according to ordinary means would lead to ambiguous, obscure or manifestly absurd
results. It may also be used to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of the ordinary
criteria.  Notwithstanding the unanimous recognition of the Vienna Convention’s customary status,
national  courts  have  not  always  been  consistent  with  its  interpretative  framework.108If  judges
adopting an internationalist approach apply the Vienna Convention in order to promote uniformity,
judges  following  the  opposite  nationalist  approach  subordinate  its  international  character  to
prevailing national  preferences109.  Moreover,  there is no agreement on the Vienna Convention’s
scope of application. In  particular, it  is not clear whether its interpretation provisions should be
applied also  to  international  instruments  dealing with private  law.  Technically,  as  a  “treaty  on
treaties”, its provisions should be applied only to international treaties regulating relations among
states, but some authors have implied from its status of customary law the possibility of applying it
also to the interpretation of private law conventions110. In any case,  the most recent instruments
concerning the private domain have provided specific interpretation rules drafted on the pattern of
those envisaged by the Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The  most  important  example  is  represented  by  another  Vienna  Convention,  the  1980  Vienna
Convention  on  the  International  Sale  of  Goods  (CISG),  which  in  article  7  provides  a  set  of
important principles and methods for interpreting uniform laws in the filed of  private law. These
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principles may be considered as a development of the general principles provided in the Convention
on the Law of Treaties. Paragraph 1 of article 7 states the principle of autonomous interpretation: in
interpreting  the  convention  the  courts  must  have  due  regard  to  its  international  character.  The
convention should not be regarded as a piece of domestic legislation and consequently its articles
and concepts should not be interpreted by reference to the corresponding meaning in the domestic
legislation  of  any  country  or  legal  system111.  The  convention’s  terms  and  concepts  are  to  be
interpreted  in  the  context  of  the  convention  itself  and  with  reference  to  the  convention’s  own
objectives.112 On this  reading,  the  principle  of  autonomous  interpretation  overlaps  with  that  of
teleological interpretation  laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The second
principle envisaged by paragraph 1 of article 7 is the principle of uniformity: in the interpretation of
the CISG one must have regard to the need to promote uniformity in its application. Uniformity and
international  character  are  closely  related:  uniformity  is  achieved  when,  in  interpreting  the
Convention, one  has due regard to the international character of its provisions113; by contrast, “un-
autonomous” or “domestically tainted” interpretation leads to the re-nationalisation of international
uniform rules114. It follows that in order to achieve uniformity courts of different countries should
reciprocally take into account their decisions on uniform law. Foreign court decisions may have a
persuasive effect in finding the proper solution to an open interpretative question and accordingly
enhance uniform interpretation115. Paragraph 1 of article 7 also states the principle of interpretation
according to good faith: <<in the interpretation of this Convention regard is to be had to the need to
promote the observance of good faith in international trade>>. There is still much debate as to the
scope and content of this provision, which is one of the most controversial of the whole treaty.
Some  argue  that  good  faith  is  nothing  more  than  an  additional  criterion  to  be  used  in  the
interpretation of the convention. On this reading, good faith is a harmless expression116,  <consigned
to the ghetto of article 7 in which it has found an honourable burial117>>. Others argue that good
faith constitutes a general principle and therefore should necessarily be directed to the parties to
each individual contract of sales118. On this reading the principle should be construed in light of the
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Convention’s manifold references to the standard of reasonableness119 and the special conditions
and  requirements  of  international  trade120.  Paragraph  2  of  art  7  CISG  provides  an  important
principle  to  be  applied  in  case  of  gap-filling:  questions  concerning  matters  governed  by  the
Convention, but which are not expressly regulated by it, are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which the Convention is based.  National law may be applied only as a last
resort, i.e. where no solution can be found either by analogical interpretation of specific provisions
of  the  Convention  or  by  the  application  of   the  general  principles  underlying  it121.  Also  the
interpretation  according  to  general  principles  is  a  specification  of  the  principle  of  autonomous
interpretation:  where  the  Convention  has  left  some  gaps,  interpretation  according  to  general
principles aims at avoiding that the gap is filled by resorting to domestic law and encourages courts
to  find  a  solution  within  the  Convention  framework.  The most  important  issue  related  to  this
provision is what should be meant by general principles. In particular, it is disputed whether the so-
called “external principles” may be used in filling the Convention’s gaps. Paragraph 2  of article 7
literally refers to the internal principles, that is the principles on which the Convention is based. But
some authors have argued that also external principles taken from other uniform law instruments
may come to the fore, as long as it is proved these form with the Convention a coherent body of
rules and use the same concepts for similar purposes122. The most important case is represented by
the UNIDROIT Principles,  which have sometimes been used by courts and arbitral  tribunals as
means of interpreting and supplementing the CISG123.  External principles are however applied with
extreme caution, since each concept and rule should generally be understood  in its own context.
Moreover, in case of conflict between external and internal principles, the latter are to be preferred,
because  they  are  based  on  the  system  and  aims  of  the  uniform law in  question.  Nonetheless,
recourse to external principles may be helpful, especially in avoiding recourse to national law.
 Although most commentators agree that the CISG succeeded in bringing uniformity in the law of
international sales124, a number of them have shown concerns on that. In particular, a variety of
sources of non uniformity has been identified. First, the existence of six official language versions
of  the Convention entails  that  there is  no single  uniform text,  but  rather  a  dizzying  variety of
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texts125. Accordingly, the literal meaning of the words comprising the Convention's rules will rarely
be exactly the same in the various languages126: different official language versions of the same
CISG provisions constitute substantially different texts. Second, reservations permitted under the
Convention introduce further significant variations in the text of the CISG in force in contracting
states127. Third, the scope of the Convention is limited and does not cover every legal issue that can
arise in international sales. Consequently, issues falling outside the scope of the Convention must
be regulated by national laws and this inevitably ends up adding non-uniformity to the international
sales regime. Fourth, the treaty provisions on interpretation are in many respects128 so vague that
they often fail to promote uniformity129. Without explicit guidelines as to how to implement such
interpretative principles, national courts have often preferred to follow their  natural tendency to
read the international rules in light of national criteria of interpretation130.
125H. M.  Flechtner,  The  Several  Texts  of  the  CISG  in  a  Decentralized  System:  Observations  on  Translations,
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7 is undoubtedly the principle of good faith: there is no agreement as to what this principle means or in what situation it
is to be applied. It is thus not surprising that  the appropriateness of including such principle in the Convention was
repeatedly questioned by the drafters and eventually it was decided to include it into the treaty << more out of a sense
that  it  could do no harm rather than out  of any conviction it  would do specific good>> (J. .E. Bailey,  Facing the
Truth,cit, p. 296).
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 J. .E. Bailey, Facing the Truth, cit, p. 276
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 J. Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales , Kluwer, 1989, p. 1. The Delchi case
(Delchi Carrier SPA v Rotorex Corp 71 F.3d 1024 2d Cir 1995) in US case law constitutes an excellent example of the
“homeward trend” followed by national courts in interpreting CISG provisions. In the  Delchi  case, the court argued
that, since there was no case law referring to the Convention in the United States, it would look to its language and the
general principles on which it is based. The rationale followed by the court in this statement is precisely contrary to that
intended by the drafters of the CISG, since article 7 (1) requires to examine all CISG case law without restriction to any
one nation’s court. Moreover, the court stated that  analogous provisions of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial code
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The combination of  these elements  has turned out  to  be,  according to some,  a  severe  obstacle
preventing uniformity in both interpretation and application of the CISG131. According to others, it
is a signal that uniformity in the context of the CISG must not be meant in absolute terms, in the
sense  of  promoting  identical  results  everywhere,  but  in  a  more  flexible  way,  in  the  sense  of
promoting similarity of results132, accommodating the extraordinarily diverse types and conditions
of international sales transactions and excluding those interpretations which are not tailored to the
needs of international trade133.
Apart from uniform rules, a measure which is frequently invoked by scholars in order to achieve
uniform interpretation in the private law domain is the establishment of an international tribunal
with the task of interpreting a number of uniform law instruments. This is perceived as the most
effective  remedy against  the re-nationalisation of  uniform law.  In  the  absence  of  a  centralised
judging authority, the various national courts tend to provide their own interpretation of the uniform
text, with the risk that its uniformity diminishes and the laborious effort to reach agreement on its
content  goes  thus in vain.134 Already in 1911 the establishment  of  an international  tribunal  for
private matters was proposed, which would deal, inter alia, with disputes on appeal from national
courts relating to private claims based on international treaties. The idea was raised again in 1920,
in relation to the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the predecessor of
the International Court of Justice. It was suggested that the Court should be given jurisdiction with
regard to conflicts between private persons relating to the interpretation of conventions concerning
private international law, as well as conventions concerning industrial property,  commercial law
and maritime law. After the Second World War similar proposals were made with respect to the
establishment of a tribunal which would provide uniform interpretation of private transport  law
conventions135. More recently, in 1985 UNCITRAL prepared a study136 in which it mentioned the
possibility fot the UNCITRAL Commission of expressing its opinion on the proper interpretation of
UNCITRAL uniform texts in case of  conflict  between  decisions  of  national  courts and arbitral
tribunals;  responding  to  questions  referred  by  a  national  court  or  arbitral  tribunal  on  the
may also inform a court where the language of the relevant CISG provisions track that of the UCC. This argument
constitutes  a  blatant  breach of the  interpretation according  to  the  international  character  of  the  convention,  which
imposes to resort to national law only after interpretation of the Convention’s specific provisions and of its general
principles has led to no results.
131J. .E. Bailey, Facing the Truth, .cit, p. 276
132
 C. Baasch Andersen, Defining Uniform Law, cit., p. 23
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 H. M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System, .cit, p. 200.
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 L.B.  Sohn,  Uniform Laws  require  uniform  interpretation:  proposals  for  an  international  tribunal  to  interpret
uniform legal texts, in UNCITRAL, Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-First Century, cit,  p. 51
135
 The 1956 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road  provided  the possibility of
having the International Court of Justice rule on disputes between contracting states on the interpretation or application
of the convention. Yet, this remedy was resorted to only once in fifty years of the convention’s history. 
136A/CN.9/267 Dissemination of decisions concerning UNCITRAL legal texts and uniform interpretation of such texts:
note by the Secretariat
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interpretation  of  UNCITRAL  texts;  replying  to  abstract  questions  of  interpretation  by  private
parties. However, none of these projects went beyond the mere stage of proposal. This is mainly
due  to  the  fact  that  the  establishment  of  an  international  tribunal  dealing  with  international
commercial law disputes is perceived by governments as an intolerable loss of sovereignty: states
are not prepared to treat disputes between private parties at the level of states disputes137. 
Given the impossibility of establishing a supranational jurisdictional authority to ensure uniform
interpretation  of  uniform  law,  some  authors  have  proposed  the  development  of  a
“jurisconsultorium”, i.e. a system allowing the sharing of scholarly and case-law-based sources of
legal understanding and interpretation of uniform law138.  Not only does this proposal entail a wider
circulation of case-law and doctrinal works across jurisdictions, but also and more importantly a
profound shift  in legal  thinking and teaching.  It  is  necessary to accustom jurists  and especially
students to the existence of a uniform law of a global reach, which is different from national law. As
Goode has put it, <<it is necessary for law schools to reduce their preoccupation with national law
and their assumption of its superiority over other legal systems and to revert at least in some degree
to the internationalism of medieval law teaching>>139. It is essential for a uniform interpretation of
uniform law to develop  a greater awareness among legal practitioners of the three basic concepts
on which this development is founded: 1) law-making is not only a prerogative of the state; 2)
uniform law has an autonomous character, i.e. it must be free from any influences (case law or legal
theory) which are purely domestic140 and must develop its own interpretation criteria; 3) uniform
law has a shared character,  i.e. domestic courts must interpret uniform law  not merely as a part of
their own law, but also as a text that is shared by an international community, so that the results to
which its interpretation leads must be acceptable to all who take part in its application141. If we share
uniform laws, we need also to share the way we use them if they are supposed to reach similar
results142. 
137R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, cit, p. 721
138C. Baasch Andersen, Defining Uniform Law, cit., p. 6
139R. Goode, Reflections on the Harmonisation of Commercial Law, cit, p. 24
140
 C. Baasch Andersen,  The Uniform International Sales Law and the Global Jurisconsultorium, Journal of law and
Commerce, 2005, 24, p. 170 available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/andersen3.html (July 2009).
141A.H. Kastley,  Unification and Community: a Rethorical analysis of the United Nations Convention, Northwestern
Journal of International Law and Business, 1988, 8, p. 602 
142
 C. Baasch Andersen, Defining Uniform Law, cit, p. 49
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The unification of international trade law
Legislative means of harmonisation
It is precisely to overcome the uncertainties and inadequacies caused by the application of domestic
laws to international transactions that a large number of scholars and business pratictioners have
claimed  the emergence of a new system of uniform,  or at  least  harmonised rules,  specifically
tailored to the needs of international trade. But opinions are still divergent on the way this very
broad objective may be reached.
 Paradoxically, the movement for the international unification of the law did not develop until the
second half of the 19th century, when national codifications reached their apex in Europe. At that
time, the dominant belief of legal positivism implied that the sovereign state was the only possible
source of law and the law was considered as essentially national in character and bound to the idea
of  the  nation  state.  Consequently,  the  success  of  the  codification  processes  constituted  both  a
catalyst  and  a  model  for  the  international  unification  of  the  law.   The  early  enthusiasts  of
international unification believed that it could be possible to unify the law of the whole world, and 
 that unification would be brought about solely by way of legislation emanating from the states,
from regional group of states, or even from a world political organisation143. On this reading, many
advocated a body of uniform legislation – a sort of global commercial code144 – which states should
agree upon at the international level and introduce into their domestic legal systems145. Accordingly,
143
 H. Kotz, Unification and Harmonization of Laws, cit, 
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 In the 60s René  David  presented  a  proposal  for  a  Code Modèle de Base,  a  collection of  general  principles  of
commercial law to be drafted in the form of an international convention with a direct binding effect upon all ratifying
states. This project would not undermine state sovereignty because, always according to David’s ideas, by ratifying this
convention,  states  would  voluntarily  transfer  their  law-making  power  for  international  commercial  matters  to  the
international organisation in charge of drafting the Code Modèle; besides, his proposal envisaged a number of “opting-
out provisions” allowing domestic legislatures the right of declaring restrictions, modifications and rejections of certain
principles  of  the  convention.  Cfr  R.  David,  Le  Droit  du  Commerce  International:  Une  Nouvelle  Tache  pour  les
Legislateurs Nationaux ou une Nouvelle Lex Mercatoria? In UNIDROIT,  New directions in international trade law :
Acts and proceedings of the 2nd. Congress on private law : Rome, 9-15 september 1976 / held by the International
Institute for Unification of private law Unidroit. - New York : Oceana : Dobbs Ferry, 1977, pp. 5 ff; K.P. Berger, The
Creeping Codification, cit, p. 135-136.
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 Cfr  M.J.  Bonell,  Do We Need a Global Commercial  Code?,   106 Dickinson Law Review,  2001, p. 87 << The
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) first launched the idea of preparing a code of
international trade law. In 1970, the Secretariat of UNIDROIT submitted a note to the newly established United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in justification of such an initiative and indicated some of the
salient features of the project. What was proposed was a veritable code in the continental sense. The proposed code
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this global code should have entailed a cleavage within each national system: on the one hand,
nationally  drafted  laws  and  codes  applicable  to  domestic  transactions,  on  the  other  hand  the
internationally drafted global code, applicable exclusively to international transactions.
 This  utopian  view  of  unification146 was  conceivable  only  within  the  context  of  the  late  19th
century’s international society, dominated by a small number of developed countries which were
experiencing the passage from a rural to an industrial and mass-production based economy. 
In this context, divergences among national legal systems appeared as an obstacle to  the further
development of international relations; on the other hand, the relatively small number and size of
these relations led many to believe that legislative unification of the main aspects of international
law was indeed the best solution to serve the new needs of the international society. At its inception,
the goal of the unification movement was the standardisation of legislation by means of uniform
codes or statutes, which would be adopted and applied by sovereign states147
The most important results were achieved in the field of international trade, because international
trade  transactions  were  the  kind  of  relations  more  urgently  in  need  of  some  sort  of  uniform
discipline . 
  The most successful attempt towards the unification of international trade law through legislative
means  is  unanimously  considered  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  International  Sales  of  Goods
(CISG). This international treaty, which entered into force in 1980, is the result of some fifty years’
work, started back in the early 1930’s. The CISG is a convention of substantive uniform law: it
provides  uniform  rules  related  to  the  main  aspects  of  one  of  the  most  important  contracts  in
international trade: the sale of goods. When contracting parties reside in CISG contracting states,
national  courts  and international  arbitrators  need no longer  choose among the various  rules  on
sale148. Nonetheless, the Convention does not preclude all conflicts of laws related to international
sale, since its scope is restricted only to a particular type of contract of sale149 (the sale of goods);
besides, it does not cover all the issues involved in the contract of sale, important aspects thereof150
falling outwith its sphere of application.  
included two parts: part one dealing with the law of obligations generally,  and part two relating to specific kinds of
commercial transactions>>
146
 The utopian character of the idea of a codification of international trade law is well exemplified by the failure of
UNIDROIT’s far-reaching, initial plans of “a progressive codification of the law of international trade” (see infra pp.
324 ff.). This project was soon diluted to the drafting of general principles for international contract law without direct
binding effect.  This  shift  in  the  drafting  approach  is  doubtlessly  due  to  the  general  weakening  of  the  unification
euphoria of that time. K.P. Berger , the Creeping Codification, cit, p. 138.
147
 M. Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws,  Am J Comp L, 39, 1991, p. 707-708
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 J. Lookosfsky,  Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales.  Problems in the Harmonisation of Private Law
Rules, Am J Comp Law, 39, 1991, p. 404
149<<Thus, some categories of sale – among which are also transactions of considerable importance in international
trade practice, such as sales of shares and other securities, of negotiable instruments and money, of ships and aircraft –
are expressely excluded from its scope>> M.J. Bonell,  The UNIDROIT Principles and CISG, in ID, An International
Restatement of Contracts, cit., ch 4, p. 63-64. 
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 This is why, by the time the CISG reached completion, it  was recognised that many problems
affecting international trade were left unsolved.
In particular, the CISG has raised skepticism  about the possibility of collecting in a fully-inclusive
and coherent legal text all the rules related to international trade law. As the CISG’s limited scope
shows,   unification  by means  of  international  conventions  has  turned  out  to  be  a  fragmentary
process,  providing  uniform  rules  only  for  certain  types  of  transactions  (e.g.  agency,  leasing,
factoring, contracts) or certain aspects related to particular types of transactions (e.g. the liability
regime  in  the  carriage  of  goods  contract).  Since  international  conventions  are  essentially
fragmentary in  nature and none constitutes an overall  codification  of  a whole  area  of  the law,
reference  to  a  supplementary national  legal  system and to  the  choice  of  law device  cannot  be
completely excluded.151 Besides,  too often has the lengthy and cumbersome process  of drafting
international conventions ended up in a Sisyphean labour: many conventions have remained a dead
letter  due  to  the  lack  of  required  ratifications152 or  have  been  eschewed  by  the  major  trading
states153.  Finally,  international  conventions  have  shown a limited  capacity  for  adaptation  to  the
needs  of  international  trade.  In  the  context  of  globalised   markets,  characterised  by rapid  and
continuous changes, the need to revise the law arises continuously and therefore the lengthy and
cumbersome process of emendation of international conventions slows the necessary reforms to an
unacceptable extent. In the context of global trade, characterised by hectic and rapid changes, any
legal instrument which does not build a process for prompt adaptation becomes part of the problem,
rather than part of the solution.154
 In conclusion, unification of trade law through international conventions has in many cases led to
the  contradictory  result  of  enhancing  divergences,  rather  than  producing  convergence  among
national laws.
A first attempt to mitigate the flaws connected with legislative unification of international trade law
is represented by the elaboration of model laws155. In this case, the uniform rules are drafted by a
group of state representatives or expert lawyers, but are only recommended to state goverments for
150
 For example, as art 4(a) of the CISG expressely states, the Convention has no bearing on validity issues, which must
be solved by local law 
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 J. Basedow, Germany Report, in M.J. Bonell (Ed.) A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts,  Kluwer
Law, 1999, p. 126
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 See for example the case of the 1980 Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods and the 1983
Geneva Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, neither of which has to date been ratified by a
sufficient number of states to enter into force
153This is the case for example of the 1974 Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods
which entered into force only in 1988 among no more than 12 States.
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 A. Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commercial Law, cit,
p. 688
155
 One of the most sucessful model law is the 1985 UNCITRAL Model law on International Commercial arbitration.
On this point see infra pp. 164ff.
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adoption.156 Model  laws have  no  binding force  and  their  introduction into the  various  national
systems is left entirely to the discretion of states.157 The advantage of this method is that it may be
easier to reach an agreement on the rules. Moreover,  as it  is for the authorities in each state to
decide if and to what extent they will give effect to the model law, its adoption may appear more
attractive to them158. On the other hand, the model law quite often runs the risk of having only a
theoretical value, because states are entirely free to disregard it and may always, even if  they adopt
it, modify it. This obviously undermines the uniformity the model law is aimed at159. Despite these
drawbacks,  a  model  law  has  the  advantage  of  fostering  some  degree  of  uniformity  without
compromising state sovereignty160. Yet, if one looks at international practice, the difference between
these two techniques of unification may appear slight. In many cases, it may well happen that a
number of reservation clauses are included into a treaty, in an attempt to facilitate ratification or
accession, under which states are entitled to declare that the uniform rules shall apply only in part or
under certain circumstances161. As a consequence, the obligations imposed on states by such a treaty
are  limited  and,  on  the  other  hand,  generous  provision  is  generally  made  for  termination  or
withdrawal162. What is more, the supposed uniform law text is frequently subject to considerable
distortions, on account of the different methods employed to translate the treaty into the various
domestic legal systems. Accordingly, it cannot always be considered identical to the text which is
applied by the judges in their respective countries. For all these reasons, the difference between an
international convention and a model law is often subtle.
Non-legislative means of harmonisation
156H.  Kotz, Unification and Harmonization of Laws,  cit., p. 1015; R. David The Legal Systems of the World: Their
Comparison and Unification,.cit, p.  78
157M.J. Bonell, International Uniform Law in Practice, cit., p. 865
158H.  Kotz, Unification and Harmonization of Laws, cit, 
159
 The  international  organisation  which  has  drafted  the  model  law may  adopt  some  measures  in  order  to  ensure
uniformity in the adoption of the text by the states.  This is the case for example of the UNCITRAL Model law on
International Commercial Arbitration where the text prepared by UNCITRAL has then been adopted by the UN General
Assembly, following its submission for consideration by all Members of the United Nations. Accordingly, when the
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 In  more recent years  an increasing number of voices have been raised in favour of a different
approach  to  international  trade  law.  A  diminished  confidence  in  the  almighty  power  of  state
legislators,  on the one hand,  and an increased awareness of  the need of involving the business
community in the process  of harmonisation on the other has  led to the idea that  unification of
international  trade  law  may  well  be  achieved  also  by  non-legislative  techniques163.  This  has
intensified  the  phenomenon  of  privatisation  of  law-making:  international  commerce  has
increasingly  developed its own uniform rules of international commercial law164.
 Business people, faced with the inadequacies of national laws in meeting the needs of international
trade, have more and more drafted their own rules to regulate their business relations in a more
satisfactory manner.  They have created  a new uniform international  law,  in  order  to  avoid the
various outdated national rules applicable to international transactions165. This has led to a sectoral
harmonisation through a wide set of standard contract terms, general conditions and model contracts
adopted by professional groups and international business associations on the basis of current trade
practices and related to specific types of transactions166. Today, these standard rules have become so
widespread and so well-known that they can often be looked at as the restatement of the customs of
a particular trade sector.167 They have become so developed and detailed that they in fact constitute
codes as  complete as  the national  ones.  Often they will  even appear  more complete and more
precise than  national codes, since they are focused on individual, specialised transactions168.
Despite their crucial  importance in international  trade,  they are nonetheless affected by a major
flaw. Although these instruments may be a suitable means of regulation for transactions between
members of the same business community, in all the other cases they may appear a biased and one-
sided instrument of regulation of international  trade,  since they clearly reflect  the interests of a
particular trade sector169. They are often drafted by associations of a national character and therefore
they may appear to favour the trade interests of the nation of origin. Besides, even when they are
drafted by an international  association, they may nevertheless reflect  the interest  of a particular
163
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164K.P. Berger,  The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, cit,  p. 27
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business group170. This may lead to a sort of “battle of the forms” in international disputes, in which
each party claims to rely on his own standard contract terms.
In  order  to overcome this situation of a fragmented  harmonisation through the development of
sectoral  international commercial  customs, some independent organisations took the initiative to
elaborate harmonisation tools  more balanced in content and truly international in form, i.e. drafted
in such a way as to be capable of being understood in a substantially uniform manner whoever
adopts them171 . These instruments are commonly referred to as “soft law”: they are non-binding
sets of rules drafted by international organisations and business constituencies based on existing
practices which parties can incorporate into their contracts172. For example, in 1933 the International
Chamber of Commerce published for the first  time the Uniform Rules and Customs relating to
Documentary  Credits173 and  have  been  adopted  by  the  banking  associations  of  more  than  150
countries; in 1935  the ICC published the Incoterms174, containing rules for the interpretation of the
most commonly used trade terms. In more recent times, not only have private organisations such as
the ICC been involved in this initiative, but also the United Nations and its specialised agencies,
such as UNCITRAL (established in 1966 which in 1985 adopted the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration175), UNCTAD and the International Maritime Organization (established in
1959 which has adopted important instruments in the field of international maritime security such
as the 1998 the International Safety Management Code applicable to particular types of ships like
passenger ships, oil and chemical tankers, bulk carriers, and gas carriers).
 As a consequence of the privatisation of law-making, the harmonisation and creation of the law no
longer lies within the monopoly of state sovereignty.  Instead, it occurs in a number of informal,
non-legislative methods176. 
 The activity of international arbitral  tribunals selected by the parties for the settlement of their
international  disputes  keeps  the  application  and  evolution  of  international  trade  law out  of  the
courts,  and  thereby  beyond  the  reach  of  domestic  laws.  A flourishing  number  of  international
organisations function as formulating agencies and draft  code-like sets of rules for international
170For  example  the  standard  terms  drafted  by  the  International  Publishers  Association  are  likely  to  prefer  the
publishers’interests  to  those  of  the  authors,  the  terms  drafted  by  the  International  Shipowners  Association  the
shipownrers’ interests to the shippers’ and so on.
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as “formulating agencies”, that is those agencies or organisations of national, regional, or international character which
are entrusted, delegated or merely involved in the formulation of trade policy or rules for the conduct of international
commercial transnactions  (L. Mistelis, Is Harmonisation a Necessary Evil? cit, p. 18)
172S.Vogenaurer,  Introduction,  in  S.  Vogenauer  and  J.  Kleinheitsterkamp  (eds),  Commentary  on  the  UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009,  p. 4.
173
 The latest version has been published in 1993; a new edition has been published in 2006
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175See infra pp. 164ff.
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commerce.  Individual  projects  of  comparative  law conducted  by  the  academic  community  are
heading towards the same end and quite often constitute the theoretical background for these sets of
rules. Last but not least, businessmen active in international trade constantly create their own law
through the drafting, use and refinement of general conditions of trade, standard contracts, as well
as the development of international practices and usages. In short, the creation and unification of the
law is being increasingly privatised.177 The notion of privatised unification and creation of the law
undermines the traditonal  positivist concept of law as an exclusive product of state sovereignty,
enacted  and  sanctioned  through  the  traditional  means  of  state  control.  New  enforcement
mechanisms  different  from those  of  the  state  judiciary  are  becoming increasingly  important  in
international trade. Compliance with this new source of law is ensured through a range of “self-
supervision  instruments”178:  arbitral  tribunals,  “black  lists”,  withdrawal  of  trade
associations’member rights and other mechanisms touching upon the commercial reputation of the
parties.  They constitute  informal social  sanctions whose common denominator is  the danger  of
losing good standing within the community of merchants. This threat is felt as a strong enough
incentive to  lead to the adherence to the self-made law of international business.179
The UNIDROIT Principles
 Following the proliferation of conventions, uniform laws, standard terms, collection of usages,
which are all  limited in scope and fragmentary in character, the need is felt for a body of general
principles and concepts to which to have recourse for the interpretation and coordination of the
single uniform law instruments180.
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  Since the early 90s, an innovative instrument is assuming growing importance in the context of
international trade law, which may provide a general framework of reference for a more coherent
harmonisation: the UNIDROIT Principles181. 
 The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC)  have been drafted by
UNIDROIT  (Institut International pour l’Unification du Droit), a UN Institute whose main purpose
is to prepare harmonised uniform rules of private law applicable between the States and groups of
states of the world182. The UNIDROIT Principles are a collection of non-national principles which
are  common  to  the  existing  legal  systems  and/or  best  adapted  to  the  special  requirements  of
international commercial contracts. Published for the first time in 1994 (a second revised edition
has been published in 2004), their scope is limited to international commercial contracts (the so-
called  B2B  transactions),  i.e.  international  contracts  between  entrerpreneurs  and  thus  are  not
applicable to transactions between consumers and between enterpreneurs and consumers.
 The UNIDROIT Principles do not fit into any of the traditional categories of legal instruments
which have up to now been conceived at international level. They are not simple standard contract
terms, nor are they drafted in the form of an international treaty: they do not have any binding force
and will be applied in practice by reason of their persuasive value only183. 
They have been drafted on the model of the American Restatements, so that they may be considered
a Restatement on Contracts at global  level.  The Restatement is  an instrument  of harmonisation
typical of the American legal system,  created in order to overcome the uncertainty and complexity
caused  by  the  presence  of  different  states  each  costituting  an  independent  source  of  law.
Technically, it consists of a collection of rules coming from the various state systems represented in
a systematic fashion184; however, its purpose is not only that of re-stating in a more coherent manner
the existing law, but also that of promoting those changes in the various state systems, which may
produce further simplification and adaptation to the needs of society.
 Although originated  in  two different  contexts,  both the PICC and the American  Restatements
appear directed towards the same main objective: overcoming the uncertainties and complexities
caused by the existence of different domestic laws applicable to cross-border transactions. Like the
Amercan  Restatements,  the  PICC represent  a  mixture  of  both  tradition  and  innovation:  in  the
absence of a common solution, provisions  have been drafted according to a “best rule” approach.
The UNIDROIT Principles present an even more creative character than the American Restatement
181On the UNIDROIT Principles see in more detail infra pp. 324ff.
182On UNIDROIT see in more detail infra pp. 145ff
183
 M J Bonell,  General Report,  in M.J. Bonell (ed), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts: The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts, Kluwer, 1999, p. 3
184R. Hyland,  The American Experience: Restatements, the UCC, Uniform Laws and Transnational Coordination,  in
A.S. Hartkamp and E.H. Hondius (eds), Towards a European Civil Code, Kluwer, 2004, p. 59.
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on Contracts: unlike the American legal system, the context in which the PICC are supposed to
operate presents remarkable differences among the national laws on many legal issues; in addition
there  is  no  common  legal  background  and  conceptual  framework  among  the  various  national
lawyers. Consequently, often have the UNIDROIT Principles’ drafters been faced with the problem
of choosing between conflicting solutions  over  the same issue.  And the choice  has  been made
according to what seemed the best solution responding to the special requirements of international
trade185.  
 The PICC represent a mixture of  tradition and innovation:  while reflecting solutions found in
many, if not all, legal systems, they also – especially when irreconcilable differences between the
various domestic laws rendered a choice inevitable – embody what in the light of the special needs
of international trade are perceived to be the best solutions, even if these solutions still represent a
minority view.
Two are the most important features which make them a very innovative instrument in the context
of harmonisation of international trade law. 
The first is their soft law character. Although phrased as abstract rules of law, the Principles have
not been drafted as a convention or model law to be transformed into national law. They constitute a
source of soft law, that is to say contract principles  without a direct binding force, the acceptance
and application of which is exclusively dependent on its persuasive power and the authority of
UNIDROIT. 
The second feature is their neutrality.  The Principles  are detached from any national legal context
and  do not  reflect the rules and principles of any single national legal order. This implies  a more
balanced content: in applying them to international disputes, judges and arbitrators will find it easier
to avoid resorting to rules belonging to this or that domestic law and to adopt an autonomous and
internationally uniform solution. Moreover, parties, when deciding which law should govern the
contract, will no longer be faced with the necessity of either choosing a particular national law,
which inevitably will be unknown or less familiar to at least one of them, or referring to not better
defined international trade usages and customs or to the enigmatic lex mercatoria.
The UNIDROIT Principles’ greatest advantage with respect  to international  conventions is their
flexibility,  that is  to say their ability to serve different  purposes.  This renders  them particularly
suited to overcome the difficulties currently encountered in international trade law. As stated in the
185Cfr also UNIDROIT,  Principles of International  Commercial  Contracts  with  Official  Commentary,  Introduction,
1994, p. viii  <<For the most  part the UNIDROIT Principles reflect concepts to be found in many,  if not all, legal
systems.  Since however the Principles are intended to provide a system of rules especially tailored to the needs of
international commercial transactions, they also embody what are perceived to be the best solutions, even if still not yet
generally adopted>>.
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Preamble, the UNIDROIT Principles may be used in five different contexts: 1) as rules applicable
to the contract, when the parties have expressely agreed that their contract shall be governed by
them; 2) as rules applicable to the contract, when the parties have indirectly referred to them by
stating that the contract shall be governed by the general principles of law, the lex mercatoria, the
principles of natural justice, and other similar expressions. The main reason why the parties may
choose the UNIDROIT Principles (or at least a system of non-national, neutral rules) as the  lex
contractus is  the frequent  difficulty  to  agree  on a national  law governing the contract.  During
negotiations each party often tends to impose his or her national law to the contract and is reluctant
to accept the other’s party law. Accordingly,  when no one has sufficient  bargaining power,  the
parties may sometimes end up referring to a neutral  system of rules  such as  lex mercatoria or
general principles of law;  3) as rules applicable to the contract when the parties – neither directly or
indirectly – have made reference to them in the contract, but it proves impossible to establish the
applicable national law186;  4)   as means of interpretation or integration of existing international
instruments, in order to overcome the major weakness connected to international conventions: the
risk that, once incorporated into the various domestic legal systems, they end up being interpreted
according to national criteria with the result that different national judges will interpret identical
rules  differently.  In  this  context,  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  provide  a  collection  of  common
guidelines for an autonomous and internationally accepted method of interpretation and integration
of uniform law instruments; 5) as a model for national and international legislators: both national
and international laws are often inadequate to meet the needs of international trade and therefore the
UNIDROIT Principles, in so far as they represent generally accepted standards at the international
level,  may  constitute  a  useful  tool  to  interpret  and  amend  national  and  international  laws  in
accordance with the the requirements of international trade187.
But it  is especially in the context of international  arbitration that the UNIDROIT Principles are
expected to have more practical applications188. Unlike state courts, who are generally bound by
their  national  legal  systems  to  apply  exclusively  national  laws  to  international  disputes,
international arbitrators enjoy a wider discretion in the choice of the applicable system of rules: in
the absence  of  a specific  choice made by the parties,  they are  generally enabled to decide the
186This may happen, for example, when the national law which is potentially applicable according to conflict of laws
rules is that of a remote country whose legal sources are of a rudimentary character or extremely difficult to access; but
in most cases this occurs when conflict of laws rules identify a plurality of national laws all potentially applicable to the
contract  and they provide contradictory solutions  to relevant  points of the dispute.  See F. Marella,  La Nuova Lex
Mercatoria, in Trattato di Diritto Commerciale e di Diritto Pubblico dell’Economia, 2003, p. 158  
187
 This has for example already happened in the case of the new Dutch Civil Dode (entered into force in 1992) , the
revision of the German law of obligations (entered into force in 2002) and especially thr Civil Code of the Russian
Federation (Parts I and II entered into force in 1995 and 1996 respectively), with specific provisions directly inspired by
them. See M.J. Bonell,  An International Restatement of Contracts, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 235-236 
188See infra pp. 360ff.
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dispute  according  to  the  rules  of  law  they  deem  appropriate189;  and  the  term  rules  of  law is
commonly interpreted as allowing the arbitrator to adopt rules which do not belong to a national
legal system, but are transnational in character. 
Hard and soft law in the legalization literature
With respect  to the subject-matter  of harmonisation of international  trade law,  the literature on
legalization190  provides an important contribution to the discussion on the comparative advantages
and disadvantages of hard and soft law191. It must nonetheless be noted that the concepts of hard and
soft  law  in  the  legalization  literature  quite  differ  from  those  commonly  adopted  by  lawyers.
Whereas the latter usually mean by hard law a set of legal rules bestowed with coercive sanction
and by soft law a set of non-legal rules of mere persuasive nature, in the legalization literature these
two terms have less defined borders: a set of rules which is highly legalized in all three dimensions
(obligation, precision, delegation) constitutes “hard law”; below this full level of legalization, there
are continuous gradations of hardness and softness, in which the distinction between hard and soft
law tends to blur. For example, we can have a set of rules characterized by a moderate level of legal
obligation coupled with high precision, but very limited delegation; or by a very high level of legal
obligation,  but  very  low  precision  and  very  limited  delegation192.   This  discussion  aims  at
challenging the common view that soft law is a “failure”, a device which may destabilize the whole
international normative system and turn it into an instrument that can no longer serve its purpose193.
In  contrast,  it  is  argued  that  international  actors  often  deliberately  choose  softer  forms  of
legalization as superior institutional arrangements,  offering many of the advantages of hard law,
avoiding some of the costs of hard law and having some advantages of their own  194. 
The  most  important  advantage  of  hard  law  is  that  it  greatly  increases  the  credibility  of  state
commitments  and   accordingly  cooperation  among them195:  precise  obligations  drafted  in  legal
terms prevent opportunistic interpretations based on self-interest, since non-complying states must
189Cfr art 1496 of the French Code of Civil Procedure; art 1054(2) of  the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure; art 182 of the
Swiss Law on Private International Law; art 17 (1) International Chamber of Commerce Regulations, art 22.3 London
Court of International Arbitration Arbitration Rules. 
190
 See supra pp. 69 ff
191K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, Hard and Soft law in International Governance,. IO, 2000, 54, 3, pp. 421-456 
192
 K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 424
193P. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, Am J. Intl L. 1983, 77, p. 423
194K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 423
195K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 426-430
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justify their behaviour by relying on legal  arguments  and not solely on their own interests and
preferences.  Moreover,  non-compliance  with  a  hard  legal  norm has  a  sort  of  spillover  effect,
because  the reputational  effect  of  the violation can be generalised  to all  agreements  subject  to
international law.  On the other hand, the most serious disadvantage of hard law is that it entails
higher contracting costs196: States generally pay greater attention to negotiating and drafting legally
binding agreements, since the costs of violation are higher; in addition, international cooperation
through hard law is frequently hampered by the often lengthy and complex ratification processes.
Another  disadvantage  is  that  hard law, being based on negotiated  consensus,  tends to reflect  a
narrow  and  often  lowest  common  denominator  not  necessarily  responsive  to  complex  global
challenges like environmental protection and labour market regulation. Moreover, states can either
be parties or non-parties to a hard legal regime: such rigidity does not favour regime development,
let  alone success,  because  it  excludes  a  priori  those states  which are  financially  or  technically
unable to comply and those which disagree with the obligations197.  Yet, hard law reduces the post-
agreement  costs  of  applying  and  enforcing  commitments,  as  well  as  of  further  negotiations198:
precisely  drafted  rules  can  be  better  interpreted  and  applied  to  specific  situations;  moreover,
proposal  for  amendments  or  new norms should be compatible  with settled  rules  and  the basic
principles  of  the  relevant  regime,  so  that  bargains  need  not  be  completely reopened  and legal
coherence is maintained . By contrast, a major advantage of soft law is its lower contracting costs199:
since one or more elements of legalization can be relaxed, soft law is often easier to achieve than
hard law. A device very frequently used to lower the obligation dimension is the escape clause, i.e.
a clause authorising non-compliance, should certain circumstances occur: for example, most arms
control  agreements  include  the  clause  whereby  each  party  shall,  in  exercising  its  national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the agreement if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
In other agreements, the contents of legal obligations are phrased in very general terms and their
specification is  left  to non-binding instruments,  such as recommendations issued by specialized
agencies.  This  the  case  for  example  of  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty,  in  which  many
sensitive  issues  such  as  the  protection  of  nuclear  materials  are  predominantly  regulated  by
recommendations from the International Atomic Energy Agency. These devices, although relaxing
the legally binding force of international commitments, may ignite a process of social learning: over
196K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 434
197W. H.  Reinecke  and   J.  M.  Witte,  Interdependence,  Globalization  and  Sovereignty:  The  Role  of  Non-Binding
International Legal Accords, in D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: the Role of Non-Binding Norms in the
International Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2000., p. 88.
198K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 430
199K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., pp. 434-436
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the  time,  non-binding  declarations  can  shape  the  practices  of  states  and  their  expectations  of
appropriate  conduct,  leading  to  the  emergence  of  customary  law  or  the  adoption  of  harder
agreements. Accordingly, one may suppose that softer forms of legalization will be more attractive
to states  as  contracting costs  increase,  as  in  the  case  of  a  large  number  of  actors  involved  in
negotiations, or particularly sensitive issues with potentially strong distributional effects200. Soft law
offers also a number of  advantages not available under hard legalization. First, to the extent that it
permits weaker forms of delegation, it is a very effective method of limitation  of sovereign costs,
coupling legal obligations with inter-state implementation mechanisms201. For example, in the field
of  international money-laundering regime, the OECD Financial Action Task Force issues policy
recommendations and guidelines, administers a system of peer review and can even impose mild
sanctions. Secondly, soft law provides more effective ways to deal with the uncertainty related to
many international issue-areas, by giving rise to processes allowing parties to learn about the impact
of rules over time and preventing them from being locked into agreements they regret, in case such
rules turn out to have hidden costs or unforeseen contingencies202.  Hortatory or precise  but not
legally  binding  rules  provide  general  standards  against  which  behaviour  can  be  assessed  and
support  learning  processes  which  reduce  uncertainty  over  time.  By  the  same  token,  moderate
delegation  involving  political  and  administrative  bodies  where  states  retain  significant  control,
allows the collection of information and expertise and thus reduces uncertainty. Thirdly, soft law
can  be  quickly  amended  or  replaced  if  it  fails  to  meet  its  purposes:  this  flexibility  may  be
particularly appropriate  in  fast  changing and technology driven  contexts,  or  where an effective
regulatory response is not yet clearly identified, due to scientific uncertainty or other causes, but
there is  an urgent requirement  to take some action203  In  such cases,  soft  law instruments  may
provide an experimental response to new challenges as they continually arise204. Fourthly, soft law
facilitates compromise among actors with different interests and values and different degrees of
power205.  Negotiating a  hard  and  highly elaborated  agreement  among heterogeneous  states  is  a
costly and lengthy process; by contrast, soft law allows states to adapt their commitments to their
particular situations, rather than trying to accommodate divergent national characteristics within a
single text. Moreover, soft law provides for flexibility in implementation, helping states to deal with
200K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 436
201K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., pp. 436-440
202K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., pp. 441-444
203D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, in ID (ed), Commitment and Compliance, cit., p. 13; W. H.
Reinecke and  J. M. Witte,  Interdependence, Globalization and Sovereignty: The Role of Non-Binding International
Legal Accords, cit., p. 95
204M. E. O' Connell, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance, cit., p.
110.
205K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., pp. 444-447
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the  domestic  political  and  economic  consequences  of  an  agreement  and  thus  increasing  the
efficiency with which it is carried out. Fifthly, soft law accommodates states with different degrees
of readiness for legalization206: those whose institutions and resources allow them to comply with
hard  commitments  can  enter  agreements  of  that  kind;  those  whose  weaknesses  in  these  areas
prevent  them from complying  with hard agreements  may opt for  softer  forms of  commitments
through reservation clauses or exceptional regimes for a transitory period. Many treaties envisage
such special provisions for developing countries, transitional economies, and other categories of
states. Such arrangements are often preferable to either a softer agreement among all parties or a
harder agreement with limited membership: over time, if the soft arrangements are successful and
without  adverse  consequences,  the  initially  reluctant  states  may  accept  harder  legalization.
Accordingly,  soft  law may be employed  when there are concerns  about the possibility of non-
compliance, e. g. because of domestic political opposition, lack of ability or capacity to comply,
uncertainty about whether non- compliance may be ascertained or sanctioned, or disagreement with
some aspects of the proposed regime. In soft law arrangements inability to comply is not a critical
barrier to entry: soft law instruments may be intended to induce states to participate or pressure non-
consenting  states  to  conform,  thus  avoiding  the  in-or  out  mechanism  of  most  legally  binding
agreements207.   Finally,  soft  law  allows  non-state  actors  a  role  that  is  possible  only  rarely  in
traditional law-making processes: it is open to transnational private actors which cannot normally
participate in the drafting, implementation and enforcement of hard law, because for the most part
they are not regognised as legitimate actors of the international system208. The advantages of soft
law do not come without cost: flexibility of soft law makes it harder to ascertain whether a state is
complying with its  commitments and therefore create  opportunities to  free riding.  Accordingly,
states  face  a  tradeoff  between  the  advantages  of  flexibility  and  the  disadvantages  in  ensuring
performance209.
Interactions between hard and soft law
206K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 445
207D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, in ID (ed), Commitment and Compliance, cit. p. 12; W. H.
Reinecke and  J. M. Witte,  Interdependence, Globalization and Sovereignty: The Role of Non-Binding International
Legal Accords, cit., p. 95
208D.  Shelton, Law,  Non-Law  and  the  Problem  of   Soft-Law,  cit.,  p.  13;  W.  H.  Reinecke  and   J.  M.  Witte,
Interdependence, Globalization and Sovereignty: The Role of Non-Binding International Legal Accords, cit., p. 95
209K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 446
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The  legalization  paradigm  shows  how  blurry  the  boundaries  between  hard  and  soft  law  are.
Examples of full legalization, where all the three dimensions are present at the highest level, are
rare: more common are those arrangements in which at least one dimension is relaxed. For example,
treaties with imprecise or indeterminate provisions have been termed “legal soft law” in that they
merge legal form with soft obligations; the International Court of Justice has recognised that legally
binding obligations among states may be created through oral agreements,  unilateral statements,
minutes  of  a  meeting,  exchange  of  letters210;  reservations  and  interpretative  declarations  are
instruments on which states may rely in order to deny or limit legal obligations stemming from hard
law commitments;  treaties  frequently envisage private  dispute resolution processes (negotiation,
mediation,  conciliation,  arbitration)  instead  of  adjudicatory  mechanisms.  Accordingly,   the
widespread inclusion of soft law commitments in hard law instruments shows that it is not always
clear where law ends and non-law begins, or, in other terms, where soft law should be placed211. By
contrast, some soft law instruments may have a specific normative content that is “harder” than the
soft commitments in treaties; moreover, they frequently envisage supervisory and implementation
mechanisms  traditionally  found  in  hard  law  texts:  this  is  the  case  for  instance  of  the  above-
mentioned Agenda 21212, which, although laying down non-binding rules, envisaged an ad hoc body
(the  Commission  on  Sustainable  Development)  to  supervise  implementation.  The  distinction
between hard and soft law is becoming ever more difficult to draw, mainly because it is rare to find
soft  law standing  in  isolation;  rather,  it  is  most  frequently  used  either  as  a  precursor  or  as  a
supplement to a hard law instrument213. 
Soft law can be used to fill gaps in hard law instruments or supplement hard law with new norms.
International  environmental  law-making provides numerous examples of conventions generating
“secondary” or “delegated” soft law, i.e. the statements and practices which develop under a treaty
to  supplement  or  correct  its  text:  a  framework  convention  is  combined  with  a  series  of
accompanying non-binding instruments (such as conference resolutions, administrative agreements,
memoranda of understanding) specifying the details  of the convention's  provisions or providing
guidance to their interpretation and application214. 
210Cp Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994, ICJ Rep. 6, in which the International Court of Justice upheld the binding character of the
signed minutes of a meeting
211D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, cit.,  p. 8
212
 See supra p. 71
213D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, cit., p. 10.
214See e.g.  The 1992 Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (YBIEL, 1992,
2, p. 819) which provides a framework for non-compliance procedure the details of which have been specified by the
internal practices and decisions of the Implementation Committee envisaged by the Protocol itself.
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In other instances, a given set of rules is first formulated in a non-binding form with the possibility,
or even aspiration, of hardening the provisions of an existing treaty, developing into a subsequent
treaty, or becoming a catalyst for the establishment of customary international law215. For example,
the 1996 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR) contained very
weak obligations, had no monitoring committee and no compliance mechanism; however, a number
of external factors, such as greater political and scholarly attention to economic and social rights,
NGOs  activity,  practice  of  similar  bodies,  notably  the  Human  Rights  Committee,  led  to  the
establishment in 1986 by ECOSOC of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to
which states where required to report. In turn, the Committee has strengthened the provisions of the
Covenant  through its General  Comments,  which have inter alia suggested steps to take against
states failing to comply with their reporting obligations: accordingly, the combined impact of these
measures has been to raise the level of obligation under the Covenant far beyond that originally
envisaged.  Likewise,  the  use  in  international  trade  of  pesticides  and  chemicals  was  for  years
regulated  through  non-binding  instruments  developed  by  the  FAO  and  the  United  Nations
Envirornment Programme, but in September 1998 ninety-five States adopted a treaty with binding
obligations  to  regulate  this  trade216.  Moreover,  in  recent  years  non-binding  instruments  have
sometimes  provided  the  necessary  statement  of  legal  obligation  (opinio  juris)  to  evidence  the
emergent  custom  and  have  helped  to  establish  the  content  of  the  norm217.  As  stated  by  the
International  Court  of Justice,  although non-binding instruments do not become binding merely
through  repetition,  a  series  of  resolutions  may  show the  gradual  evolution  of  the  opinio  juris
required for the establishment of a new rule218.
Harmonisation as a product and harmonisation as a process
Most legal doctrine has so far dealt with harmonisation only as a product: there is a vast amount of
literature  on  the  products  of  harmonisation,  such  as  commentaries  to  the  various  international
215C. Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, cit., p. 30 and 32.
216Convention  on  the  Prior  Informed  Consent  Procedure  for  Certain  Hazardous  Chemicals  and  pesticides  in
International Trade, ILM 1999, 38, 1.
217D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, cit., p. 1
218ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ILM, 1996, 35, par. 71.
122
conventions,  model  laws and  international  restatements219.  But  little  attention  has  been  paid  to
harmonisation  as  a  process,  that  is  the  working  methods  used  by  the  different  international
organisations engaged in an harmonisation project220. The emphasis on the process of harmonisation
is based on the premise that much of the success of a harmonisation project depends on its planning,
its organisation and the care with which its boundaries are delineated221  . This was not always taken
sufficiently into account in the past, with the result that in many cases, only after the harmonisation
tool was drafted it was discovered that the effort was not really worthwhile: there was not great
demand for it, or even hostility, from the sectors affected222.
In order to avoid this waste of effort, time and money, some authors have analysed and discussed
the  methods  adopted  by  the  harmonising  agencies  for  selecting,  initiating  and  dealing  with  a
particular harmonisation project, with a view to assessing the most significant problems which may
impede progress towards completion, adoption and application of a harmonisation instrument.223
Although methods and approaches  vary from agency to agency,  legal  doctrine has  identified a
number of phases commonly recurring in most harmonisation processes. In each phase it is also
possible to identify a number of related issues and problems.
The preliminary stage
This phase has the purpose of exploring the feasibility of an harmonisation project.
219
 For the 1980   Convention on the  International  Sale  of Goods see e.g.  P. Schlechtriem and I.  Schwenzer  (eds),
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford University Press, 2005; for the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration see e.g.  H. N.. Holtzmann and  J. E. Neuhaus,  A
Guide to  the Uncitral  Model  Law on International  Commercial  Arbitration:  Legislative History  and Commentary,
Kluwer law, 1995; for the UNIDROIT Principles see e.g. M.J. Bonell (ed),  An International Restatement of Contract
Law: The Unidroit Principles Of International Commercial Contracts, Transnational Publisher, 2005.
220On  the  distinction  between  harmonisation  as  a  product  and  harmonisation  as  a  process  see  F.  Cafaggi,  Una
governance per il diritto europeo dei contatti?, in Id (ed.), Quale armonizzazione per il diritto europeo dei contratti?
CEDAM, 2003, pp. 183- 211 
221R.  Goode,  H.  Kronke,  E.  McKendrick,  Transnational  Commercial  Law:  Text,  Cases  and  Materials,  Oxford
University Press, 2007 p. 215
222R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick,  Transnational Commercial Law ,   cit, p. 217. In the field of international
commercial arbitration the best-known example is the  European Convention  Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration
which was signed in 1961 in Geneva and was conceived mainly as an instrument laying down uniform rules for the
promotion of arbitration in East-West disputes.  Yet,  on account  of the complexity of its  provisions,  most of which
concerned only with  the resolution of largely theoretical problems,  this  convention has found scarce application in
practice.  Another  example,  always  in  the  context  of  the  harmonisation of  arbitration laws  in  Europe,  is  the  1966
Strasbourg European Convention, which, although aimed at establishing a uniform arbitration law for both international
and domestic arbitrations, has never entered into force: it was signed only by Austria and Belgium and ratified only by
the  latter.  Cfr  A.  Redfern  and  M. Hunter,  Law and  Practice  of  International  Commercial  Arbitration,  Sweet  and
Maxwell,  1991, p. 64 and P. Fouchard, E. Gaillard, B. Goldman,  Traite’ de l’Arbitrage Commercial International,
Litec, 1996, pp. 157-163 
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In the preliminary or exploratory phase the most important issue is the selection of the subject, that
is the area or the particular institution of the law to be harmonised.
The idea for a harmonisation project  usually emerges in a paper discussed at a conference or in an
article published in a journal, which draws the academic community's attention. This was the case
for example of Schmitthoff's paper at the 1962 Colloquium on the Sources of Law of International
Trade224, which is commonly considered the first step in the creation of UNCITRAL.  But the idea
may  also  come  from  an  organisation  not  directly  involved  in  harmonisation  projects,  which
communicates it to the secretariat of a relevant agency or from a formulating agency itself. This was
the  case  for  example  of  the  Model  Law  of  International  Commercial  Arbitration  and  of  the
UNIDROIT Principles. In the former case, the first step was taken by UNCITRAL Secretariat in
1978, during a meeting with a number of interested international organisations225; in the latter case
the idea came from the UNIDROIT Governing Council in 1971226. Once the idea has come, in some
way or another, to a formulating agency's  attention, the most important issue is ascertaining the
feasibility of the project.  Nowadays all agencies seek to ascertain whether the problem which the
harmonisation  project  purports  to  address  really  exists,  and,  if  so,  whether  it  is  susceptible  of
solution  by  harmonisation.  Furthermore,  the  preliminary  survey  aims  at  exploring  whether  the
project  is  sufficiently  serious  as  to  justify  the  time,  effort  and  money  which  the  preparation,
conclusion  and  promotion  of  the  project  entail.227 This  is  the  most  important  stage  of  the
harmonisation process:  the lack of an accurate survey on the feasibility of the project has been the
main cause in the past of the failure of many harmonisation attempts228.  The most important flaw
which may affect  the project in this preliminary stage is its over-ambitiousness: several projects
have failed because they sought to achieve too much, especially at the outset229. This was the case of
UNIDROIT's initial idea of a universal code of commercial contracts, to be achieved by means of
an international convention: after a first preliminary report in 1974, this project was set aside for
many years as being too ambitious and was taken up only in 1980, when it was redrafted in a more
feasible fashion.230 
Another big flaw of the initial harmonisation project may be its scarce relation with the business
community interests: the project may tackle problems which the commercial lobbies involved do
224
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226See infra, p. 324.
227R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law , cit , p. 217
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not see at all, or which are not felt to be really serious231. In selecting the topic for a harmonisation
project,  one should take account  of the radicated conservatorism of business  circles,  which are
deeply attached to their national law and usually perceive new rules as a dangerous upheaval of the
status  quo232.  Accordingly,  in  choosing a topic for  harmonisation,  it  is  essential  to ascertain  in
advance how far the interests concerned are prepared to abandon their national rules and to accept
uniformity of law233. Sometimes, even where the problem of the harmonisation of a certain subject
is particulary felt within the business community,  the chances of success depend on an accurate
balance of the interests involved: if the result envisaged is not a win-win situation for all the parties
affected by the harmonisation project, the reluctance of the disadvantaged lobby is likely to be
significant and the chances of sufficiently wide acceptance of the future instrument recede234 
The formulatory stage
Once a valid subject has been identified, the second phase, the formulatory stage235, consists in the
proper elaboration of the harmonisation project. Before embarking in  drafting, two preliminary and
closely connected issues come to the fore:   the selection of the agency and the selection of the
proper harmonisation tool.
Selection of the agency
The question whether the organisation which has taken up the project is the most suitable for the
project  itself is  related to one of the most important problem of the harmonisation process:  the
coordination among the various formulating agencies. The solution to the issue of the selection of
the agency depends on a number of factors,  namely the nature of the instrument envisaged, the
231H. Kronke, International Uniform Commercial Law Conventions, cit, p. 17
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233H.C.  Gutteridge,  Comparative  Law:  An  Introduction  to  the  Comparative Method  of  Legal  Study  &  Research,
Cambridge University Press, 1946, p. 175. Cfr also p. 157 << the citizens of many countries are deeply attached to their
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agreements reached with the other formulating agencies and  the determination of the agency in
charge of the project playing a leading role in that particular sector of harmonisation236. 
The flourishing of formulating agencies whose fields of action tend to overlap is not necessarily a
bad thing, to the extent that this fosters a certain degree of healthy competition. Nonetheless,  a
number of factors should be taken into consideration, in determining the competence of an agency
to deal with a given project. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce is not a law-
making  body  and  therefore  it  is  not  engaged  in  the  preparation  of  legislative  tools,  such  as
international  conventions  or  model  laws.  On  the  other  hand,  since  it  is  the  international  non-
governmental body which best represents the world business class at the international level, it may
have an enormous influence on the development of uniform rules and standard terms which may be
directly  incorporated  by  individual  parties  into  their  contracts.  This  is  indeed  what  happened
through the elaboration by the ICC of such instruments as Incoterms, the Uniform Customs and
Practice of Documentary Credits, the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees. Where competences
between  the  work  of  different  agencies  effectively  overlap,  the  decision  as  which  one  is  best
suitable for the project is a matter of established practice.  An important instance is represented by
the  relationship  between  UNIDROIT  and  UNCITRAL:  the  former  was  set  up  to  promote  the
harmonisation of private law, including commercial law; the latter is devoted to the harmonisation
of international trade law. Accordingly, in the field of international trade law, both organisations
appear suited to carry out a project. What happens in practice is that the secretariats of the two
organisations  work  together  in  order  to  avoid  duplication  of  efforts:  the  decision  as  which
organisation will concretely deal with a given project is taken on a case by case basis.
Not infrequently two or more organisations operate in the same field of harmonisation, but through
different kinds of instruments. Here, coordination among agencies and instruments operating in the
same field of  harmonisation becomes most important.  For  example,  demand guarantees  are  the
subject  of  both  the  ICC's  Uniform Rules  for  Demand  Guarantees  and  the  UN Convention  on
independent  guarantees  and  stand-by  letters  of  credit.  The  Convention  contains  provisions  on
judicial remedies that would be outside the scope of ICC Rules, but both instruments deal with the
rights and duties of the parties. Accordingly, duplication is avoided by the convention's deferment
to  party  autonomy and thus leaving room to the Uniform Rules  drafted  by the ICC.   Another
important example is represented by the relationship between the Model Law and the NYC, but this
point will be dealt with in detail further237.
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Selection of the instrument
The selection of the instrument largely depends on the competences of the organisation undertaking
the project. For instance, since the ICC is not a law-making body,  it can only draft instruments
aimed  at  harmonising  contractual  practice,  in  particular   contractually  adopted  rules,  such  as
standard contract terms, model contracts and contractual guides. The Hague Conference on Private
International Law, which is the specialised body for private international law conventions, will deal
only with this particular instrument.
 But when a formulating agency has at its disposal a wide range of harmonisation tools, as in the
case of UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT, what are the criteria determining the instrument's choice? The
preliminary question is  whether governments will be involved in the project. In  the case of the
UNIDROIT Principles, the view was taken that, since they were meant to be non -binding rules, the
work should be done exclusively by scholars and government should not be involved. Accordingly,
the choice of a legislative instrument such as a convention or a model law was excluded238. Where it
is envisaged that the instrument will be adopted by states, the choice is between a convention and a
model law. Where there is a reasonable expectation that states will accept a common text without
raising too many exceptions or recurring to too many opting out clauses, the convention technique
is preferable, in that it ensures more uniformity. On the other hand, a model law is more suitable,
when it is felt that it will be difficult to agree on a common text and that there will be states which
will claim the possibility to adapt the common text to their specific needs. 
Once the agency and  the  instrument  has  been  selected,  careful  attention should be paid to  the
planning and organisation of the drafting process. This entails a wide range of specific issues. The
issue of a close connection with business interests is at stake also in this stage of the process. Here
the problem is to involve the interested business sectors in the drafting. What frequently happened
in the past – and still does in some formulating agencies – is that business associations were invited
only at the last stage of the process,  once the new instrument's main features had already been
decided by government officials and academic experts. Business associations were considered as
observers or, at best, as  messengers of the new harmonisation tool: they were merely asked to take
it home and to spread the word among their members239. This of course greatly contributed to the
drafting of harmonisation measures perceived as distant by the business community.  Nowadays
238See infra pp. 326ff.
239R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law , op cit, p. 733
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many commentators  stress the importance of involving the business community not only in the
promotion  of  the  harmonisation  tool,  but  also  in  its  elaboration:  it  is  suggested  that  the  most
successful  instruments  are  those  whose  drafting  process  has  taken  in  large  account  business
interests, concerns and experience, especially before embarking on detailed drafting.  Maybe the
most important example in this respect is the latest revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits (the so-called UCP 600) published in 2007 by the International Chamber
of  Commerce.   This  set  of  rules  has  been  defined  as  the  most  successful  act  of  commercial
harmonisation in the history of world trade, being currently observed by banks in approximately
180 countries240. The latest revision process looks very impressive for the wide range of individuals
and  groups  who  gave  their  contribution:  the  UCP  Drafting  Group  examined  more  than  5000
individual comments before arriving at its final proposal; the UCP Consulting Group, consisting of
members from more than 25 countries served as the advisory body241; the more than 400 members
of the ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice made pertinent suggestions for changes
in the text;  and 130 ICC National  Committees  worldwide took an active role in  consolidating
comments from their members. Given the wide variety of the interests taken into consideration, it is
not  surprising that  the  UCP are  frequently  cited  as  the foremost  example of  how international
business self-regulation can be more efficient than treaties, government regulation or case-law242.
A widely debated problem is whether the drafting should be approached by the organisation as a
whole,  or  rather  by a  smaller  committee.  This  issue is  related  to  the problem of  avoiding  the
elaboration of over-ambitious projects which we have seen before. In the past the text was generally
drafted,  discussed  and  formally  adopted  by  a  diplomatic  conference  or  by  the  plenum of  the
organisation  in  charge  of  the  project.  But  this  system  entails  a  number  of  drawbacks,  which
seriously affect the quality of drafting. Setting up a diplomatic conference is very complicated and
costly:  its  meetings  entail  substantial  expenses,  with  participants  from many parts of the world
having to be funded by governments for their travel, accommodation and subsistence costs. Where,
as it is common, there are two or more working languages, the costs of translation and interpretation
have to be covered. In addition, most of its participants are officials heavily engaged in goverment
work,  and  the  time  they  can  devote  to  the  conference  is  limited.   All  these  factors  limit  the
frequency of the meetings, so that often the diplomatic conferences meet no more than once a year
and sometimes less frequently than that. Another important drawback is related to the conference's
240
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membership, which is continuously subject to changes, with the consequence that new members
have to be given the time to catch up with the work already done243.  The final result is that the
diplomatic conference has often very little time to discuss the various issues on the agenda and
accordingly  to  take  ponderate  decisions.  Consequently,  all  the  complex  issues  related  to  the
elaboration  of  a  harmonisation  instrument  must  be  approached  in  a  very  limited  numbers  of
meetings. This is often reflected in bad drafting. In order to overcome these drawbacks, the general
practice  today  is  to  confer  the  power  of  drafting  to  a  restricted  committee  and  only the  final
discussion and approval to the diplomatic conference. This is for example the practice followed for
the elaboration of all UNCITRAL's most recent  legislative instruments: once a restricted working
group has drawn up a draft text, the full Commission takes it over and adopts the final text, which is
subsequently approved by the UN General Assembly or by a diplomatic conference244. It is argued
that  the  quality  of  draft  legal  text  increases   proportionally  to  the  decrease  of  the  number  of
draftsmen  245:  accordingly,  it  is  considered  incomparably  more  efficient   the  work  of  a  small
working group,  whose membership remains constant  for the whole duration of the process  and
which has ample time for studying proposals, redrafting texts and reconsidering issues than that of a
large forum where a large number of participants going over the issue for the first time and where
legal texts must often be redrafted on the spot246.   On  this reading, the process of a large convention
discussing a broad project of many articles and ending in a failure is contrasted to that of a small
working group beginning from a small canvas of a mere few articles and gradually proceeding to a
more elaborated text.247 Experience has shown that the drafting process of an instrument developing
gradually is in the final  analysis  faster and has higher  chances  of success than an initial  grand
design:  this  allows time for  the development  of  a  consensus in  support  of  the project  and the
243R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law ,  cit,  p. 236. Sometimes new members even
challenge issues which have already been settled: this may doubtless turn out useful, since it may show the weakness of
what  previously agreed, but on the other hand it hampers the speedy progression of the work. 
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in the Twenty-First Century, United Nations publication, 1995, p. 15
245W. Vis, Process of preparing universally acceptable uniform legal rules, op. cit., p. 15, quoting R.David
246J. Honnold, Goals of Unification,  in UNCITRAL (ed), Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-First Century, cit.,
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introduction of new ideas and provisions as it unfolds248. 
But this middle-ground solution has not always proved useful in  overcoming the drawbacks related
to the diplomatic conference. The problem always remains that, when it comes to the final text's
approval,  most  of  the  diplomatic  conference's  delegates  have  little  or  no  involvement  in  or
knowledge of the text to be approved, since they did not attend the drafting committee's sessions.
So, when the conference is called to discuss and approve the final text, it is generally necessary to
examine  it  afresh,  article  by  article,  paragraph  by  paragraph:  time  pressures  build  up  as  the
conference proceeds and towards the end there is likely to be a scramble to finish on time. In this
process it is all too easy for errors of one kind or another to  occur and for some of the coherence of
the original draft prepared by the committee to be lost.249  Accordingly, the only way to overcome
or at least reduce the drawbacks related to the diplomatic conference is to pay keen attention to its
planning and management. A good solution may be to appoint a person expert in the field to act as
responsible of the project in charge of the organisation of regular meetings, the elaboration of a
timetable for the project, the preparation of drafts, the invitation to submit, observations, proposals,
and the like.
 The post-adoption stage
This stage has only recently come to the fore, the adoption of the instrument being traditionally
considered as the culmination of the work. Nowadays there is an increasing awareness that a greater
effort is needed to promote the instrument and to secure ratifications and accessions.  Promotion is
necessary   in  order  to  overcome  traditional  sceptisism  against  new  laws.  Lawyers  and
businessmen's traditional conservatorism has been best described by Rene David: <<lawyers and
businessmen are attached to the status quo, to the order of things which they know, and to which
their  behaviour and  their  ways  of  doing things  have been  adapted.  They view all  reform with
suspicion,  seeing  primarily  the  trouble  it  will  cause,  rather  than  its  beneficial  effects  and  the
progress which it is intended to produce. This attitude can be clearly seen when the international
unification of law is considered. Everyone accepts unification provided this means the others falling
into line with his national law>>250. This is why new uniform laws are often rejected by national
lawyers  and  businessmen  as  <<  a  synthetic  compromise  on  the  lowest  common  denominator
248R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law ,  cit , p. 231
249R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law ,  cit , p. 237
250R. David, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol II ch 5, 1972, p. 24-25
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without supporting case law>>251 . Despite the increasing awareness of the importance of promotion
of harmonisation tools , the amount of resources spent for this activity remains inadequate. As has
been noted by the Secretariat of UNCITRAL, given the large amount of money spent in the drafting
of harmonisation tools, it is not understandable why international organisations and their member
states are so reluctant in spending  more for making that text known 252.
What can be done to overcome this conservative routine253? The most  important  antidote is  an
adequate and disseminated information to all the addressees and ultimate users of a given text:
business  circles,  practitioners,  and  especially  judges.  It  goes  without  saying  that  promotion  is
useless if it is not combined with the involvement of the business community during the drafting
stage.  Otherwise, one risks promoting a text perceived as too distant by its own addressees.  As
Sacco has put it, when the new source of law is based on the will of the interested parties, the new
rule is grounded in general consent and consequently there is no traumatic break with the previous
law254.
 Once new texts are better  understood, once the objectives behind the rules and the underlying
policies  are  clear,  they  can  be  more  easily  acceptable.  It  is  in  particular  necessary  to  dispel
misconceptions255  and  explain  departures  from traditional  domestic  law,  in  order  to  eliminate
concerns about the adoption of a new rule conceived as foreign, that is strange or unknown. In
addition, it is useful to emphasise that a well-drafted uniform law can be easily applied in many
jurisdictions and therefore can quickly raise a large amount of case-law which can dissipate doubts
of  interpretation  of  its  norms.   Finally,  one  should  create  awareness  about  the  fact  that  an
international transaction is not naturally rooted in one particular domestic law and therefore can be
better regulated by a uniform transnational law.
 The promotional  initiatives  carried  out  by formulating  agencies  are  varied.  UNCITRAL,   for
example, periodically publishes a collection of its uniform texts and related materials, as well as a
yearbook providing reports of its activity, with particular reference to the status of its conventions.
It  has  also  set  up  an  electronic  database  collecting  the  case  law relating  to  its  harmonisation
251Secretariat  of  UNCITRAL,  Promoting  wider  awareness  and  acceptance  of  uniform  law  texts,  in  UNCITRAL,
Uniform Commercial  Law in  the Twenty-First  Century,  United  Nations  publication,  1995,  p.  253.  The Secretariat
refers,  by way of example, that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration was once labelled “esperanto law” and
“UNCITRAL fast food”.
252Secretariat  of UNCITRAL,  Promoting wider awareness  and acceptance of  uniform law texts ,   cit,  p.  254. The
Secretariat  has  for  example  estimated  that  the  cost  for  the UN Sales  Convention borne  exclusively  by the United
Nations, excluding all the costs for delegation, amount to 4 million US dollars.
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instruments,  organises  regional  and  national  seminars  to  promote  its  initiatives  and  provides
technical assistance to national legislators involved in legislative reform.
The main actors of uniformity in transnational commercial law: UNCITRAL
and UNIDROIT
UNCITRAL general features
The  United  Nations  Commission  on  International  Trade  Law  (UNCITRAL)  is  a  specialised
commission  of  the  United  Nations,  established  in  1966  in  order  to  further  the  progressive
harmonization and unification of the law of international trade. UNCITRAL is composed of sixty
member states elected by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Membership in UNCITRAL
is  limited  to  a  small  number  of  states,  so  as  to  facilitate  the  deliberations.  UNCITRAL  was
originally composed of 29 States; its membership was expanded in 1973 to 36 states and again in
2004 to 60 states. Membership is representative of the various geographic regions and the principal
economic and legal systems of the world. In particular, there are five regional groups represented
within UNCITRAL: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Caribbean, Western Europe
and Other  States  (this latter  category includes  Australia,  Canada,  New Zealand  and the United
states).  Members  are  elected for  six  years,  half  the members  being renewed every three years.
UNCITRAL is open to participation as observers to other interested UN member states, as well as
by international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental: they are allowed to join
all sessions to the same extent as members, with the sole exception that they have no right to vote.
This exception is however of little significance, since UNCITRAL typically reaches its decision by
consensus,  rather  than  by voting:  during its  sessions  all  efforts  are  made in  order  to  take into
account all concerns raised and to reach a final text which is acceptable to all.256 
  UNCITRAL’s work is organized and conducted at three levels257. The first level is UNCITRAL
itself, often referred to as the Commission, which holds an annual plenary session  lasting from two
256UNCITRAL. The UNCITRAL Guide, United Nations Publication, 2006, p. 3, available on the website uncitral.org  at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/V0650941.pdf (July2009)
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to four weeks and taking place in alternate years at United Nations headquarters in New York and at
the Vienna International Centre.  The second level is composed by the intergovernmental working
groups,  whose purpose is to develop the topics related to UNCITRAL’s work programme.  The
Commission has  established six Working Groups to perform the substantive preparatory work on
topics  within  UNCITRAL’s  statutory  purposes:  Procurement,  International  Arbitration  and
Conciliation, Transport Law, Electronic Commerce, Insolvency Law and Security Interests. Each
Working Group is composed by experts  specialised in the topic, who can hold sessions more often
(usually twice a year, holding a spring session in New York and a fall session in Vienna) and in a
less formal environment258. The Working Groups report on their progress at UNCITRAL’s annual
session  and  submit  their  drafts  to  the  latter  for  review  and  approval.  The  third  level  is  the
Secretariat, which assists the Commission and its working groups in the preparation and conduct of
their  work.  It  is  made  up  of  highly  qualified  professionals  from  the  International  Trade  Law
Division  of  the  UN Office  of  Legal  Affairs  and  its  tasks  include  making  preparatory  reports,
providing necessary background information, suggesting and reviewing preliminary draft texts. In
order to improve the quality of its technical assistance, the Secretariat often consults outside experts
in  a  particular  field  coming  from different  legal  traditions.  Such  experts  have  so  far  included
academics, practising lawyers, judges, bankers,  arbitrators and members of various international,
regional and professional organizations.
As we can see from this brief outline, UNCITRAL structure, allowing a wide range of experts and
stakeholders to participate and contribute to its works, is highly representative of the transnational
business  class  and  constitutes  an  example  of  epistemic  community259:  its  sessions  represent  a
<<wholesome mix of academic specialists in commercial and comparative law, practising lawyers,
and members of government ministries with years of experience in international lawmaking>>260.
Moreover, its decision-making method, essentially based on consensus rather than on voting and
veto mechanisms, is an example of how Habermas’ theory of communicative action can work in
practice261.
The Birth of UNCITRAL
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Participants to the debate which gave rise to UNCITRAL were faced with most of the issues that we
discussed in more general terms in the previous paragraphs, when dealing with the broad topic of
harmonisation of transnational commercial law, namely the obstacles to harmonisation, the various
techniques, approaches and instruments of harmonisation and the notion of a new law merchant262.
The first step towards the establishment of UNCITRAL is commonly considered prof. Schmitthoff's
speech at  the 1962 Colloquium, convened in London by the International  Association of Legal
Science, on the “Sources of Law in International Trade”263. In his intervention, prof Schmitthoff
lamented the lack of coordination among the formulating agencies dealing with the unification and
harmonisation of international trade law264. In a subsequent article published some years later, he
suggested as a remedy the establishment of an international agency of the highest order, possibly on
the level of the United Nations, which should be charged with the task of coordination265. Following
prof. Schmitthoff's  remarks,  Hungary took a decisive role in fostering these ideas.  In 1964 and
1965266, it submitted to the UN General Assembly a memorandum267, in which it pointed out that,
although  a  number  of  international  organisations  were  already  dealing  with  the  issue  of  the
development of international trade law,  their efforts were uncoordinated and therefore it claimed a
more active role of United Nations in this area. In the wake of Hungary's  initiative, the General
Assembly of the UN requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive study reviewing
the  work  so  far  accomplished  in  the  unification  and  harmonisation  of  international  trade  law,
analysing the methods and the topics suitable for further advances and considering the future role of
the United Nation in the field.268 Accordingly,  in 1966 the Secretariat  prepared a report entitled
“Progressive Development of the Law of International Trade”269, which was based on a preliminary
study by prof. Schmitthoff. Not only did the Report lay the foundations for the establishment of
UNCITRAL, but it also constitutes an excellent summary of the results so far accomplished and the
main obstacles still to overcome in the field of the harmonisation of international trade law. The
Report  consists  of  four  chapters.  Chapter  One  identifies  two  different  but  complementary
approaches, which have so far been used to reduce conflicts and divergencies arising from the laws
of different countries. The first, defined as the “clinical method”, consists in establishing common
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rules  regulating  the  conflict  of  laws;  the  second  –  the  “preventive  method  –  consists  in  the
harmonisation or  unification  of  substantive rules270.  Lastly,  the report  summarises  Schmitthoff's
well-known  doctrine  of  the  development  of  international  trade  law271.  According  to  him,   the
development of the law of international trade has gone through three stages. The first was that of the
medieval lex mercatoria, a body of universally accepted rules which was applied to the members of
the cosmopolitan class of merchants at the fairs, markets and ports of all European countries. In the
second stage, the law of international trade was incorporated into the municipal law of the various
national  states,  which replaced the feudal  stratification of medieaval  society.  In  the third stage,
international trade law is returning to be universal: commercial custom has again developed widely
accepted legal concepts, such as f.o.b. and c.i.f. terms, and international conventions have led to a
significant  level  of harmonisation in important  branches  of  the law,  such as the sale of goods,
transport by sea air and land and arbitration. In particular, the law of international trade in its third
stage  of  development  shows  three  characteristics.  The  first  is  the  similarity  of  the  rules  in  all
national  legal  systems272.  Although  international  trade  law  is  still  formally  incorporated  into
municipal  law,  it  is  the  only part  thereof  trascending  the  divisions  between  legal  families  and
between countries of free market economy and  countries of planned economy. When it comes to
international  trade,  lawyers  of  all  countries  find  without  difficulty  that  they  speak  a  common
language, because this branch of law relies on three basic common principles: party authonomy,
pacta  sunt  servanda,  arbitration  as  the  ordinary  way  of  settling  disputes273.   The  second
characteristic  is  that,  although  international  trade  law  is  largely  universal  in  its  contents,  its
application  still  depends,  as  it  forms  part  of  municipal  law,  on  the  authority  of  national
sovereigns274. Finally, the third feature, which is also the outstanding characteristic of the modern
development of this field of  law, is that although its application still depends on state sovereignty,
its formulation is brought about, to a large extent, by formulating agencies275. Some of these are
United Nations organs, others are intergovermental organisations, others are non-govermental ones
and are formed by merchants and jurists not acting as goverment representatives. 
 Chapter Two reviews the work and achievements of the main formulating agencies in the field of
harmonisation  and  unification  of  international  trade.  First,  it  surveys  the  activites  of
270
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intergovermental  organisations  having  a  global  reach276,  such  as  the  UNIDROIT,  the  Hague
Conference  on Private International  Law,  the United Nations specialised agencies  (International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Civil Aviation Organisation); then it deals
with  regional international  organisations277,  such as the Council  for Mutual Economic Aid, the
European Economic Community, the Council of Europe, the Organisation of African Unity; finally,
it  analises  the work of a number of  non-govermental  organisations278,  such as the International
Chamber  of  Commerce,  the  International  Association  of  Legal  Science,  the  International  Law
Association and the Institute of International Law. 
Chapter Three describes in further detail the instruments used in the harmonisation and unification
of international trade law: international agreements, model and uniform laws, uniform commercial
customs  and  practices279.  In  this  respect,  the  report  observes  that  each  of  these  instruments
complements  the  others  and therefore  the future  development  of  the law of  international  trade
requires  that  all  of  them should  continue  to  be  actively  pursued280.  It  also  enumerates  further
topics281 which may be suitable for harmonisation or unification, emphasising however that this
process is not desirable per se, but only where it is proved that common measures would have a
beneficial effect on the development of international trade282. Moreover, it observes that, since the
topics  related  to  international  trade  are  primarly  of  a  technical  nature,  harmonisation   can  be
achieved  more  easily  than  in  other  sectors  of  the  law  more  closely  connected  with  national
traditions,  such  as  family  law,  succession,  personal  status283.  Finally,  the  report  suggests  that
unifying measures may have a “radiation” (nowadays we would more commonly say spill-over)
effect284: the common principles hammered out by one instrument can subsequently be followed in
others285.
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  Chapter Four describes the shortcomings of the process of harmonisation and unification286. The
report  stresses  the  paucity  of  success  which  has  so  far  characterised  the  movement  for  the
unification and harmonisation of the law of international  trade287.  It  points out that the progress
made  has  been  rather  slow  in  relation  to  the  amount  of  time  and  effort  employed  and  that
developing  countries  have  played  only  a  small  role  in  the  activities  carried  out  in  the  field.
Furthermore, it notes that none of the relevant agencies enjoys worldwide acceptance, and none has
a balanced representation of developed and developing countries. Finally, the Report observes that
there has been insufficient coordination and cooperation among agencies. Consequently, there are a
wide number of competing agencies involved in overlapping attempts to achieve uniformity in the
field of international trade law. What is more, a large part of these attempts are time-consuming and
over -ambitious, with the final result that they often end up in draft  conventions or model laws
which fail  to culminate in the adoption of  uniform legislation.  When conventions  are adopted,
generally only a small percentage of the states members of the United Nations become parties. In
order  to  overcome  these  shortcomings,  the  report  proposes  to  systematise  the  process  of
harmonisation  and  unification  and  also  to  allow  developing  countries  a  better  opportunity  to
participate to it288. The United Nations would be in the best position to ensure the achievement of
these objectives, with its almost universal membership representing the various legal, economic,
and  social  systems,  as  well  as  all  stages  of  economic development.289 Nonetheless,  there  is  no
existing United Nations organ which is both technically competent and able to devote sufficient
time to a complex and time-consuming task such as that of promoting the progressive development
of the law of international trade. Therefore – the Report concludes – a new organ, a commission for
international  trade  law,  needs  to  be  created,  which  would  increase  the  usefulness  of  existing
formulating agencies and improve the chances of bringing their work to a successful conclusion290.
This Commission would act as a sort of “clearing house”, by exercising some  supervision over the
activites of the formulating agencies and promoting contacts and furthering collaboration between
them. In addition, the Commission should be in charge of determining which projects should be
carried to conclusion, which should be revised and which set aside. Although coordination should
be its primary role, it would be desireable to authorize it, when appropriate, to perform formulating
functions as well291.     
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The Report was discussed by the General Assembly during its twenty-first session in 1966.  The
most discussed issue was the determination of the specific tasks of the future commission. Some
representatives suggested that the commission should coordinate and centralize the efforts already
made in the field of harmonisation and unification of international trade law and promote wider
acceptance  of  instruments  already  in  existence.  Others  argued  that  it  should  also  perform the
function of formulating new instruments designed to further the development of international trade
law292.  The  final  resolution293,  which  was  adopted  at  the  end  of  the  debate  and  gave  birth  to
UNCITRAL, did not innovate on this point with respect to what already stated in the report: it
stressed its role of coordination of the work of the formulating agencies and also authorised it to
prepare or promote the adoption of new conventions, model laws and uniform laws. Another topic
of discussion was the membership of the future commission. It was agreed that it should be small
enough to guarantee its smooth functioning and large enough to allow an adequate representation of
countries  of  the  various  legal  and  socio-economic  systems  and  of  various  stages  of  economic
development294 in the world. Resolution 2205 decided that the commission would be composed of
twenty-nine  states  elected  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  for  six  years  from
different groups of countries295. In order to ensure continuity in its membership, a rotation system
was envisaged, whereby the terms of fourteen of the members would expire every three years296.
The president of the General Assembly would select, by drawing lots, the fourteen members serving
for three years within each group of states.
The first session of the Commission was opened on 29 January 1968297. The most important issue
on the agenda was the definion of the work programme. The report had not recommended a specific
work programme for UNCITRAL: it had merely suggested some topics and laid down some overall
criteria  on  which  the  harmonisation  and  unification  process  should  focus.  Far  from drafting  a
general working programme and defining exactly which topics should fall within the definition of
harmonisation  of  international  trade  law,  the  commission  limited  itself  to  confirm  the  broad
definition of international trade law provided for in the Report and took an ad hoc approach to the
harmonisation process. It decided to draw up a list of topics needing harmonisation or unification
and from that list identify those having priority. For each topic the Commission had also to decide
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whether it would be given regional or worldwide treatment and which would be the appropriate
harmonisation  or  unification  instrument298.  During  the  debate,  seventeen  different  topics  were
proposed by the various members and eventually the Commission decided to focus its efforts on
three broad sectors of international trade law: international sale of goods, international payments
and commercial arbitration299.
Another important resolution adopted in the first session was the agreement that the Commission
should take decisions by way of consensus. This wise decision enabled it to establish a tradition of
non-ideological, constructive discussions, aimed at finding technically sound and widely acceptable
solutions300 . This is one of UNCITRAL’s distinctive features which has remained unchanged until
today.   Although  UNCITRAL  is  an  intergovermental  organisation  whose  members  are  State
representatives, its decision-making process has so far never followed the formal procedures of a
diplomatic conference301, but rather, as Honnold puts it, the informal ones of a Quaker meeting302.
UNCITRAL resembles more an epistemic community than an intergovermental body: consensus is
founded on rational arguments rather than on a trade-off among the various stakeholders303. 
UNCITRAL activities
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  Since its establishment, UNCITRAL has  prepared a wide range of conventions, model laws and
other instruments dealing with the substantive law that governs trade transactions or other aspects of
business law which have an impact on international trade.  The work of  UNCITRAL does not end
with the adoption of  a text, but it also includes activities to promote its work and the adoption of
the  legislative  and  non-legislative  texts  it  has  produced304.  These  activities  include  organizing
educational programmes, seminars and conferences, with a view to familiarizing participants with
UNCITRAL‘s  work,  assisting   governments  and   legislative  authorities  to  review  existing
legislation in line with UNCITRAL’s texts, and providing advice and assistance to international and
other  organizations,  such  as  professional  associations,  organizations  of  attorneys,  chambers  of
commerce and arbitration centres, on the use of UNCITRAL’s harmonisation tools.
 Another  important  task within the mandate of UNCITRAL is the coordination of the work of
organizations  active  in  the  field  of  international  trade  law,  both within and  outside the  United
Nations system, in order to foster cooperation, avoid duplication of efforts and prevent the adoption
of  contradictory  harmonisation  measures305.  In  recent  years  a  growing  number  of  regulating
agencies  in  the  field  of  international  trade  has  emerged,  making  UNCITRAL’s  coordination
function more and more important. This task is essentially carried out by the Secretariat,  which
actively follows the meetings and participates to the works of  a wide number of organizations,
whose regulatory activities relate to the topics of UNCITRAL’s programme. Those organizations
include, for example, the Hague Conference on Private International  Law, the International  Bar
Association, the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (UNIDROIT),  the United Nations Regional Commissions, the World Bank and the
World Trade Organization.
 As far  as the field of  commercial  dispute resolution is  concerned,  UNCITRAL has  adopted a
number of significant measures. In 1976 it issued the Arbitration Rules, a comprehensive set of
rules  covering  all  aspects  of  arbitration  proceedings,  which  have  been  widely  accepted  and
extensively used  throughout  the  world306.  In  1980 UNCITRAL adopted  the Conciliation Rules,
establishing a set of rules which parties may employ for the conduct of conciliation proceedings
arising  out  of  their  commercial  relationships.  After  the  publication  of  the  Model  Law  on
International  Commercial  Arbitration  in  1985,  UNCITRAL  has  issued  in  1996   the  Notes  on
Organizing  Arbitral  Proceeding,  designed  to  assist  arbitration  practitioners,  by  providing  an
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annotated list of matters on which an arbitral tribunal may wish to formulate decisions during the
course of arbitral proceedings, including deciding on a set of arbitration rules, the language and
place of an arbitration and questions relating to confidentiality, as well as other matters, such as
conduct of hearings and the taking of evidence and possible requirements for the filing or delivering
of  awards.  Finally,  in  2002 UNCITRAL adopted  the  Model  Law  on  International  Commercial
Conciliation.  Also in  the field of  dispute resolution UNCITRAL activity is  not  only limited to
rulemaking.  UNCITRAL’s  promotion efforts   have been focussed especially on the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement  of Foreign Arbitral  Awards ,  which, although
adopted  prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  former,  is  nonetheless  an  instrument  of  fundamental
importance  for  international  arbitration.  In  particular,  UNCITRAL  Secretariat  has  published
important  studies  on  its  application  and  interpretation,  which  have  contributed  to  increase  its
effectiveness307. Moreover, in 1982 UNCITRAL has published a set of Recommendations to assist
arbitral institutions and other interested bodies in the application of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
UNCITRAL harmonisation tools
In order to accomplish its mandate to harmonize the law of international trade, UNCITRAL has
adopted  two  different  categories  of  harmonisation  tools,  which  operate  at  different  levels  and
involve  different   degrees  of  harmonisation:  legislative  and  non-legislative  (or  contractual)
instruments.
Legislative techniques
307
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The  traditional  legislative  technique  is  represented  by  the  international  convention,  which  is
designed to unify the law in a given field by establishing binding legal obligations. UNCITRAL
uses this instrument in order to reach the highest level of harmonisation among the laws of the
participating states. UNCITRAL conventions usually allow little flexibility to adopting states, since
they generally do not provide for reservations or declarations, or they provide them only to a very
limited extent. 
UNCITRAL has so far drafted the following conventions: the UN Convention on the Limitation
Period in the International Sale of Goods (1974); the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea (1978); the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (1980); the United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International
Promissory Notes (1988); the United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport
Terminals in International Trade (1991); the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees
and  Stand-by  Letters  of  Credit  (1995);  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Assignment  of
Receivables  in  International  Trade  (2001);  and  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Use  of
Electronic Communications in International Contracts (2005).
The most innovative legislative technique, which has met with considerable success in the past
twenty years, is constituted by the model law. A model law is a legislative text that is recommended
to states for enactment as part of their national law. It is an appropriate vehicle for harmonization of
national laws when it is expected that states will wish or need to make adjustments to the text of the
model  to  accommodate  local  requirements  that  vary  from  system  to  system,  or  where  strict
uniformity is  not  necessary or desirable.  It  is  precisely this flexibility that  makes a  model law
potentially  easier  to  negotiate  than  a  convention  containing binding  obligations  that  cannot  be
altered.  Notwithstanding  this  flexibility,  in  order  to  increase  the  likelihood  of  achieving  a
satisfactory  degree  of  unification  and  to  provide  certainty  about  the  extent  of  unification,
UNCITRAL usually recommends states to make as few changes as possible when incorporating a
model law into their legal system.
  The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 was the first model law adopted
by UNCITRAL and was followed by the  Model Law on International Credit Transfers (1992); the
Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services with Guide to Enactment (1994);
the  Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996); the  Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment (1997); the Model Law on Electronic Signatures
with Guide to Enactment (2001); and the Model Law on International  Commercial  Conciliation
(2002).
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Recent model laws completed by UNCITRAL have been accompanied by a “guide to enactment”,
providing  explanatory  information  to  assist  governments  and  legislators  in  using the  text.  The
guides include, for example, information that assist states in considering what, if any, provisions of
the  model  law might  have  to  be  varied  to  take  into account  particular  national  circumstances,
information relating to discussions in the working group on policy options and considerations, and
matters not addressed in the text of the model law that may nevertheless be relevant to the subject
matter of the model law itself.
When in a given field it proves impossible to draft a uniform set of rules, either in the form of
convention or model rules, UNCITRAL may limit its action to the elaboration of a set of principles
or legislative recommendations in the form of a Legislative Guide. Yet, this harmonisation tool
does not consist in a mere statement of general objectives: instead of establishing, as in the case of a
convention  or  a  model  law,  a  single  set  of  solutions,  it  provides  a  set  of  possible  legislative
solutions to certain issues. Moreover,  it  discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different
policy choices, in order to assist the national legislature in evaluating different approaches and in
choosing the most suitable one in a particular national context. Finally, a Legislative Guide may
also be used to provide a standard against which governments and legislative bodies could review
and update existing laws.  UNCITRAL’s first legislative recommendation was adopted in 1985, to
stimulate  review  of  legislative  provisions  on  the  legal  value  of  computer  records.  In  2000,
UNCITRAL published the Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects and  in
2004 it issued the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. A legislative guide on secured transactions
is currently being prepared.
Model  provisions  purport  to  accomplish  the  “harmonisation  of  the  harmonisation”:  they  are
provisions recommended in future conventions or revisions of existing ones. They are issued where
it is felt that a number of conventions dealing with the same issue contain contradictory provisions
and there is consequently the need for further harmonisation. In 1982, for example, UNCITRAL
formulated a model provision establishing a universal unit of account of constant value that could
be used, in particular, in international transport and liability conventions, for expressing amounts in
monetary terms308.
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 Provisions on a universal  unit  of account and on adjustment of the limit  of liability  in international  transport
conventions, United Nations Publication ,1982 available at www.  uncitral. org/ pdf/ english /texts/ transport/ UoAP/
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With a view to achieving uniformity also in the application and interpretation of its legislative texts,
in 1988 UNCITRAL established a database collecting court decisions and arbitral awards relating to
those  texts  (case  law  on  UNCITRAL  Texts,  CLOUT)309.  This  system  relies  on  national
correspondents who are required to collect the relevant case law in their jurisdiction, draft abstracts
of the decisions and submit both the texts and the abstracts to the UNCITRAL Secretariat, who will
translate them into the six official languages of the UN310. Although for the time being the majority
of the cases reported relates only to the CISG and the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration,  material  related  to  other  UNCITRAL  texts  will  be  included  as  relevant  case  law
develops311.
Non- legislative techniques
Contractual techniques consist essentially in the elaboration of standard contract terms, i.e. uniform
rules which parties may use in their relations either by incorporation or by mere reference to them
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specific provisions, as well as those which refer in general to a legal text elaborated by UNCITRAL. The primary task
of national correspondents is to collect final decisions and awards issued in their respective «implementing states» (i.e.
those states that are party to a  UNCITRAL Convention or have enacted legislation based on an UNCITRAL Model
Law). However, national correspondents may also collect other relevant decisions and awards relating to a national law
which is closely modelled on the text of a UNCITRAL Convention, even if the state is not party to the Convention. The
abstracts are generally not a complete summary of the decision or award, but rather a pointer to the specific issues
concerning the application and interpretation of the relevant UNCITRAL text in a given decision or arbitral award. This
is because their purpose is to provide the reader with sufficient information to decide whether it is worthwhile to obtain
and examine the complete decision or arbitral award which is the subject of the abstract. To this aim, the following
points are included in the abstract : the reasons for applying or interpreting the provisions of the UNCITRAL text in the
way they have been interpreted ; the claim or relief sought by the parties and any other factor describing the procedural
context  within which the case was decided ; the countries of the parties and the type of transactions involved. The
abstracts are forwarded to the Secretariat together with the complete  court decision or arbitral award in its original
language. However,  only the abstracts are translated into the six official languages of the United Nations ; the full
decisions and awards are made available in the form in which they are forwarded to the Secretariat to any interested
person for individial use upon request and against payment of a fee covering the cost of copying and mailing.
311
 The User Guide refers that at the time of publication of the guide, i.e. february 2000, the following legal texts are
covered by the system: Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods (New York,1974), and
as amended by the Protocol of 1980; United Nations Convention on Contracts  for the International  Sale of Goods
(Vienna, 1980);  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985);  United Nations Convention
on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (Hamburg); United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-
by Letters of Credit (New York, 1995); UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services
(1994);  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  on  Electronic  Commerce  (1996);  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  on  Cross-Border
Insolvency (1997). In addition,   the system will also cover the following,  and any future,  Conventions and Model
Laws, when they enter into force or are implemented by States:  United Nations Convention on International Bills of
Exchange  and  International  Promissory  Notes  (New York,  1988);  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Liability  of
Operators of Transport Terminals  in  International  Trade (Vienna,  1991);  UNCITRAL Model  Law on International
Credit Transfers (1992).
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in  their  contract.  Examples  are  the  UNCITRAL Arbitration  Rules  (1976)  and  the  UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules (1980).
 The legal  guides are designed to help parties  to draft  international  contracts.  Legal  guides  are
issued in sectors where it is not possible to identify standard rules and practices. They provide  the
parties  with  the  expertise  and  reference  materials  necessary  to  face  negotiations;  they  discuss
various issues underlying the drafting of a particular type of contract; consider various solutions to
those  issues;  describe  implications,  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  those  solutions;  and
recommend the use of certain solutions in particular circumstances. The first legal guide was the
UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Drawing up International Contracts for the Construction of Industrial
Works  (1987).  It  was  followed by the  UNCITRAL Legal  Guide on International  Countertrade
Transactions (1992) and, in 1996, the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings.
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT): An
Overview 
The birth of UNIDROIT
The  Rome-based  International  Institute  for  the  Unification  of  Private  Law  (UNIDROIT)  was
founded in 1926 under the initiative of the Italian Government, which proposed to the League of
Nations the creation of an international institute for the study of private law, whose main purpose
should have been to examine ways of harmonizing and coordinating the rules of private law of the
different states or groups of states, with a view to gradually promoting the adoption of a uniform
system of private law by the  states312. According to the founding Statute of 1926, the links between
the Institute  and the League of Nations were very close,  so that  the former appeared a sort  of
auxiliary body of the latter313: for example, the Council of the League of Nations had to approve the
312M. Matteucci,  UNIDROIT: The First Fifty Years, in UNIDROIT (ed), New Directions in International Trade Law:
Acts and Proceedings of the 2nd Congress on Private Law by the International Institute of Private Law Unidroit, Oceana
Dobbs Ferry, 1977, p. xvii
313
 M. Matteucci, op.cit., p. xviii
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UNIDROIT Council and the norms concerning its functioning and administration; every year an
annual report on the Institute’s activities was submitted to the assembly of the League of Nations314.
After Italy had withdrawn from the League of Nations in 1937 and consequently given its notice of
termination of the UNIDROIT Statute, the Institute became a fully independent intergovernmental
organization, on the basis of a new statute signed on the 15th March 1940, which entered into force
on the 21st April of the same year and is still into force today, albeit with minor emendments.
UNIDROIT structure and working method
The  International  Institute  for  the  Unification  of  Private  Law  (UNIDROIT)  is  an  independent
intergovernmental organisation with its seat in Rome. Membership of UNIDROIT is restricted to states
acceding to the UNIDROIT Statute. UNIDROIT’ S  members are currently 63.   
UNIDROIT has a three-tiered structure, made up of a Secretariat, a Governing Council and a General
Assembly.  The  Secretariat is  the  executive  organ  of  UNIDROIT, responsible  for  the  day-to-day
carrying out of the Work Programme and is appointed by the Governing Council for five years. The
Governing Council supervises every activity of the Institute and draws up its Work Programme. It
is made up of one ex officio member, the President of the Institute, who is appointed by the Italian
Government,  and  25  members  elected  by  the  General  Assembly  among  eminent  judges,
practitioners,  academics  and  civil  servants.  The  President  and  the  members  of  the  Governing
Council hold their office for a term of five years and can be re-elected. The General Assembly is the
ultimate  decision-making  organ  of  UNIDROIT and  is made  up  of  one  representative  from  each
member state. It determines the Institute's budget each year, approves the Work Programme every
three years and elects the Governing Council every five years. 
The working method followed by UNIDROIT is generally that of a typical intergovernmental body.
Once  a  subject  has  been  included  in  the  UNIDROIT'  s  Work  Programme,  the  Secretariat,  where
necessary,  draws up a  feasibility study and/or a preliminary comparative law report, designed to
ascertain the desirability and feasibility of the project. On the basis of this preliminary study, the
Governing Council decides whether the project is to be pursued and if so it confers the task of
314M.R.  Saulle,  Istituto  Internazionale  per  l’Unificazione  del  Diritto  Privato,  Enciclopedia  del  Diritto,  vol.  XXIII,
Giuffrè, 1973, p. 59;  M. Matteucci, op. cit., p. xix
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producing a draft convention upon a study group consisting of a small number of experts sitting in
their personal capacity. The results of the study group’s work are circulated among member state
representatives  to  find  out  whether  the  draft  meets  with  sufficient  interest.  If  the  response  is
positive,  there  are  two alternative  routes  for  the  adoption  of  the  draft  convention315.  The  first
involves the creation of a governmental committee of experts in charge of the revision of the draft
under  economic,  social  and general  political  aspects.  The draft  Convention, as emended by the
committee,  is  submitted  to  the  Governing  Council  for  approval  and  advice  as  to  the  most
appropriate steps to be taken. Where it judges that the draft Convention reflects a consensus among
a sufficient  number of states and accordingly stands a good chance of adoption at a diplomatic
Conference, the Governing Council entrusts the UNIDROIT Secretariat with the task of setting up
such  Conference  for  final  adoption  of  the  draft  as  an  international  Convention.  The  second
alternative,  which was employed in the case of several  conventions on the law of transport and
shipping, is the adoption of a draft text by another international organization which then takes up
the final procedural steps according to its own rules .
As we will see in more detail below316, in drafting the UNIDROIT Principles, the Institute followed
a different working method, which departed from the traditional intergovernmental bargaining: the
Principles were drafted by a restricted Working Group of experts sitting in their personal capacity,
without the direct involvement of government representatives. This was due to the particular nature
of the UNIDROIT Principles, which were not conceived as a binding instrument to be approved by
an international diplomatic Conference.
UNIDROIT activities
According to art. 1(1) of the UNIDROIT Statute, the purposes of the Institute are to examine ways
of harmonising and coordinating the private law of states and of groups of states, and to prepare
gradually for the adoption by the various states of uniform rules of private law. In order to carry out
its statutory tasks, UNIDROIT can rely on a number of instruments broadly envisaged in art 1 of its
315
 P. Widmer, The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law: Shipyard for World-wide Unification of
Private Law, EJLR, 1998/9, 1, p. 191
316See infra pp. 328ff.
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Statute, such as drafts of laws and conventions, studies in comparative private law, conferences and
scholarly works.
Until recently, UNIDROIT' s main contribution to the harmonisation of private law has been that of
carrying out preparatory studies related to the elaboration of draft conventions, which were then
adopted either by a diplomatic conference convened by the member states of UNIDROIT, or under
the auspices  of  other  international  organisations.  The most  important  study in  this  respect  was
conducted under the leadership of Ernst Rabel since 1926, which led to the two Hague Conventions
on the International Sales of Goods of 1964 (adopted by a conference convened by UNIDROIT
member states), as well as to the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sales
of  Goods  (adopted  by  UNCITRAL).  As  mentioned  above,  UNIDROIT  has  conducted  such
preliminary studies especially in the field of transport law: the most important  are those related to
the 1956 CMR Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, which
was eventually adopted by the Committee on Internal Transport of the UN Economic Commission
for Europe. In more recent years, UNIDROIT has concentrated its activity on sectors other than
transport law and the sale of goods: the most important examples are represented by the two 1998
UNIDROIT Ottawa Conventions on International Financial Leasing and International Factoring, the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and the 2001 Cape
Town Convention on International Interests on Mobile Equipment.
UNIDROIT’ s latest activities show a sharp preference for non-binding harmonization tools. This
shift of approach reflects a general skepticism toward unification of the law through international
conventions:  a  wide number  of  conventions  in  the  preparation of  which  UNIDROIT  had  been
involved  had  either  remained  dead  letter  or  reached  a  very  scarce  number  of  ratifications317.
Moreover, too often was UNIDROIT’ s role with respect to international conventions confined to
that  of  conducting  preliminary  studies  to  the  benefit  of  other  international  organizations.
Accordingly, UNIDROIT’ s decision to embark on the elaboration of harmonization instruments of
a  soft  law  character,  not  directly  involving  national  governments  or  other  international
organisations,  might  also  be  read  as  an  expression  of  the  desire  to  overcome  its  traditional
subordinate role with respect to other formulating agencies and to gain a unique role in the field of
harmonisation of private law. In particular, UNIDROIT has so far elaborated three types of non-
binding harmonization instruments: model laws, legal guides and general principles of law. 
317
 For example, the 1973 Conventions on the Contract for the International Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by
Road (CVR) and on the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Inland Navigation Vessels (CLN), which were based
on drafts prepared by a UNIDROIT Study Group and adopted by the Economic Commission of Europe, have never
entered into force, because they failed to reach the required number of ratifications.
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Published  in  2002,  the  Model  Franchising  Disclosure  Law  identifies  a  number  of  disclosure
obligations upon franchisors (relating for example to information to be disclosed, the format of the
information document and exemptions from information to be disclosed) in their relationship with
franchisees, so as to ensure that the prospective franchisees who intend to invest in franchising receive
material information about franchise offerings and thereby a safe legal environment between all the
parties  in  a  franchise  arrangement  is  created318.  The  Model  Law  on  Leasing,  adopted  on  the  13th
November 2008, was designed to help developing countries and countries in transition toward a market
economy  to  develop  a  leasing  legislation  in  line  with  international  standards.  Whereas  the  1988
UNIDROIT  Ottawa  Convention  on  International  Financial  Leasing  covers  cross-border  leasing
transactions, this model law is designed for domestic leasing contracts and is therefore aimed at
creating a legal basis for the development of a modern leasing industry within the territory of the
enacting country319. 
In 1998 UNIDROIT published the first edition of the Guide to International Master Franchising
Arrangements  (the  second  edition was  published  in  2007).  This  Guide  offers  a  comprehensive
examination of the whole life of master franchise arrangements, from the negotiation and drafting
of the master franchise agreement and other associated agreements, to the end of the relationship
and  its  effects.  It  deals  principally  with  the  positions  of  the  parties  directly  involved,  i.e.  the
franchisor  and  the  sub-franchisor,  but,  in  instances  where  it  is  considered  to  be  of  particular
importance, the positions of others affected, such as sub-franchisees, are covered.
In  2004  the  Governing  Council  of  UNIDROIT  adopted  the  Principles  of  Transnational  Civil
Procedure, prepared by a joint American Law Institute/UNIDROIT Study Group. The Principles,
consisting of 31 provisions, aim at reconciling differences among various national rules of civil
procedure,  taking  into  account  the  peculiarities  of  transnational  disputes  as  opposed  to  purely
domestic ones. They may not only serve as guidelines for code projects in countries without a
consolidated civil procedure tradition, but may initiate law reforms even in countries with long and
high quality procedural traditions; they may also be applied by analogy in international commercial
arbitration.
The most important soft law instrument elaborated by UNIDROIT (at least by judging from the
amount  of  literature  to  which  it  gave  rise)  is  represented  by  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  of
International Commercial Contracts, which will be analysed below in chapter five320.
318
 Model  Franchising  Disclosure  Law-  Explanatory  Report,  par.  3  available  at   http://www.unidroit.org/
english/modellaws/2002franchise/2002modellaw-e.pdf
319
 UNIDROIT  2008,  Study  LIXA,  Doc.  13,  Appendix  VII,  p.  iii,  available  at  http://  www.unidroit.org/  english/
documents/2008/study59a/s-59a-13-e.pdf
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 See infra pp. 319 ff.
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CHAPTER  THREE:  MAIN  FEATURES  OF  INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND ITS LEGITIMACY
Arbitration  may be  defined  in  general  terms  as  a  consensual,  private  process  for  the  binding
resolution of a dispute through the decision of one or more private, independent individuals selected
by the parties to the dispute.1  The decision of the arbitral tribunal (commonly known as the award)
is final and legally binding on the parties and will be recognised and enforced by the courts of most
states around the world.2
Arbitration  has  proved  to  be an  important  testing  ground  for  the  development  of  transnational
commercial  law:  it  is  in  its  context  that  issues  such  as  the  meaning  and  the  role  of  the  lex
mercatoria have  had  the  greatest  significance.  In  addition,  international  commercial  arbitration
represents  the  privileged  field  for  application  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  of  International
Commercial Contracts (and, to a lesser extent, the Principles of European Contract Law).3
General Characteristics of Arbitration
Normally disputes are solved through a process of adjudication. Adjudication is a process in which
disputants present  proofs  and arguments  to  a  neutral  third  party who has  the power to issue a
binding decision4.  The two most important forms of adjudication are litigation in courts (public
adjudication) and arbitration (private adjudication).  Arbitration is a form of private adjudication
based on an agreement between the parties. By agreeing to arbitrate, parties agree that their disputes
should be resolved, not by judges  in court,  but  by arbitrators  acting in a private capacity:  they
1
 Cfr  C. Bühring-Uhle,  Arbitration and Mediation in International Business,  Kluwer  Law,  1998, p. 39; P. Capper,
International Arbitration: a Handbook, Lovells Publishing, 2004, p. 2.
2
  P. Capper, International Arbitration: a Handbook, cit.  p. 2
3
  R.  Goode,  H.  Kronke,  E.  McKendrick,  Transnational  Commercial  Law:  Text,  Cases,  and  Materials,  Oxford
University Press, 2007, p. 622. On this point see infra pp. 360ff.
4
 S. Goldberg, F. Sander & N. Rogers, Dispute Resolution, Little, Brown and Company Publishing, 1992, p. 199
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"contract out" of their right to litigate disputes in those national courts which would otherwise be
competent to adjudicate5
 Arbitration is a private adjudication process based on three essential features, which differentiate it
from other  means of  dispute resolution..  First,  arbitration is  an adjudication process  essentially
founded on a private agreement,  that  is  the party agreement  to refer  the dispute to arbitration.6
Second, the arbitrator’s purpose is basically that of reaching a decision on the case, rather than, for
example,  suggesting a way in which a compromise may be reached.  Third,  the decision of the
arbitrator,  although  stemming  from  a  private  agreement,  may  be  recognised  and  enforced  in
national courts as though it were a national court’s judgement7 
 Foundation on party agreement  renders  arbitration a private adjudication process  distinct  from
litigation, which, as we have just seen, is a public adjudication process and consequently is not
dependent upon the will of the parties8. The arbitration agreement serves three main functions. The
first to show parties’ consent to resolve their dispute by arbitration. Once the parties have reached
an agreement on arbitration, such decision is binding upon them: in selecting arbitration, parties
agree to submit their dispute to a private tribunal, to exclude the jurisdiction of the public courts,
and to abide by the decision of that tribunal. Consequently,  the consent to arbitration cannot be
unilaterally withdrawn.9 The second is that it constitutes the basic source of  the powers of the
arbitral tribunal. As a general rule, an arbitral tribunal may exercise only those powers which the
5
  J. M. Lookofsky;  Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, Transnational Juris Publications, 1992, p.
559
6
  In particular, the arbitration clause (or  clause compromissoire) is the agreement by which parties decide to refer to
arbitration disputes which may arise between them at some time in the future, whereas the submission agreement (or
compromis) deals with disputes already arisen between parties.
7
 A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, 1993, p. 3
8
 Of  course,  foundation on party agreement does not  mean that  party autonomy is  unlimited.  The most  important
limitations to this freedom stem from the concept of arbitrability, that is the range of disputes which may be decided
through arbitration. Each state can decide, in accordance with its own economic and social policy, which matters may
be settled by arbitration and which may not. Claims are generally deemed not arbitrable where they are perceived as
matters of public interest,   as in the case of human rights or criminal law, or where it is felt that court jurisdiction
provides  a  more  adequate  form of  protection,  as  in  the  case  of family  law.  Arbitrability  constitutes  a  significant
limitation to party autonomy, if only one considers that the types of non-arbitrable claims differ from nation to nation.
Consequently,  it may well happen that a claim arbitrable under a ceretain national law may not be arbitrable under
another. Therefore, before resorting to arbitration, parties need to take into account how the arbitrability issue is dealt
with  under a plurality of national law and namely under the law of the arbitration agreement,  under the law of the
place of arbitration, or under the law of the country where enforcement is sought.
9
 The agreement to arbitrate is difficult to be enforced at law. None of the traditional enforcement remedies appear
adequate in practice: neither an award of damages, given the difficulty of quantifying the loss sustained, nor an order for
specific performance, since a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate if he does not want  to do so. That is why the
problem of the arbitration agreement’s breach has been approached, both at national and international level,  with a
policy of indirect enforcement. For example, art 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that a party may request a
court at the place of arbitration to appoint an arbitrator where the other party refuses to do so. Such an order has the
effect of setting up the arbitration process, since the tribunal may proceed in the absence of the other party. A different
remedy  is  provided  for  by  the  New York  Convention:  art  2.3  states  that  courts  in  a  contracting  state  in  which
proceedings have been filed in breach of an arbitration agreement are to refer the parties to arbitration at the request of
one of the parties, unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, or incapable of being performed.
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parties may confer upon it together with the additional or supplementary powers conferred by the
law (or laws) governing  the arbitration. The third is to establish the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal.  In  the ordinary litigation process  before a  court,  the court’s  jurisdiction is  determined
according to several criteria, of which parties’ agreement will be only one. In the arbitral process,
the agreement of the parties is the only source determining jurisdiction.  
Although it does not have the powers of a court, an arbitral tribunal is entrusted by the parties with
the  right  and  duty  of  reaching  a  decision  which  will  be  binding  upon  them.  This  feature
distinguishes arbitration from the other “alternative” means of dispute resolution (ADR) – such as
mediation and conciliation – which aim to arrive at a negotiate settlement. Moreover, it allows to
qualify arbitration as an adjudication process, in a sense assimilated to litigation. Accordingly, the
most  important  principles  of  due  process  are  generally  to  be  followed  also  in  the  conduct  of
arbitration proceedings.  For instance,  art V.1(b) of the New York Convention provides that  the
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the party against whom the award is invoked
has  been  faced  with  denial  of  a  fair  hearing,  that  is  he  was  not  given  proper  notice  of  the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present
his case10
 Once rendered,  the arbitral  decision has legal  effects comparable to the judgement  of a public
court. If the award is not complied with voluntarily, it may be enforced in front of a national court
according to its legal proceedings. As a consequence, the validity and effectiveness of an award
ultimately  depends  on  the  support  of  the  national  legal  system.  That  is  why  a  number  of
commentators  emphasise  the  hybrid  nature   of  the  arbitral  process11:  it  starts  with  a  private
agreement between the parties, it goes on by way of private proceedings, it ends with a binding
award  bestowed  with  legal  force  and  effect,  which  most  national  courts,  provided  that  certain
conditions are met, will  be prepared to recognise and enforce.  The discipline of the arbitration
process results from the inter-relation among the rules of  the arbitration institutions, national laws
and international treaties.
10
 This does ot mean, however, that proceedings must be conducted as though the parties were in front of a national
court. It is generally enough that the hearing was conducted in accordance with the agreement between the parties, the
principles of equality of treatment and the right of each party to have a proper opportunity  to present his case. Cfr  A.
Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 462
11E.g. A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 8
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Reasons for development: inadequacy of international transactions and
litigation
 In  parallel  with  the  outstanding  development  of  international  trade,  international  commercial
arbitration has over the last  half century developed to such a point   that  it  now constitutes the
ordinary way of settling commercial disputes internationally. It is commonly estimated that 90% of
international contracts provide for an arbitration clause12.
 The  growing  importance  of  arbitration  in  international  trade  is  a  direct  consequence  of  the
globalisation phenomenon. Arguably,  globalisation has led to the steep increase of international
transactions,  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  international  disputes.  This  is  because  international
transactions are in great need of legal certainty.  International transactions are more complex and of
a larger duration than domestic transactions: hence, the higher probability of disputes. In addition,
whereas domestic transactions take place within a well-defined national legal  framework, at the
international level such a framework is largely missing. International transactions are still for their
most part subject to national laws, which often vary significantly and inevitably generate conflicts.
The traditional solution of conflict of laws rules can only to a limited extent remedy this situation13.
 Inadequacy of international transactions
  In the context of a globalised world economy, the typical international transaction is no longer
represented by the relatively simple international sale of goods between a seller and a buyer. The
business transactions of the globalisation era now include large-scale construction projects, joint
ventures,  high-technology  licensing  agreements,  or  strategic  alliances  between  two  or  more
industrial conglomerates.  Such transactions usually expand over long periods of time, deal with
complex technologies, include more than two parties, and involve often governments, which tend to
12
  This is a communis opinio among scholars. Cfr e.g. T.A. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and
Mandatory Rules, Duke Law Journal, 2000, 49, 5, p. 1279.
13
 D. Lehmkuhl, Resolving Transnational Disputes: Commercial Arbitration and the Multiple Providers of Governance
Services,  2003  ECPR  Workshop  Paper,  available  at   www.essex.ac.uk/ ecpr/events/j  ointsessions/
paperarchive/edinburgh/ws11/Lehmkuhl.pdf. (July 2009)
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safeguard  with  their  sovereign  power  the  vital  national  interests  potentially  affected  (national
security, industrial policy, exploitation of national natural resources).
 The  most  troublesome  feature  of  these  long-term  international  contracts  is  their  inherent
uncertainty: they are particularly vulnerable to change, and therefore carry an even greater potential
for  conflicts  than  domestic  transactions14.  A  number  of  factors  account  for  this  uncertainty.
International transactions are frequently exposed to financial risks such as fluctuations in exchange
rates,  which  can  have  a  disastrous  impact  on  the  economic  balance  of  the  transaction  itself15.
Similarly, international transactions are also particularly vulnerable to political events within any of
the countries involved in the transactions itself: turmoil, revolutions, closed trade routes, war.
 Moreover,  international  transactions  suffer  from  cultural  differences,  which  in  most  cases
constitute a serious hurdle to a sheer understanding between parties. In the first place, there are
language  differences,  since  in  most  international  business  relations  at  least  one  party  has  to
communicate  in  a  foreign  language16.  Normally,  parties  will  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  by
resorting to a third language (commonly English) known by both of them; nonetheless, the potential
for miscommunication is still large, mainly because each party will understand certain notions and
concepts from the standpoint of his own social and legal background17. Cultural differences are not
only found in language. There is indeed a subtler,  non verbal  communication in which cultural
differences are even more difficult to detect and overcome. Accordingly,  non-verbal language is
frequently an important source of misunderstanding in intercultural communication18.
14
 C.  Bühring- Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, cit, p. 9
15
 For instance, the decline of the value of U.S. dollars vis a vis the Japanse Yen during the 1980s rendered many long-
term supply contracts  ruinous  for  the  American purchasers  of Japanese goods.  Cfr  J.W. Salacuse,  Making Global
Deals: Negotiating in the International Marketplace, Random Hause Business Books, 1992, p. 150
16
 The problem exists  even  where  both  parties  speak the  same  language;  as  the  famous  G.B.  Shaw saying  goes:
<<England and America are two countries separated by a common language>>.
17
 Take the example of  a French and an American party negotiating  the transfer of the property of a farm: "immovable
property" under French law encompasses farm animals and agricultural machinery, whereas "real property" in most
American jurisdictions does not. Hence, although using the same word "property" each party may actually think of quite
a different set of assets.
18
 Business practice tells many anecdotes of misunderstanding stemming from non verbal communication. The different
perceptions about  the importance and the use of time in  business relations  constitutes  a shining example.  Cultural
groups who  value punctuality  and the efficient  use  of time,  may very often feel  annoyed,  when  involved in time-
consuming  rituals  before  getting  to  the  "core  business"  of  a  negotiation.  On  the  other  hand,  in  cultural  contexts
emphasising the building of personal relationships in business dealings and the necessity to invest time in this process,
the insistence on tight schedules and deadlines may be felt as rude or even as a tactical manoeuvre to overwhelm or
deceive the other party. Cfr E. Hall, The Silent Language in Overseas Business, Harv Bus Rev, 1960, p. 87 ff . In this
respect,  many practitioners underline for example the central role which personal relationships play in Chinese society.
Commonly referred to as guanxy, personal relationships are deeply rooted in Chinese culture: they constitute the "oil of
life" and are just as important as the formal lines of authority. This also accounts for the large use of conciliation in
China as means to settle disputes. There are approximately 40,000 conciliation centres in China, spread throughout all
levels of society, from local villages to workplaces and commercial transactions between firms: the goal in Chinese
society is mainly to have the dispute settled and not adjudicated. Cfr T. Hagelin, Reflections on the Economic Future of
Hong Kong, Va. J. Trans. L., 1997, 30, p. 734; A. Ye, General Introduction to and Comments on the Integrated Dispute
Rersolution Systems in the PRC,  in International  Council  for Commercial  Arbitration (ed), Proceedings of the 17th
ICCA Conference 16-18 May 2004, Kluwer, 2004.
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Finally,  adequate  communication  and  information  is  frequently  hampered  by  the  considerable
geographical distance between the parties. Distance-communication in writing, over the telephone,
via e-mail or video-conference is inevitably less effective than person-to-person communication,
since  it  lacks  the  full  arsenal  of  verbal  and  non-verbal  communication,  as  well  as  of  social
interaction  (business  meals,  coffee-breaks,  conversations  on  non-business  matters),  which  is
extremely  important  in  building  and  maintaining  relationships  and  therefore  achieving  a  full
understanding between parties19.
Inadequacy international litigation
 To make things worse, not only international contracts, but also international disputes are fraught
with greater uncertainty than domestic disputes. This is mainly due to the fact that both legal and
non-legal control mechanisms will tend to be less effective in international business. 
 Non-legal control devices are less effective, because they largely depend on the coherence of the
social  environment.  And in international  business,  the social  context is  normally much weaker.
Parties will be successful in solving conflicts informally, in contexts where there is a high concern
for business reputation and for the continuation of the business relationship with the other party.
Although considerable exceptions may be found20, in the weaker context of international trade, quite
often  contracting  parties  never  expect  to  see  each  other  again:  social  norms  represent  less  an
effective device to prevent disputes. Besides, the ability of the parties to solve conflicts informally
is frequently restricted  by the same cultural,  linguistic,  and logistic  differences,  inherent  in  the
business transaction, and which may have contributed to the emergence of the dispute itself .
As far as legal control mechanisms are concerned, suffice it to say that no international tribunal for
the resolution of commercial disputes exists. Therefore,  international commercial litigation must
necessarily be conducted in front of national courts, and frequently is conducted in front of several
courts at the same time.  Moreover, international  litigation in front of a national court entails a
situation in which a plurality of different legal systems are involved in the dispute. This in turn
creates a number of  complications, that increase the uncertainty and costs of litigation.  But most of
19
 C. Bühring- Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, cit. , p. 15
20
 The classic examples are constituted by the oil and diamond industries, where the global market is made up of a
limited number of large players are involved in constant relations.
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all,  there  is  no  such thing as  a  binding decision  in  international  trade,  which can  be  enforced
internationally throughout the world.
 The  most  important  legal  problems  involved  in  international  court  litigation  regard:  court
jurisdiction,  the procedural  and substantive law applicable to the dispute,  and the effect  of  the
foreign judgement abroad.
 The problem of court jurisdiction stems from the fact that no uniform international standards about
the assertion of jurisdiction exist21. The rules under which national courts assume jurisdiction over a
dispute vary from country to country and frequently lead to conflicting outcomes. Accordingly, it
may well happen that the same dispute is subject to parallel lawsuits in different jurisdictions, and
that  the different  national  courts  involved end up with contradictory judgements22.  Parties  may
attempt to solve the problem of parallel  litigation by drafting an unambiguous choice of forum
clause. But, in the absence of uniform international standards, the danger of parallel lawsuits cannot
be excluded entirely: parties to a choice of forum clause cannot be certain that the chosen forum
will accept the jurisdiction23, nor can the parties be assured that all the other courts will respect their
forum selection and refrain from exercising their own jurisdiction.
 Procedural  problems  in  international  litigation  arise  especially  from  the  dramatic  differences
between civil and common law systems in the methods and scope of evidence gathering. The most
important source of conflict is represented by the American doctrine of discovery. Discovery is a
fundamental principle of procedural law, whereby each party is entailed to request  documents and
other evidence from other parties, or even  compel the production of evidence, on all the relevant
facts to the case24 . This principle allows for example the cross-examination of witnesses by the
21
 There are uniform standards limited to particular regions of the world. The most important standards are provided by
the Brussels I Regulation/ Lugano Convention regime, which is applicable in all European states, both belonging and
not belonging to the EU (See infra p. 159). 
22
 Well known examples of parallel litigation are constituted by the Hunt and British Petroleum case (B.P. Exploration
Co. Ltd v. Hunt, Queen´s Bench Division, Commercial Court, Cause 1975 B No. 4490 and Hunt v. BP Exploration Co.
Ltd, 492 F.Supp. 885 N.D. Tex 1980, 580 F. Supp. 304, N. D. Tex 1984) where the same dispute ended up in front of
the House of lords, the ECHR, and the Court of Texas, and the Laker case (British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, 1985
A.C.  58, ),  where British and American courts engaged in a legal  battle over jurisdiction, which caused enormous
transaction costs.
23
 Even if in theory all state laws accept the validity of a forum choice clause, its effective respect is a matter of judicial
discretion.  Judicial  practice  shows  that  recognition  of  choice  of  forum  clauses  is  subject  to  a  great  variety  of
requirements which allow for a great margin of interpretation. A common requirement is for example that the clause
must  be reasonable,  but the reasonableness of the clause depends on a multiplicity of factors varying from court to
court; sometimes courts are even tempted to exploit their discretion and recognise clauses that permit judges to reduce
their workloads by sending cases abroad. A very much followed criterion in common law countries is the forum non
conveniens doctrine, whereby  a court may decline its jurisdiction simply because it believes that the defendant, for a
number  of  very  discretional  reasons  (  the  location  of  witnesses  and  documents,  the  better  availability  of  judicial
resources), can more adequately  pursue his action in another jurisdiction. Cfr W.W. Parker, When and Why Arbitration
Matters, in G.M. Bersesford Hartwell, (Ed.), The Commercial Way to Justice,  Kluwer Law, 1997,  pp. 76-80
24
 Cfr J.M. Lookofsky;  Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, cit., p . 641-642; see also generally G.
Born, International Civil Litigation in the United States Courts: Commentary and Materials, Kluwer, 1996, ch 11, pp.
843-922 and  Wikipedia, voice Discovery (Law)
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lawyers of both sides25, and even the right on lawyers of each side to be granted entry onto the
premises of the other side to conduct their own investigations26. The principle of discovery has a
very broad scope under the American Federal Rules of Evidence: the only requirement is that the
information sought must be relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action27. As a
consequence, this standard of relevance allows for very broad intrusions into the private sphere of
the  other  party;  intrusions  which  in  many  civil  law  countries  often  amount  to  criminal
infringements,  because  in  such  countries  the  gathering  of  evidence  is  regarded  as  an  official
function within the exclusive domain of the courts28. Nonetheless, when judging over international
disputes,  American  courts  frequently  issue  unilateral  orders  of  discovery  abroad,  without  first
seeking permission or cooperation of the foreign sovereign state concerned.29 As a result, a foreign
litigant requested by an American court to implement an order of discovery in his home country is
frequently torn between two contradictory obligations and sanctions: if on the one hand he complies
with the American request, he will violate his own national law and consequently be subject to the
relative sanction; if on the other hand he does not implement the discovery order, he will bear the
sanction the American court can impose in case of non-cooperation.
What is more, such unilateral orders of extraterritorial discovery have given rise to a number of
diplomatic protests and notes by  states, which consider them as a violation of their sovereignty30. A
number  of  foreign  jurisdictions,  including Canada,  France  and the  United Kingdom have even
passed  specific  legislation  -  the  so-called  "blocking  statutes"  -  in  order  to  prevent  the
implementation of extraterritorial orders of discovery from the American courts.
 It  is  thus  no surprise that  US doctrine  itself considers  the issue of discovery one of the most
troublesome aspects of their relations with foreign jurisdictions31. In order to solve the problem of
the  divergent  methods  of  evidence  gathering,  some  twenty  states  have  acceded  to  the  Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, which lays down a common procedure by which a
judicial authority in one contracting state may request evidence located in another contracting state.
Nonetheless, resort to the Convention has so far been limited and American courts have frequently
issued orders of discovery by-passing the Convention
25
 Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 33
26
 Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 34
27
 Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 26(b) (1)
28
 C. Bühring- Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, cit, p. 32
29
 J.M. Lookofsky; Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, cit. , p. 472
30
 J .M. Lookofsky; Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, cit., p. 473
31
 Cfr par. 442 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, reporter´s note 1 (1987)<<no aspect
of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to so
much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the United States>>, quoted by J..M.
Lookofsky; Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, cit. , p. 473
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 The problem of the different substantive laws applicable to international disputes has already been
dealt with in the chapter on the harmonisation of international trade law32. Here, it is enough to
remind that, in the absence of an unambiguous choice made by the parties, national courts will have
to resort  to their  own choice of law rules,  with most uncertain  results.  Even where  party have
succeeded in agreeing on a certain  national  law, it  may be hard to  predict  the outcome of the
dispute,  when a court  is  called upon to apply a foreign law, since it  may lack the background
knowledge to fully understand the rules embodied in an unfamiliar legal tradition.
 But the most important source of uncertainty in international litigation is undoubtedly the issue of
enforcement of foreign judgements.  On account of the territorial limitations of state sovereignty, a
court  judgement has  per se no binding force outside the jurisdiction where it  is  rendered.  In  a
foreign country, it may have effect only if it is recognised by the competent authority (usually the
court) of that country. So, in a foreign country, a foreign judgement will have the effect of a final
decision and the power to preclude a new litigation on the same dispute, only if it is recognised in
that jurisdiction. By the same token, the enforcement of a foreign judgement abroad is subject to the
discretional decision of the competent local authorities. It follows that, in the absence of a specific
international treaty,  states are under no obligation to recognise and give enforcement to foreign
judgements. And indeed there are no clear rules in international practice33, since national courts tend
to  recognise  and  give  enforcement  to  foreign  judgements  on  a  mere  case-by-case  basis  and
sometimes the decision varies not only from country to country, but even from court to court within
the same country. 
In Europe, the problem of parallel litigation has been solved by a specific Regulation, the so called
Brussels I Regulation , which provides uniform criteria for the assertion of international jurisdiction
of  the  courts  in  the  member  states  and  introduces  the  principle  of  automatic  recognition  of
judgments  given in  the European  Union. It  also provides a  limited number  of exceptions upon
which recognition and enforcement may be refused (lack of jurisdiction, improper service in case of
default  judgements,  violation of international  public policy).  Finally,  it  ensures a uniform court
practice, by conferring upon the European Court of Justice the power of deciding on questions of
interpretation arising out of the application of the Convention.
32
 See supra pp. 94ff
33
 Generally speaking, legal doctrine has identified three main approaches to the recognition problem followed by the
courts throughout the world: 1) the courts simply disregard foreign decisions; 2) the courts recognise foreign decision
on a reciprocity basis; 3) the courts recognise foreign judgements only in so far as they meet certain procedural and
substantive  standards,  commonly  encompassed  under  the  label  of  the  "due  process  of  law".(Cfr  F.  Juenger,  The
Recognition of Money Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, Am. J. Comp. L., 1998, 36, 1,  p. 5.).
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 But, outside the scope of the Brussels Regulation (the Regulation is applicable only to civil and
commercial matters34),  European legal systems follow no uniform approach to this issue, since each
country continues to apply its own criteria for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements.
On  the  one  hand,  we  find  Denmark,  which,  absent  a  specific  obligation  stemming  from  an
international treaty,  is extremely hostile to the recognition of foreign judgements35. On the other
hand, we find countries such as England and Italy, where recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgements  is  the  general  rule:  only  the  usual  grounds  of  defences  will  be  available  against
enforcement (public policy, respect of "due process" principles). In the middle, we find countries
like Germany, which essentially subject enforcement to the condition of reciprocity: according to
art 722 of the German Civil Procedure Code, a foreign judgements will not be recognised, inter alia,
where the foreign court has no jurisdiction under German law36 and where there is no guarantee of
reciprocity37.
As we can see, although the Brussels Convention represents an important achievement in this field,
it may not be considered to put the final word on the problem. On account of its limited territorial
scope,  it  leaves  untouched the member states´existing recognition regimes  with respect  to  non-
member states.
Outside Europe, the situation is even worse: only few multilateral conventions have been signed,
but  have little  practical  significance38.  There  are  also a  number of  bilateral  treaties,  which EU
countries have signed with non-EU states. In addition to having a very limited importance, such
treaties may create new enforcement problems, since there are no clear rules in case of conflict
among them.39
In conclusion, litigation of international disputes in front of national courts is subject to a number of
risks:
34
  The so called "new Brussels II Regulation" (Council Regulation No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003) disciplines the
mutual recognition and enforcement of decisions in divorce matters and matter of parental responsibility.
35J. M. Lookofsky; Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 495: foreign judgements are considered
to bear a certain evidentiary weight, but the real value of this has been opened to question.
36
 This  requirement  is  known  as  the  mirror  image  principle,  since  Germany  in  a  sense  project  its  own  rules  of
jurisdiction on the judgement rendering court: foreign judgements are recognised, provided they have been rendered in
the same cases in which German courts could be deemed competetent
37
 Under the principle of reciprocity, the party seeking recognition must show that comparable judgements from the
state where recognition is sought would be recognised in the country where the judgement at issue originated. In recent
practice, German courts have however interpreted this requisite with flexibility, requiring only an essential similarity
between the cases. Cfr Martiny, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgements in the Federal Republic
of Germany, Am. J. Comp. L., 1987, 35, p. 749-52.
38
 Cfr the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements in Civil and Commercial
matters,  which was ratified only by Cyprus,  the Netherlands and Portugal,  and the Montevideo Convention on the
Extraterritorial validity of Foreign Judgements and Arbitral Awards
39
 The conflict of conventions is described as a nightmare for lawyers in international litigation. Cfr J. M. Lookofsky;
Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, cit. , p. 500
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1) it may already be difficult for the parties to agree on an appropriate forum. Even where parties
find an agreement, courts of several countries may still claim jurisdiction over the same dispute,
giving rise to the problem of parallel litigation;
2) during the litigation, parties may be forced to gather evidence or tolerate the taking of evidence
through unfamiliar methods;
3)  additional  uncertainty  may  result  where  national  courts  have  chosen  and  apply  a  foreign
substantive law to the dispute
4) a judgement may have no effect at all outside the jurisdiction where it was obtained.
As we will see, the growing importance of arbitration in international trade may be explained as a
response to the typical risks on international litigation. 
The sources of international arbitration
Arbitration as a “forensic minefield”
Although the staunch defenders of the floating arbitration thesis claim the contrary, arbitration does
not exist in a legal vacuum.  As a general rule, the conduct of arbitral proceedings is regulated by
two main sources. The first is the will of the parties, which constitutes arbitration’s foundational
principle (a sort of  Grundnorm 40), the second is the governing law, generally referred to as the
curial  law or  the  lex loci  arbitri,  which is  the national  law of  the place  or  seat  of  arbitration.
Whereas in most cases the lex loci arbitri will regulate all matters of the arbitral proceedings41, it
may sometimes happen that, in addition to these two basic sources, other different systems of laws
or rules42 may come into play in regulating some specific aspects of the arbitration. In particular it is
possible to identify five different systems of laws or rules which may impact upon the international
arbitral process43: the law governing the parties’ capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement, the
40
 J.F. Poudret and S. Besson, Droit Compare’ de l’Arbitrage International, Bruylant, 2002, p. 83
41
 Cfr.  M. Mustill, S.C. Boyd , Commercial Arbitration, Butterworths, 2002, p. 61
42
 These  may  be  both  rules  of  substantial  law  and  conflict  of  laws  rules;  both  national  laws  and  international
conventions, rules resulting from the parties’ will, rules of arbitral institutions, previous arbitral decisions.  P. Fouchard,
E. Gaillard, B. Goldman, Traite’ de l’Arbitrage Commercial International, Editions Litec, 1996, p. 71
43
 A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit,  p. 72
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proper law of the arbitration agreement, the law governing the existence and proceedings of the
arbitral tribunal, the proper law of the contract i.e. the law governing the substantive issues of the
dispute and finally the law governing recognition and enforcement of the award. Given the wide
variety of the different sets of laws or rules which may be applicable at the same time, arbitration
may sometimes turn into a “forensic minefield”44 i.e. a process in which the arbitrator, the parties
and  their  counsel  need  to  face  a  complex  maze  of  national,  international  and  non-national
conflicting laws and rules45.  For instance, as far as the issue of  arbitrability is concerned, it may
happen that a claim may be arbitrable under the law governing the arbitration agreement and under
the  lex loci arbitri, but not according to the law of the place of enforcement. It  follows that an
award  on  such  dispute,  although  validly  rendered  under  the  curial  law,  may  prove  to  be
unenforceable under the law of the place of enforcement. Another issue for potential conflict is the
capacity of the parties to arbitrate, which is not always regulated by the  lex loci arbitri since it
depends upon the party’s nationality or place of usual residence. This issue is particular problematic
in cases where one or more parties is a state, because generally national systems impose restrictions
on the capacity of a state or state agency to enter into an arbitration agreement.  Conflicts  may
frequently arise since there is no uniform solution for this issue. Some national laws (e.g. in United
Kingdom, Germany,  The Netherlands and Switzerland) put no restriction on the capacity of the
state or state agencies to enter into an arbitration agreement; by contrast other laws (e.g.  Saudi
Arabia and Belgium) prevent the state and state agencies from entering into arbitration agreements;
other laws take (e.g. in the United States) a middle-ground position  and prevent only the Federal
Government from entering into arbitration agreements, whereas they envisage no such limitation on
state agencies.
The sources of uniform arbitration rules aim at reaching the ideal situation in which the potential for
conflicting laws and rules is minimised and international arbitral proceedings are conducted in the
same way no matter where they take place46. In such an ideal situation, the arbitral tribunal would
be guided by the agreement of the parties,  or  failing this agreement,  by its own judgement;  in
addition,  it  would be able to render  an award enforceable on the same conditions in any state.
Arguably, as we will see in more detail in the following chapters, the complete fulfilment of this
situation will remain an ideal: each state has its own national characteristics and practices, its own
concept  of  how  arbitrations  should  be  conducted;  moreover,  states  with  a  long  tradition  in
arbitration practice and highly developed arbitration laws are particularly  reluctant  to switch to
uniform rules. Nonetheless, the publication of international standard of arbitral procedure embodied
44
 A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit p. 72
45
 J.M. Lookofsky; Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, 1992, cit., p. 561
46
 A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 77
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in the UNCITRAL Model law and in the New York Convention has fostered an almost universal
wave of  legislative  reform aimed at  updating national  arbitration  laws  to  the modern  needs  of
international  practice47.   Urged  by  the  international  environment’s  pressure,  states  which  had
previously shown hostility vis a vis arbitration or which submitted it to a rigorous system of court
supervision have soften their approaches in order not to undermine their stake in the arbitration
market. These countries have come to realise that a simple, liberal and modern arbitration law is a
good  “marketing  strategy”  allowing  to  draw  a  far  greater  number  of  arbitral  disputes  in  their
territory48. Hence, the pressures  exerted on national legislatures in favour of a reform .
It is to the survey of these sources of uniform arbitration rules that we now turn.
The sources of uniform rules in international commercial arbitration
The two main sources of uniform rules in international commercial arbitration are:
- The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(commonly referred to as "the New York Convention" or NYC) and
- The United Nations  Commission for  International  Trade  Law (UNCITRAL)   Model  Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (commonly referred to as "the UNCITRAL Model Law”) and
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
Despite the limitation suggested by its name, the NYC establishes minimum standards both for
enforcement  and  jurisdiction  aspects  of  international  commercial  arbitration.  According  to  the
discipline provided by the Convention, each contracting state must recognise foreign arbitral awards
as  binding  and  enforce  them  using  procedures  comparable  with  those  applicable  to  domestic
awards.49. In addition, always according to the Convention, a contracting state asked to recognise
and enforce a foreign arbitral award can refuse to do so only on the basis of the limited criteria set
forth by the Convention itself50.  Sponsored by the United Nations, it is one of the most successful
47
 P. Fouchard, E. Gaillard, B. Goldman, Traite’ de l’Arbitrage Commercial International, cit, p. 83. Already during the
drafting  process  of  the  UNCITRAL Model  Law some  states  like  France  (1980)  decided  to  reform their  national
arbitration  laws.  After  its  publication  there  has  been  a  worldwide  wave  of  legislative  reform  e.g.  in  the  United
Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Austria.
48
 P. Fouchard, E. Gaillard, B. Goldman, Traite’ de l’Arbitrage Commercial International, cit, p. 84
49
 New York Convention art III
50
 The New York Convention sets out three fundamental standards for international arbitration: the arbitration must
comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement; the parties must be treated fairly and with equality (i.e. according to
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agreements concluded within its framework51. To date, it has been ratified by over 130 countries,
thus providing the most extensive network for the enforcement of decisions resolving disputes: the
regime  established  by  the  Convention  far  exceeds  any  comparable  international  regime  for
enforcing  court  decisions52.  This  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  important  advantages  of
international arbitration over international court litigation.
The UNCITRAL Model Law has been adopted by UNCITRAL in 1985 with a view to harmonising
the different national arbitration procedures and adapting them to the specific needs of international
commercial arbitration practice53. It is important to point out that the purpose of the Model Law is
not to replace the various arbitration laws of the world with a  single uniform law of universal
application. Rather, it purports to make available to national legislatures a set of principles and rules
that  can  be  adopted  to  provide  or  improve  national  laws  governing  international  commercial
arbitration and, in so doing, to bring such laws into closer harmony with each other. The Model
Law provides a model which states can use as the basis for their national law but they are in no
sense bound to follow its exact wording; they can depart from it to a greater or lesser extent.54 The
original idea was to draft a protocol annexed to the NYC which should deal with the conduct of
arbitral  proceedings,  but  eventually  UNCITRAL took the view that  harmonisation in  this  field
could  be  achieved  more  effectively  by  the  promulgation  of  a  model  law,  rather  than  by  a
supplementary  protocol  to  the  Convention,  since  the  former  means  allows  more  room  for
flexibility55.  The Model Law covers all stages of the arbitral process from the arbitration agreement
to the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award and reflects a worldwide consensus on the
principles and important issues of international arbitration practice.  
Whereas  The  Model  Law  constitutes  a  model  for  national  legislations,  the  Arbitration  Rules
constitute a model for ad hoc arbitration and arbitration institutions. The Rules´aim is therefore
similar to that of the Model Law: creating a greater uniformity in the rules applicable to arbitration
proceedings in order to render the parties reasonably sure of obtaining an award which would be
enforceable under the NYC56. Drafted in 1976, the Rules cover all aspects of the arbitral process,
the principles of international due process); the award must respect international public policy both with resepect to its
content and its subject matter.  Where such criteria are not met,  the Convention allows a national court to refuse to
enforce  an  award  made  outside  its  jurisdiction.  cfr  J.D.M.  Lew,  Achieving  the  Dream:  Autonomous  Arbitration,
Arbitration International, 2006, 22, 2, p. 189
51
 C. Bühring-Hule, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, cit p. 75
52
 P. Capper,  International Arbitration: a Handbook . cit., p. 3
53UNCITRAL Secretariat ,  Explanation of Model Law,   UN Doc A/CN.9/264 (reproduced in UNCITRAL Yearbook,
vol. XVI - 1985).
54R.  Goode,  H.  Kronke,  E.  McKendrick,  Transnational  Commercial  Law:  Text,  Cases,  and  Materials,  Oxford
University Press,  2007, p. 632.
55A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 508; M.R. Sammartano,
International Arbitration Law and Practice, Kluwer, 2001, p. 830.
56A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 480
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providing a  model arbitration clause,  setting out  procedural  rules  regarding the appointment  of
arbitration and the conduct of arbitral proceedings and establishing rules in relation to the form,
effect and interpretation of the award.
The Model Law and the Arbitration Rules are not affected by substantial differences in terms of
provisions57:  this  comes  as  no  surprise,  given  that  they  were  drafted  by  the  same  institution
essentially for the same harmonisation purpose. The most important differences regard the scope of
these two sets of rules. The Model Law applies only to international and commercial arbitration,
whereas the Arbitration Rules may be used for both domestic and international disputes. But most
importantly the Arbitration Rules can in no way derogate the mandatory provisions of the national
law applicable to the arbitration58 , whereas the Model Law is designed to prevail as a lex specialis
with  respect  to  other  provisions  governing  international  commercial  arbitration  within  the
jurisdiction of a country which adopts the Model Law59 . Moreover the Model Law contains an
important provision regulating the extent of court intervention in the arbitration process, which is of
course not found in the Arbitration Rules. Art 5 states that << in matters governed by this Law, no
court shall intervene escept where so provided in this Law>>: this means that, in all the topics and
aspects of arbitration regulated by the Model Law, a national court can intervene only in those cases
expressely provided for by the Model Law itself. 
Both the Model Law and the Arbitration Rules have met with considerable success in the arbitration
practice. Although the latter were designed specifically for use in ad hoc arbitration, a number of
arbitral institutions have adopted them, either in full or in  part. 60  
In some cases the arbitral institutions have only formally adopted the UNCITRAL Rules, but have
in fact radically changed them as to undermine the basic principles of the arbitral proceedings as
57Even though  the  Model  Law,  which  is  addressed  to  national  legislators,  contains  provisions  on the  recognition,
enforcement and the setting aside of the awards: similar rules are of course not provided by the Arbitration Rules, which
are conceived for private parties. Conversely, only the Arbitration Rules contain detailed provisions  for establishing the
costs and fees of arbitration, admittedly one of the most troublesome issues on which an agreement is difficult to find
58
 See art 1(3) of the Arbitration Rules
59A. Redfern and M. Hunter,  Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 512. There is in this
respect a specific exclusion regarding national rules on arbitrability: if the law of he country concerned excludes the
possibility of submitting certain types of disputes to arbitration, this will prevail; so will any legislation providing for
compulsory arbitration (art 1.5)
60
 See for example the Rules of Procedure of the Inter American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC), or the
Rules for Arbitration of the Kuala Lampur Arbitration Centre and the Cairo Arbitration Centre. But the most significant
practical application of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules has been in connection with the proceedings of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established in 1982 pursuant to the Algiers
Accords, which resolved the crisis between United States and Iran culminated with the Iranian seizure of US Embassy
hostages  in 1979. The Tribunal  was  established  to   resolve  existing  disputes  between  the  two  countries  and their
nationals,  especially  the  claims  against  US  citizens  and  the  Iranian  governments   involving  commercial  debts,
nationalisations,  expropriations,  breaches  of  contracts  and  other  matters.  The  Tribunal  sits  in  The  Hague  and  is
comprised of nine arbitrators: three appointed by Iran, three by the United States,  and three by the party-appointed
members  acting  jointly  or,  in  absence  of  agreement,  by an  appointing  authority.  The  tribunal  adopted  with  some
modifications, the UNCITRAL Rules and therefore plays an important role in the development of a case law related to
such rules.
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envisaged by UNCITRAL. This has given rise to concerns over the expectations of the parties, who
submitted their disputes with a view to having them settled according to UNCITRAL Rules and
were in fact faced with a radical different kind of arbitration. Accordingly, in 1982 UNCITRAL
issued a set of recommendation61 urging an arbitral institution which adopts the Arbitration Rules to
refrain as far as possible from modifying them and, if exceptionally some modifications are needed,
to highlight the departure from the Rules.
To date, more than 40 States States have adopted the Model Law in whole or in part62, as the basis
for their national  law of arbitration63.  Strangely enough,  none of the so called major arbitration
jurisdictions have adopted the Model Law64, although they all actively participated to its drafting
and are still participating to the ongoing discussions over its reform. Nonetheless, where national
arbitration laws have not adopted the Model Law, they have moved on to adopt its underlying
philosophy: they shifted from an arbitration system centred on control and supervision by national
courts  to a system based on party autonomy and non-intervention65. This has given the Model Law
the status of generally accepted standard in international arbitration, akin to general trade usages or
lex  mercatoria66  it  is  therefore  virtually  inconceivable  that  any  state  will  in  future  introduce
legislation relating to arbitration without first looking at the text of the Model law  67. Moreover,
comparative surveys have shown that even where states have adopted arbitration laws not based on
the Model Law, the practical  effects of the discipline have not been greatly different: most of the
fundamental issues such as arbitrability, due process, constitution of the tribunal, and the tribunal’s
right to shape the proceedings are dealt with in an identical (or almost identical) fashion.68. by way
of  conclusion,  the  NYC,  the  UNCITRAL  Arbitration  Rules  and  the  Model  law  represent  a
61UN Doc. A/CN.9/230 “Recommendations to assist arbitral institutions and other interested bodies with regard to
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”, YBCA, 1983, VIII, p. 211
62
 For a complete list of the countries which adopted a legislation based on the Model Law, see UNCITRAL’s website
www.uncitral.org
63
 In countries like Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Hong Kong, and Nigeria the Model Law was adopted either
without  change  or  with  little  modifications.  Countries  like  the  Netherlands  and  Spain  have  not  passed  legislation
directly based on the Model Law, although the influence of the latter – or at least its travaux preparatoires – is visible.
A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 526.
64
 England, France, Sweden, Switzerland, USA (only four states in USA have adopted the Model Law).
65
 This is the case for example of Swiss Private International Law Act 1990, which on the one hand strongly limits court
intervention, on the other hand provides arbitrators  with a wide discretional power to control the arbitration process,
except where the parties agree otherwise. Moreover, it establishes that, where neither party is domiciled or has a place
of business in Switzerland, the parties can expressly agree to exclude all juridical recourse, subject to few restrictions. A
similar liberal act has been adopted in Sweden in 1999 and, in a more moderate vein, in France in 1981. Despite the
1996 reform, English arbitration law has still  a more conservative approach, since courts have retained a substantial
power of intervention, arbitrations are subject to a large number of mandatory provisions, and parties are allowed to
challenge awards in front of the national court on a lengthy list of grounds. J.D.M. Lew, op. cit., p. 192
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 J.D.M. Lew, op.cit., p. 191
67
 A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit p. 525
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 C. Soderlund, A Comparative Overview of Arbitration laws: Swedish Arbitration Act 1999, English Arbitration Act
1996 and Russian Federal Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1993, Arbitration International, 2004, 20, 1, p.
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significant contribution to the development of a uniform, international arbitration process designed
to produce a binding an enforceable method for the resolution of disputes in international  trade
across national boundaries.69
In addition to these sources collected in written official texts, the arbitration system includes the
rules  and  practices  of  the  leading  arbitral  institutions.  As  a  result  of  the  activities  of  such
institutions,  supplemented  by the  comments  of  academic  doctrine,  there  is  a  growing  body of
international rules and practice relating to international arbitration which is documented in the many
legal journals which specialise in the field.
Finally,  it  should be borne in mind that, despite the frequent claims of the alleged independent
character of international arbitration, every arbitral process has a juridical seat in a certain country.
Consequently,  such arbitration must be conducted in accordance with the arbitration law of that
state. Although most national arbitration laws limit the power of intervention of state courts, the
latter  often  play  an  important  role  in  supporting  arbitration,  especially  in  the  recognition  and
enforcement of the award. As a general rule, state courts are not allowed to make the final decision
on the merits of the dispute. However, courts have the power to review, set aside, or refuse the
enforcement  of  the  award,  normally  on  public  policy  grounds.   An  unsuccessful  party  may
challenge an award in the courts of the juridical seat of the arbitration or in the courts of the state
where enforcement is sought. In this respect, art. V NYC provides a set of limited grounds on which
the recognition and the enforcement of an award may be refused, at the request of the party against
whom it is invoked. 
As we can see, despite the considerable efforts made by the United Nations in this field, the arbitral
process is governed by a maze of different normative systems which have simultaneous application.
Consequently,  it is not always easy for the interpreter to identify the exact rules or set of rules
applicable to the particular dispute.
.
Advantages of arbitration
International arbitration offers a number of advantages over court litigation, which descend from its
character  of  private adjudication  process.   They are  commonly found in,  procedural  flexibility,
69
 A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit p. 527
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speed and lower costs, neutrality, confidentiality and, most importantly, simpler enforceability of
the decision70.
Arbitration is a consensual process; a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute, unless he has
agreed to arbitration. Party autonomy is a fundamental principle of arbitration: parties are free to
determine not only whether,  but also how, their disputes should be solved. They have also the
power and freedom to: select the tribunal (or agree on the method of selection); choose the rules
that will apply to the proceedings and choose the language of the arbitration.
Hence, the advantage of procedural flexibility. Procedural flexibility means that the parties, or, if
they fail to agree, the arbitrators, are free to determine the rules for the conduction of arbitration.
Parties can even choose the place of arbitration and, more importantly, the person or the persons
who are going to decide the dispute71. This allows parties to choose arbitrators according to the
particular  skills  and  expertise  necessary to  solve their  particular  dispute:  they can  for  example
appoint corporate, or banking, or securities law, but also civil engineering experts. Consequently, an
experienced tribunal of this kind should be able to grasp quickly the salient issues of fact and law in
dispute and so save the parties both time and money, as well as offering them the prospect of a
sensible award72. Finally, parties may agree that the arbitration should be held in a language (such
as  English)  understood  by  both  of  them  and  in  which  their  business  relationship  has  been
conducted. Nonetheless, one must also look at  the other side of the coin. The private nature of
arbitration  means  also  that  arbitrators  often  consider  their  task  as  a  commercial  service,  and
therefore  they  may  be  tempted  to  use  flexibility  in  order  comply  with  customer-satisfaction
standards  rather  than  legal  certainty,  so  that  neither  party  goes  home  empty-handed  after  the
dispute. 
 Arbitration´s procedural flexibility may result in savings of time and costs, even if this will often
depend on a number of other factors such as the number of arbitrators, the complexity of arbitration
and the degree of cooperation between the parties73. Neutrality , i.e.  the possibility of selecting  a
70Cfr J.W. Rowley (Ed.), Arbitration World, , The European Lawyer, 2006, p. xii; M.Kerr, International Arbitration v
Litigation, JBL, 1980, p. 164; R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and
Materials, cit., p. 624.
71
 In major multi-million dollar arbitration cases parties even have the habit to conduct the so-called "beauty contests"
i.e.  they interview the potential candidates prior to making the choice of nominating their  own arbitrator (cfr K.P.
Berger (ed), The Practice of Transnational Law, Kluwer Law, 2001, p. 25).
72A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration,  cit., p. 23
73
 Ibidem. Cfr also J.M. Lookofsky; Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, cit. , p. 559-60, <<In actual
fact, international arbitration is sometimes a slow-moving business, and it rarely comes cheap>>, especially because the
arbitrator´s fees are generally geared towards the amount of the dispute. Cfr also R. Goode, Commercial Law, Lexis
Nexis,  2004, p. 1163: <<the court fees in an action are relatively modest,  whereas in an arbitration the parties are
responsible for the arbitrator's remuneration and travel and accommodation expenses  (which may be particularly heavy
if there are several arbitrators coming from different countries),  the hire of accommodation for the hearing and the
payment of the stenographer if they wish to have a full record of the evidence. In the case of an institutional arbitration
the parties also have to pay the administrative charges of the arbitral institution. On the other hand, the arbitrator's
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neutral forum completely detached from the litigants´ nationality is undoubtedly an advantage, if
only one considers that  either party  is usually reluctant to submit the dispute to the court of the
other party´s state.   
Also the advantage of  confidentiality stems from the private nature of the arbitration process.  In
most legal systems, arbitral awards do not automatically become matters of public record, as court
judgements usually do: they may be published only with the parties´consent74.
 We have already dealt with the more favourable enforcement regime laid down in the New York
Convention, which binds most of the world to enforce arbitral awards considered valid according to
the criteria set out by the Convention itself. The possibility of a worldwide enforcement is very
important  especially  in  cases  where  the  dispute  has  been  settled  in  a  country  in  which  the
respondent   does not  have any or  enough assets.  In  such cases,  the winning party may have a
guarantee to enforce the award in the different county where the losing party´s assets lie
If these are the advantages of international arbitration, it may then be considered appropriate, at
least in general terms,  to resort to this dispute-settlement mechanism, where one or more of  the
following circumstances occur:
1) parties wish to overcome the problems connected to parallel  litigation and  choice of forum
clause. As we have seen above, parties may try to solve the problem of parallel litigation by drafting
an appropriate choice of forum clause. But it is not always easy to agree on a forum. There may be
many reasons why such agreement cannot be reached. A party may comprehensively be reluctant to
accept the state court of the other party,  because it may feel a bias of "hometown justice"75, i.e.
suspect that the judge will tend to rule in favour of the local party76. Moreover, even where provided
with sufficient guarantees as to the impartiality of the judge, the party may nonetheless  feel not
familiar with the legal system and the language of the country concerned77. Another reason may be
for  example  that  the  procedures  of  the  courts  having otherwise  jurisdiction are  considered  too
cumbersome and lengthy; finally a party may simply find a local forum unfavourable (for example
because it entails an uneven distribution of trial costs: the foreign party has to bear the costs of
greater familiarity with the practices of the industry or market may shorten the proceedings and thus save expense>>.
74
 Though confidentiality cannot fully insulate arbitration from the public eye. Arbitral awards may become object of
litigation in front of public courts and accordingly the general public may hafe an indirect knowledge of them.
75
 C. Bühring- Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, cit. p. 22
76
 ´The literature on arbitration refers many cases of "hometown justice" bias. See e.g. W.W. Park,  When and Why
Arbitration Matters, cit., p. 75 <<In some countries the questionable integrity of the judicial system may make judicial
proceedings  resemble  auctions  more  than trials,  with  judgements  going to  the  highest  bidder>>; or  M.J.  Bond,  A
Geography of International Arbitration, Arbitration International, 2005, 21, 1, p. 102,  who refers that in Brazil it is
common practice for lawyers of both sides to personally hand the brief to the judge and discuss the case in private
outside the presence of the other parties. Were this to occur in England - the author observes- not only would the lawyer
be banned from legal practice forever,  but would also be prosecutes,  since this behaviour undoubtedly constitutes a
criminal offence.
77
 M. Huleatt-James & N. Gould, International Commercial Arbitration: a Handbook, cit., p. 8 
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hiring local counsel in addition to its home counsel, of translating documents and lodging in the
venue  of  the  trial78 ).  In  arbitration  parties  can  choose  their  own  forum and  place  of  dispute
settlement, without being bound by the jurisdiction rules of any country. An arbitral tribunal can be
agreed  upon  in  a  mutually  accessible  country,  with  proceedings  in  a  common  language,  and
according to procedural rules which give neither side an unfair advantage;79
2) parties wish to keep their dispute private and therefore rely on arbitration´s confidentiality;
3)  The language  of  the  contract  may be  different  from the language  of  the  state  court  having
jurisdiction. In this case, the parties may wish to avoid the trouble of translating all documents into
the state court´s language;
4) Similarly, and more importantly, the chosen governing law of the contract object of the dispute
may be different from the law of the state court. In this case, parties wish to avoid problems arising
from the fact that the national judge is required to apply a foreign law, which he is likely not to be
familiar with;
5) parties wish to have a final binding decision which is not subject to an appeal. In many states, it
is not possible to appeal against an arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator made an
error of law. In other states, it is possible for the parties to agree to exclude the right of appeal;
6) parties wish to benefit from a wider enforcement regime. On account of the wide geographical
purview of  the  New York  Convention,  the  award  will  be  enforced  on  a  worldwide  basis  and
national  courts  will  generally  enforce  arbitral  awards  far  more  readily  than  foreign  court
judgements80;
Disadvantages of arbitration
On  the  other  hand,  and  always  in  general  terms,  arbitration  may  result  an   inappropriate  or
unfeasible device for dispute settlement in the following circumstances:
1) the dispute is not "arbitrable" under the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, the law of the
state where the arbitration is to take place, or the law of the state where the enforcemnt is sought;
78
 C. Bühring- Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, cit, p. 23
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2)  one  of  the  parties  lacks  the  capacity,  under  the  law  of  its  domicile,  to  participate  in  an
arbitration81;
3)the nature of the remedy sought is not normally within the powers of an arbitral tribunal: for
example, if a party seek a coactive order such as a permanent injunction;
4) in disputes related to state contracts involving a developing country, there is a strong objection to
arbitration  by  the  public  contracting  party,  which  perceives  as  a  pro-Western  bias  the  rules
regulating  the  arbitral  process,  and  consequently  insists  that  the  dispute  should  be  settled  by
national courts applying domestic law82;
5) parties distrust arbitration because it lacks full appeal and formal rules of evidence83.
International and commercial arbitration
Most publications on arbitration deal only with a particular type thereof: international commercial
arbitration.  Although the definition of the terms international and commercial entails important
consequences,  both in terms of theory and practice,  no uniform definition exist. Therefore,  it is
always necessary to refer to the relevant state´s arbitration law in order to get to know the proper
meaning of the terms "international" and "commercial". Usually, this will be the so called lex loci,
i.e. law of the state in which the arbitration is to take place.
International  arbitration is  to be distinguished  from domestic  arbitration.  This  is  because  many
countries have different rules for domestic arbitrations, usually providing for greater oversight and
involvement of the courts than is the case with international arbitrations.84There are good reasons
for doing this. First, an international arbitration will usually have no connection with the state in
which the arbitration takes place, other than the fact that it is taking place on the territory of that
state.85 Secondly,  in  international  arbitrations  there  are  very few issues  of  consumer  protection
involved, because parties are usually corporations or state entities. Accordingly, the state concerned
81
 For example, according to their respective national laws, the Saudi Arabian State and the US federal government may
not be a party to an arbitration agreement (though US state agency may be).
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 J. M. Lookofsky; Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, cit. , p. 560
83For  example,  arbitrators  have  not  the  power  to  require  the  attendance  of  witnesses  under  penalty  of  fine  or
imprisonment: this coercive power is typical of state sovereignty and states are not likely to delegate to a private arbitral
tribunal, however eminent it may be. Cfr A. Redfern and M. Hunter,  Law and Practice of International Commercial
Arbitration, cit, p. 47 
84R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 2007, p. 628
85A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 12
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can afford to take a more relaxed attitude towards such arbitrations86 . Thirdly, in the conduct of
international arbitration often a great variety of different nationalities, cultures, mentalities, legal
backgrounds, legal systems and legal principles come into play. This entails a greater flexibility in
the regulation of its proceedings, but most of al the need to abandon narrow, parochial concepts of
how an arbitration should or should not be conducted.87 The NYC applies to enforcement of awards
not considered as domestic awards in the state where the recognition and enforcement is sought.
The Convention therefore recognises that a different legal regime may apply to domestic awards.
National  laws  adopt  divergent  criteria  for  the  definition  of  the  international  character  of  the
arbitration. In some jurisdictions an arbitration will be considered as international with reference to
the nature of the dispute, in others to the nationality of the parties, in others to the residence of the
parties.  In  an  attempt  to  harmonize  the  different  definitions  of  international  arbitration,  the
UNCITRAL Model Law has set out the following criteria. According to art. 1.3 of the Model Law
an arbitration is international if:
a) involves parties having their places of business in different states, or
b) deals with disputes arising out of obligations to be performed in  a different state from the place
of business of at least one of the parties
c) the subject matter of the arbitration is connected to a state different from the place of business of
at least one of the parties
d) parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more
than one country.
The definition envisaged by the Model Law relies on a mixed approach: it does not focus on one
criterion to the exclusion of the others, but it identifies a number of factors the most important of
which is the place of business of the parties to the arbitration88.
Also the definition of the commercial character of the arbitration  has a fundamental importance. It
constitutes an essential condition for the so-called "arbitrability" of the dispute.. Under the laws of
some states,  only commercial  disputes  can  be submitted to  arbitration;  besides,  the New York
Convention   allows  states  to  exclude  disputes  from its  application,  which  are  not  regarded  as
commercial  under  their  national  laws.  The term also denotes  cases  in which states  act  in  their
private  capacity  and  therefore  are  not  covered  by  sovereign  immunity;  finally  it  distinguishes
international  commercial  arbitration  governed  by private  law from other  forms  of  international
arbitration (such as disputes between states) disciplined by public international law.
86ibidem
87
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88R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 2007, p. 629
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The UNCITRAL Model Law provides a uniform definition of international but not of commercial
arbitration. However, in a footnote to art 1 it suggests that the term commercial should be given a
wide  interpretation  so  as  to  cover  matters  arising  from all  relationships  of  commercial  nature,
whether contractual or not. This footnote constitutes only a recommendation: in order to decide
whether a given arbitration is commercial reference must be made to the relevant national law.
Different types of arbitration
Within the field of international commercial arbitration, two important distinctions are to be made:
on the one hand, between general arbitration and specialised arbitration; on the other hand, between
institutional and ad hoc arbitration.
 Specialised forms of international arbitration exist in many industries such as commodities trade
and shipping: they are conducted under the auspices of a particular trade association, according to
specialised  arbitration  rules,  typically  by  experts  of  that  particular  trade  sector,  and  frequently
exclude lawyers both from the tribunal and from the counselling to the parties. Given their high
specialisation, they are generally not covered by the legal  literature of international  commercial
arbitration.
Institutional arbitration occurs within a framework of a specialised, permanent institution which
administer the whole adjudication process. Such institution will set the arbitral process in motion by
constituting  an  arbitral  tribunal,  providing  a  pre-established  set  of  procedural  rules,  drafted  by
experts and in many cases continually updated. In addition, the institution helps with the selection
of the place of arbitration, the appointment and -  where necessary - the replacement of arbitrators,
and lays down criteria for the arbitrators´fees. Finally it may also provide accessory services such as
logistical support ( notification of written pleadings and documents, reservation of hearing rooms).89
 The most important  advantage  of institutional  arbitration lies in the prestige of the institution.
which  strengthens  the  credibility  of  the  award  and  facilitates  both  voluntary  compliance  and
enforcement.  The  disadvantages  of  institutional  arbitration  are  commonly  considered  the  high
administrative  fee  and  the  delays  stemming  from  sometimes  cumbersome  administrative
procedures.
89
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Conversely, in ad hoc or non-institutional arbitrations, the parties, alone or with the arbitral tribunal,
devise and administer their own procedure without reference to institutional rules or supervision90.
 The  advantages  of  ad hoc arbitration  are  the higher  party  control  over  the procedure,  greater
flexibility in adapting the procedures to the peculiarities of the dispute, and savings in terms of costs
and delays associated with institutional arbitration. On the other hand, the disadvantages stem from
the lack of institutional supervision. It is virtually impossible for the parties to foresee and provide
for all the procedural issues which may come up during the arbitration process91. Before the dispute,
it  is  generally  very difficult  to  foresee  what  kind of  procedure  will  be  most  appropriate,  what
contingencies will have to be taken into consideration and whether both sides will cooperate to get
the matter resolved. In institutional arbitration, such hurdles are overcome, as we have seen,  by
reference to a pre-established body of rules. 
A  compromise  solution  is  frequently  found  in  the  practice  of  using  arbitration  institutions  as
appointing  authorities  for  ad  hoc  arbitration  under  the  UNCITRAL  Rules.  At  a  substantially
reduced  fee,  the  parties  benefit  from  two  of  the  most  important  advantages  of  institutional
arbitration: a set of detailed procedural rules and the certainty that the tribunal will be established.
The international commercial arbitration’s social context: grand old men vs
technocrats
The development of international commercial arbitration has also been studied from a sociological
perspective. The best known sociological account of the arbitration system has been outlined by
Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth in their book “Dealing in Virtue”92.  According to these authors,
two opposing trends may be observed in the social context of international commercial arbitration.
On the one hand, international commercial arbitration has become a field of intense competition
between arbitral  sites, arbitral institutions, counsel, and arbitrators93. Competition among arbitral
institutions and arbitrators is so intense because parties have the power to select their own private
90
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judge  and  therefore  they  constantly  evaluate  the  skills  and  the  authority  of  their  potential
arbitrators94.  Consequently,  arbitrators and institutions compete in order to gain more and more
“symbolic capital”95, i.e. prestige, status and recognition as leading arbitrators: success in this field
is  dependent  upon  the  capacity  of  persuading  the  parties  that  given  groups  of  individuals  or
institutions actually represent the leading arbitration providers. There is a tendency to try to “make
it by faking it”, exaggerate the experience of individuals and institutions in order to allow them to
gain  acceptance  as  being  successful96.  On  the  other  hand,  despite  this  fierce  competition,  the
arbitration community is characterized by a high degree of cohesion: there is a relatively small
number of  important  institutions of  an international  scope (the  most  important  of  which is  the
International Chamber of Commerce), and of individuals in each country who act as the key players
both in the capacity of counsel and arbitrators97. These individuals are connected by personal and
professional  relations  cemented  by  conferences,  journals  and  the  common  participation  to
arbitrations.  In  the  international  arbitration  community,  roles  are  frequently  mixed:  the  same
individuals belonging to the networks around the main arbitral institutions are found in the roles of
lawyers, co-arbitrators, or chairs of the arbitral tribunal98.
Developments in the field of international commercial arbitration are marked by a social conflict
between  two generations  of  arbitrators,  the “grand  old men” versus  the technocrats.  These two
generations carry different values as to the characteristics qualifying someone as an arbitrator, i.e.
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maintain the status of leading arbitrators.  (cfr P. Bourdieu, Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,
Routledge, 1984, p. 114 and 291; D. Jary and J. Jary, Symbolic Capital, Collins Dictionary of Sociology, Collins 2000,
p. 127; George Ritzer (ed), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, Blackwell, 2007, p. 888-889) 
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what constitutes symbolic capital, what are the characteristics of the people who are recognized as
having  authority  to  handle  these  high-stakes,  complicated  and  lucrative  disputes99.  The  old
generation of the “grand old men” is for its large part composed by senior European professors who
have risen to the top of their national legal profession and gained a very high stake of authority,
experience and wealth before being asked to serve as arbitrators.100 Accordingly,  they conceive
arbitration more as an honorary duty than as a profession. In order to preserve the independence of
judgment, the grand old men are convinced that arbitrators should render an occasional service,
provided on the basis of long experience and wisdom acquired in law, business or public service.
This old generation is increasingly criticized by the new one, made up of practitioners who came to
arbitration in the wake of the rapid growth of this market in the 1980s101. They juxtapose to the
grand old men’s authority and experience their specialization and technical competence. In contrast
with the amateurism or  idealism of  their  predecessors,  they present  themselves  as  international
arbitration professionals, as entrepreneurs selling their services to other business practictioners102.
The development of this new generation of arbitrators is mainly fostered by two factors. The first is
the profound modifications of the ICC structure as a result of the rapid expansion of the arbitration
market.  In  order  to  deal  with  the  constant  increase  of  new  cases  characterized  by  greater
geographical diversity, not only did the ICC increase its level of bureaucratization, but also needed
to recruit  new arbitrtators  who did not fit  the profile  of the Continental  grand  old men103.  The
second is the Anglo-american law firms’ entrance into the arbitration market. In the wake of the
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increasing importance of arbitration in the context of international trade, these firms now consider it
important to include this specialty in the range of services they are able to offer to their international
clients104. Anglo-american law firms see the new generation’s attitude towards arbitration as the
gateway to enter this market and to introduce in it the legal techniques which are the basis for their
dominance.  And so the new generation,  supported  by U.S.  law firm,  is  pushing to bring more
transparency, rationalization and competition into the system. In the field of ICC arbitration, it has
for  example  successfully  introduced  a  declaration  of  independence,  which  all  the  proposed
arbitrators  are  required  to  sign,  mentioning any significant  relationship  between  arbitrators  and
counsel for parties in the arbitration. Moreover, large American law-firms also had a role in the
promotion of  new arbitration centers  (London,  Stockholm, Vienna)  competing with ICC.105 But
most of all US law-firms are exerting a strong influence in the transformation of arbitration into a
particular  kind of  litigation,  a  litigation  in  a  different  forum.  Contrary  to  the  grand  old  men’s
mentality, who conceive arbitration as a duty and namely the duty to clarify and aid the judge in
rendering good justice, the lawyers employed in US law firms do not feel any responsibility but to
satisfy their  clients  with  all  the legal  means  at  their  disposal106.  Accordingly,  they have  a less
dogmatic  and  more  tactical  approach  to  arbitration.  They reject  its  specificity,  they consider  it
merely as one of the possible solutions that they can propose to their clients to solve a dispute. In
order to best fulfill their clients’ interests, they engage in forum shopping and are ready to operate
in  many  jurisdictions  and  types  of  proceedings  at  the  same  time107.  They  are  even  ready  to
jeopardize the traditional advantages of arbitration, which claims to be more rapid and less costly
because informal, by introducing a number of technicalities typical of litigation.
 In conclusion, international commercial arbitration is moving from a small, closed group of self-
regulating artisans to a more open and competitive business centred on Anglo-American law firms'
dominance108: a sort of US-style off-shore litigation109.
The debate on the “floating” arbitration
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The “floating” arbitration theory
The most important principle underpinning the laws of international commercial arbitration in all
jurisdictions is the autonomy of the parties. The recognition of parties' freedom can be considered
inherent to the definition of arbitration itself:  not  surprisingly,  it  is also recognised as the most
fundamental principle in the main harmonisation tools of the field, such as the UNCITRAL Model
Law, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the ICC Rules. The emphasis on this principle has led
to the claim that arbitrators in international arbitrations derive their authority from the consent of
the  parties,  rather  than  from any national  legal  system.  This  is  the  main  core  of  the  so-called
floating arbitration theory. According to this doctrine, international commercial arbitration does not
owe its existence, validity,  or effectiveness to a particular national    law110 , its legal force being
founded only on the agreement of the parties.111 
The debate on the floating arbitration mirrors, and to a large extent overlaps, with that on the new
lex mercatoria.112 Like the latter, it is characterised by a fierce contrast between two opposite views:
the autonomist thesis, which supports the autonomous character of the international  commercial
arbitration legal system, and the nationalist thesis, which denies this autonomy. As we will see in
the following chapters, this contrast is frequently found in the drafting process of uniform rules of
international commercial arbitration. Like in the lex mercatoria debate, the autonomous character of
arbitration developed in order  to overcome national law’s drawbacks as applied to international
disputes. Although international arbitration deals with matters connected to more than one state, it is
generally regarded as governed by the law of a particular state, namely the law of the state in which
the arbitration is held (the lex loci arbitri). But the application of the lex loci arbitri has frequently
led to unsatisfactory results, especially in the context of recognition and enforcement of awards.
Supporters  of  the  autonomous  character  of  arbitration  claim  for  the  necessity  of  insulating
international arbitration from the restrictive national rules applicable to international disputes. 
The concept of non-national arbitration emphasises the complete privatization of the international
arbitral process. It is assumed that international commercial arbitration is sufficiently regulated by
its own rules, which are either adopted by the parties or drawn up by the arbitral tribunal itself113.
Accordingly,  it  needs  no  recognition  from  whatever  national  legal  system.  The  conduct  of
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international  commercial  arbitration is  fostering the emergence  of an autonomous body of both
procedural and substantive rules applicable to international commercial transaction (the so-called
lex mercatoria arbitralis).
 The  procedural  side  of  the  lex  mercatoria  arbitralis is  constituted  in  the  first  place  by  the
procedurals  rules  of  the main arbitration institutions.  Such rules  are quite similar  on the major
issues that involve the conduct of arbitral hearings. Accordingly, they clearly express a consensus
within the international  commercial  community as  to  how arbitral  institutions  should supervise
arbitral proceedings114. This consensus is confirmed by the existence of the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, which constitute the model upon which most of arbitral institutions have set up or reformed
their arbitration rules. Moreover, most national laws on arbitration do not differ in the regulatory
approach  towards  arbitration:  they  essentially  subscribe  to  the  de-regulatory  methodology  that
promotes  the  autonomy  of  the  arbitral  process  and  which  is  founded  upon  the  principle  of
contractual freedom115. The success of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration is fostering this convergence. Finally, the NYC represents the agreement among the vast
majority of states as to the legal discipline of award enforcement. In conclusion, it is possible to
identify a well-defined body of procedural rules which regulate arbitral proceedings on a worldwide
basis and provide arbitration with consensus from the international  commercial  community and
acceptance within most national legal systems.
But the development of an autonomous arbitration system implies also a substantive dimension.
Autonomous arbitration supporters  foresee that in the not too distant  future the development of
international  arbitration  will  foster  the  emergence  of  an  arbitral  common  law  of  international
transactions116. According to the autonomous arbitration thesis, states have impliedly delegated their
law- making authority in the area of transnational commerce to international arbitrators and to the
process of private arbitral adjudication. Moreover, most arbitral rules (e.g. ICC Rules, UNCITRAL
Model Law) allow international arbitrators to take commercial customs and trade into account in
interpreting the applicable law. This invites arbitrators to engage in law-making processes, since
they are called upon to set  out  those principles which reflect  the commercial  practices  and the
common sense of the commercial community. Consequently, arbitral awards deciding commercial
disputes can progressively acquire the general normative force of legal rules. In other words, the
content of arbitral awards can have a precedential value. This arbitral common law of transnational
transactions  constitutes an applicable set  of  rules  in  subsequent arbitral  proceedings,  unless the
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agreement to arbitrate specifically excludes its application. On this reading, not only states but also
private  parties  have  impliedly  waived  their  authonomy.  The  agreement  to  arbitrate,  where  no
otherwise  specified,  implies  party  acquiescence  to  the  application  of  special  arbitrator-created
commercial law rules. By deciding to submit their dispute to arbitration, parties impliedly agree that
the  application  of  any  law  designated  by  them should  be  settled  by  reference  to  the  general
commercial practices of the community of international merchants, which are now progressively
formalised into the basic tenets  of the  lex mercatoria arbitralis117.  For  instance,  one can easily
identify substantive legal rules in the highly specialised field of maritime arbitration. The sector of
maritime industry is characterised by a high degree of uniformity.  On the one hand,  there is  a
widespread  use  of  standard  contract  clauses  which  ensure  high  predictability  in  maritime
transactions. Furthermore, maritime arbitration awards have a recognised precedential value, which
reinforce the uniform interpretation of such standard- terms. The practice of maritime arbitration
suggests that  international traders do favour a system of arbitration based on the precedential value
of the awards and which generates,  through the interpretation of uniform standards,  substantive
uniform rules, fostering a higher degree of predictability in transactions and disputes118.
But also the analysis of ICC arbitration case law reveals the emergence of a common arbitral law of
international  contracts.  According  to  Carbonneau,  this  emerging  body of  law consists  of  three
different  set  of  rules:  universally  acknowledged,  natural-law  type  principles  (e.g.  good  faith),
national legal principles adapted to international commercial practices (e.g. the strict commitment to
the  pacta sunt  servanda principle and the consequent  restrictive interpretation  of  the  rebus sic
stantibus and force majeure principles) and more  sui generis principles which mirror the specific
usages  and ethic of  the community of  international  merchants  (the general  duty to  renegotiate,
which  is  not  expressly  found  in  any  national  legal  system).  Given  the  high  prestige  of  this
institution, which is one of the most effective and most often used forms of institutional arbitration
and  the  consistency  with  which  ICC  arbitrators  apply  such  principles,  one  can  identify  the
emergence of a body of uniform substantive law for international transactions. 
Critical accounts of the floating arbitration theory
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The autonomist thesis has sparked a considerable wave of criticism. The most important counter-
argument is that  the so called  lex mercatoria arbitralis in no way constitutes law, let  alone an
autonomous legal order. Its alleged sources appear too hapzard and episodic to stand as a viable
source for legal rules119.  Even awards rendered under the procedures of well-established arbitral
institutions retain an inherently private  ad hoc character: all types of arbitration rest exclusively
upon the will of the parties which opt for this alternative adjudication system for the resolution of
their own individual dispute.  Consequently,  in order to become legally binding,  arbitral  awards
need to be enforced in national courts. But enforceability is always subject to criteria laid down in
national or public international law, that is to say sources based on state sovereignty. By asserting
the legal nature of the lex mercatoria arbitralis through an implied waiver of sovereignty, one risks
to transpose contract regulation from the well defined realm of municipal law to a regime of vague
and  indefinite  general  principles  of  non-law.  In  conclusion,  although  one  may,  somewhat
emphatically  and  informally,  speak  of  lex  mercatoria  arbitralis,  in  truth  <<no  international
commercial arbitration exists in the legal sense. Every arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to
say, subject to a specific system of national law. Every right or power a private person enjoys is
inexorably  conferred  by  or  derived  from  a  system  of  municipal  law>>120.  The  alleged  lex
mercatoria only acquires the character of law to the extent that it is recognised and incorporated
into a national legal system. By recognising to arbitration the character of an autonomous legal
order, one risks to cut all the ropes with reality and let arbitration float  freely into the theoretical
stratosphere.121 
Autonomous arbitration supporters reply that they are fully aware that arbitration cannot float in a
legal vacuum and is ultimately attached to a municipal legal system. They point out in this regard
that they mean the notion of  autonomy essentially as detachment from the restrictive rules of the
lex  fori.  The autonomy arbitrators enjoy in the choice of both procedural  and substantive rules
makes arbitration independent of the law of the place it is rendered (the so called lex loci arbitri).
True, as far as enforcement is concerned, arbitral awards still depend upon a national law. But the
widespread diffusion of the NYC allows an award to be enforced in nearly any country of the world
according  to  uniform standards.  As to  the  criticism of  vagueness  and  uncertainty,  autonomous
arbitration supporters reply that many lex mercatoria rules are more detailed than state law rules:
for example, the rules on letters of credit adopted by the bankers of the world under the auspices of
the ICC, as well as c.i.f. or f.o.b. contract clauses can certainly compete with national rules in terms
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of  reasonabless and clarity. On the other hand, there are some legal rules (e.g. the French law of
delict, the international law of diplomacy) which are no less vague than the lex mercatoria rules.
Accordingly, the degree of clarity, universality, generality cannot be considered a useful criteria to
distinguish law from non- law. The reluctance to admit the lex mercatoria within the catalogue of
autonomous  systems  of  law  stems  from  an  old-fashioned  jurisprudence  of  positivism,  which
emphasises legislation as the heart of law and minimises the role of custom and practice in the law-
making process122.
New developments in the floating arbitration debate
Recently, the debate on the autonomous character of international commercial arbitration seems to
have  abandoned  the  features  of  a  religious  war  between  believers  and  non  believers  and  has
accordingly  concentrated  on  a  number  of  specific  issues,  entailing  important  practical
consequences.  The main one is the importance of the place of arbitration in the conduct of the
proceedings.  How much significance should be attached  to the fact  that  an arbitration is  being
conducted in a particular jurisdiction?123  Has the legal system of the place of arbitration imperative
authority on the validity of the proceedings and on that of the award?124Some commentators take the
view that little or no significance should be attached to the claims of the jurisdiction in which the
arbitration is being conducted, on the basis that the jurisdiction is chosen by the parties for reasons
of convenience. Accordingly, parties' freedom should be given priority and should not be limited by
the domestic law of the place of arbitration. The leading case which adopted this view was decided
by the Court of Appeal of Paris in 1980125.  The Court had to decide on the challenge of an award
rendered by the ICC in Paris. In dismissing the claim, the Court argued that, although the arbitral
proceedings took place in France, the award could not be considered a French award and therefore
the French court did not have jurisdiction to set it  aside. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
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considered that neither party was a French national, the contract was neither signed nor performed
in France and Paris was chosen for reasons of neutrality and not because parties wished to subject
themselves to the French arbitral law126. As has been noted, the Paris Court of Appeal's decision did
not  say  that  the  award  at  issue  was  stateless,  but  merely  that,  on  the  basis  of  the  particular
circumstances of the case, there was no connection with the French legal order127. The mere fact that
the arbitration  took place  in France  was  not held a  sufficient  ground to consider  the award  as
French. But if this decision were to be applied universally, it would follow that, unless the parties
themselves agree to submit  to the procedural law of a particular state, the arbitral proceedings are
not be reviewable by any court other than the court of the state in which enforcement is sought128.
Consequently, the purpose of the floating arbitration view as stated in the Gotaverken decision is to
shift the attention from the jurisdiction in which the arbitration takes place to the jurisdiction in
which enforcement is sought. Instead of subjecting arbitration to a dual system of control, first by
the law of the place of arbitration and then by the law and the courts of the place of enforcement of
the award, the floating or delocalised arbitration supporters propose that there should be only one
point of control: that of the place of enforcement. But this does not mean that arbitration is stateless.
True, floating arbitration supporters argue that the binding force of an international award derives
from the contractual agreement to arbitrate, without a specific national legal system serving as a
foundation. But, in the final analysis the award is always subject to the  post facto control of the
jurisdiction of the place of enforcement.129  The international arbitral system would ultimately break
down if no national jurisdictions could be called upon to recognise and enforce awards130. Floating
arbitration opposers see the Gotaverken decision differently.  In their opinion, this case represents
only an example of a more relaxed approach towards international awards followed by domestic
courts.  An  international  arbitration,  rather  than  being  detached   from its  country  of  origin,  is
provided with a larger  extent  of autonomy and is  subject  to fewer constraints,  than a domestic
arbitration. If the facts of Gotaverken are changed slightly, so that the Swedes deliver cocaine rather
than tankers, one wonders whether the French court would exhbit a similar  laisser-faire attitude
towards alleged public policy violations.131  They suggest that subjecting arbitral proceedings only
to the law of the place of enforcement entails a number of drawbacks. The first is that this solution
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presupposes  that  the  arbitral  process  works  in  a  legal  vacuum unless  and  until  enforcement  is
sought132.  The second is that the delocalisation theory is not always respectful of party autonomy133.
For example, in the Hilmatron case134, the French courts found that the award was not integrated
into the Swiss legal system, although the parties expressly provided that the arbitration shall take
place in Geneva under the law of the Canton of Geneva. Similarly, in the Chromalloy135 case, the
US District Court concluded that the award was not grounded in Egyptian law although the contract
envisaged that both parties had irrevocably agreed to apply Egypt laws and to choose Cairo as the
place  of  arbitration.  The third  is  that  the  delocalisation  theory may involve  litigation  in  every
country in which the respondent has assets136, whereas insisting that the validity of an arbitral award
is governed by the law of the place of arbitration has the advantage of subjecting the question of
validity to a single decision of the court  of origin.137 Accordingly,  exposure to a multiplicity of
proceedings in a number of different countries and the consequent high probability of conflicting
decisions of different foreign courts undermines what should be one of the purposes of international
commercial arbitration, namely to promote efficiency in the settlement of the dispute.138. Finally the
success of UNCITRAL Model Law reduces the need of developing such a controversial doctrine.
The fact that an increasing number of countries around the world are enacting legislation in line
with the Model Law reduces the chances of parties being caught out by a hostile local law which is
not appropriate for international  arbitration.139 The gradual convergence enhanced by the Model
Law  brings  national  arbitration  systems  more  and  more  in  line  with  international  standards:
accordingly, the need to free international commercial arbitration from the law of the place in which
it takes place has been reduced. Moreover, the Model Law itself provides that certain important
regulatory140 and control141 functions are to be exercised by the courts of the place of arbitration142. 
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The nature of international commercial arbitration from the perspective of
social sciences
Arbitration and autopoiesis
In  recent  years,  a  number  of  scholars  have  attempted  to  analyse  the  issue  of  the  autonomous
character  of  international  commercial  arbitration  from an  interdisciplinary standpoint.  The  best
known analysis is undoubtedly Gunther Teubner’s essay  “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the
World Society”,  published in the famous book “Global Law without a State”143. In discussing the
legal  nature  of  the  lex  mercatoria,  Teubner  also  takes  into  account  the  role  of  international
commercial arbitration. In particular, he maintains that the interaction between global contracts and
international  commercial  arbitration  sets  up an  autopoietic  mode of  operation144 within  the  lex
mercatoria system,  which makes  its  functioning similar  to  that  of  national  legal  systems.  This
occurs  through  a  number  of  socio-legal  phenomena.  The  first  is  what  Teubner  calls  the
establishment of an internal hierarchy of contractual rules within international  contracts145.  They
contain  not  only  "primary  rules",  which  regulate  the  future  behaviour  of  the  parties,  but  also
`secondary  rules'  which  regulate  the  recognition  of  primary  rules,  their  identification,  their
interpretation  and  the  procedures  for  resolving  conflicts.  Accordingly,  international  contracts
reproduce what, according to the positivist theory, is one of the most important constitutive element
of the legal system and which distinguish it from the social realm: the contemporary presence of
primary and secondary rules146. The second is the temporalization of contractual self-validation, i.e
the capacity of contractual rules of reproducing themselves from their own constitutive elements147.
Each self- regulatory contract goes far beyond the particular commercial transaction and establishes
a whole private legal order with a claim of global validity. Each contract extends itself into the past
and into the future. It refers to a pre-existing standardisation of rules and it refers to the future of
conflict  regulation.  This  makes each  single  contract  an  element  of  an  on-going  self-production
process, in which the network of elements creates the very elements of the system. The third and
most important phenomenon is the so-called externalization of the self-referential contract148. With
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this terminology Teubner refers to the fact that arbitration provides international contracts with an
external  sanction  of  validity.  By  submitting  an  international  contract  to  arbitration,  Teubner
observes,  the issue of deciding upon the validity of the contract  itself is referred to an external
institution (the  arbitral  institution which  in  some cases  even assumes the  character  of  a  quasi-
legislative institution, as in the case of the International Chamber of Commerce or the International
Law Association). This externalization introduces a differentiation within the lex mercatoria system
between a spontaneous law (the “unofficial law” contained in the contract) and an organized law
(the “official law” produced by the arbitral institutions in judging upon the validity of international
contracts). On this reading, the provision of rights and duties envisaged in international contracts
(unofficial law) is controlled and disciplined by the official law of the arbitral institutions. Thus,
Teubner concludes, this distinction between official and unofficial law ends up reproducing that
between  state  law  and  contracts  in  the  national  legal  system  and  a  hierarchy  of  norms  and
institutions begins to build up.
Arbitration and globalization theories
In  recent  years  a number of  scholars  have relied on the findings of the state and globalization
debate149 in order to assess the legal nature of international commercial arbitration. Two positions
seem to have so far emerged from this interdisciplinary research stream: the first is a  radical view
which, by building on the so-called “globalist” approach to globalization, considers arbitration as an
increasingly autonomous legal order more and more detached by state sovereignty; the second is a
more moderate view, which seeks to go beyond the theories conceiving the relation between the
state and globalization as a collective-sum game and sees arbitration as a hybrid regime composed
of national, international and non-national sources overlapping and intersecting at various points in
the arbitration process.
 The widest account so far of the first view has been sketched by A. Claire Cutler in the book
“Private  Power  and  Global  Authority:  Transnational  Merchant  Law  in  the  Global  Political
Economy”150. Cutler sees the development of lex mercatoria through the lens of a globalist view of
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globalization. She argues that globalization forces are bringing about profound transformations in
local and global political economies and are challenging conventional understandings of the world
order151. In particular, Cutler identifies these transformations with the juridification, pluralization
and privatization of the global economy. She argues that international commercial transactions are
becoming  increasingly  internationalized  and  transnationalised,  i.e.  they  more  and  more  cross
national borders. Accordingly, the field of international trade law has expanded in scope with the
creation  of  new  kinds  of  commercial  activities  and  legal  regulations  and  the  creation  of  new
subjects and sources of law. Moreover, and most importantly, these new actors and sources of law
are  seriously  challenging  the  state’s  monopoly  over  legislative  and  adjudicative  functions  in
international commerce. The increasing role of private authority in the regulation of international
trade  is  shattering  the  public  sphere  into  a  complex  and  multilayered  network  of  interacting
institutions  and  bodies,  where  the  boundary  between  the  public  and  private  realms  (and
consequently  public  and  private  authority,  public  and  private  law)  is  increasingly  difficult  to
sustain152.  The incoherence of the private/public distinction can be observed on essentially three
grounds, namely empirical, conceptual and ideological. The first suggests that the distinction may at
one time have reflected empirical conditions, but it has now ceased to do so. Evidence of this is the
growing interpenetration of the two spheres, so that private actors act publicly and public actors act
privately.  On  the  one  hand,  multi-national  corporations,  private  trade  associations,  private
arbitrators  impact on matters  of national  public  policy,  eroding the policy-making autonomy of
states; on the other hand, states act more and more as private commercial actors, for example by
negotiating  private  international  contracts  or  by  accepting  the  jurisdiction  of  private  arbitral
tribunals. The second ground refers to the conceptual obscurity of the status of international trade
law as an autonomous legal order with a well defined range of sources and principles. As the wide
debate  over  the  lex  mercatoria shows,  there  is  no  agreement  on  its  definition,  its  sources,  its
content, let alone its very existence153. The third alludes to the problematic distinction between state
and civil  society.  The distinction between the public  and private realm rests on the ideological
foundation that it is possible to conceive of social and economic life apart from government and
law.  This  ideological  conviction  denies  the  mutually  constitutive  nature  of  the  economic  and
political  domains,  thus  inhibiting  belief  that  institutions  ordering social  life  are  the  product  of
human agency and therefore can be altered. In the context of trade relations, it operates to obscure
151
 A.C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority, cit, p. 2
152
 Ibidem
153
 A.C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority, cit, p. 52-53
187
the political nature of private trade relations and the role of private trade law in the material and
ideological constitution of global capitalism154.
 The most important legal tools fostering the development of global private authority are the new
law merchant, the movement for the unification and harmonization of international trade law and
international commercial arbitration. Disguised in a purely technical and apolitical regulation, the
new  lex  mercatoria provides  in  fact  the  basic  norms  governing  property,  contract  and  dispute
resolution, exerting in this way distributional functions to the global capitalist elite’s advantage155.
Likewise, the movement for the unification and harmonization of international trade law facilitates
the global elite’s activities by creating national and international regulatory orders which reduce the
costs of negotiating and enforcing agreements  and minimize barriers to the free flow of goods,
services  and  capital.  Significantly,  Cutler  observes,  in  the  unification  and  harmonization  of
international trade, soft law instruments are now increasingly preferred over more costly hard laws
and public adjudicatory processes156: soft law – she argues - is cheaper and easier to achieve, but it
is also easier to breach with impunity. It furthermore gives rise to more opportunities for “creative
lawyering” and the private shaping of legal regulation157: it sets up a “soft infrastructure” sensitive
to corporate interests and the need to facilitate business strategies158. By the same token, the rapid
growth of international commercial arbitration indicates that private authority is able to influence
also the field of dispute resolution. In recent years, there has been such a tremendous expansion of
arbitration, that the latter has eclipsed national adjudication as the preferred method for resolving
international  commercial  disputes159.  Matters  that  were  once considered as exclusive domain of
national  justice, and therefore subject  to mandatory law, are being found to be arbitral subject
matters, with the consequence that many politically sensitive matters are being removed from public
supervision  and  control  in  national  courts.  The  trend  towards  increased  recourse  to  private
arbitration is being encouraged by states, which are involved in a regulatory competition to provide
a hospitable legal framework for arbitration proceedings and accordingly limit the powers of their
national courts to review arbitral awards160. On this reading, governments are participating in the
expansion of the private sphere and the neutralization and insulation of international commercial
concerns from public policy review.  True, this insulation is incomplete,  since states still  retain
authority to enforce arbitral awards. Nonetheless, states are exercising their authority by enforcing
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decisions stemming from private arbitral bodies and in so doing they foster the expansion of private
dispute settlement161.   As far as international  commercial  disputes settlement is concerned, state
authority remains central, but its role has changed. The state is more and more assuming the role of
enforcer  or  stabilizer  of  rules  and  practices  established  by  private  authorities162.   The  grounds
provided to assert arbitration as the preferred method of commercial dispute settlement reflect the
growing  importance  of  the  privatization  of  commercial  relations  and  the  liberal  idelologies
concerning the natural, neutral, apolitical, efficient and, hence, superior nature of private regulation.
Private arbitration is regarded as the most natural  means for resolving international  commercial
disputes, for it gives maximum scope to the principles of freedom of contract and the autonomy of
the contracting parties. Consequently, it is far more efficient, more neutral and more reliable than
adjudication in national courts163. 
Relying on these instruments, private authority is regulating international commercial transactions
according to a neo-liberal order aimed at the production of competitive services and industries by
conferring privileged rights on corporate capital and subordinating social welfare concerns of equity
and  justice  to  the  discipline  of  free  market164.  The  increasing  reliance  on  soft,  discretionary
standards and privatized international commercial arbitration is strengthening private institutions
and  processes,  while  weakening  mechanisms  that  work  toward  participation  and  democratic
accountability165. 
 Contemporary theories of international relations and law are unable to theorize these phenomena,
because they see states as the only subjects, and positive law as the only source of law. However,
Cutler argues, today a number of de facto non-state subjects (e.g. multi-national corporations) and
non-state  sources  (the  new  lex  mercatoria)  of  law  have  emerged,  notwithstanding  their
insignificance  or  invisibility  under  mainstream theories.   State-centric  theories  of  international
relations  and  international  law  are  incapable  of  capturing  these  developments,  since  they  are
premised upon the liberal “art of separation”, wherein markets and civil society are regarded as
separate  and  distinct  from  politics,  governments  and  the  state166.  Such  separation  renders  the
activities of private actors and institutions politically ‘invisible”, since they are regarded as part of
the realm of apolitical and neutral, private economic activity167. Consequently, international trade
law is isolated from the sphere of politics and democratic control as part of the private domain of
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consensual,  economic activity168.  Its  conception as  a  law belonging to the private,  non-political
realm obscures its political nature and distributional functions in determining the allocation of risks
of international commercial transactions, in regulating the global market in terms of commercial
competition and in enforcing bargains. The rules of international law are so foundational to the
global political economy,  that they may be usefully regarded as a constitutive element of global
capitalism169.  They represent  a driving force in  the “hyperliberalisation”  of  the state  and world
order170 i.e. a new asset of the world order founded on the establishment of a borderless global
economy,  the  complete  denationalization  of  all  corporate  procedures  and  activities  and  the
eradication of economic nationalism171. 
However,  most author support the second, more moderate view.  Katherine Lynch’s book “The
Forces  of  Economic  Globalization:  Challenges  to  the  Regime  of  International  Commercial
Arbitration”172 is  maybe  the  most  important  work  in  this  direction.  Her  analysis  is  aimed  at
investigating  whether  and  how  the  development  of  a  transnational  system  of  international
commercial arbitration challenges the traditional conception of  national sovereignty whereby the
state has a monopoly over law-making and the dispensation of justice173. Lynch’s main argument is
that economic globalization is certainly transforming and reconfiguring the nation state’s regulatory
role within the international arbitral regime, but this does not necessarily result in an erosion of state
sovereignty  or  a  decline  of  the  state;  rather,  one  can  observe  a  re-shaping  of  the  centers  of
governance within the regime174.  Accordingly,  international commercial arbitration can be better
theorized as a hybrid regime, dualistic in nature, combining both a state-centric system organized
around the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards and
other bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties, and a multi-centric system made up of a complex
network  of  private  contracts,  non-national  norms  elaborated  by  formulating  agencies  and
international arbitral institutions, as well as customs and general principles of law175. Through the
modernization  and  reform  of  their  national  arbitration  laws,  nation-states  have  given  up  some
autonomy  and  control  over  international  commercial  arbitrations  conducted  within  their
jurisdiction. There has been a significant integration of internationally accepted arbitral principles
and standards within national arbitration laws, such as party autonomy with reference to both the
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determination of the arbitration procedure and the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, the
arbitrators’  competence  to  determine  their  own  jurisdiction,  the  separation  of  the  arbitration
agreement from the underlying contract, and an overall more limited intervention by national courts
in the arbitral  process176.   The increasing role of  party autonomy in the arbitration process  has
spurred arbitral institutions as well as the specialized formulating agencies to create a large amount
of private informal norms of dispute resolution. These self-regulation norms constitute now new
sources of law and represent a move away from the concept of law-making as a close state-centric
system towards a wider and polycentric  notion of law-making, whereby the law is created and
evolves by a de-centralized process in which non-state actors have come to play an increasingly
central role177. Legal norms originate more often than not by transnational epistemic communities
consisting of scholars, arbitrators, legal practitioners, judges and member of international arbitral
institutions and organizations who determine the best and more appropriate rules for the conduct of
arbitration;  such norms are subsequently enforced by states,  by enacting domestic legislation in
which they are enshrined.  Although the governance system of the international arbitration regime is
not primarily state-centric, national states and their legal systems still maintain a crucial regulatory
role178. The lack of any supra-national court or constitutional body exerting control over the regime
means that nation-states continue to play an important support and supervisory function at various
points in the arbitration process: in the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements, in
the determination of which disputes can be submitted to arbitration, in the provision of support and
supervision of the arbitration process,  in particular  by ensuring  fairness and justice and in the
recognition and enforcement  of arbitration awards179.  Consequently,  the success of international
commercial  arbitration  and  its  emergence  as  the  pre-eminent  means  of  resolving  international
commercial  disputes would not have been possible without the mechanisms of national judicial
controls serving as a safety net and lending assistance during the arbitral process and enforcing
arbitration awards180.
Lynch identifies another important effect of globalization on international commercial arbitration,
namely the progressive harmonization of national arbitral laws which tend to evolve in a parallel
direction and become more similar as time progresses. However, she also admits that a uniform
system among national arbitration laws or a truly transnational arbitral procedure is far from being
achieved: although there has been a significant degree of internationalization of arbitration practice
and procedure in recent times, the regime is still influenced by nation-specific cultural attitudes and
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national laws and practices diverge in many key areas of the arbitration process181. This reflects the
inherent tension between the global and local aspects of international commercial arbitration182.
A similar  interdisciplinary approach  to arbitration is  provided by  Dirk Lehmkuhl in the  paper
“Resolving  Transnational  Disputes:  Commercial  Arbitration  and the  Multiple  Providers  of
Governance Services”183. He argues that the debate on floating arbitration resembles the dispute on
the existence of a law beyond the state. As the latter, it is usually trapped in the stalemate of the
traditionalist and transnationalist theses184. The traditionalist thesis in the law-globalization debate
reads  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  non-national  system  of  rules  for  the  regulation  of
international transactions. International transactions can only be regulated by state-law: non-state
law can become relevant only in so far as it is recognised by a certain national legal system. By the
same token, the traditionalist view in the floating arbitration debate argues that there can be no such
thing  as  autonomous  arbitration,  since  the  validity  of  any  arbitration  presupposes  in  the  final
analysis recognition within a national system.  By contrast,  the transnationalist thesis in the law and
globalization  debate  reads  that  only  the  evolution  of  an  autonomous  set  of  transnational  rules
detached from state authority can overcome the deficiencies of a plurality of diverging national
legal systems applicable to international transactions. By the same token, the transnationalist view
in  the  floating  arbitration  debate  argues  that  only  the  development  of  autonomous  rules  of
international commercial arbitration detached from state authority can overcome the drawbacks of
national laws as applied to international  commercial  disputes. The author argues  that neither of
these views is able to fully account for the nature of international commercial arbitration. There are
both centripetal and centrifugal forces in international arbitration. On the one hand, there are signals
towards an increasingly greater autonomy in international arbitration.  The growing importance of
the  arbitration  industry has  triggered  a  process  of  regulatory competition among national  legal
systems185. Nation-states have amended their domestic arbitration laws with a view to creating more
favourable conditions to arbitration. Such reforms have generally expanded party autonomy and
restricted the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. A second important aspect contributing
to the autonomous character of international arbitration is the high degree of voluntary compliance
with arbitral awards, which renders enforcement by national courts almost unnecessary, or at least
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not in the ordinary way of ensuring compliance186. But, on the other hand, there are developments
which tend to counter the progressive emancipation of arbitration from national constraints. There
are indicators emphasising the increasing role of state law in international arbitration. One is the
wide stream of criticism against the autonomous character of arbitration itself, which isolates this
system  from  the  applicable  mandatory  national  laws  and  therefore  questions  the  capacity  of
arbitration  to  warrant  fundamental  requirements  of  justice,  especially  in  the  field  of  consumer
protection187.  On this reading a number of commentators have underlined that  all  national  laws
envisage the possibility for  national  courts to dismiss or even review awards  violating national
mandatory law.  Despite  the harmonised regime introduced by the NYC, national  legal  systems
significantly differ with regard to the degree of judicial intervention allowed over arbitral awards.
Another  indicator pointing towards a limitation of arbitration autonomy is its bureaucratisation.
The growing importance of the arbitration market has spurred a regulatory competition not only
among national legal system, but also among arbitration institutions. This has triggered a profound
transformation  in  the  arbitration  world.  Arbitration  is  no  longer  an  alternative  way of  solving
dispute  in  an  amicable  manner,  but  a  highly  sophisticated  professional  service  dominated  by
professional entrepreneurs. Each arbitration institution has now its own bureaucracy and its well
defined set of procedural rules, which makes it very similar to a national tribunal. This development
takes  away  many  of  the  advantages  commonly  attached  to  arbitration  over  litigation,  since
arbitration becomes more complex, more time-consuming and more expensive188.  The existence of
both  centrifugal  and  centripetal  forces  in  international  arbitration  demonstrates  that  neither  the
traditional nor the transitional thesis can adequately explain  its development, which follows a more
tortuous, contradictory process.
In order to understand this complex development, Lehrkmull argues that we need to take off our
"state- centric blinders", recognise that the traditional, monolithical conception of the state in only a
myth, and embrace the theory of the polycentric systems of governance189, which closely resembles
the theory of the disaggregated sovereignty outlined in the introductory chapter190. The main tenet
of this theory is that, in the wake of globalization, the traditional functions of the state are no longer
exercised exclusively by the unitary structure of the state itself. The state should now be conceived
as a disaggregated entity of multiple centres of authorities, each exercising a facet of state power in
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competition with alternative providers of governance191. In other words, in exercising its traditional
functions, the state needs now to interact with a number of non-state actors (individuals, groups of
individual non-govermental organizations), each specialized in the provision of a particular service
of governance. But this interaction is very complex and contradictory.  As Santos has put it, this
interaction  is   <<inherently  contradictory,  and  animated  by  dialectical  tensions  between
deterritorialisation  and  reterritorialisation  of  social  relations,  globalization  and  localization,
harmonization and differentiation,  boundary maintaining and boundary transcending>>192. In this
interaction, Lehmkuhl observes,  the different providers of governance services are simultaneously
competing (since  they  fulfil  equivalent  functions)  and  complementing  themselves (since  they
mutually influence and support each other)193. On this reading, arbitration is viewed as a system of
governance providing a particular service in the global market: the service of security and certainty
in  international  transactions.  Accordingly,  centripetal  and  centrifugal  forces  in  international
commercial  arbitration are indicators of this contradictory interaction among state and non-state
actors  in  the  provision  of  this  service  of  governance.  On the  one  hand,  there  are  aspects  that
increase the relevance and autonomy of arbitration, or, to put it differently,  that favour  private
arbitration, without government involvement: the fact that arbitration laws have become an object
of  regulatory  competition  among  states,  the  voluntary  weakening  of  domestic  public  policy
provisions  by  national  legal  authorities,  and  the  courts'  acceptance  of  trade  norms  governing
arbitration decisions. On the other hand, there are tendencies that counter this: the emergence of
parochial  thinking  in  court  decisions  and  the  re-politicisation  of  arbitration  –  for  example,  in
questions of consumer protection . 
Another account of the floating arbitration debate from a global governance perspective is provided
by  Peer  Zumbansen  in  the  paper  “Piercing  the  Legal  Veil:  Commercial  Arbitration  and
Transnational  Law”194.   He argues  that the study of transnational  law cannot be separated from
questions concerning the relationship between state and society, and the conditions and possibility
of governance beyond the nation state. On this reading, lex mercatoria and arbitration195 reflect an
ongoing search for more varied and differentiated forms of governance beyond the nation state,
which does not imply a lost, but rather a changed statehood196.  These new form of governance
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entail not only a higher degree of self-regulation, but also more cooperation and interaction between
state  and  non-state  actors197.  He  rejects  the  claims  of  an  alleged  autonomous  character  of  lex
mercatoria and arbitration.  Such claims reflect an outdated, laissez faire perception of an apolitical
market  society on one side and the state on the other,  which in turn entails  an ostensibly pure
private law, free from political intervention and influence198. But already in the nineteenth century,
with the rise of the interventionist welfare state, Zumbansen observes, this view was inadequate to
explain  the  state’s  systematic  involvement  in  the  market.  Nonetheless,  the  idea  of  the  non-
interventionist state continues to guide the interpretation of transnational phenomena, regardless of
the lessons stemming from the Westphalian experience, which marked the mutual involvement of
public law and private law as an irreversible phenomenon199. By the same token, legal doctrine,
dominated  as  it  is  by  positivism,  appears  inadequate  to  account  for  these  new  governance
phenomena.  The concept  of international  law is  still  centred on states  relations,  in  spite of the
abundant proliferation of transnational economic transactions among states and private parties200.
Likewise,  the  realm  of  private  law is  still  that  of  economic  transactions  among  equal  market
participants,  in  spite  of  the  “publification”  (sic)  of  private  law  by  labour  and  social  law and
interventionist policy201. Lacking an adequate conceptual framework, lex mercatoria and arbitration
continue to be theorized in terms of an autonomous private law, which needs to be kept separated
from the  public  sphere202.    An interdisciplinary  research  agenda  –  Zumbansen  concludes  -  is
therefore needed, able to go beyond the rifts between public and private law and to re-formulate the
concepts of law and society on which lex mercatoria is based203. 
Application of norm diffusion theories to the law of international commercial
arbitration 
Application of the legalization paradigm
 The application  of the legalization paradigm204 to the main sources of international commercial
arbitration (the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
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Awards, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts)  shows that also within the field of the law of
international commercial arbitration the distinction between hard and soft law is blurry.  The New
York Convention, which from a legal standpoint is to be considered as a hard law instrument, does
not  reach  the  full  level  of  legalization:  its  provisions  are  legally  binding,  but  they  often  lack
precision, since key concepts such as “arbitration agreement” and “award” are not defined205; on the
other hand, it provides  a full level of delegation, since its interpretation and application is left to
state courts. By contrast, the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UNIDROIT Principles – both soft
law instruments from a legal standpoint – are not legally binding, but on the other hand have a
comparable level  of precision (or  imprecision)  with respect  to the New York Convention (they
represent a systematic set of rules in which many key concepts such as “good faith” or “commercial
arbitration” are not precisely defined) and and a lower (albeit still significant) level of delegation,
because their interpretation and application is largely left to arbitral tribunals, which enjoy a certain
degree of autonomy from state courts.
Nonetheless, the regulation of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards at global level could not
have been achieved but through a legally binding treaty, since only legally binding rules would have
represented a credible commitment on national courts and parties to arbitrations. Here, we face a
situation in which the costs of non-compliance are particularly relevant: if any party challenging an
award could rely on opportunistic arguments favouring its self-interest, the credibility of the whole
arbitration  system  would  be  a  stake.  Accordingly,  and  despite  their  imprecision  in  defining  a
number  of  key  concepts,  non-compliance  with  the  New  York  Convention  provisions  must  be
justified through legal discourse, i.e. traced back to the limited grounds for refusal of enforcement
envisaged by the Convention itself.
The particular features of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UNIDROIT Principles ( non- legally
binding nature, moderate precision and delegation) allow to combine some of the advantages of
hard law  with those of soft law; at the same time, the high level of delegation permits to overcome,
at least in part, the main disadvantages of soft law.  Their non-binding character and moderate level
of precision has allowed the drafters to reach a consensus in a relatively short period of time on a
systematic  set  of  norms, covering a large part  of the arbitral  process and the subject-matter of
international  commercial  contracts  respectively;  this  has  also  permitted  the  adoption  of  “best
solutions”, not necessarily reflecting the rules common to all the legal systems of the world206.  The
high level of delegation has allowed to overcome the disadvantages related to the lack of precision,
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by fostering a process of mutual learning among legislatures, courts and arbitrators aimed at filling
the gaps within the rules of these harmonisation tools and testing the impact of the “best solutions”
in practice.
 As  the  following  chapters  will  show,  the   international  commercial  arbitration  regime  is
characterised by a strong hybridation between hard and soft law instruments. After 50 years, two
provisions of the New York Convention have been de facto modified by a soft law instrument, the
“Recommendation  regarding  the  interpretation  of  Article  II(2)  and  Article  VII(1)  of  the
Convention”, in order to update them to current arbitration practice207. Nonetheless, the diffusion of
the  liberal  interpretation  suggested  by  the  Recommendation  will  depend  on  the  successful
interaction between the Convention, the Model Law and the various national arbitration laws: on
the one hand the Recomendation shall  allow an interpretation of  the written from requirement
envisaged by the Convention in light of less stringent national law; on the other hand, the reform of
art. 7 of the Model Law shall encourage national legislators to adopt updated provisions on the
written form requirement of the arbitration agreement in their national arbitration laws. Likewise,
the  wide  number  of  national  arbitration  legislations  largely  based  on  the  Model  Law  on
International  Commercial  Arbitration has given  rise to hybrid  forms of  laws,  which have been
formally  adopted through  national  law-making  procedures,  but  whose  content  has  been  almost
entirely determined by a non-national source208. Accordingly, the wide diffusion of the Model Law
is  an  example  of  a  soft  law  instruments  which  develops  into  hard  national  legislation.  The
application  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  as  means  to  interpret  and  supplement  national  and
international legislation (which has so far proved to be the most succesful use of the Principles) has
fostered a creative interpretation of unclear or outdated provisions more in line with international
practice: in particular, they have been an important instrument to promote the acceptance of the
principle of good faith in common law jurisdictions209.
Finally,  it should be noted that, although the distinction between hard and soft law is becoming
increasingly blurry,  it  is  still  important  to identify which norms in  the international  system are
meant to be binding and which are not. After all, much of the work of lawyers and judges still
consists in administering the law/non-law boundary by deciding on which side of it various alleged
norms and conduct fall210. Moreover, the aim of most global governance is to achieve enforceable
hard obligations: a fully legalised treaty bestowed with coercive sanctions is still the best means to
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ensure cooperation among states and non-state actors generally strive to get non-binding principles
transformed into hard law so as to be able to enforce the norms they champion211.
Application of the constructivist “norm life cycle”
The constructivist  account  of  norm diffusion212  opens up new insights  into the analysis  of the
harmonisation of the law of  international commercial arbitration. As we will see in more detail in
the following chapters, this harmonisation process can be seen as a process of diffusion of uniform
norms in the field of international commercial arbitration following the constructivist “norm life
cycle” in at least two of its three stages, namely norm emergence and norm cascade. Formulating
agencies  like  UNCITRAL,  UNIDROIT  and  the  International  Chamber  of  Commerce  can  be
considered  as  epistemic  communities  or  norm entrepreneurs,  challenging  the  existing  logic  of
appropriateness with which the arbitral process was conducted in the various states, characterised
by a mistrust vis à vis this method of dispute resolution in favour of the more traditional litigation in
national  courts,  and trying to foster  the emergence  of  a common culture of arbitration,  i.e.  the
gradual convergence in norms procedures and expectations of participants in the arbitral process.213
Constructivists observe that an emergent norm, in order to move towards the second stage of norm
cascade, needs to be institutionalised in specific sets of international rules and organisations, so as
to clarify what the norm exactly is and what constitutes a violation or a departure thereof. This is
what  is  currently  happening  in  the  field  of  the  harmonisation  of  international  commercial
arbitration: over  the past twenty years there has been an evident move toward the codification or
restatement  of  general  principles  of  law or  commonly accepted  practices  (e.g.  the UNCITRAL
Model Laws on International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation, the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules,  the  rules  of  procedures  of  the  various  international  arbitral  institutions,  such  as  the
International Chamber of Commerce and the London Court of International Arbitration) and the
vague notion of lex mercatoria is being progressively replaced by written codifications such as the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the Principles of European Contract
Law and the CENTRAL database. Once a “critical mass” of states have been persuaded to adopt the
new norms, constructivists say that these have reached a threshold or tipping point, since from this
moment  on  they  start  to  bring  about  change  in  the  prevalent  beliefs  and  values  within  the
international system.. 
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Two of the main harmonisation tools in the field of international arbitration seem to have reached
this  threshold:  the  first  is  the  New  York  Convention  on  the  Recognition  and  Enforcement  of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, which has been adopted by most states in the world and therefore seems
to have achieved even the final stage of internalization; the second is the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, which has reached or is reaching the tipping point, since
nearly 50 States around the world have so far enacted a legislation based on this instrument and
among them feature many of the world's  main trading nations, such as some Canadian and US
states, Germany, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom. In the norm-cascade phase, constructivists
envisage three major motivations pulling other tates to respond to the pressure stemming from “
state  leaders”  and  ultimately  adhere  to  the  new  rules:  legitimation,  that  is  the  concern  with
international approval (in the sense that not complying with internationally accepted standards may
undermine their reputation and credibility)214; conformity,  whereby Ssates comply with norms to
demonstrate that they have adapted to the social environment they belong; esteem, whereby state
leaders conform to norms in order to avoid disapproval stemming from violation of internationally
accepted standards  and thus enhance  national  consensus (and,  as a result  their own prestige)215.
These  motivations   appear  too  general  and  do  not  take  into  account  the  peculiarities  of  the
international trade context. More convincing seems the explanation that states decide to conform
their national laws to international trade standards because they want to convey a “signalling effect”
to  the  international  business  community:  they  want  to  make  their  national  laws  dealing  with
international trade matters immediately familiar and recognisable to the foreign practitioner, so as to
attract as many foreign investments and arbitrations as possible within their territory. In the specific
context of international commercial arbitration, this signalling effect can also be interpreted with
reference  to  the  nationals  of  the  state  concerned.  As  arbitration  is  largely  founded  on  party
autonomy,  parties  are  free  to  choose  the  place  of  arbitration  and  therefore  the  procedural  law
governing their dispute. If a given country has an outdated arbitration law, it will rarely be selected
as place of arbitration; consequently, even its nationals will be forced to go abroad to solve their
disputes and thus will have to deal  with a foreign arbitration law with which they may not be
familiar.
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Legitimacy in international commercial arbitration
Interdisciplinary approaches to international commercial arbitration have been mainly adopted with
a view to addressing the issue of its autonomous character with respect to state order. Very few
attempts  have  been  made  to  assess  its  legitimacy.  One  of  the  rare  examples  in  this  sense  is
represented by  Banakar’s essay “Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration”216 . Building on
Teubner´s discourse217, this author provides a number of arguments supporting the autonomy and
legitimacy of international commercial arbitration. Banakar´s central thesis is that arbitration has six
characteristics   which  make  it  an  autopoietic  and  therefore  autonomous  and  self  -legitimized
system218.  In the first place,  it  is bestowed with a contractual character,  since it  is based on the
agreement of the parties. Secondly,  it is a system characterized by a high degree of informality,
since  its  private  nature  entails  that  the  arbitrator  is  not  obliged  to  stick  to  the  lengthy  and
complicated procedural rules of court litigation. Thirdly, arbitration has an intercultural dimension,
in the sense that the arbitrator can usually speak the language of both parties and is familiar with
their laws and procedures. Fourthly, arbitration is to some extent independent of municipal courts,
since  parties  are  free  to  choose  both  substantive  and  procedural  rules.  Fifthly,  arbitration  is  a
transnational global phenomenon, which has the potential to transcend geographical and national
boundaries traditionally used to determined jurisdiction in every legal culture. Sixthly, arbitration is
being progressively institutionalized, that is it is beginning to have its own proper institutions and
well-defined  procedural  rules  and  therefore  is  increasing its  autonomy from the  national  level.
These particular characteristics allow arbitration to facilitate the internal social integration of the
business community, by enhancing the regulated autonomy of the customs and usages of merchants.
Arbitration is a self-reflexive system in the sense that it regulates self-regulation219: it establishes
procedural rules to foster the development of a self-regulated area of the market (i.e. international
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commercial transactions)220, it sets up a favorable environment in which the business community
can strengthen its own self-regulation221.
Nonetheless, Banakar's assessment of the legitimacy of international commercial arbitration relies
only on a particular view of this notion (i.e. Teubner’s concept of self-legitimation); thus far there
has been no detailed analyisis of how legitimacy in this field may be justified under the various
theories envisaged by the social sciences literature. It is not possible here to tackle this issue in all
its respects; yet, some broad considerations can be made. As outlined in the introductory part of this
work,  there  are in  the  literature  two  main  different  approaches  to  the  notion  of  legitimacy:  a
normative and a descriptive approach222. From a normative standpoint, the issue of the legitimacy of
international  commercial  arbitration  depends  on  how the  issue  of  its  autonomous  character  is
addressed.  Supporters  of  the  globalist  approach  to  arbitration,  who  consider  arbitration  as  an
increasingly  autonomous  legal  order  more  and  more  detached  by  state  sovereignty  may either
emphasise its dangerous lack of legitimacy223 or rely on autopoiesis in order to emphasise the self-
legitimation of this regime224.  On the other hand, scholars seeing arbitration as a hybrid regime
composed of national, international and non-national sources may argue that in this field there are
enough  links  with  state  sovereignty  to  make  it  accountable  to  its  addressees.  Governance  of
international commercial arbitration occurs through the interaction between states and a restricted
number of intergovernmental organisations (such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT) and non-state
actors (such as the various arbitral institutions). Accountability is assured through the instrument of
delegation: the increasing use of soft law and the large scope of party autonomy in arbitration are
indicators that states are delegating to international organisations and non-state actors the task of
determining the most appropriate standards for the conduct of arbitration, but that at the same time
they retain the power of supervising the arbitration process. As observed supra by Lynch, state law
is still a fundamental source of international commercial arbitration, although the content of many
national  arbitration  laws  is  even  more  determined  by  model  laws  elaborated  by  transnational
epistemic communities. Moreover, the increasing role of party autonomy in the arbitration process
has spurred arbitral institutions as well as the specialized formulating agencies to create a large
amount of private informal norms of dispute resolution; yet,  in the absence of  a supra-national
arbitration tribunal, national courts and laws continue to play an important support and supervisory
function  at  various  points  in  the  arbitration  process:  for  example,   in  the  recognition  and
220
 R. Banakar, Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration, cit, p. 361
221
 R. Banakar, Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration, cit, p. 393
222
 See supra pp. 54 ff.
223See Cutler above pp. 186ff
224See Banakar above
201
enforcement of arbitration agreements, in the determination of which disputes can be submitted to
arbitration, and in the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards. 
The legitimacy problem of this form of governance lies in the restricted number of actors taking
part to the decision-making process. Nonetheless, in recent years there has been a steep increase in
the participation of non-state actors as observers to the working sessions of the main formulating
agencies  in  the  field,  i.e.  UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT.   The fact  that  these  observers  are  not
members and therefore have no right to vote is of little significance, since, as we have seen above,
these  formulating  agencies  typically  reach  their  decisions  by consensus,  rather  than  by voting:
during working sessions, all efforts are made in order to take into account all concerns raised and to
reach a final text which is acceptable to all225.   The involvement  of a wide range of outside experts
and stakeholders not belonging to the state or  formulating agency's  bureaucracy in the drafting
process of UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT is therefore  an attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of
their harmonisation tools and facilitate their reception in practice.
The particular decision-making process followed by UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT is also the main
indicator of the legitimacy of international commercial arbitration from a descriptive perspective.
Despite  their  status  as  inter-governmental  bodies,  these  formulating  agencies  usually  follow a
decision-making process based on consensus, rather than on voting and veto mechanisms, which
closely  resembles  the  logic  of  communicative  action226 and  allows  the  adoption  of  widely
acceptable solutions  founded on rational arguments rather than on a trade-off among the various
stakeholders227. Accordingly, they represent an example of legitimate governance in habermasian
terms, i.e. a decision-making process aimed at reaching a reasoned consensus among actors and  in
which the various stakeholders' interests are taken into consideration 
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CHAPTER  FOUR:  THE  HARMONISATION  OF  ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE  –  DRAFTING  AND  DIFFUSION  OF  THE  UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
SECTION  I  :  THE  UNCITRAL  MODEL  LAW  ON  INTERNATIONAL  
COMMERCIAL  ARBITRATION-  LEGISLATIVE  HISTORY  AND  MAIN
FEATURES
The legislative history of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration 
The legislative history of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration can be traced
back  to  1978,  when  UNCITRAL  Secretariat  held  a  consultative  meeting  in  Paris  with
representatives of various international organisations involved in international arbitration (Asian-
African  Legal  Consultative  Committee,  International  Council  for  Commercial  Arbitration,  the
Arbitration Commission of the International Chamber of Commerce)1. The purpose of the meeting
was  to  explore  new ways  to  improve  the  overall  framework  of  international  arbitration2.  The
participants to this meeting shared the common view that it would be in the interest of international
commercial arbitration if UNCITRAL would initiate steps leading to the establishment of uniform
standards of  arbitral  procedure3.  It  was also observed that,  since most national laws on arbitral
procedures were drafted to meet the needs of domestic arbitration, there were often divergences
between the latter and international arbitration practice. Some national laws, for example, did not
recognize the competence of the arbitral tribunal to decide about its jurisdiction, or restricted the
power  of  the  parties  to  determine  the  applicable  law,  or  imposed  judicial  control  over  the
1Secretariat Note A/cn.9/169 11 May 1979, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, p. 1173
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composition of the arbitral tribunal and sometimes even over the application of substantive law4.  It
was  therefore  necessary  to  conceive  an  harmonisation  tool  which  would take  into  account  the
specific features of international commercial arbitration5, so as to fill in the gap between modern
arbitration  practice  and  old-fashioned  national  laws6.  Moreover,  it  was  also  suggested  that
harmonisation of arbitral  procedural  rules,  by eliminating certain  local  particularites  in national
laws, would be helpful in limitating the grounds of judicial setting aside of arbitral awards.
The conclusions reached in Paris were reported by the Secretariat to the UNCITRAL Commission
at its 1979 session. The first important preliminary issue the Commission had to face was whether
the harmonisation of arbitration law should be accomplished by a model law or a convention. The
choice for  the model law was based essentially on practical  reasons,   namely the advantage of
avoiding the costly and time-consuming processes of inducing a diplomatic conference of all UN
member  states,  negotiating  an  international  text  on  the  basis  of  consensus  and  achieving  the
ratifications  by individual  states.  Moreover,  since  arbitration laws  constitute  only a part  of  the
state’s procedural law, it was recognised that a model law could be easier to be absorbed into a
state’s  procedural  system  than  a  convention,  whose  provisions  could  be  varied  only  with  the
cumbersome device of  reservations.  Once approved by UNCITRAL,  the text of the model  law
would be available to state legislators without the need of any further ratification process; the text
could be adapted to the language, structure and needs of the various legal systems.
Accordingly, at the end of its session the Commission adopted the formal decision to  request the
Secretariat  to  prepare,  in  consultation  with  interested  international  organisations,  and  after
scrutinizing the provisions of national legislations relating to arbitral procedure, a preliminary draft
of  a model law on international arbitral procedure.7 In carrying out this task, the Secretariat should
restrict the scope of the draft  to international  commercial  arbitration and  take into account the
provisions of the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules8. 
Pursuant to this request, the Secretariat began collecting materials on national laws pertaining to
arbitral procedure. In 1981 the Secretariat issued its first report on the possible features of the model
law. In this report one finds clearly stated the main purposes underlying the future model law. The
Secretariat emphasised that, were the model law to facilitate international commercial arbitration
and  ensure  its  proper  functioning  and  recognition,  it  would  need  to  provide  solutions  to  the
manifold defects or pitfalls encountered in arbitration practice. One of the most important purposes
envisaged from the outset by the Secretariat was the need to strike a reasonable balance between the
4
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freedom of the parties to determine the procedure and the need for mandatory national provisions
ensuring fair and just proceedings9. A major complaint in arbitration practice was indeed that parties
agreements on procedure were often frustrated by mandatory provisions of the applicable law. For
example,  parties  often felt  that their freedom was unduly restricted with regard to the types  of
disputes to submit to arbitration, the method of selection and appointment of arbitrators, and the
arbitrator’s competence to decide on his own competence or the applicable procedural rules10. These
restrictions,  stemming  from  national  laws,  raised  criticism  if  not  hostility  towards  mandatory
provisions of law. However, the solution should not be understood as conferring total freedom to
the parties and refusing all mandatory provisions in international commercial arbitration. Parties’
freedom should be limited by mandatory provisions designed to prevent any denial of justice or
violation of due process in the procedure established by the parties. On this reading, the model law
would provide a “constitutional framework” which would recognise parties’ freedom and at the
same time guarantee the validity of their agreements based thereon11. With the latter argument, the
Secretariat  took  implicitly  a  stand  over  the  debate  on  the  “floating  arbitration”12:  refusing  all
mandatory rules,  the Secretariat  admitted,  would amount to consider international  arbitration as
“supranational”, in the sense of fully detached from any national law. Instead, the underlying idea
of the report was the necessity to envisage a certain link between arbitration proceedings, including
the awards, and a national law which would give recognition and effect to the award and would also
provide for some form of adequate assistance by national courts. This in turn would imply a precise
demarcation of the scope of possible intervention and supervision by national courts13. 
 In view of the complexity of the issues and the work required for the preparation of a draft model
law, the Secretariat suggested that this task should be conferred to a working group which could
rely on its technical support14. Following the Secretariat’s suggestion, the Commission conferred to
the Working Group on International Contract Practices the task of preparing the draft model law:
the  secretariat  would  prepare  the  background  studies  and  provide  the  Working  Group  with
assistance15. Although the working group was initially composed of 15 States, its first session was
also attended by 27 States as observers and six international organisations. This level of interest
9
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remained constant throughout the following sessions, so that in 1983 the Commission decided to
enlarge  the  Working  Group  to  include  all  36  of  its  member  states.  Instead  of  concentrating
immediately on the drafting, the Working Group addressed first a number of background questions
which had been submitted to its attention by the Secretariat in its Second Note16. The issues dealt
with ranged from the scope of application of the future model law (e.g. whether it should apply also
to  ad  hoc  arbitration  )17 ,  to  the  need  for  a  definition  of  crucial  terms  such  as  “arbitration”,
“international” and “commercial”18, to the need for envisaging provisions regarding the validity of
the arbitration agreement19, or the arbitrability of the disputes20, the principle of separation of the
arbitral clause21, the qualifications required to the arbitrators22. By providing answers to these issues,
the Working Group outlined the basic features and policies of the future Model Law. 23. In 1984,
after five sessions and five preliminary drafts, the Working Group completed its task by submitting
to the Commission the final draft of the Model law, which was transmitted to all UN states and to
interested international  organisations for comments.  In  addition,  ICCA organised in Lausanne a
special meeting to discuss the draft  Model Law, to which almost 550 practitioners and scholars in
the field of international arbitration from 39 countries took part.  The draft was reviewed at the
1985 session of the Commission and at the end of the same session the final text of the Model Law
was approved. The Report of this session24, together with its summary records25, constitute the most
important  part  of the Model Law's  travaux preparatoires.26  Finally,  on December 11 1985 the
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the resolution approving the Model Law.
The scope of application of the Model law
16
 Second Secretariat Note, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP. 35 (1 december 1981)
17
 Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its third session A/CN.9/216 (16-26
February 1982), par. 15-16  available at www.uncitral.org
18
  Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its third session, cit., par. 16-21
19
 Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its third session, cit.,  par. 22
20
  Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its third session, cit , par. 30
21
 Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its third session, cit.,  par. 34
22
 Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its third session, cit.,  par. 42
23
 H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit  , p. 12
24
 A/40/17. This is the Commission's Report to the UN General Assembly of the session at which the Model Law was
adopted (H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit  , p. 20)
25
 A/CN.9/SR305-333. These are the summaries of what was said during the Commission's session. (H.M. Holtzmann
and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit , p. 19).
26
 P. Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, Sweet and
Maxwell, 2005,  p. 10
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Article 1, concerning the Model law scope of application, is the article with the longest legislative
history 27. The necessity of defining the scope of application of the Model law as exactly as possible
emerged very clearly during the travaux preparatories: it was recognised from the outset that the
Model Law was a text which, once enacted by the states, would form only a part of their national
legislation.  Since the Model  Law was to co-habit  with  states’  other  laws,  it  was necessary to
determine as precisely as possible its sphere of application.
Article 1 establishes three main limitations to the scope of application of the Model Law. The main
purpose of this article is to determine which types of arbitration are governed by this harmonisation
instrument.. The first limitation is of a substantive nature, stating which matters are governed by the
Model law: it applies only to international commercial arbitration, as defined by the law itself  28.
The second limitation is of a territorial character: the Model Law applies only to arbitrations whose
place is in a state adopting the law. The third limitation concerns public policy: the Model law does
not affect other rules of the state governing arbitrability or special arbitration procedures.
 As to the first limitation, article 1 provides four alternative tests to determine when an arbitration
should be considered international, but on the other hand provides only a non-exaustive lists of
examples of what constitutes a commercial  arbitration29.  Furthermore,  no definition of the term
arbitration is provided.
27
 P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of  the Model Law, Arbitration International, 1995, 11, p. 7; H.M.
Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit , p. 27
28 The decision to limit the application of the model law to international commercial arbitration was based essentially
on two grounds. The first was the argument that it was in  international trade disputes that diversity among national
arbitration laws produced its worst effects on the smooth functioning of the arbitral process. The second was the
practical consideration  that harmonisation was easier if limited to international arbitration, because the resistance of
states towards the maintenance of their own particular procedures was less strong than in purely domestic disputes.
H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus,  op. cit, p. 28  Seventh Secretariat Note – Analytical Commentary on Draft Text
(A/CN.9/264) 25 March 1985, in  H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit ,p. 71
29
 The list is not contained in the main text of the article but in an attached footnote.
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The “international” character of the arbitration 
In order to determine the international character of the arbitration, the Working Group preferred to
provide a number of alternative tests, rather than a general formula such as that envisaged by the
French Code of Civil Procedure30. The French definition is wider and simpler, but on the other hand
it was feared that because of its breadth it might lead to divergent interpretations in the courts of the
various  states  adopting the  Model  Law31.  The first  test  (art.  1  par.  a)  refers  to  the most  usual
situation32 and  was  inspired  by  the  1961  European  Convention  on  International  Commercial
Arbitration. It provides that an arbitration is deemed international if the parties have their place of
business in different states; where the parties have more than one place of business, the latter is that
with the closest relationship to the arbitration agreement33. The second group of criteria (art. 1 par.
b) qualify an arbitration as international where one particular element thereof is situated in a state
other  than that  in  which the parties  have  their place of business:  1)  the place of arbitration,  if
determined in the arbitration agreement; 2) the place of arbitration, if determined pursuant to the
arbitration agreement34; 3) any place in which  a substantial part of the obligations underlying the
dispute is to be performed; 4) any place with which the dispute is most closely connected. 
Finally, according to the last criterion envisaged by article 1 par. c, an arbitration is international if
the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement refers to more
than one country. By this provision, parties can “opt-in” the Model Law, i.e. they can subject an
otherwise domestic arbitration to the model law, provided that the subject matter of their dispute
30
 Art 1492 of the French Code of Civil Procedure (as revised in 1981) establishes that an arbitration is international
when it involves the interests of international trade: << Est international l’arbitrage qui met en cause des interets du
commerce international>>.
31
 H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus,  op.cit, pp. 28-29, Second Secretariat Note- Possible Features of a Model Law:
Questions for Discussion (A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.35) 1 December 1981, in  H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op cit, p.
44-45.The French definition was also  considered as a tautology because it  did not include a definition of the term
« international ». An example of the practical disadvantages of the French definition is quoted by Sanders ( P. Sanders,
The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation , Kluwer, 2001, p. 58), who observes that French courts had to
decide whether an arbitration between a French company and a French subsidiary, wholly owned by a foreign company,
was international
32
 P.  Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL, cit.,  p. 58 <<most cases are international because the parties have their place of
business in different States at the time of concluding their agreement to arbitrate>>.
33
 The Working Group preferred the term place of business to the more common one of « seat » for two reasons. First, it
believed that it would better reflect general business practice, since normally parties refer their interests to the place
most closely connected to the transaction; second, this notion had already been adopted by the CISG, another important
UNCITRAL instrument. 
34
 The first two cases refer to the situation in which parties with the place of business in the same state agree  to arbitrate
in a foreign Model Law country. The expression « pursuant to » has given rise to two divergent interpretations: one
limits  this  term to the cases where the place of arbitration,  although not  expressely determined by the parties,  can
nonetheless be implied from the content of the agreements; the other encompasses also those cases (envisaged under art.
20 of the Model Law) where, failing an agreement by the parties, the place of arbitration is determined by the arbitral
tribunal. The Commission failed to reach an agreement on which interpretation should prevail, therefore the conflict
remains. Cfr Sixth Secretariat Note- Analytical Compilation of Goverment Comments (A/CN.9/263), 19 March 1985,
in  H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 64
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relates to more than one country.  However, article 1 provides for an important limitation to this
freedom: the Model Law cannot apply to disputes which cannot be subject to arbitration under the
law of the enacting state. This limitation refers to the so-called “arbitrability” of the dispute: the
Model Law leaves to the enacting state the power of determining which dispute may be subject to
arbitration.
The commercial character of the arbitration
The Working Group did not manage to reach a comprehensive definition of the term “commercial”,
although it  recognised that  it  was widely used in practice and had acquired a sufficiently clear
meaning35. Yet, it was deemed undesirable to leave the matter entirely to individual states, without
providing some guidance for uniform interpretation.  Therefore, the Working Group agreed on an
intermediate solution: drafting a non-exhaustive list of examples of commercial relationships.  But a
second question came to the fore: which form should this list assume? Should it be part of the text
of the Model Law or should it constitute an annex to article 1? The prevailing view was to draft the
list in a footnote annexed to article 1, mainly because such a list was contrary to the legislative
techniques  in  a  number  of  legal  systems  and  because  the  examples  could  be  interpreted  as
exhaustive  despite its express illustrative nature. Moreover,  the list was considered  too wide and
too vague, with the risk of turning out being more harmful than helpful36. Nonetheless, it was finally
decided that the list, despite its shortcomings, would provide some guidance and help to prevent too
restrictive interpretations to be found in some national laws and legal doctrine. This is the  reason
why  the  final  version  of  the  footnote  warns  that  term  “commercial”  should  be  given  a  wide
interpretation37. In particular, the Working Group has repeatedly emphasised38  that the term should
not be interpreted according to some particular national definitions, which restrict its scope to those
relationships dealt with in commercial codes or to transactions between merchants. This concerns
35
 First Secretariat Note (A/CN.9/207), in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 41.
36
  Third Working Group Report A/CN.9/233 28 March 1983, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 51
37
 Cfr UNCITRAL Model Law article 1 footnote 2: <<The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so
as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a
commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or ex-
change of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construc-
tion of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or
concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by air,
sea, rail or road>>.
38
  Cfr e.g. Seventh Secretariat Note, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 71
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stemmed from the experience with the New York Convention, which allows the interpretation of
the term “commercial” according to national standards39 and which often resulted in excessively
narrow interpretations from an international standpoint. The call for an extensive interpretation of
the term “commercial” does not mean that this term should have a boundless scope. During the
travaux preparatoires the Working Group has identified a number of cases which were not meant to
be included within the term, namely labor, employment, family, and consumer disputes. Moreover,
the scope of the term is in any case restricted by the general limitation of arbitrability stated in art
1(5), according to which no matter may be subject to arbitration according to the Model Law, if it is
not arbitrable under the enacting state's municipal law.
The definition of “arbitration”
The Working Group decided not to provide a comprehensive definition of the term “arbitration”,
because it would involve the difficult task of drawing the line between arbitrations falling under the
scope of the Model Law and those which did not. What is more, the Secretariat noted that national
statutes  and  international  conventions  widely use  the  term “arbitration”  without  providing  any
definition: therefore, defining the term in the Model Law was considered both a complicated and
unnecessary  task.40 Nonetheless,  it  was  agreed  to  include  a  clarification,  rather  than  a
comprehensive  explanation  of  meaning,  in  order  to  specify  that  the  Model  Law  covers  both
institutional  and ad hoc arbitration.  However,  in the  travaux preparatoires one may find useful
guidance as to the intended scope of the term. The Working Group stated that the Model Law was
designed for consensual arbitration, i.e.  arbitration based on a voluntary agreement between the
parties and therefore some types of arbitrations, such as compulsory arbitrations imposed by statute,
should automatically fall outside its scope. In addition, the Working Group agreed that the Model
Law should not apply to some types of free arbitration, such as arbitrato irrituale in Italian law, the
Dutch  bindend avies, and the German  Schiedsgutachen, which commonly result in decisions that
are binding only as contractual  provisions and not as arbitral  awards.  Yet,  the Working Group
concluded that such limitations should not be expressed in the Model Law, since it was thought
difficult  to  distinguish  the  various  types  of  free  arbitration  from those  under  the  Model  Law.
39
 Art  1(3)  of  the  New York  Convention  allows  States  to  restrict  the  Convention  to  awards  arising  out  of  legal
relationships which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making the restriction.
40
 Second Secretariat Note, cit, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 157
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However, the Working Group noted that states could refer to these limitations, where necessary, in
enacting the Model Law41.
The territorial scope of the Model Law
According to art. 1(2), the Model Law applies only if the place of arbitration is in the adopting
State42. This principle was the result of a wide debate within the Working Group, in which two
opposite criteria were faced: the territorial criterion, according to which the place of arbitration was
the sole connecting factor for the Model Law's territorial application and the autonomy criterion,
according to which the place of arbitration should not be the only determining factor, the Model
Law also applying to arbitrations taking place in another country, if the parties had chosen to be
governed by the procedural law of a state adopting the Model law. Had the latter criterion prevailed,
parties  would  have  been  free,  with  the  only  restriction  of  public  policy  and  rules  of  court
competence inherent to each national system, to choose the arbitration law of a state other than that
of  the  place  of  arbitration.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission  decided  not  to  adopt  the  autonomy
criterion:   it  was  argued  that  the  territorial  criterion  was  already  widely  accepted  by  existing
national laws and where the latter allowed parties to adopt the autonomy criterion, this was rarely
used. Moreover, it was pointed out that the Model Law allows the parties wide freedom in shaping
arbitral proceedings, including the power to agree on procedural rules of a foreign law, provided
that they do not conflict with the mandatory provisions of the Model Law. Accordingly, the wide
degree of freedom recognised to the parties reduces the need for providing them with the choice of
a foreign law in lieu of the law of the place of arbitration43. 
41
 First Working Group Report, in  H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, p. 157
42
 The Model  Law envisages  four  exceptions  to  this  priciple:  art  8  (when  a party brings  the  dispute  object  of an
arbitration  agreement  before  a  court),  9  (request  for  interim  measures  by a  court  before  or  during  the  arbitration
proceedings), 35 and 36 (recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards).  These articles apply even if the place of
arbitration is outside the enacting state.
43
 Commission Report A/40/17 21 August 1985, in   H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, p. 129
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The Model Law as lex specialis
The remaining limitations to the Model law’s scope envisaged by article 1 concern the relationship
between  the  Model  Law  and  other  legal  provisions  of  the  enacting  state.  The  first  limitation
concerns treaty law: as stated in art 1(1), bi- or multi- lateral treaties signed by the adopting state
prevail over the national arbitration statute adopting the Model Law44. This limitation may appear
superfluous, since the priority of treaty law descends in every legal system from the hierarchy of the
sources of law. Nonetheless, it was decided to retain this clarification in order to emphasise the fact
that the Model Law would not harm the effectiveness of the treaties already in force in the adopting
state45.  
As concerns  the relationship between  the Model  Law and other  provisions  of   national  law in
conflict with the Model Law itself, the general view within the Working Group was to grant the
Model Law the character of lex specialis: the Model Law was designed to establish a special regime
for international commercial arbitration and therefore should prevail over any other municipal law
on arbitration. However, it was decided not to include an express reference to the special character
of the Model Law, because this principle could not apply to any aspect of international arbitration.
There were some issues, such the capacity of the parties to enter an arbitration agreement, or the
enforcement by the courts of interim measures granted by the arbitral  tribunal, which were not
settled by the Model Law: therefore, it would not always be an easy task to determine whether a
specific issue is governed by the latter, albeit implicitly, or not dealt with therein and thus governed
by other provisions of national law46. The most important exception to the special character of the
Model Law is the issue of arbitrability, embodied in art. 1(5): the Model Law does not affect other
laws of the enacting state by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or
may  be  submitted  to  arbitration  only  according  to  provisions  of  other  laws.  The  issue  of
determining which disputes can be subject to arbitration is left to the legislation of each individual
state, since there is so far no consensus on this point at the international level. 
General features of the Model Law
44
 P. Binder, op. cit. p. 21
45
 Seven Secretariat Note, in  H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 69
46
 Fourth Secretariat Note par. 3-5, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,   p. 138.139
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The “Magna Charta” of international arbitration
The most important principles of the Model Law are embedded in articles 18 and 19, which the
Secretariat defined as the “Magna Charta” of arbitral procedure47: the latter establishes the principle
of  autonomy  of  the  parties  and  arbitrators  in  governing  the  proceedings,  whereas  the  former
establishes the principle of equal treatment of the parties. In striking a balance between these two
fundamental principles, both articles set up a “liberal framework”48 granting autonomy to the parties
and,  failing  agreement,  helping  with  default  rules  and  conferring  discretionary  powers  to  the
arbitrators, within the limits necessary to secure fair proceedings49. The two principles enshrined in
art 18 and 19 directly address a question emerged since the early preparatory works of the Model
Law:  how to provide the parties with the freedom to agree on the procedures to be followed in the
arbitration and at the same time guaranteeing fairness in the proceedings50.  Article 19 contains two
fundamental rules. The first is the freedom of the parties to agree on the arbitral procedure to be
followed,  the  “rules  of  the  game”  tailored  to  their  specific  needs51,  subject  to  the  mandatory
provisions of the national law. The second is the power, recognised to the arbitral tribunal if such
agreement is lacking, to conduct the arbitration in the way it considers appropriate, subject to both
the  mandatory  and  non-mandatory  provisions  of  the  Model  Law.  This  general  rule  is  further
specified  in  other  provisions:  art.  19  (2)52 identifies  the  issues  in  which  such  power  can  be
exercised; art. 17 confers the power to order interim measures of protection; art. 25 authorises the
arbitral tribunal to continue or terminate the proceedings upon certain kinds of default of a party; art
26 empowers the arbitral tribunal to nominate its own expert. Yet, the freedom of the parties and of
the  arbitral  tribunal  cannot  be  unlimited.  In  order  to  ensure  due  process  and  fairness  of  the
proceedings, the Model Law contains a number of mandatory provisions limiting the autonomy of
the parties and the discretionary powers of the arbitral tribunal.  Art. 18, establishing that each party
must  be  treated  equally  and be given  full  opportunity  to  present  its  case,  constitutes  the  most
important of these provisions, the other articles providing detailed mechanisms by which the goals
47
 Seventh Secretariat Note par. 1
48
 Seventh secretariat Note par. 1 in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 583
49
 G.  Herrmann,  The  UNCITRAL Model  Law on  International  Commercial  Arbitration.  Introduction and  General
Provisions, in P. Sarcevic (ed.), Essays on International Commercial Arbitration, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989,  p. 15
50
 H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit , p. 568. See supra pp. 203ff
51
  First Secretariat Note, par. 17, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit p. 571
52Art 19(2) specifies that the power conferred to the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence. Of course, this provision is not mandatory and therefore subject to
parties' will. Contrary to this provision, they can agree on particular rules of evidence, for example that certain evidence
should be deemed inadmissible, or that a certain kind of document be the exclusive evidence,. In this case, the arbitral
tribunal should abide by that choice. H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 566
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of equality and fair procedure are to be achieved53 . The principle of equal treatment between parties
means that no party shall be given an advantage over the other, for example by allowing it to choose
more tribunal members than the other party.  The Model Law provides also an important sanction in
case  of  breach  of  these  fundamental  principles.  This  sanction  is  implied  from  art.  34,  which
envisages the setting aside of the award on grounds of procedural injustice, and expressly mentions
the situation where a party is unable to present its case54. 
Default rules and the principle of completeness
In preparing the draft provisions of the Model Law, one of the questions the Secretariat asked the
Working Group was to what extent supplementary rules on arbitrtal procedure should be included55.
In  answering the key question of  how detailed the Model  Law should be,  it  adopted a middle
ground between two extreme approaches: neither has it limited the provisions to a single statement
allowing the arbitral tribunal to conduct the proceedings as it wishes, subject to any agreement of
the parties and the need to guarantee equal treatment, nor has it drawn up a fully detailed set of
procedures56.   Rather,  the  Working  Group  agreed  that  the  Model  Law  should  be  sufficiently
complete  by  including  a  “skeleton  set  of  rules”57,  a  set  of  basic  provisions  to  govern  the
commencement and functioning of arbitration proceedings, even where parties had not agreed on
the necessary procedural rules, but that it need not cover every detail of procedure58.  Thus, the
Model Law provides a sort of “emergency kit”59 of default rules which apply in the frequent cases
where the parties  did not include in  their agreement  to arbitrate  any provisions concerning the
procedures, or any reference to a set of arbitration rules and which deal with the most basic issues of
arbitration, such as how to commence the arbitration, where it will take place, its language, and
what happens if one party fails to participate. These rules, albeit supplementary,  can constitute a
limitation to the arbitral tribunal's discretionary power to conduct the procedure in the way it deems
appropriate, since art. 19 (2) subjects this power to both mandatory and non mandatory provisions
of the Model Law.
53
 H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, Commentary on art 18, p. 550
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 P. Binder, op.  cit,  p. 183-184; G. Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law, cit,   p. 13
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 A/CN.9/WG.11/WP.35, par. 25
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 H.M. Holtzmann,  Report V: The Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings, in P. Sanders (ed), UNCITRAL' s Project  for a
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer, 1984, p. 130 
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 G. Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law, cit,  p. 11
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 First Working Group Report A/CN.9/216, par. 58
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 G. Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law, cit,  p. 11
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Certainty about court intervention
Art. 5 delimits the scope of court intervention to those provisions contained in the Model Law, so as
to provide certainty that all instances of court influence on arbitral procedure can be found in the
Model Law itself, without the need to search outside it and screen all the other laws of the land
where  arbitration  takes  place60.   The  enacting  state  can  of  course  widen  the  cases  of  court
intervention, nonetheless it  is  obliged to include all these cases in the enacting law, in order  to
increase certainty for parties and arbitrators as regards court intervention61. Yet, article 5 expressly
makes clear that this certainty is ensured only in matters governed, either expressly or impliedly by
the  Model  Law.  Where  an  issue involving arbitration  is  not  regulated  by the Model  Law,  the
question of court intervention needs to be solved with reference to the other rules of the law of the
place of arbitration. 
During the travaux preparatoires it was repeatedly made clear that the purpose of art 5 was not to
imply that court intervention was undesirable or should be kept to a minimum, but rather to oblige
the enacting legislator to include all the cases of court intervention in the arbitration process within
the provisions of the arbitration law. Accordingly, by drafting art 5 no position was taken as to the
proper role of courts in arbitral proceedings, since it purpose  was not to establish the extent of court
intervention,  but  merely to  provide parties  and arbitrators  with certainty about  the instances  in
which court supervison or assistance was to be expected62
The debate on art. 5 focussed primarily on how to identify which matters were governed by the
Model Law and which were not. The article has been criticised for not providing a clear answer to a
question of  fundamental  importance,  namely whether  in  a  given  situation court  intervention  is
available or excluded63. The Commission shared the view that this problem was common to any lex
60
 G. Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law, cit,  p. 25
61
  If a State enacts the Model Law without adding any further instance of court intervention, its courts are enabled to
intervene  in  the  following  situations:  decision  on  validity  of  arbitration  agreements  (art  8.1);  granting  of  interim
measures (art. 9); assistance in the taking of evidence (art. 27); recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (art. 35
and 36); functions listed in art. 6 (see infra).
62Cfr Fifth Working Group Report A/CN.9/246 6 March 1984, par. 185-187, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, cit
p. 222.223; Seventh Secretariat Note, Analytical commentary on Draft Text, A/Cn.9/264 25 March 1985 par. 2, in H.M.
Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, p. 228
63
 See A/CN.9/263/ADD.2 UK Comments 21 May 1985, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit p. 224-228 and
Lord Mustill's intervention in Summary Record A/CN.9/SR.309,. 302 par. 1-5, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus,
op. cit  p. 230-231; Commission Report A/40/17 21 August 1985, par. 59, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,
p. 237-238
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specialis and to all harmonisation instruments of international law, which do not cover every aspect
of  a  subject  matter.  In  all  these  cases,  it  was  necessary,  though  admittedly  often  difficult,  to
determine the scope of the text through the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation. The debate
also provided some guidelines which may be useful  in identifying the matters governed by the
Model Law. The Working Group pointed out that the term «matters governed by the Model law»
was narrower than «international  commercial arbitration» which defines the scope of the Model
Law, since there may be matters referring to international commercial arbitration, which are not in
fact governed by the Model Law64. These matters include, among the others, the capacity of the
parties to conclude the arbitration agreement, the impact of state immunity, the competence of the
arbitral  tribunal  to  adapt  contracts,  enforcement  by  courts  of  interim  measures  ordered  by the
arbitral tribunal and the question of arbitrability. 
Another general rule relating to court intervention is art. 6, which calls upon each enacting state to
designate  which  court  or  other  competent  authority  is  to  perform  certain  functions  under  the
arbitration law: deciding on the appointment of an arbitrator (art. 11), or his challenge (art. 13), or
the termination of his mandate (art 14), ruling on the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal (art. 16),
deciding on the setting aside of an award (art 34). It is believed that this provision will help the
smooth  functioning  of  the  proceedings  on  essentially  two  grounds.  First,  because  it  achieves
centralisation, so that foreign parties may easily identify the competent court or authority; second,
because  it  allows  the  designated  authority  to  specialise  and  gain  experience  in  international
commercial arbitration65.
Not all court  tasks envisaged by the Model Law are included in article  6.  For example, court
assistance in taking evidence (embodied in art.  27) and recognition and enforcement  of awards
(provided in arts 35 and 36) are not mentioned, because these functions cannot be assigned to courts
in  advance  according to  the  general  criterion  of  the place  of  arbitration:  they depend on more
variable criteria, such as the location of evidence or the location of assets of the losing party, so that
the  designation  of  the  competent  court  cannot  be  determined  in  advance66.  Article  6  expessly
provides that also a non judicial authority may be designated: this rule was added to the original
draft because in some countries the functions envisaged by this article are carried out by specialised
bodies, such as chambers of commerce or arbitral institutions67. 
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 Fourth Secretariat Note Comments and Suggestions on the Fourth Draft A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.50 16 December 1983,
par.5,  in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit   p. 222; Fifth Working Group Report, cit,  par.  188,  in H.M.
Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit,  p. 223 
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 G. Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law, cit,  p. 25; H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, p. 240
66
  P. Binder, op. cit,  p. 56; H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit , p. 240
67
 H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit p. 241
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Compliance with international instruments 
From the very inception of the Model Law project, the Commission decided that the draft uniform
law should take into account the provisions of two fundamental United Nations harmonisation tools
in the field of international commercial arbitration: the New York Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards  and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules68. Since the main
purpose  of  UNCITRAL  was  to  harmonise  the  law  of  international  trade,  it  was  of  crucial
importance that the national arbitration laws enacting the Model Law did not stand alone, but that
they should be closely related to a unified legal framework including contacts, arbitration rules, and
enforcement conventions69. The close relationship with the Arbitration Rules is reflected in the bulk
of  the  Model  Law's  supplementary  provisions,  which  are   closely  modelled  on  the  former.
Nonetheless, especially in the field of evidence, some Arbitration Rules provisions have not been
included in the Model Law. For example, art. 25(5) of the Arbitration Rules, which establishes that
parties may present evidence of witnesses in the form of written statements, was not included in the
Model Law, because it was preferred to leave this specific issue to the agreement of the parties or
the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. This choice was in line with the purpose of the Model Law's
supplementary provisions to envisage only a skeleton of rules and not a body of rules regulating
every detail of the procedure. Another example is art 24(1) of the Arbitration Rules, which states
that each party has the burden of proving the facts underlying its claim or defense. In this case, it
was preferred not to regulate the matter of the burden of proof, since it was feared that it might
interfere with the broad freedom in the conduct of arbitration granted by the Model Law in art. 1970.
Before  embarking  in  the  drafting  of  the  Model  Law  provisions,  the  Secretariat  conducted  a
preliminary study on judicial decisions applying and interpreting the New York Convention71. This
survey showed the remarkable success of this international instrument, which had been adopted by
a considerable  number of   states and had given  rise to few divergencies  in  its  application and
interpretation72.  Accordingly,  the  Commission  shared  from the  outset  the  view  that,  given  the
68
 H. M. Holtzmann, Report V, cit,  p. 130
69
 H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit , p. 9
70Cfr Commission Report A/40/17 par. 328-329 
71 Secretariat Study on the New York Convention A/CN.9/168 in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, p. 1065-
1070. The Secretariat essentially relied on the case-law published on various issues of the Yearbook of Commercial
Arbitration.
72 1979 Commission Report A/34/17 par. 77, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, p. 1071
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success of the NYC, aligning the Model Law with the Convention would foster the unification of
the law in the field of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.73 The issue of  compliance
with the NYC emerged especially in the legislative history of articles 34, 35 and 36 which concern
recognition,  enforcement  and  the  setting aside  of  arbitral  awards.  The most  debated  issue  was
whether the grounds for setting aside an award should be limited to those grounds for refusing
recognition and enforcement envisaged in the NYC. During the discussion, numerous other possible
grounds were taken into consideration, but the view which ultimately prevailed was to adopt the
NYC's grounds, with some minor modifications. It was for instance suggested to add the case of
newly discovered facts or evidence, but this option was discarded, since it would run against the
basic principle of rapid and final settlement of the dispute; another option was the case in which the
award was improperly procured by the other party (as a result, for example, of fraud, bribery, etc),
but this was considered as a violation of due process, which was already covered by the existing
provisions74. In the end, it was felt that relying on the NYC's grounds would facilitate predictability
and expeditousness in arbitration and also help to establish a harmonised system of limited recourse
against awards and their enforcement75. 
 Not  only does  the  Model  Law  deal  with  the issue  of  setting  aside,  but  also with that  of  the
recognition and enforcement  of  the awards.   Despite  the initial  reservations76,  the Commission
decided  to  introduce  in  the  Model  Law provisions  concerning  recognition  and  enforcement  of
arbitral awards, which of course mirror the NYC ones. Eventually, this choice proved very useful,
since such provisions establish a uniform regime for international awards, which applies both to
foreign  and  domestic  awards77 .  By  so  doing,  the  Model  Law  takes  the  harmonisation  of  the
discipline of recognition and enforcement a step further, since the NYC  is limited only to foreign
awards.78 Moreover, it goes towards the delocalisation of arbitration, by reducing the importance of
the place of arbitration in the conduct of international commercial  arbitration79: all  international
awards  are  treated  in  a  uniform manner,  irrespective  of  their  place of  origin.  With the  regime
73
 H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit, p. 1056
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 Second Draft art 41 (art 34 final text) par. 28 –28, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, op. cit , p. 932-933
75
 Third Working group Report A/CN.9/233 par. 187
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  The main problem was the fact that the New York Convention had already successfully handled the matter and
therefore there was no need for further provisions. States which had not adhered to the NYC would be unlikely to adopt
the identical provisions of the Model Law, mainly because the Convention granted its member states the reciprocity
reservation, limiting the application to countries which are also member of the Convention and this option was not
envisaged in the Model Law.  Cfr  Fifth Working Group Report A/CN.9/246 par. 142, in H.M. Holtzmann and J.E.
Neuhaus, op. cit  p. 1032; Second Working Group Report A/CN.9/232 par. 129.
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 In the context of the Model Law, domestic awards are those awards issued in international commercial arbitrations
taking place in the enforcing or recognising state.
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 G. Herrmann,  The Role of the Courts under the UNCITRAL Model Law Script, in J.D.M. Lew (ed), Contemporary
Problems in International Arbitration, Centre for Commercial Law Studies Queen Mary College, 1986, p. 169
79
 Seventh Secretariat Note art 35 par. 3
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introduced by the Model Law, the distinction between foreign and domestic international awards,
which is relevant under the NYC, loses much of its importance: the only relevant distinction is
between international and non-international (i.e. purely domestic) awards80.
The 2006 reform
In 2006 a small reform of the Model Law was endorsed in order to bring it more in line with current
international trade practice. However, this reform did not affect the whole structure and the general
features of the Model Law, since only few articles were emended, namely art. 7, concerning the
form of the arbitration agreement;  art.  17,  dealing with interim measures  of protection and art.
35(2), concerning the requirements for enforcement of the award. The revised version of article 7 is
intended to  address  evolving practice  in  international  trade  and  technological  developments.  In
amending  article  7,  two  options  were  adopted,  which  reflect  two  different  approaches  on  the
question of definition and form of the arbitration agreement81. The first approach is closer to the
original 1985 text. It widens the written requirement of the arbitration agreement by recognizing the
arbitration agreement as being in writing if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the
arbitration agreement has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means. On this reading,
the arbitration agreement no longer requires necessarily signatures of the parties or an exchange of
messages between them: the agreement to arbitrate may be entered into in any form (e.g. including
orally)  as  long  as  the  content  of  the  agreement  is  recorded82.  In  addition,  the  first  approach
recognizes as written the arbitration agreement concluded by means of electronic communication
and provides a definition of the latter, which is inspired from the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic  Commerce  and  the  2005  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Use  of  Electronic
Communications  in  International  Contracts83.  The  second  approach  defines  the  arbitration
agreement in a manner that omits any form requirement84. This very broad definition of arbitration
80
 ibidem
81
 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,  Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the
1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006, United Nations publication, 2008,  par.
19
82
 ibidem
83
 ibidem
84
 Ibidem.  Cfr art 7 option II “Arbitration agreement” is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or
certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defi ned legal relationship, whether
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agreement was introduced because it was noted that, in those jurisdictions which had removed the
written form requirement for arbitration agreements, that removal had not given rise to significant
disputes as to their validity. It was also observed that in such jurisdictions the provision contained in
the revised draft article 7 would be unlikely to be adopted and that therefore an alternative proposal
should be envisaged85.
The extensive revision of  art.  17 on interim measures  required  the inclusion of  a  new chapter
(chapter IV a) in the Model Law. This chapter lays down the conditions which must be satisfied in
order for the arbitral tribunal to grant  interim measures; it  envisages a detailed procedure for the
granting,  modification, suspension and termination of  such measures  and finally it  envisages a
regime for their recognition and enforcement in front of national courts.  In the light of the more
flexible written requirement  of the arbitration agreement  introduced by the reform,  the new art
35(2)  simplifies  the  requirement  for  enforcement  of  the  award:  presentation  of  a  copy  of  the
arbitration  agreement  is  no  longer  required;  in  addition,  when the  award  is  made in  a  foreign
language, submission of a certified translation is no longer mandatory, but subject to the court’s
request.
Finally a new article 2 A has been introduced, which lays down some rules of interpretation. This
provision mirrors article 7 of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods and is  designed to facilitate interpretation by reference to internationally accepted
principles86. Art 2 A (1) states that in the interpretation of the Model Law, regard is to be had to its
international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith. Art 2 A (2) provides that questions concerning matters governed by the Model Law
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on
which the Model Law is based.
contractual or not.
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 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its thirty-ninth session, 19
June-7 July 2006, A/61/17, par. 165.
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SECTION  II:  THE  IMPACT  OF  THE  UNCITRAL  MODEL  LAW  ON
NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAWS
 Different approaches to the adoption of the Model Law
The first comprehensive study1 on the diffusion of the UNCITRAL Model Law is the article by
Sanders “Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law”2, which introduced the expression
“Model Law country”. This, although vaguely defined, has become very common in the literature:
according to professor Sanders, a Model Law country is a country whose arbitration law contains a
considerable  number  of  provisions  reflecting  or  at  least  based  on  the  Model  Law3.  More
importantly, this study identifies a useful framework to describe the various approaches followed by
the  states  in  introducing  the  Model  Law  regime  into  their  national  arbitration  legislation.  In
particular, five different approaches are identified: assimilation, extension to domestic arbitration,
opting-in, opting-out, adoption as  lex specialis.  As we will see, these approaches do not exclude
one another: a state may adopt two or more of them at the same time. The first approach consists in
enacting a new law for international commercial arbitration which is identical to the Model Law, or
almost identical4. For example, Cyprus' s law of 1987 contains 36 articles corresponding, except for
minor modifications, to the 36 articles of the Model Law; Connecticut has totally incorporated the
Model  Law into its  new law while adding a further  article  37:  “This  Act  may be cited as  the
UNCITRAL  Model  Law  in  International  Commercial  Arbitration”;  Hong  Kong  and  Bermuda
1In  1993  an earlier  work  by Isaak  Dore  (I.  Dore,   The  UNCITRAL Framework  for  Arbitration in  Contemporary
Perspective, Kluwer, 1993) analysed the impact of UNCITRAL Model Law on national legislations during the first five
years  of  its  existence  and  therefore  was  limited  to  the  analysis  of  its  impact  in  the  United  States,  Canada,  the
Netherlands, as well as to the debate on its adoption in the United Kingdom. 
2
 P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, Arbitration International, 1995, 11,1, pp.1-37. This
study surveyed the national laws of the 22 countries which had so far adopted the Model Law: although the number of
Model Law countries has now more than doubled, the general framework outlined in this survey is still valid today.
3P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, cit, pp. 1-2. See also  A. Redfern and M. Hunter,
Law and Practice of  International  Commercial  Arbitration,  Sweet  and Maxwell,  2004,  p.  633,  who  identify  three
criteria qualifying a given country as a “Model Law country”: 1) when reading the national statute, the impression must
be given that the legislator took the Model Law as basis and made certain amendments and additions, but did not simply
take  the  Model  Law as  one  among  various  models  or  follow only  its  principles;  2)  the  bulk  of  the  Model  Law
provisions must be included (70 to 80 percent) and in particular its fundamental provisions and principles; 3) the law
must contain no provision incompatible with modern international commercial arbitration (e.g. foreigners may not be
arbitrators, no excludable appeal  on errors of law)
4
 P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, cit, p. 3
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annexed the Model Law to their new arbitration acts and added some provisions dealing with the
interpretation  and  application  of  the  Model  Law.  Likewise,  Scotland  in  its  1990 Law  Reform
(Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Scotland  Act,  annexed  the  Model  Law  in  Schedule  7  with  certain
modifications to adapt it for application in Scotland5. 
 The second approach consists in extending the Model Law regime also to domestic arbitration.
This  possibility  was  expressly  envisaged  during  the  travaux  preparatoires of  the  Model  Law:
although this harmonisation tool was designed for international commercial arbitration, this would
not prevent states from adopting its model provisions also for domestic arbitrations, so as to avoid
the  problematic  dichotomy  between  domestic  and  international  arbitration6.  This  road  has  for
instance been followed by Germany, Canada, Quebec, Bulgaria, Mexico and Egypt. States adopting
the third approach may, by enacting the Model Law, envisage the possibility for the parties to opt in
its regime for domestic arbitration7: this has been done for example in Hong Kong8, Scotland9, and
Nigeria10; by contrast, states can also provide for the opposite possibility of allowing the parties to
opt-out  the  Model  regime  and   have  their  international  arbitration  governed  by  the  rules  for
domestic arbitration: in Australia parties to an international arbitration taking place in Australia can
exclude the application of  the Model Law by an agreement  in writing11;  likewise,  in  Bermuda
parties may agree in the arbitration agreement or any other document in writing that any dispute that
has arisen or may arise between them is not to be settled in accordance with the Model Law12; by
the same token, in Hong Kong the parties to an international arbitration agreement may agree in
writing that the agreement is, or is to be treated, as a domestic arbitration agreement13. According to
the last approach (adoption of the Model Law as lex specialis), international commercial arbitration
is considered as a special type of arbitration and therefore is regulated by a plurality of different
regimes:  a  set  of  common  rules  applicable  to  all  types  of  arbitrations,  domestic  arbitration
provisions  (which  sometimes  may  constitute  the  standard  regime)  and  the  special  rules  for
international  commercial  arbitration (which enact  the Model Law).  In  Nigeria,  for example,  the
5See infra pp. 292ff
6Commission Report of 15 August 1979 in  H.M. Holtzmann and J.E. Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law:
Legislative History and Commentary, Kluwer, 1989,  p. 40 
7
  P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, cit, p. 5. 
8
  S. 2L of the Arbitration Ordinance of Hong Kong  allows parties to a domestic arbitration to agree, when a dispute
has arisen, that part IIA of the law (i.e. the Model Law regime) is to apply.  
9S. 66(4) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990 permits the parties, without requiring that
a dispute has effectively arisen, to agree that the Model Law as set out in Schedule 7 shall apply notwithstanding that
the arbitration would not be an international commercial arbitration within the meaning of art. 1 of the Model Law
10S. 57(2)(d) of the 1988 Nigeria Arbitration and Conciliation Decree provides that the parties may expressly agree,
despite the nature of the contract, that the dispute shall be treated as an international arbitration.
11s. 21 of 1989 Australia International Arbitration Act
12s. 29 of Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993
13s. 2M of 1989 Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance
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Model Law has been introduced in part  III  of its 1988 arbitration law, which bears  the title of
“Additional Provisions relating to International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation”: this part
applies in addition to the other  provisions of the  law. The 1993 Tunisian law of arbitration is
divided  into  three  chapters:  chapter  one  contains  common  provisions,  chapter  two  deals  with
domestic arbitration and chapter three enacts the Model Law for international arbitration, this last
chapter referring in many articles to provisions contained in the preceding two. Georgia's Statute on
arbitration deals in part II with arbitration on international transactions: this part supplements the
general  provisions  contained  in  part  I  and  shall  be  applied  concurrently  with  the  latter.  This
approach  is  the most problematic:  beside the difficulties in establishing the cases  in which the
special rules for international commercial arbitration should prevail over the common provisions, it
does  not seem to comply with the so-called  principle of  user-friendliness,  whereby the foreign
reader must be able to clearly identify in a single text the whole discipline applying to international
arbitration.
As we have seen, states may choose to apply more than one approach at the same time. The most
flexible  country  in  this  respect  appears  to  be  Hong  Kong  which  has  adopted  the  assimilation
together with the opting-in and opting out systems. By virtue of this multiple approach, Hong Kong
has enacted the Model Law in its entirety, but has at the same time provided the parties with the
widest  discretion  as  to  its  adoption:  the  Model  Law  is  the  default  regime  for  international
arbitration, but on the one hand the parties can agree to opt out of it and apply the domestic rules to
their international arbitration, and on the other hand they may decide to opt in the Model Law and
thus extend its regulation to their domestic arbitration.
Modifications made in the adoption process
When introducing the Model Law into their  legislation,  states  have hardly ever  mirrored  every
single article, but have made some modifications with a view to adapting its standard regime to the
specificities of the national environment. By comparing the national arbitration laws of the various
Model Law countries, it is possible to identify those Model Law articles which have been most
frequently subjected to modification during the enactment process. 
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Scope of application
Art. 1, which is the article with the longest legislative history14 is not surprisingly also the most
frequently and most substantially changed provision . This article is concerned with the delimitation
of  the  Model  Law's  scope  of  application  through  the  definition  of  international  commercial
arbitration. As far as the definition of international arbitration is concerned, it  essentially lays down
three criteria: the parties' place of business is in different States (par. 3a); the place of arbitration,
the place of performance of the contract or the place of the subject-matter of the dispute is outside
the State where the parties have their places of business (par. 3b); the parties expressly agree that
the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country (par.3c).   Some
countries  have  adopted  a  simplified version of  art.  1  by implementing only the most  common
situation qualifying an arbitration as international, i.e. where the parties have their place of business
in different  states: according to art.  1(2) of Bulgarian arbitration law (as amended in 1993), the
international  commercial  arbitration  resolves  civil  property  disputes  arising  from foreign  trade
relations  as  well  as  disputes  about  filling  gaps  in  a  contract  or  its  adaptation  to  newly arisen
circumstances, if the domicile or the seat of at least one of the parties is not in the Republic of
Bulgaria. Other countries have even broadened the concept of international arbitration: in addition
to the criteria enumerated in the UNCITRAL text, the 1988 California International Arbitration and
Conciliation Code defines as “international” any arbitration in which the subject-matter is otherwise
related to commercial interests in more than one state15,  with the result that the code applies to
almost all arbitrations taking place in California that are commercial and have any of the broad
statutorily defined international links16.  But the most interesting innovation has been enacted by
Tunisian arbitration law: after repeating the criteria envisaged in art. 1(3) of the Model Law, it adds
the definition of international arbitration of art. 1492 of the French Code of Civil Procedure: <<if it
generally concerns  international  trade>>17.  In  fact,  the Tunisian law contains two definitions of
international arbitration: the Model Law and the French one, which was rejected by the Working
Group of UNCITRAL18. Finally, some other countries refrained from a definition of international
arbitration and preferred to delimit the scope of the law by focussing on the types of disputes falling
14
 See supra p. 206
15Sec. 1297.13(d) of the 1988 California International Conciliation and Arbitration Code
16I. Dore, The UNCITRAL Framework for Arbitration in Contemporary Perspective, cit., p. 136
17Art. 48(d) of the Tunisian Law n. 93-42 of 26 April 1993 on the enactment of the Arbitration Code
18
 P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, cit, p. 9
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within its application19.  This is the case of Russia, whose law of 14 August 1993 envisages two
categories of disputes which may be referred to international commercial arbitration: 1) disputes
resulting from contractual and other civil law relationships arising in the course of foreign trade and
other forms of international economic relations, provided that the place of business of at least one of
the  parties  is  situated  abroad;  2)  disputes  arising  between  enterprises  with  foreign  investment,
international associations and organisations established in the territory of the Russian Federation;
disputes between the participants of such entities, as well as disputes between such entities and
other subjects of the Russian Federation 20. This is also the approach followed by some of the US
states which  adopted the Model Law: sec. 684.03 of the 1986 Florida International Arbitration Act
states that the provisions of the Act apply to the arbitration of disputes between two or more persons
at least one of whom is not a resident of the US, or, if they are residents, if the subject- matter of the
arbitration is located outside the US, or involves a contract to be performed or enforced (in whole or
in part) outside the US, or if it bears some other relation to one or more foreign countries; likewise,
sec. 9.9.31 of the Georgia Arbitration Code establishes that the part 2, regulating the arbitration of
disputes arising out of international transactions, applies if at least one of the parties is domiciled or
established  outside  the  United  States,  or  if  the  dispute  bears  some relation to  any property  or
activity outside the United States.
The Model Law  contains a limited opt-in provision, embodied in art. 1(3)(c), which allows the
parties to extend the Model Law's scope of application to arbitrations which would otherwise be
domestic, by expressly agreeing that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more
than  one  country.  However,  this  provision  permits  to  extend  the  Model  Law  regime  only  to
arbitrations  having  some  international  character  and  not  to  wholly  domestic  arbitrations:
accordingly, a state willing to provide for the possibility of bringing a purely domestic arbitration
under the Model Law regime has to envisage a special opting-in provision21. Moreover, it has been
criticised by the UNCITRAL Secretary General itself as being accompanied by a large degree of
imprecision22 :  therefore,  it  is  not  surprising  that  there  are  no  reported  examples  of  parties
concluding such agreement and several enacting countries (e.g. Russia and Ukraine) have deleted
this provision23. 
Since  the Working Group could not agree on a common definition of the term “commercial”, it was
eventually decided to provide in a footnote to art.  1 a non-exhaustive list of transactions falling
19I. Dore, The UNCITRAL Framework for Arbitration in Contemporary Perspective, cit., p. 142; P. Sanders, Unity and
Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, cit, p. 8
20Art. 1 of the Law of the Russian Federation of 14 August 1993 on International Commercial Arbitration
21P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, cit, p. 10
22Analytical Commentary 25 March 1985 (UN Doc A/CN.9/264), par. 31
23P. Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation, Kluwer, 2001, p. 26
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within this term which should be given wide interpretation. In the adoption process several states
(e.g California, Cyprus, Egypt, Nigeria, Scotland and Ukraine) were not satisfied with this solution
and have decided to insert the footnote into the text of the law itself, while others (most Canadian
provinces, Peru, Florida and Georgia) omitted it and did not insert a definition of “commercial” in
the text  24. Accordingly, in these latter countries the law is applicable to international arbitrations
regardless of whether they are commercial.25
Interim measures
Before the 2006 reform the UNCITRAL Model Law provided a very scant regulation of interim
measures  of  protection,  which  was  limited  to  only  two short  provisions:  art.  9  (court-ordered
interim  measures),  establishing  the  court's  power  to  grant  at  the  request  of  a  party  an  interim
measure of protection before and during arbitral proceedings; and art. 17 (arbitral tribunal ordered
interim measures), conferring upon the tribunal, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the power to
order interim measures always at the request of a party. This discipline left two important issues
unsolved:  whether  interim  measures  ordered  by  the  tribunal  could  be  qualified  as  awards  and
whether they could be enforced by the courts. These issues have been autonomously regulated by
some states in the adoption process, so that no common solution has been worked out: Australian
law provides that parties may agree that Chapter VIII of the Model Law (on enforcement of awards)
may apply to orders under art. 1726. Scotland expressly states that an order under art. 17 shall take
the form of an award27. Likewise, the Canadian province of British Columbia defines in sec. 2 of its
International Commercial Arbitration Act an arbitral award as any decision of the arbitral tribunal
on the substance of the dispute, including an interim award made for the preservation of property.
By  the  same  token  another  Canadian  province,  Ontario,  states  in  s.  9  of  its  International
Commercial Arbitration Act that an order under art. 17 Model Law is treated as if it were an award.
By contrast, Quebec reserves interim measures before or during the arbitration proceedings to the
24P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, cit, p. 10; P. Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL on
Arbitration and Conciliation, cit, p. 27
25I. Dore, The UNCITRAL Framework for Arbitration in Contemporary Perspective, cit, p. 142
26s. 23 of Australia International Arbitration Act
27Art 17(2) Schedule 7 1990 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Scotland Act 
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court. Tunisia28 and California29 provide for court assistance if a party does not comply with an
order  under  art.  17.  Finally,  as  we will  see  in  more  detail  in  the  following  chapter,  Germany
provides a special regime for the enforcement of interim measures ordered by the arbitral tribunal
which allows the court to recast, repeal or amend such measures 
As we have seen above30, the 2006 reform has introduced a new chapter IV a in the Model Law,
which has replaced the art. 17 of the original 1985 version. This chapter lays down very detailed
provisions  dealing  with  both  court-ordered  and  arbitral  tribunal-ordered  interim  measures.  In
particular, as far as the issue of the qualification of interim measures as arbitral award  is concerned,
the new art. 17(2) defines an interim measure of protection as any temporary measure “whether in
the form of  an award or in another  form”; this  wording  allows to maintain the two opposing
approaches  to  this  issue  adopted  by  the  jurisdictions  which had  enacted  art.  17 in  its  original
version: on the one hand, those countries which have expressly provided that an interim measure
should be issued as a formal award; on the other hand, those countries which have allowed interim
measures only in the form of an order31. As the Working Group explicitly made clear, this wording
should not however be misinterpreted as taking stand in respect of the controversial  issue as to
whether or not an interim measure issued in the form of an award would qualify for enforcement
under the New York Convention.32  Finally,  the new articles  17 H and 17 I  provide a detailed
regulation of the recognition and enforcement by the competent court of interim measures ordered
by the arbitral tribunal: this regime is similar to that of the enforcement of arbitral awards  found in
arts.  35 and  36,  taking into account  the  alterations  necessary  to  the  specific  nature  of  and  the
particular issues related to interim measures33. For example, art. 17 H (1) provides that an interim
measure issued by an arbitral tribunal shall be recognized as binding and unless otherwise provided
by the arbitral tribunal, enforced upon application to the competent court. This rule represents a
compromise  over  the  issue  whether  enforcement  of  interim measures  should  be  subject  to  the
approval  of  the  arbitral  tribunal:  the  mid-ground  position  was  found  by  replacing  the  direct
reference  to  the  necessity  of  approval  with  the  wording  that  the  interim  measure  should  be
recognized as binding “unless otherwise provided by the arbitral tribunal34.
28Art. 62 of the Tunisia Law n. 93-42 of 26 April 1993 on the Enactment of the Arbitration Code
29s. 1297.171 of  the California International Conciliation and Arbitration Code
30See pp. 219ff
31UN Doc A/CN.9/508 par. 67
32UN Doc A/CN.9/547, par. 72
33UN Doc A/CN.9/524, par. 20
34P. Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, Sweet and
Maxwell, 2005, p. 178
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Provisions on the arbitral tribunal
The rules  concerning  the jurisdiction,  appointment  and   challenge  of  the  arbitral  tribunal  have
substantially been complied with by the enacting states, with only a number of minor modifications.
Only  few  states  made  amendments  to  art.  16  Model  Law,  which  lays  down  the  Kompetenz-
Kompetenz rule35: Tunisia omitted the provision in art 16(3) that the arbitral tribunal, pending court
appeal, may continue the proceedings and envisaged that the court shall give its decision in any case
within three months. In Bulgaria the arbitral tribunal decides with a ruling or with the award on the
plea that  the arbitral  tribunal does not have jurisdiction and the possibility for immediate court
review envisaged in art. 16(3) Mode Law is excluded: if the arbitral tribunal rejects the plea and
renders a final award, this award may be set aside on the ground that there was no valid arbitration
agreement36. 
 The most important amendment related to the appointment of the arbitral tribunal concerns the
default number of arbitrators in case of  lack of agreement between the parties: whereas art. 10(2)
Model Law, in line with international practice, lays down the default rule of the three-arbitrator
tribunal, common law countries such as Scotland, Florida, North Carolina and Ohio have provided
for the sole arbitrator. Art. 10 Model Law has been criticised for not envisaging a rule preventing
the possible deadlock which may arise where parties agree on an even number of arbitrators and the
latter  fail  to reach  a majority37.  Egypt38 and Tunisia39 avoid the deadlock by requiring that  the
arbitral tribunal shall consist in any case by an uneven number of arbitrators; Brazilan arbitration
law40 provides that if the parties appoint an even number of arbitrators, the latter are authorised to
appoint immediately an additional arbitrator and in case of disagreement among the arbitrators the
parties shall request the court to appoint such additional arbitrator.
Art. 12 (1) of the Model Law imposes on the arbitrator the duty to disclose any circumstances likely
to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence. Almost all adopting states
have employed the same terms “impartiality” and “independence”, without further defining them.
Only the arbitration statutes of California, Oregon and Texas have specified which circumstances an
35
 On the Kompetenz- Kompetenz rule see in more detail infra pp. 256 ff and 307 ff
36Art. 20 of Bulgarian Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 5 August 1988
37P. Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation, cit, p. 34; see also the discussion on this point in
the chapter on English arbitration
38Art. 15(2) of the 1994 Egyptian Law enacting a Law concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters 
39Art. 55(1) of the Tunisian Law n. 93-42 of 26 April 1993 on the Enactment of the Arbitration Code
40Art. 13 of the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Law
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arbitrator  must  disclose  when  accepting  an  appointment.  For  example,  art.  1297.121  of  the
California  Code of  Civil  procedure  provides  that  the designated  arbitrator  shall  disclose  to  the
parties  any information which  might  cause  his  impartiality  to  be questioned including,  but  not
limited to, inter alia whether the arbitrator has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or he
served as an arbitrator or conciliator in another proceeding involving one or more of the parties to
the proceedings. In any case, both the American Arbitration Association and the International Bar
Association  have  drafted  a  set  of   ethical  guidelines  for  commercial  arbitrators  which  contain
similar provisions on the duty of disclosure and, although not directly binding upon the arbitrators
or the parties, they are generally recognised worldwide41.
The Model Law provides in art. 13 a detailed procedure for the challenge of arbitrators. In par. 1 it
is stated that the parties are free to agree on the procedure for challenge; failing such agreement,
par. 2 provides that the decision on the challenge will be made by the arbitral tribunal including the
challenged arbitrator; finally, par. 3 lays down the mandatory rule whereby if the challenge, either
under the procedure agreed upon by the parties or under the procedure of par. 2, is not successful,
the challenging party may request the court to decide on the challenge with a decision not subject to
appeal; furthermore, while such request is pending, the arbitral tribunal, including the challenged
arbitrator, may continue the arbitral proceedings and render the award.  In the adoption process,
states  have  generally  followed this  pattern,  while  enacting  only minor  modifications  on  single
aspects  of  the procedure.  Peru has  excluded  the challenged  arbitrator  from the decision on his
challenge42. Tunisia has deleted the decision by the arbitral tribunal on the challenge and therefore,
if the challenged arbitrator does not withdraw from his office or the other party does not agree on
the  challenge,  the  decision  will  be  taken  by  the  Court  of  Appeal43.  Germany  has  omitted  the
exclusion of appeal of the court's decision in par. 344. Egypt has added to art. 13 a fourth paragraph
stating that if the arbitrator is successfully challenged, whether by a decision of the arbitral tribunal
or  by  the  court  reviewing  the  challenge,  the  arbitral  proceedings  already  conducted  shall  be
considered null and void, including the arbitral award45 : this deviates from art. 15 Model Law,
which  provides  in  such  case  for  the  appointment  of  a  substitute  arbitrator.  Finally,  British
Columbia46 and  Oregon47 have  added  the  possibility  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  decide  on  the
challenge if the party making the request had an opportunity to have his challenge decided  by an
41P. Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, cit, p. 119
42Art. 25 of the Peru Decree Law no. 25935 of 7 November 1992 enacting the General Arbitration Law
43Art. 58(3) of the Tunisian Law n. 93-42 of 26 April 1993 on the Enactment of the Arbitration Code
44Sec. 1037(3) of the 1998 German Arbitration Law
45Art. 19 of the 1994 Egyptian Law enacting a Law concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters 
46S. 13(5) of the  British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Act
47S. 36.478 of the 1991 Oregon International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act
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entity other  than the arbitral  tribunal: this may be the case where the parties  have agreed on a
decision on the challenge by an arbitral institution.
Rules applicable to the substance of the dispute
Art. 28 is one of the most frequently changed articles of the Model Law in the national transposition
process. This provision establishes a number of guidelines as to the choice of the rules applicable to
the merits of the dispute. Par. 1 states that the arbitrator shall decide the dispute in accordance with
the rules of law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. The term “rules
of law” is commonly given a wider interpretation than “law”, allowing the parties to choose also
non-national rules, such as the UNIDROIT Principles and the  lex mercatoria48.  In  addition,  the
same paragraph provides that any designation of the law of a given state shall be construed, unless
otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the substantive law of that state and not to its conflict of
laws rules: the so-called voie directe to the determination of the law applicable to the substance of
the dispute. By contrast, par. 2 establishes the so-called voie indirecte, where the parties have not
chosen the rules applicable to the merits: failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal
shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. Finally,
par. 3 allows the tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties
have expressly authorised him to do so. Whereas par. 1 was left substantially unchanged, a wide
number of states have modified the voie indirecte envisaged in par. 2 and opted for the voie directe:
failing any determination by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply, instead of the conflict of
law rules which it considers applicable, the law of the state it considers most closely connected with
the dispute49. This has for example been the solution adopted in Egypt50,  Germany51,  Oman and
Mexico.  Accordingly,  one may wonder whether this latter solution has not become the standard
rule in international practice52. Other countries, in opting  for the voie directe, have conferred upon
the tribunal the same discretion enjoyed by the parties in par.  1: failing any designation by the
48See the section on  German arbitration law for a more detailed discussion on the issues related to this article of the
Model Law (pp. 246ff).
49
 The  rule  of  the  closest  connection  has  been  borrowed  from art.  4  of  the  1980  Rome  Convention  on the  Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations.
50Art. 39(2) of the 1994 Egyptian Law enacting a Law concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters 
51Sec. 1051(2) of the German Arbitration Law
52Cp P. Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, cit., p.
235: <<More than half of the adopting jurisdictions fail to subject the tribunal's choice of law to the “conflict of laws
rules”, which demonstrates a clear rejection of the model law's  principle of restricting the tribunal's  choice to such
rules>>.
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parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law it considers to be appropriate given all the
circumstances of the case. This rule has been adopted by all the Canadian provinces, and some US
states, namely California53, Ohio54 and Oregon55. In addition, it has been adopted by a number of
countries which have not enacted the Model Law, but have a long tradition in arbitration, namely
Switzerland56, France57 and the Netherlands58.
Finally, it should be noted that art. 28(3), which allows the tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono or as
amiable  compositeur,  has  been  maintained  in  virtually  every  Model  Law  country.  This  is
particularly significant as far as common law countries are concerned, because these concepts are
unknown in their legal tradition and their inclusion in the Model Law has often been considered as
an obstacle to the diffusion of this harmonisation tool in such countries59. The fact that none of the
common law countries  deleted art.  28(3) when adopting the Model Law demonstrates quite the
contrary.
Grounds for the setting aside of the award: violation of public policy
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the grounds for setting aside an award envisaged by art.
34(2) of the Model Law are virtually the same as those of art. V of the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards. In the adoption process states did
not make many modifications to the grounds envisaged in art. 34(2). Only in respect to the violation
of public policy did some countries (e.g. Australia60, Bermuda61 and Zimbabwe) add a clarification:
they specified,  for  the avoidance  of  any doubt,  that  an  award  induced  or  affected  by fraud  or
corruption constitutes a case of violation of public policy. Scotland even added an extra ground for
setting aside the award when procured by fraud, bribery or corruption and in respect of the time
53S. 1297.283 of  the California International Conciliation and Arbitration Code
54S. 2712.53 of the Ohio Arbitration Code
55S. 36.508 of the Oregon International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act
56
 See the 1987 Swiss Private International Law Act, art. 187
57See art. 1496 of the Code of Civil Procedure as emended in 1981
58See art. 1054 of the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986
59See  Lord Mustill,  A New Arbitration Act  for the United Kingdom? The Response  of  the Departmental  Advisory
Committee to the UNCITRAL Model Law, Arbitration International, 1990, 6, 1, p. 27.
60S. 19 of the Australia International Arbitration Act
61S. 27 of the  Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993
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limit for introducing the action of setting aside added to art. 34 that the time-limit of three months
does not apply in this case62.
Unsettled issues: post setting aside and exclusion of setting aside
The Model Law, similarly to other national laws not based on the Model Law, does not contain a
provision on the consequences when the application to set aside the award has been successful. The
post-setting aside situation is therefore an underdeveloped area of arbitration law, with some issues
still left unsolved: has the jurisdiction of the court revived after the award has been set aside? Or is
the arbitration agreement still  operative? should the dispute be submitted to arbitration and new
arbitrators be appointed? Few countries have so far regulated the post-setting aside situation. The
Netherlands, which is not a Model Law country, opted for the revival of court jurisdiction, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties63. On the contrary, Germany provided that in the absence of any
indication to the contrary,  the setting aside should result  in the arbitration agreement becoming
operative again in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute64. Tunisia established that if the court
sets aside the award either wholly or partially, it may, as the case may be and on application of all
the parties, decide on the merits65.
A number of non-Model Law countries provide for the exclusion by agreement of the parties of the
setting aside of the award, either totally or only with respect to some of the grounds for setting
aside:  this  is  the  case  for  example  of  Switzerland,  whose  1987 Private  International  Law  Act
permits parties, if none of them has its domicile, habitual residence or business establishment in
Switzerland, expressly to agree in writing to exclude the setting aside or limit it to one or several
grounds envisaged in the Act itself. In the absence of an express provision in the Model Law on this
point, Tunisia has added in its arbitration law a similar rule: the parties who have neither domicile,
62Art. 34(3) Schedule 7 1990 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Scotland Act.
63Art. 1067 of the Netherlands Arbitration Act 
64Sec. 1059(5) of the German Arbitration Law
65Art. 78(5) of the Tunisian Law n. 93-42 of 26 April 1993 on the Enactment of the Arbitration Code
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principal residence nor business establishment in Tunisia, may expressly agree to exclude totally or
partially all recourse against an arbitral award66.
Recognition and enforcement of awards
The Model Law regime of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (envisaged in its chapter
VIII) is borrowed from the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards; however, the Model Law goes further than the latter, since its enforcement regime
applies also to domestic awards. Yet, in the adoption process many countries have made the radical
choice of omitting chapter VIII from enactment. Its similarity to the New York Convention, widely
adhered to by states from all parts of the world, induced these countries to consider this part of the
Model  Law as  redundant  and therefore  not  worth  adopting:  this  is  the  case  of  Australia67 and
Bermuda68, whose arbitration acts provide that where both chapter VIII of the Model Law and the
New York  Convention  would  apply,  chapter  VIII  does  not  apply.  Hong Kong formulates  this
differently,  by establishing  that  international  arbitrations  falling  within the scope of  its  act  are
regulated by chapters I to VII of the Model Law, thus excluding ch. VIII69. Also in the USA many
states adopting the Model  Law refrained  from including chapter  VIII,  since  they felt  that  their
arbitration act would be pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act, which in chapter 2 implements
the New York Convention. Accordingly,  they provided a special enforcement regime of arbitral
awards which partially corresponds to and partially deviates from the Model Law. For example,
California and Texas statutes contain no provision on enforcement of awards (the California Code
only contains provisions on enforcement of interim awards which do not fall within the scope of the
New York Convention).  According to the Georgia Arbitration Code, enforcement  of an arbitral
award related to an international transaction is grounded on the principle of reciprocity, which is to
be determined in accordance with applicable federal law and international treaties in force, such as
the  1958  New  York  Convention  implemented  by  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act70.  In  addition,
enforcement may be refused if the award is contrary to public policy and other such grounds which
could nullify domestic awards,  such as fraud, corruption, partiality of an arbitrator appointed as
66Art. 78(6) of the Tunisian Law n. 93-42 of 26 April 1993 on the Enactment of the Arbitration Code
67S. 20 of the Australia International Arbitration Act
68S. 28 of the  Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993
69S. 34C of the  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance
70S. 9.9.42 of the Georgia Arbitration Code
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neutral and the tribunal exceeding its authority. The grounds for refusing enforcement laid down in
Florida  International  Arbitration  Act  are  comparable  to  those  envisaged  in  art  36 Model  Law,
except  for  two additional  grounds  not  expressly included  in  the Model  Law or  the  New York
Convention: that the tribunal had previously decided the dispute to be not arbitrable and that the
neutral arbitrator had a material conflict of interest71.
Additions made in the adoption process
During the travaux preparatoires the UNCITRAL Working Group discussed  several matters which
eventually did not lead to a provision in the Model Law. Nevertheless, some states, when adopting
the Model Law, considered some of these matters worth including in their new Model Law- based
arbitration legislation.
Consolidation
Consolidation  is  one  of  the  most  important  issues  stemming from multi-party  arbitrations,  i.e.
arbitrations with multiple parties on one side or on both sides. In this situation two fundamental
questions arise72: whether, in the absence of agreement of all the parties potentially involved in the
multi-party dispute, the arbitrator or the state court are entitled to order a compulsory consolidation
of the arbitrations and whether, if the parties fail to reach an agreement, the court may appoint the
arbitral tribunal for the consolidated proceedings.
The UNCITRAL Working Group was of the view that there was no real need to include a provision
on consolidation in the Model Law; nonetheless, many common law countries included provisions
on consolidation when adopting the Model Law. These regimes may be divided into two groups:
court-ordered and arbitral tribunal-ordered consolidations. To the first group belongs Canada, which
was the first country to adopt the Model law in 1986. The International Commercial Arbitration
71SS. 684.24-25 of the Florida International Arbitration Act
72For a more detailed discussion on the topic see the section on German arbitration law (pp. 246 ff).
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Acts of the Canadian provinces (with the exception of Quebec, which adopted the Model Law as
such)  contain  the  same  standard  provision  on  consolidation  of  arbitration  proceedings:  on
application of one party with the consent of all other parties, the court may order consolidation on
the terms it  considers just;  where the parties to the consolidated arbitration proceedings cannot
agree as to the choice of the arbitral tribunal, the latter shall be appointed by the court; where the
parties to the consolidated arbitration proceedings cannot agree on any other matter necessary to
conduct  the consolidated  arbitration,  the  court  is  entitled  to  make any other  order  it  considers
necessary. Almost identical provisions have been subsequently repeated in California73, Oregon74,
Texas75 , North Carolina76 and Ohio77. To the second group belongs Australia, whose International
Arbitration Act provides in sec. 24 that the application for consolidation shall be made not to the
court  (as  it  is  the  case  in  domestic  arbitration),  but  to  the  arbitral  tribunals  concerned  which
deliberate  jointly  on the  application;  if  they are  unable  to  agree,  the  related  proceedings  shall
proceed as if no application has been made.  Sec. 24 is however an optional provision applying if
the parties so agree in writing; on the other hand, parties to an international arbitration may opt out
of the international regime into the domestic regime, which provides as we have just seen for court-
ordered consolidation. New Zealand envisages a similar consolidation regime with the important
difference that, if the different arbitral tribunals involved cannot agree on which one shall conduct
the  consolidated  arbitral  proceedings,  this  decision  will  be  made by the  High  Court78.  Finally,
Florida provides a rather unclear regulation: disputes may be consolidated by an arbitral tribunal if
all the affected parties agree to the consolidation and the tribunal feels that the consolidation will
serve  the  interests  of  justice  and the  expeditious  solution of  the disputes.  The proceedings  are
conducted  under  such  rules  as  the  parties  agree  upon or,  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement,  as
determined by the arbitral tribunal79. This provision does not state clearly whether it is the arbitral
tribunal chosen by the parties that shall order consolidation and does not specify what happens in
case that the parties do not make such choice.
Costs of the arbitration
73S. 1297.272 of the California International Conciliation and Arbitration Code
74S. 36.506 of the Oregon International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act
75S. 249.27 of the Texas International Arbitration Act
76S. 1-567.57 of the North Carolina International Commercial Arbitration Act 
77S. 2712.52 of the Ohio Arbitration Code
78S. 9(1) Second Schedule of the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1997
79S. 684.12 of the Florida International Arbitration Act
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 In its First Note to the Working Group, the UNCITRAL Secretariat suggested the inclusion in the
Model Law of a provision allowing the arbitral tribunal to request a deposit from the parties for fees
and costs and to fix its own fees, subject to any different agreement between the parties and, as the
case  may  be,  court  review80.  Although  eventually  the  Working  Group  did  not  follow  this
suggestion, in adopting the Model Law a wide number of states have included provisions on this
topic. Following the pattern of art.  38 of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, national regulations of
costs  and  fees  generally  provide  that,  unless  otherwise  agreed  by  the  parties,  the  costs  of  an
arbitration are at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal and include not only the fees and the expenses
of the arbitrators, but also the legal fees and expenses of the parties, their legal representatives, the
witnesses and expert witnesses and the administrative fees and expenses of the arbitral institution.
This  has  been  for  example  the  solution  adopted  in  Australia81,  Bermuda82,  Nigeria83,  British
Columbia84, and most US states adopting the Model Law. By contrast, the Russian Federation and
Ukraine regulated the matter by simply adding a second paragraph to art. 31 Model Law (dealing
with  form and  contents  of  the  award),  providing  that  the  award  shall  state  the  amount  of  the
arbitration, fees and costs and their apportioning85. Some states have also introduced a system of
court control on the costs and fees established by the arbitral tribunal: Mexican law states that the
arbitrators shall fix their fees after consultation with the court in case a party so requests and the
court agrees to perform this function86. New Zealand's Arbitration Act provides that on application
of a party who deems that the  amount or allocation of costs or expenses is unreasonable, the High
Court may make an order varying the costs or allocation, or both.87 Irish law distinguishes between
an agreement of the parties on the costs of the arbitration and no such agreement; in the latter case
any party may apply to the High Court for determination of these costs on the basis it thinks fit88.
Finally, fewer states deal with two important issues related to the costs of arbitration: the omission
of arbitrators to decide on fees on costs and the deposits on costs. As to the first issue, Australia’s89
and Hong Kong's90 laws establish that if no provision is made in the award with respect to the costs
any party may apply to the arbitral tribunal to amend the award by adding a declaration on costs
80Commentary  on matters  not  addressed  in  the  final  text,  in  H.M.  Holtzmann  and  J.E.  Neuhaus,  A Guide  to  the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, cit., pp. 1118-1119 
81S. 27 of the Australia International Arbitration Act
82S.32 of the  Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993
83SS. 49-50 of the Nigeria Arbitration and Conciliation Decree
84S. 31 of the  British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Act
85Art. 31(2) of the Law of the Russian Federation of 14 August 1993 on International Commercial Arbitration and art.
31(2) of the Ukraine Law of 24 February 1994 on International Commercial Arbitration
86Art. 1454 of the Mexican Arbitration Law
87S. 6(3) Second Schedule of the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1997
88S. 11 of the Irish International Commercial Arbitration Act
89S. 27(4) of the Australia International Arbitration Act
90S. 2 GJ of the  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance
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after hearing any party who wishes to be heard. New Zealand's Arbitration Act states that in the
absence of fixing and allocating the costs each party shall be responsible for the legal and other
expenses  of  that  party  and  for  an equal  share  of  the  fees  of  the  arbitral  tribunal91.  Greek  law
envisages that if the arbitral tribunal has not established the costs at the termination of proceedings
it  may establish and divide them by a separate  award92.  As to the  second issue,  Mexico93 and
Nigeria94 provide a regulation along the lines of art. 41 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: the
arbitral  tribunal,  on its establishment, may request  each party to deposit an equal amount as an
advance for the costs of the arbitration; when a party so requests and the court consents to perform
the function, the arbitral tribunal shall fix the amounts of any deposits only after consultation of the
court.
Most of the states which added provisions on costs added at the same time a provision on interest.
This has generally been done by envisaging a very simple provision, such as “unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may award interest” (cp. British Columbia95, California96,
North Carolina97, Ohio98, Oregon99, Texas100, Hong Kong101, which nonetheless in 1996 repealed this
provision because considered as unnecessary).  Other countries have envisaged a more elaborated
discipline, distinguishing between interest payable up to the date of the award and interest payable
from the date of the award: for example, Australian arbitration law contains two optional provisions
in respect  of interest. Sec. 25 deals with interest up to the making of the award which may be
awarded at such reasonable rate as the tribunal determines, excluding interest on interest; sec. 26
allows the tribunal to award interest from the day of the making of the award or such later day as
the tribunal specifies at the rate it considers reasonable. A similar discipline is provided by Bermuda
International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993 in s. 31.
91S. 6(1) Second Schedule of the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1997
92Art. 32 of the  Greek Arbitration Law
93Art 1456 (1) of the Mexican Arbitration Law
94S. 50 of the Nigeria Arbitration and Conciliation Decree
95S. 31(7) of the  British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Act
96S. 1297.317 of the California International Conciliation and Arbitration Code
97S.1-567.61(f) of the North Carolina International Commercial Arbitration Act 
98S. 2712.61 of the Ohio Arbitration Code
99S. 36.514(6) of the Oregon International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act
100S. 249-31(7) of the Texas International Arbitration Act
101S. 34D of the  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance
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Conciliation
Conciliation is  a  form of  alternative  dispute resolution (ADR) in   which a person or  panel  of
persons assists  the parties  in an independent  and impartial  manner in their  attempt  to reach  an
amicable settlement of their dispute102. Conciliation  mainly differs from arbitration because in the
former the parties are still masters of the proceedings and do not relinquish control of their dispute
as  they do in  arbitral  or  judicial  proceedings.  Accordingly,  a  party  may terminate  conciliation
proceedings at any time he considers they are no longer useful, whereas in an arbitration a party
cannot unilaterally terminate the proceedings, but he is bound to continue until the decision of the
arbitrator, unless the other party agrees on termination. Unlike the arbitral tribunal, in no way can
the conciliator decide the dispute on behalf of the parties, but he can only help them to reach an
agreement on the settlement of the dispute103. Yet, there are some connections between arbitration
and conciliation:  during the arbitral  proceedings  the parties may agree on the settlement of the
dispute and request the arbitral tribunal to incorporate their settlement in an award on agreed terms
(cp.  Art  30  Model  Law);  moreover  the  parties  may  establish  a  link  with  conciliation  in  the
arbitration clause by drafting a so-called “escalation clause” and providing that before resorting to
arbitration they should first make a serious attempt to settle the dispute amicably.
On account of these connections, during the  travaux preparatoires  the suggestion was made to
refer  in  the  preamble  of  the  Model  Law  to  conciliation  as  an  additional  method  of  dispute
resolution,  or  even  to  include  some provisions  on conciliation.  Neither  of  these proposals  was
ultimately adopted, because it was felt that conciliation was so heavily dependent on the will of the
parties that there was no necessity to create legislative rules104. However, several states adopting the
Model Law for their national arbitral legislation used this opportunity to deal with conciliation as
well: some have simply included a single provision  making a general reference to conciliation and
encouraging the parties to resort to this type of dispute resolution, other have included a more or
102
 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use ,
United  Nations  Publication,  2002,  par.  5   (available  at  www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml.../ml-conc-
e.pdf)  . The term “conciliation” as used in the Model Law is very broad and includes notions  such as “mediation ,
neutral evaluation, mini trial” or similar terms. Practitioners draw distinctions among these expressions in terms of the
methods used by the third person to help the parties reaching the agreement on the settlement of their dispute or the
degree to which the third person is involved in the process. Nonetheless, the drafters of the Model Law were of the
opinion that  from the viewpoint of the legislator no distinction needed to be made and therefore relied on a broad
definition of the term “conciliation” (see Id, par. 7)
103
 P. Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation, cit, p. 69
104P. Binder,  International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, cit., p.
297; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and
Use 2002, par. 10
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less complete discipline of the matter105. The first group of states has envisaged a sort of policy
statement  in  their  arbitration  law,  by  declaring  that  it  is  not  incompatible  with  arbitration  to
encourage the settlement of a dispute by conciliation: this is the case of Canada106, Peru and Brazil,
which added a slightly more detailed provision, imposing on the arbitral tribunal the duty at the
beginning of the procedure of trying to conciliate the parties and render, in case that the attempt to
settle  is  successful,  an  award  on  agreed  terms.  The  second  group  of  states  have  regulated
conciliation in a more complete fashion. Hong Kong107 and Singapore108  have envisaged a similar
discipline in two sections of their respective Arbitration Acts dealing with the appointment of a
conciliator in case the arbitration agreement provides for conciliation, the power of an arbitrator to
act as conciliator and the duty of the arbitrator to disclose confidential information obtained during
the  unsuccessful  conciliation  before  resuming the  arbitral  proceedings.  Other  states  within  this
group have regulated conciliation in still further detail and included the term “Conciliation” in the
title of their statutes. This approach is followed by  the Bermuda International Conciliation and
Arbitration  Act  1993109,  the  Nigeria  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Decree  1988110 and  the  India
Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance 1996111,  which provide a discipline largely based on the
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules which the parties  may opt in and whose text  is  annexed to all
statutes.
Also in the USA conciliation has generally been referred to by the states adopting the Model Law.
The only exceptions are Connecticut, which has enacted the Model law as such, and Georgia. The
other US states either limit themselves to a general policy statement (cp. North Carolina, whose
arbitration code provides in sec. 1-567.60 that the arbitral tribunal may use mediation, conciliation
or other procedures at any time during the arbiral proceedings to encourage settlement), or  provide
a complete set  of conciliation rules dealing with many aspects thereof,  such as the conciliator's
105
 P. Sanders, UNCITRAL's Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, Arbitration International, 2007, 23,
1, pp  105-106
106All International Arbitration Acts of the Canadian provinces contain the same standard formula: “for  the purpose of
encouraging settlement of a dispute,  an arbitral tribunal may,  with  the agreement of the parties, employ mediation,
conciliation or other procedures at any time during the arbitration proceedings and, with the agreement of the parties,
the  members  of the  arbitral  tribunal  are  not  disqualified  from resuming  their  roles as arbitrators by reason of the
mediation, conciliation or other procedure”.
107Ss. 2A and 2B of the  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance
108Ss 16 and 17 of Singapore International Arbitration Act 
109See ss  3-21 of the  Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993
110See ss. 37-42 of the Nigeria Arbitration and Conciliation Decree
111See ss. 61-82 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance
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appointment, immunity and duties of disclosure (cp. the statutes of California112, Ohio113, Oregon114
and Texas115).
The fact that so many states adopted laws on conciliation, prompted UNCITRAL to reconsider its
approach on this matter: it was realized that such states were doing so in order to respond to the
concerns by practitioners that contractual solutions alone did not meet completely the needs of the
parties; accordingly, a legislative framework was required which, while preserving the flexibility of
conciliation,  could  at  the  same  time  provide  the  parties  with  certain  guarantees  which  the
contractual  solution  was  not  able  to  ensure,  such  as  the  admissibility  of  certain  evidence  in
subsequent judicial or  arbitral proceedings and the enforceability of the settlement agreement116. In
order  to   address  these concerns  UNCITRAL decided  to  prepare a  model law on the topic,  to
support the increased use of conciliation. Adopted by UNCITRAL on 24 June 2002, the Model Law
on International  Commercial  Conciliation provides  uniform rules  in  respect  of  the  conciliation
process, to encourage the use of conciliation and ensure greater predictability and certainty in its
use.  To  avoid  uncertainty  resulting  from  an  absence  of  statutory  provisions,  the  Model  Law
addresses procedural aspects of conciliation, including appointment of conciliators, commencement
and termination of conciliation, conduct of the conciliation, communication between the conciliator
and other parties, confidentiality and admissibility of evidence in other proceedings, as well as post-
conciliation  issues,  such  as  the  conciliator  acting  as  arbitrator  and  enforceability  of  settlement
agreements.  Since  the  Model  Law  on  International  Commercial  Conciliation  has  been  adopted
when all main trading nations of the world had already included provisions on conciliation in their
arbitration laws, this harmonisation tool has not so far had a diffusion comparable to that of the
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Conciliation has been enacted in Canada (2005), Croatia (2003),
Hungary (2002), Nicaragua (2005) and Slovenia (2008). In addition, in the United States the Model
Law has influenced the drafting of the  Uniform Mediation Act, adopted in 2001 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law and enacted by the states of Illinois, Iowa,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio and Washington117.
112See Ch. 7 Title 9.3 of the California International Conciliation and Arbitration Code
113See ss. 2712.74-90 of the Ohio Arbitration Code
114See ss. 36.528-558 of the Oregon International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act
115See ss. 249-34-43 of the Texas International Arbitration Act
116UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use,
cit, par. 11
117
 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2002Model_conciliation_status.html
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Liability of arbitrators
In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  issue  of  the  liability  of  arbitrators  was  highly  controversial,  the
UNCITRAL Working Group decided not to deal with this matter in the Model Law118. However,
this issue has in recent years received much attention in international practice and therefore some
states, especially of common law tradition, when reforming their arbitration laws on the Model Law
pattern  have  used  this  opportunity  to  add  a  provision  on  the  liability  of  arbitrators.  This  has
generally been done by establishing as a general rule the principle of the immunity of the arbitrator:
the arbitrator is not liable for negligence in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in the
capacity of arbitrator. Many states have also added to this general rule a provision specifying the
extent of the arbitrator's liability: Australia119 and Sri Lanka120 provide that the arbitrator is liable for
fraud in respect of anything done or omitted in his capacity; Bermuda that he may be liable for the
consequences of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing121; Malta that he is liable where his action or
omission is attributable to malice and fraud122; Ireland that he his liable for anything done or omitted
in bad faith123; Hong Kong124 that he is liable for anything done or omitted to be done dishonestly.
Finally,  Hong  Kong  and  Ireland  extend  the  arbitrator's  liability  and  immunity  to  his  agents,
employees, advisors, as well as persons or other institutions which appoint arbitrators or perform
any other function of an administrative nature in connection with the arbitral proceedings. 
Towards a uniform arbitration procedure?
Over  the  past  thirty  years  there  has  been  a  tremendous  growth  of  international  commercial
arbitration. In just twelve years (1979-1990), the International Chamber of Commerce received the
same amount of arbitration cases (i.e. 3500), as it did in the first 55 years of its existence (1923-
1978)125.  In  the 1990s,  this  growth has  even intensified:  in  1999 only there  were  529 requests
118See First Secretariat Note 14 May 1981 and First Working Group Report  23 March 1982 in H.M. Holtzmann and
J.E. Neuhaus,  op.cit, pp. 1148-1149
119
 S. 28 of the Australia International Arbitration Act
120S. 45 of the Sri Lanka Arbitration Act
121S. 34 of the  Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993
122S. 20(3) of Malta Arbitration Act
123
 S. 12 of the Irish International Commercial Arbitration Act
124S. GM(1) of the  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance
125C.N. Brower,  Introduction,  in  R.B. Lillich and C.N. Brower (eds),  International  Arbitration in the 21st Century:
Towards “Judicialization” and Uniformity ?, p. ix.
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submitted to  the ICC Secretariat126 and these  figures  have remained constant  over the past  few
years127. Accordingly, it is now widely recognised that arbitration is the usual way of settlement of
international commercial disputes128. 
 The  proliferation  of  international  commercial  arbitration  has  entailed  two  fundamental
consequences129.  The  first  is  the  increasing  “judicialisation”,  whereby  arbitrations  tend  to  be
conducted  more  frequently  according  to  procedural  formalities,  and  parties  tend  to  adopt  an
adversarial approach, relying on dilatory tactics which are typical of litigation in courts. As a result,
arbitration has been criticised by some as having become almost indistinguishable from litigation,
which it was at one time intended to supplant130.  The second consequence is the ineluctable trend
towards uniformity of rules and laws governing international commercial arbitration131. Especially
in the wake of the wide diffusion of the UNCITRAL Model Law, national  arbitration laws are
becoming increasingly harmonised132.  In  particular,  a comparative survey of the most important
arbitration laws shows the emergence of a consensus on at least three overriding principles: party
autonomy in matters of procedure, due process, and limited judicial review over arbitral awards133.
These principles are laid down in arts 19, 18 and 34 of the Model Law respectively, but they are
also found in the arbitration laws of many other countries which have not adopted legislation based
on the Model Law134. 
 Procedural  autonomy granted  under  most  arbitration  laws  has  allowed  arbitration  practice  to
develop a set of rules which have progressively developed into a standard arbitration procedure135.
These  standards  have  two  main  advantages136.  Firstly,  they  represent  an  amalgam  of  different
126
 W.L. Craig, W.W. Park, J. Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, Oceana Publications, 2000, p.
3.
127The ICC Secretariat receives around  600 new requests for arbitration every year: see the website 
128See e.g. P. Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, in P. Sanders
(ed.),  Comparative  Arbitration Practice  and  Public  Policy in  Arbitration,  Kluwer,  1987,  p.  257;  J.  H.  Carter,  The
International Commercial Arbitration Explosion: More Rules, More Laws, More Books: So What ?, Mich. J. Intl. L.,
1994,  15, p.  785;  M. L.  Moses,  The Principles  and Practice of  International  Commercial  Arbitration,  Cambridge
University Press, 2008, p.  1.
129C.N. Brower,  Introduction, in R. B. Lillich and C:N. Brower (eds), International  Arbitration in the 21st Century:
Towards “Judicialization” and Uniformity ?, Transnational Publishers, 1994, p. ix.
130
 F.S. Nariman, The Spirit of Arbitration: the Tenth Annual Goff Lecture, Arbitration. International., 2000, 16, p. 262.
131
 C. N. Brower, W(h)ither International Commercial Arbitration ?, Arb. Int., 2008, 24, 2, p. 183.
132
 G. Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, Va. J. Trans. L., 2003, 36, 4, p. 1320.
133G. Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, cit., p.  1321; A. Scott Rau and E.F. Sherman, Tradition
and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, Tex. Intl L. J., 1994, 30, 89, p. 24.
134See e.g.  the 1981 French Nouvel Code de Procedure Civile, which in art. 1494 provides the greatest possible freedom
for the exercise of party autonomy: the arbitration agreement may, directly or by reference to a set of arbitration rules,
define the procedure to be followed in the arbitral proceedings; it may also subject them to a given procedural law. An
almost identical provision is envisaged by art. 182 of the 1987 Swiss Private International Law Act.  The principle of
due  process  is  contained  in  art.  1502(4),  which  imposes  observance   of  “adversarial  process”  (principe  de  la
contradiction); finally,  art. 1502 provides a limited right  of recourse against  an award, on grounds similar to those
envisaged by art. 34 of the Model Law.
135
 G. Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral procedure, cit., p.  1323.
136
 K.P. Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business, Kluwer, 2006, p. 330.
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procedural  cultures137, thereby developing a “best practice” standard of international  commercial
arbitration, trascending the various legal traditions. Secondly,  because such standards establish a
number of basic principles shared by global  consensus,  they provide more predictability for the
conduct  of  the arbitral  procedure  and  relieve the parties  from the difficult  task of  agreeing on
procedural issues in their arbitration agreement.
 The most important sets of rules which, within the general framework provided by harmonised
national laws, are fostering the emergence of a uniform arbitration procedure, are the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, the International Bar Association (IBA) Rules on the Taking of Evidence and the
IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests. Drafted in 1976 for ad hoc arbitrations, the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules have had wide diffusion, having being used as a model for the procedural rules of
a  number  of  arbitral  institutions,  including   the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC), the International Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association, the Rules for Arbitration of the Kuala Lampur Arbitration Centre and the
Cairo Arbitration Centre, the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration. Given their broad similarity
to the UNCITRAL Model Law138, their role in the creation of a uniform arbitral procedure is now
particularly important in those countries, such as Switzerland and the US, which have not adopted
the  Model  Law  in  their  legislation,  but  whose  main  arbitral  institutions  have  conformed  their
procedural rules to the Arbitration Rules: in these countries, institutional arbitrations are therefore
conducted under the uniform procedural standards laid down by UNCITRAL. The 1999 IBA Rules
on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration provide uniform rules aimed at
conducting the evidence  phase  of  international  arbitration proceedings  in an efficient  and cost-
effective manner139.  They primarily restate  and generalize practices  that  were already in  use in
international arbitration and address such issues as document production, written witness statements
and witness examinations, expert evidence, inspections, admissibility of evidence, and conduct of
evidentiary hearings.  The idea  underlying  their  drafting is  the search  for  compromise solutions
taking into account both common law and civil law approaches to evidence. Since most arbitral
rules do not deal in detail with issues of evidence, parties may agree on the application of the IBA
Rules in the arbitration clause140, or later at the outset of the arbitration itself. Even in the absence of
an  agreement  on  their  application,  arbitral  tribunals  and  counsel  often  look  to  the  Rules  for
137
 A. Scott Rau and E. F. Sherman,  Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, Tex. Intl L. J.,
1994, 30, 89, p. 95.
138
 See supra pp. 163 ff
139
 Foreword to the IBA Rules of Evidence
140
 Indeed, in the Foreword to the IBA Rules of Evidence, the drafters have included a model clause which parties may
use if they wish to refer to the Rules in their arbitration agreement: <<In addition to the (rules chosen by the parties),
the parties agree that the arbitration shall be conducted according to the IBA Rules of Evidence>>.
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guidance, because they strike a fair balance between civil and common law approaches to the taking
of evidence141. Hence, their influence goes beyond their formal application.
The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests are another set of rules, elaborated by the International
Bar Association, which provide uniform rules on one of the most disputed issue of international
arbitration:  the  independence  and impartiality of  the  arbitrator.  Most  arbitration  laws and rules
require arbitrators to disclose without delay any cirmustances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts
as to their impartiality and independence142. Nonetheless, many arbitrators find it difficult to know
in  practical  terms  what  should  be  disclosed  and  have  concerns  about  “overdisclosing”,  i.e.
unjustified  challenges  raised  by the  parties  simply to  delay  procedures143.  The  IBA  Guidelines
attempt  to  deal  with  these  issues. They are  made up of  two parts:  Part  I  lays  down  the best
international practice with regard to the arbitrator's independence, impartiality and obligations of
disclosure; part II provides a number of examples of how the general standards of part I should be
applied. In particular, part II envisages three groups of situations which may lead to a conflict of
interests: the Red List (the most serious examples of conflict of interests, in which the arbitrator
must  not  accept  the  appointment),  the Pink List  or  waivable  Red List  (situations  in  which  the
conflict is still serious, but if informed parties expressly agree on the arbitrator, the latter can accept
the appointment), the Orange List  (situations in which parties are deemed to have accepted the
arbitrator if, after disclosure, no timely objection is made by them); the Green List (situations which
do not raise questions of impartiality or independence and therefore require no disclosure). The IBA
Guidlines  have  been  criticised  for  having relaxed existing practice,  so that  partners  from large
international  law  firms  involved  in  complex  and  intertwined  relations  with  multinational
corporations  will  not  be  prevented  from  serving  as  arbitrators144.  Nonetheless,  they  have  been
frequently  referred  to  in  arbitration  practice  as  a  carefully balanced  system of  grounds  for  the
challenge of arbitrators145.
In  conclusion, harmonisation of arbitration procedure occurs primarily under national arbitration
laws146: thanks to the broad party autonomy which modern national legislation grants to parties and
arbitrators, international commercial arbitration is now conducted in many respects in a uniform
manner  throughout  the  world.  Yet,  important  procedural  divergences  remain,   especially  with
141
 Cp.  M. L. Moses, op. cit.,  p. 165: <<Most parties and arbitrators prefer that the IBA Rules of Evidence remain in
the category of guidelines, rather than being imposed on the arbitrators by party agreement. This permits flexibility as
needed to make the arbitral process responsive to the needs of the particular case. (..) some arbitrators, on the other
hand, prefer for the IBA Rules of Evidence to be adopted as binding, because they believe there is less discussion about
evidentiary issues if the Rules are considered binding>>.
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 Cp art 12(1) Model Law
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 M. L. Moses, op. cit., p. 131; K.P. Berger,  Private Dispute Resolution in International Business., cit., p. 442.
144M. L. Moses, op. cit.,  p. 136.
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 K. P. Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business, cit.,  p. 443.
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 G.  Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, cit., p.  1333
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reference  to  the  degree  of  court  intervention  before  and  during  the  arbitration  process.   The
diffusion  of the Model Law and the New York Convention   has brought about  uniformity in the
role of courts after the conclusion of the arbitral process with respect to the award, by harmonising
the grounds for setting aside and refusal of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Also
countries which have not adopted the Model Law have followed this restrictive approach towards
judicial review of arbitral awards. Yet, no uniformity exists in the role of the courts before and
during  the  course  of  arbitral  proceedings.  For  example,  whereas  in  Model  Law  countries  the
arbitrator may rule on its own jurisdiction, in many countries which have not adopted the Model
Law it is up to the court to determine the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction147.  Even less uniformity can
be found in the degree of court  intervention during arbitration procedures.  Here positions range
from the detailed provisions contained in sections 42-44 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act, to the
absence of any provision in this respect under the arbitration rules of the French Code of Civil
Procedure. The original version of the Model Law simply enumerated the cases in which a court
may  intervene  in  the  arbitral  process,  without  specifying  the  procedures  and  limits  of  this
intervention. Consequently, crucial issues, such as the enforcement by courts of procedural orders
issued by the arbitral tribunal, were left unanswered. A first attempt to provide a uniform discipline
in this regard has been carried out  with the 2006  reform of the UNCITRAL Model Law, by
introducing a more detailed regulation of interim measures  of  protection148,   arguably the most
important  case  of  court  intervention during arbitral  proceedings.  It  remains  to  be seen whether
Model  Law  countries  will  adopt  this  proposed  amendment  in  their  legislation149 and  whether
countries  whose arbitration law is not based on the Model Law will  continue to take different
approaches to interim measures.
147
 This is  the case,  for example,  of the 1994 Arbitration Law of the  People's  Republic  of China,  which  does not
recognise  the  principle  of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz:  according  to  art.  20  of  the  Law,  the  validity  of  the  arbitration
agreement (and therefore the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction) is determined either by an arbitration commission (generally
CIETAC, China's main arbitration institution), or by the People's  court (an English translation of China's Arbitration
Law is available at www.cietac.org).
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 See supra p. 220
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 A  number  of  countries,  in  enacting  the  Model  Law in  its  original  version,  have  envisaged  their  own  regime
concerning interim measures: this is the case for example of Germany, Australia and Scotland (see pp  263ff.).
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SECTION  III:  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  UNCITRAL  MODEL  LAW  IN
GERMANY
In order to illustrate the impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law on national legislations, the following
sections single out two exemplary case studies: the 1998 German Arbitration Law and the 1996 English
Arbitration Act. The first represents probably the Model Law country on which most literature has
focused, whereas the second is an interesting example of a national arbitration law which, although the
travaux preparatores expressly excluded the option of enacting the Model Law, relied - as the drafters
have acknowledged - whenever possible on the Model Law structure, language and spirit.
 Germany's “inferiority complex” vis  à vis arbitration
The German business community has always suffered a sort of “inferiority complex” with regard to
international arbitration. Despite Germany's leading role in international trade1, only a small number of
international arbitrations took place in its territory: though an elephant in international trade, Germany
has always been a dwarf in international arbitration2. The statistics of the ICC showed this clearly: in
1987 the ICC chose Germany as the place of arbitration only in 3 cases out of a total of 237 held under
its auspices3. Data also showed that German nationals figured among the most frequently appointed
arbitrators  (after  UK, Swiss,  US and French  nationals) and that  German law was among the most
1Cfr  Statistiken vom Statistischen Bundesamt  im Jahrbuch 1998 für  das Ausland,  92, 269, quoted by P.S.  Heigl,  Das
Deutsche Schiedsverfahrensrecht von 1998 im Vergleich zum English Arbitration Act 1996, Peter Lang Publisher, 2000, p.
19: in 1996 Germany lag shortly behind the leading USA with a share of 10% of the whole worldwide export, ahead of
France and Great Britain respectively
2O. Sandrock,  International Arbitration in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Hitherto Missed Opportunity, Am. Rev.
Int'L Arb, 1990, 1, p.  49
3These data are quoted by K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration in Germany: A New Era, Arb Int, 1993, 8, 2, p.
102
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frequently chosen substantive laws4. Nonetheless, Germany was  very rarely selected as the place of
arbitration.  Consequently,  even  though  many German  lawyers  figured  among the  members  of  the
international  arbitrators'  elite,  they  often  needed  to  go  abroad  to  carry  out  their  offices.   They
represented an exception to the practice of factual territoriality, according to which the chairman of the
arbitral tribunal (or the sole arbitrator) usually comes from the country of the place of arbitration and
therefore applies his national arbitration procedural law5. This resulted in a competitive disadvantage
with respect to their Swiss, English, Austrian, or Swedish colleagues, since German lawyers acting as
arbitrators were almost always forced to deal with foreign arbitration procedures with which they may
not have been completely familiar6.
There were three most important grounds accounting for this paradoxical situation. The first was that
Germany represented in a sense a victim of tradition. Parties were used to choosing always the same
traditional cities as place of arbitration (Zurich, Paris, Stockholm, London, Vienna and The Hague) and
they were reluctant to change their habit. These places had from a long time been selected as seats of
arbitration and accordingly enjoyed a sort of rent which was difficult to avert. At the beginning, they
were chosen  because of their neutrality. But after the end of the Cold War, the argument of neutrality
lost  much  of  its  weight7.  Nevertheless,  their  reputation  as  traditional  arbitration  centres  remained:
parties kept  selecting them as places of arbitration,  because they cherished tradition8.  The second
reason was that  Germany had for  a long time been the victim of its own inertia.  Before the 1998
4Cp data quoted by P.S. Heigl,  Das Deutsche Schiedsverfahrensrecht von 1998 im Vergleich zum English Arbitration Act
1996, cit, pp. 20-21
5K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration, Kluwer, 1993, p. 43
6The argument of the inferiority complex contradicts the common refrain of states as transmission belts (see supra pp. 15
ff). As it will be explained better in the following paragraphs, Germany's need to conform to international standards can be
read also in terms of national pride. Germany has arguably used the standards embodied in the  Model Law as means to
increase its power. It  is thus not a story of lost statehood, but rather of changed statehood. Sovereignty does not mean
independence from external actors, but ability to cooperate and interact with them.
7Cp   Bundestags-Drucksache  n.  13/5274  of  July  12,  1996  at  p.  2:  <<Das  neue,  von  der  Auflösung  der  Ost-West
Konfrontation gekennzeichnete welt-politische Klima lasst jedoch den Gesichtspunkt der politischen Neutralität mehr und
mehr  in  den Hintergrund  treten>> and P.S.  Heigl,  Das Deutsche  Schiedsverfahrensrecht  von  1998 im Vergleich  zum
English Arbitration Act 1996, cit, p. 23: <<das Neutralitätsargument ist jedoch außerst fragwürdig, denn die Tatsache, dass
ein Staat jahrhundertelang nicht in einen Krieg verwickelt war und keinem Verteidigungsbündnis angehört, sagt nichts über
die Güte dieses Staates als Schiedsort aus>>.
8German scholars  frequently provide another ground which has contributed to make Germany the victim of tradition: the
general  mistrust  against   Germany stemming from its recent history (i.e.  negative perceptions stemming from the Nazi
legacy and the Second World War), although they generally recognise that the influence of this factor is difficult to assess.
In any case, they have considered the reception of an internationally accepted text like the UNCITRAL Model law as a
chance to dispell this bias and to launch a signal to the world that German law complies with international standards and
does  not  hide  unexpected  drawbacks.   Cfr  e.g.  G.  Lorcher,  Schiedsgerichtberkeit:  Übernahme  des  UNCITRAL
Modellgesetzes?, ZRP 1987, p. 231 and   P.S. Heigl,  Das Deutsche Schiedsverfahrensrecht von 1998 im Vergleich zum
English Arbitration Act 1996, cit,  p. 25; R. H. Kreindler  and T. Mahlich,  A Foreign Perspective on the New German
Arbitration Act, Arb Int, 1998, 14, 1, p. 74
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reform,  Germany's law of arbitration  dated back to 1877:  it was a very old-fashioned law9, not in line
with the modern needs of arbitration practice10. It dealt with arbitration only in a rudimentary manner,
since it followed the typical 19th century vision of the arbitration process as a sort of surrogate of court's
litigation.  The regulation  of  arbitration process  was limited to 27 short  paragraphs  and thus  many
aspect thereof were left to the case law of the courts. By conferring the task of developing and updating
arbitration law to the courts, the German legislator ended up diminishing the attractiveness of Germany
as  a  place  for  international  arbitration11.  Although the  courts  adopted  a  very   modern  and  liberal
approach12,  showing  their  willingness  to  take  into  account  the specificities  of  the  arbitral  process,
foreign parties were normally not aware of the important  work carried out by them. Since foreign
parties were normally not familiar with the German language, let alone with the whole bulk of German
case law, the only source which was immediately and easily accessible to them was the scant statutory
law  of  arbitration,  which  showed  a  distorted  image  of  an  old-fashioned  piece  of  legislation13.
Accordingly, the German legislator's inertia constituted the most important obstacle to the development
of  the country as  a  flourishing arbitration  centre.  In  order  to  overcome this  legislative inertia,  the
German business and academic community took a very active role in the epistemic community which
formed  both  within  the  framework  of  UNCITRAL  and  the  working  commissions  in  charge  of
reforming German arbitration law. Its purpose was to change Germany's perception of international
arbitration, a matter which was no longer to be conceived as a surrogate of litigation, but as a crucial
factor in order to enhance Germany's leading role in international trade. Acting both at the national and
9
 Germany and its old  arbitration law has been expressly referred to by the UNCITRAL Working Group during the drafting
of the Model Law as an example of  an industrialised country whose legislation is antiquated and obsolete with respect to
the practices of modern international commercial arbitration. Cfr A/CN.9/263 par. A.1(b)
10K. H. Bockstiegel,  An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, Arb Int,
1998, 14, 1, p. 20
11Cfr   Bundestags-Drucksache  n.  13/5274  of  July  12,  1996  at  p.  2  <<Das  in  seinem  normativen  Bestand  veraltete
Schiedsverfahrensrecht  der  ZPO  wird  in  Fachkreisen  als  eine  wesentliche  Ursache  dafür  angesehen,  dass  die
Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  als  Austragungsort  fur  internationale  Schiedsstreitigkeiten  eine  im Vergleich  zu  anderen
europäischen Ländern kaum nennenswerte Rolle spielt>>.
12German courts started applying the Model Law long before the 1997 reform came into force. Since the publication of the
Model Law in 1985, German courts – and especially the Federal Supreme Court -   have shown a tendency to refer to the
Model Law as the implicit standard of their decisions. Accordingly, the Model Law was used as an instrument to update the
old provisions of the 1877 Act, so that by the time the new arbitration law came into force in 1998, German courts could
already rely on a body of case law complying with international standards. Cfr H. Raeschke-Kessler, The New German
Arbitration Act v. Old German Case law: Which Case Law of the of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme
Court) is to be Applied to the New Act?, Arb Int, 1998, 14,1, p. 47.
13Cfr  K.  Schumacher,  Fragen  zum  Anwendungsbereich  des  künftigen  deutschen  Schiedsverfahren  Recht,  Festschrift
Glossner, Heidelberg 1994, p. 341 :<<Dass das deutsche Schiedsverfahrensrecht von daher “sicherlich zu den liberalsten
der Welt” gehort, erschliesst sich aber nur wenigen mit der Materie vertrauten Experten, nicht dagegen dem Laien und auch
nicht ausländischen Anwälten, welche die Preferenz fur einen bestimmten Schiedsort massgeblich von der Akzeptanz und
Vertrauheit der lex fori abhängig machen>>.
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international level, the German members of this epistemic community engaged in a “two level arguing”
process and were ultimately able to press the German legislator to adopt a text which was drafted
entirely outside  the traditional national legislative process. By embracing the Model Law, the new
arbitration law is only formally adopted by the German legislative body, its contents being determined
essentially by the UNCITRAL's transnational epistemic community. Germany's complete adhesion to
the Model Law has been possible thanks to the double-track-activity of some German nationals who
played a prominent role first within UNCITRAL and then within the German reform commissions in
charge of adopting the new arbitration law. 
The third obstacle to the development of a flourishing arbitration practice in Germany was the lack of
what may be termed an adequate “arbitration infrastructure”.14As a result of its poor reputation as an
arbitration  centre,  Germany  could  not  develop  an  adequate  network  of  arbitration  specialists  and
research  centres,  providing  German  lawyers  with  the  necessary  expertise  to  tackle  the  highly
sophisticated issues related to international  commercial  arbitration. In  comparison to the traditional
arbitration  centres,  fewer  law  firms  specialised  in  arbitration  practice  established  their  offices  in
Germany.  In  addition,  German national  courts were not able to develop the expertise necessary to
guarantee  fairness  and  equal  treatment  in  the  arbitration  proceedings,  achieved  by  their  foreign
counterparts,  such as  the Swiss  Federal  Tribunal,  the  English  Court  of  Appeal,  or  the Paris  Cour
d'Appel15
 Overcoming the inferiority complex
The “small” arbitration law reform of 1986
14K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration in Germany: a New Era, cit., p. 103
15K.P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration, cit, p. 44
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The 1877 German arbitration law, contained in the 10th book of the Code of Civil Procedure, was left
untouched for almost a century: it was not until 1986 that  a partial reform entered into force, which
amended only some details of the arbitral proceedings16   
In particular, the reform concerned the rules on the validity of the award in case of signature refusal by
one of the  arbitrators. While under the old law an arbitrator, often influenced by the party who had
appointed him, could prevent  the conclusion of the arbitration and the award from becoming final
simply by refusing his signature,  § 1039 of the new code let the signatures of the majority suffice,
provided that the presiding arbitrator mentioned in the award that the signature of one of the arbitrators
could not be obtained17. The reform also allowed the parties to agree on different ways of  notification
of  the  award  instead  of  the  formal  service  through  state  organs  (§1039.2)  and  provided  for  the
competence of the court in whose district the arbitration was being or had been held for all decisions
relating to the designation  or challenge of arbitrators (§1045)18. Finally, the reform introduced a minor
change in the terminology of  the grounds for the setting aside of awards: the old reference to “public
policy”  was  replaced  by  the   expression  “a  result  that  is  manifestly  incompatible  with  essential
principles of German law, in particular with fundamental rights” (§1041 and §1044). Despite these
improvements, the reform did not affect the whole structure of the law and did not overcome many
other major drawbacks which discouraged foreign parties from choosing Germany as the place for their
arbitration.  The  most  evident  flaw was  the  so-called procedural-theory rule  advocated  by German
courts, according to which an arbitration was considered as German if it had been conducted according
to German arbitration law, even if the place of arbitration was not in Germany. This was in blatant
contrast  with the territorial principle followed by most modern arbitration laws, where the  lex loci
arbitri applies to all arbitrations taking place in the territory of the respective country19. The contrast
between the German system, which stuck to the procedural theory,  and all other modern arbitration
laws,  which  applied  the  territorial  criterion,  entailed  the  risk  of  frequent   conflicts  of  jurisdiction
between the German and the other national courts. The German courts, as well as the courts where the
16
 Federal Republic of Germany: Act on the Revision of the Private International Law, in International Legal Materials,
1988, p. 28-29  
17K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration in Germany: a New Era, cit, p. 104
18This new provision was significant because  the old law provided for the competence of the court which was designated in
the arbitration agreement or which would be competent for the claim in the absence of an arbitration agreement.  In this
latter  case,  the  German  code  of  civil  procedure,  like  many  other  legal  systems,  provides  that   the  court's  territorial
competence should be determined, as a general rule, according to the respondent's  habitual residence. Accordingly, this rule
was difficult to comply with in the field of international arbitration: if the respondent resided abroad, as it was usually the
case ,  this  implied a denial  of jurisdiction by the German courts.  K. P. Berger,  International Economic Arbitration in
Germany: a New Era, cit, p. 104-105.
19K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration in Germany: a New Era, cit, p. 107
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arbitration had its  seat,  could claim jurisdiction over  the arbitration and this would undermine the
smooth  progress  of  the  arbitration  itself.  Another  major  defect  concerned  the  composition  of  the
arbitral tribunal, which, according to the German Code of Civil Procedure, had to be composed by two
members, whereas in modern arbitration practice the three-member tribunal had become an established
customary rule20.  Finally,  a third pitfall was a number of provisions running counter to the general
international practice of preserving the validity of the arbitration agreement as far as possible. The
German law established that the arbitration agreement became invalid  if the arbitrators declared they
had reached a deadlock, or if  the party-nominated arbitrator died,  resigned,  refused to act,  became
invalid or incapable of acting for other reasons. In all these cases, most modern arbitration laws  laid
down rules  allowing  the  arbitrator  to  be  replaced,  in  order  to  save  the  validity  of  the  arbitration
agreement.
 Given the modest extent of the 1986 reform, it came as no surprise that the number of arbitrations
decided  in  Germany  had  not  increased  since  then.  What  is  more,  after  this  anodyne  attempt  of
modernisation, the national legislature lost sight of arbitration as a subject for reform. It seemed to
underestimate  the growing importance  of  arbitration in  international  trade  and the repercussions  a
modern arbitration law might have on the national economy and prestige.  
 Improvement of the arbitration infrastructure
The development of an adequate arbitration infrastructure was the main reason why the 1998 reform
was far more successful than the previous one occurred in 1986. A pivotal element of this infrastructure
was represented by the German Arbitration Institution (Deutsche Institution fur Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit,
DIS), which was founded in 1992 as a merger of the German Arbitration Committee (GAC) (Deutscher
Ausschuss fur Schiedsgerichtswesen) and the German Institute for Arbitration (Deutsches Institut fur
Schiedsgerichtswesen). The GAC was founded in 1920 and its main activity had been the production of
a number of institutional arbitration rules. Founded in 1974, the German Institute for Arbitration was
20K. P. Berger,  International Economic Arbitration in Germany: A New Era , cit, p. 106. The rules envisaged by the old
arbitration law on the composition of the arbitral tribunal could easily lead to a deadlock. Not only did they establish that
each party should appoint an arbitrator, but also that if an agreement could not be reached and if the parties had not made
special provisions for such a case, the arbitral agreement would cease to have effect (art. 1033(2) ZPO). Cfr G. Lörcher, The
New German Arbitration Act, Journal of International Arbitration, 1998,15,2, p. 89.
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mainly concerned with the scientific study and  promotion of arbitration in Germany and it also served
as an institution to provide information on the practice of arbitration to German industry and the bar. In
order to enhance their efficiency, the general assemblies of both institutions at their meeting of October
30, 1991, decided to merge into the newly created German Arbitration Institution from January,  1,
1992.21   The DIS has its seat in Bonn and has branches in Berlin and Munich. It serves mainly two
purposes: the first is to administer arbitral proceedings under its own set of arbitration rules, which it
has inherited from the former institutions and which are now also available in an English and French
version22. These rules are still primarily used for domestic arbitration, even if they have been revised in
order to adapt them to the Model Law. The second is to spread the culture of arbitration in Germany,
by organising seminars and issuing publications on this subject. In particular, the DIS administers a
database providing the full text of nearly all arbitration-related German court decisions, as well as an
English abstract of the most important ones23. Moreover, it co-operates to the publication since 2003 of
the German Arbitration Journal (Zeitschrift fur Schiedsverfahren - “SchiedsVZ”).
The legislative history of the 1998 reform
After the disappointing 1986 reform, the issue of a totally renewed arbitration law was rekindled by the
German  Institute  for  Arbitration,  which  presented  in  1989  a  first  draft  of  a  “Model  Law   for
Germany”24.  This  report  analysed  all  the  articles  of  the  UNCITRAL Model  Law  with  a  view to
determining whether  they were  compatible  with  the framework  of  German arbitration  and general
procedural law. The result of this study was very encouraging: the UNCITRAL Model Law was not
regarded as being in contrast with the guiding principles of German arbitration and procedural law.
21K. P. Berger,  International Economic Arbitration in Germany: a New Era ,  cit,  p.  117.  This event  was  also largely
advertised by the German media. The press conference held in Bonn on January, 21, 1992, with which the foundation of the
DIS was announced, was featured in the main German newspapers and on German television.
22K. H. Bockstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento, Germany as a Place for International and Domestic Arbitrations – General
Overview, in ID (eds), Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, Kluwer Law, 2007, p. 14. In addition, the DIS
serves as the competent  authority  for the duties of the ICC in Germany and regularly  acts as appointing authority for
UNCITRAL or other ad hoc proceedings or gives general advice on the selection of arbitrators. 
23Given the confidentiality of arbitration, it has not been possible to set up a similar database for arbitral awards. However, a
limited collection of German arbitral awards, or at least reports thereof, can be found in the specialised publications, such as
the  Zeitschrift  fur  Schiedsverfahren (from 2003),  Recht  und Praxis  der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit  (until  2001),  Recht  der
Internationalen Wirtschaft and the Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration.
24Deutsches  Institut  fur  Schiedsgerichtswesen,  Ubernahme  des  UNCITRAL-Modellgesetzes  über  die  Internationale
Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit in das Deutsche Recht, 1989, hrsg vom Deutschen Institut fur Schiedsgerichtswesen 
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Accordingly,  the publication of  this  report  changed  the course  of  the debate on the reform of  the
German  arbitration  law  into  one  direction:  German  should  adopt  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law.
Moreover, it supported the idea that a new German  arbitration law should be limited to international
arbitrations, as defined in art.1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The argument provided in favour of this
view was that the underlying features of domestic arbitration were so different from international one,
that there must be also different set of rules for each kind of arbitration.
 Despite  the  publication  of  this  influential  report,  the  issue  of  the  arbitration  law  reform  was
overwhelmed by German reunification in 1989, which entailed the promulgation of an enormous body
of statutes on all issues related to the unification process. It was resumed in 1992, after the foundation
of the German Institution of Arbitration (DIS). The establishment of an influent epistemic community
within  the DIS has been an important catalyst for the rapid adoption of a national arbitration law based
on the UNCITRAL Model Law. In particular, the DIS has played a pivotal role as an intermediary
between  German arbitration practitioners and the German Ministry of Justice in the drafting process of
the German arbitration law25.  Moreover,  it  has  greatly contributed to the creation  of an arbitration
doctrine,  which  has  remedied  the  lack  of  expertise  in  the  field  suffered  by  the  German  legal
community. The drafting process which led to the adoption of the new German Arbitration Act based
on  the  UNCITRAL  Model  law  was  characterised  by  a  close  cooperation  among  arbitration
practitioners, academia and the German Ministry of Justice. In particular, two drafting commissions
were  established.  One was set  up by the Ministry of  Justice and was composed of nine members
coming from judicial  administration,  the judiciary,  the German bar,  academics  and practitioners  of
arbitration26.  This  Commission  had  the  task,   directly  conferred  by  the  Minister  of  Justice,  of
developing proposals for reforming the German  law of international and domestic arbitration27,  paying
particular attention to the UNCITRAL Model Law. The other was formed at the DIS and involved ten
members, mostly arbitration practitioners and academics. On February, 1 1994 the Commission of the
Ministry of Justice published its draft, together with a report on each individual provision of the draft.
Relying on this report, the experts of the Ministry of Justice issued a first draft, which amended the
25
         K. P. Berger, Drafting History and Principal Features of the New German Arbitration Law, in K. P. Berger (ed), Das
Neue Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit – The New German Arbitration Law, RWS, 1998, p. 42
26Cfr  Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996 at p. 3; K. H. Böckstiegel, An Introduction to the New German
Arbitration Act, cit, p. 20
27Thus, the scope of the mandate conferred by the Minister of Justice to the commission represented an important change in
the direction of the reform process: contrary to the proposals made by the German Institute of Arbitration, the reform should
now focus not only to international but also to domestic arbitration
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commission's one only on minor details28. The Ministry's draft contained also a summary of the aims of
the reform, as well as a commentary on both the general aspects and  its particular provisions29. This
report constitutes the travaux preparatoires  of the new German arbitration law. Thereafter, the Legal
Committee of the German Parliament adopted the final text on November 2, 1997. The final bill was
approved by the Parliament on December 13, 1997 and entered into force on January, 1, 1998. Thus, by
drafting a text which closely followed the Model Law, the two commissions were able to persuade the
German legislature to adopt a piece of legislation which was  de facto drafted by outside experts at
UNCITRAL and not by the officials in the German legislative body30. This was undoubtedly due to the
“double-track” activity of German legal experts,  Gerold Herrmann and Karl Heinz Bockstiegel above
all, who were two of the most influential personalities during the travaux of the Model Law and also
members  of  the  commissions  at  the  German  Ministry  of  Justice  and  at  the  German  Institute  of
Arbitration (DIS).
 The guiding principles of the German Arbitration Act
The drafting process was influenced by a number of drafting guidelines which were approved right at
the outset of the deliberations by both commissions. With hindsight, they also represent the guiding
principles  of  the new arbitration act,  since  they reflect  the essential  features  of  what  constitutes a
modern arbitral legislation. These principles may be summarised in: signalling effect, user-friendliness
and arbitration-friendliness31. The idea of the signalling effect is the main feature of the new German
arbitration law: it essentially means that the German arbitration law must be familiar to the foreign
practitioner. He has to recognise the law as a well-known set of rules able to dispel concerns of local
particularities hidden in the statute or in the commentaries. This explains why German arbitration law
constitutes a “bow” to the Model Law . Drafting the new arbitration law as closely as possible to the
original wording of the Model Law32  was a means to let the foreign practitioner feel immediately at
28
 Cp.  Bundestags-Drucksache  n.  13/5274  of  July  12,  1996  at  p.  1  <<Das  Kernstuck  des  Entwurfs  entspricht  im
wesentlichen dem von der Kommission zur Neuordnung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts vorgeschlagenen Diskussionsentwurf,
dessen Redaktion beim Bundesministerium der Justiz oblag>>.
29Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996 
30K. P. Berger, The New German Arbitration Law in International Perspective, Forum Internationale, 2000, 26, p. 3.
31K. P. Berger, Drafting History and Principal Features of the New German Arbitration Law, cit, p. 44
32
 The effort towards a verbatim reception of the UNCITRAL Model Law was taken so seriously, that the Commission at
the Ministry of Justice constantly made sure that the text of the German arbitration law could be easily re-translated into
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home, when reading the German arbitration law, for if he knows the Model Law (and all arbitration
practitioners certainly do), he also knows the German arbitration law33. The other two guidelines are a
specification of the signalling effect. They were applied to the modifications to the Model Law, which
were  necessary  in  order  to  adapt  it  to  the  particularities  of  the  German  legal  system.  The  user-
friendliness and arbitration-friendliness of the law are ensured in so far as the drafters take into careful
consideration that in no way shall amendments to the Model Law undermine the latter's original spirit
and  regulatory  framework.  This  is  because  the  purpose  of  the Model  Law is  indeed  to  provide  a
framework for arbitration, which is readily understandable by people of very different legal cultures34
Accordingly, national legislatures which take care to keep the wording of the Model Law provisions as
far as possible, help foreign users  becoming familiar with national law.
The strict adherence to the wording and the drafting style of the Model Law has entailed the adoption
in the German law of arbitration of a number of provisions which sound quite peculiar to the German
lawyer's ear35. This is the case of suppletive provisions, which are generally introduced by the formula
“unless otherwise agreed by the parties” or “failing an agreement by the parties” and the like. The
provision of suppletive rules relies on the idea that all legal rules are generally mandatory. Therefore
non-mandatory rules must be expressly identified by the law with the above-mentioned formulas. This
approach is quite unusual for German law-making tradition, according to which it is preferable to state,
in more general terms,  that the parties are always free to agree on their own rules, unless this is not
expressly excluded by a particular legal provision36. Nonetheless, in order to comply with the principles
of user friendliness and arbitration friendliness, German drafters decided to stick as close as possible to
the Model Law's drafting technique, doing away with the German law-making tradition.
English. Cp. P. Schlosser, Bald neues Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland?,  RIW, 1994, p. 723 
33German arbitration law's  signalling effect is clearly stated in the words of the working commission at the Ministry of
Justice during the travaux preparatoires: <<if we want to reach the goal that Germany will be selected more frequently as
the seat  of international  arbitrations in the future,  we have to provide the foreign parties with  a law that,  by its  outer
appearance and by its contents, is in line with the framework of the Model Law which is so familiar all over the world>>.
(Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996 at p. 28, translated by K.P. Berger,  Drafting History and Principal
Features of the New German Arbitration Law, cit,  p.  44. Thus the working commission appeared to be aware that the
German arbitration's law signalling effect was primarily directed to overcome Germany's “inferiority complex” vis à vis
international arbitration.
34Cp  Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Report to the Lord Advocate of the Scottish Advisory Committee on
Arbitration Law, Arb Int, 1990, p. 63
35Cfr P. Schlosser, Bald Neues Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland?, RIW, 1994, p. 724
36F. B. Weigand, The UNCITRAL Model Law: New Draft Arbitration Acts in Germany and Sweden, Arb Int, 1995, 11, 4, p.
400. Relying on this drafting style, the former Code of Civil Procedure (s. 1034) embodied in one single provision the
regulation of arbitral proceedings, by stating inter alia that insofar as the parties have made no express agreement on the
matter, the procedure shall be determined by the arbitrators at their own discretion. 
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 The main provisions of the  German arbitration law
As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, in 1998 the German arbitration law has been completely
reformed,  after having remained virtually unchanged for almost  a century37.  The  Leit-Motiv  of this
reform is the so-called “signalling effect”, that is the purpose of promoting Germany as an attractive
venue for international arbitration38. The core of the new German arbitration law consists in a number
of provisions (sections 1025-1066), which replace the former sections of the 10th Book of the Code of
Civil Procedure (the “ZPO)39. The new German arbitration law's provisions may be divided into three
groups with respect to the level of conformity to the Model Law: those identical to the Model Law,
those modifying the Model Law, and those introducing new rules which were not envisaged by the
Model Law.
Common provisions
One of the major novelty introduced by the new German arbitration law is the adoption of the so-called
territoriality principle, which is one of the cornerstones of the Model Law and brings Germany in line
with most of the other European arbitration systems40. This provision does away with the procedural
theory  which,  as  we  have  seen  above,  was  one  of  the  main  inconvenient   of  the  previous  law.
According to the territoriality principle, the new German arbitration law applies now to all arbitration
37M. Buhler,  The German Arbitration Act: Text and Notes, Kluwer, 1998, p. 3
38Cfr  also   Bundestags-Drucksache  n.  13/5274  of  July  12,  1996  at  p.  1  <<ein  zeitgemasses  und  den  internationalen
Rahmenbedingugen angepasstes Recht soll das Ansehen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Austragungsort internationaler
Schiedsstreitigkeiten fordern>> 
39More precisely, the new German Arbitration Law is divided into five Articles. Article 1 encompasses Sections 1025 to
1066 of the ZPO; Articles 2 and  3 contain provisions amending other federal acts; Article 4 contains transitional provisions
and Article 5 contains provisions as to the coming into force of the new law.
40M. Buhler, The German Arbitration Act: Text and Notes, Kluwer, 1998, p. 5
256
proceedings whenever the place of arbitration41 is located in Germany ( §1025-1)42. The shift to the
territoriality criterion entails that the parties can no longer agree on a foreign procedural law for an
arbitration taking place in Germany43. This represents a significant limitation of the principle of party
autonomy,  which  is  nonetheless  necessary  in  order  to  overcome  the  uncertainties  related  to  the
application of the procedural theory44 . Moreover, since in the majority of cases the parties agree on the
place  of  arbitration,  the  issue  of  the  applicable  procedural  law  is,  according  to  the  territoriality
principle,  unproblematic45:  it  is   with  no  exception  the  lex  loci  arbitri.  Finally,  the  choice  of  the
territoriality principle makes the distinction between a domestic and a foreign award (and arbitration)
very easy to draw: all the awards issued in Germany are to be considered domestic, whereas those
issued abroad are to be considered as foreign. This in turn leaves no ground to the application of art
1.1.3 of the New York Convention46. On the other hand, the adoption of the territoriality criterion does
not exclude  in toto  the possibility of applying a foreign procedural law, because, like in the Model
Law, most of the German arbitration law provisions are suppletive in nature and thus can be derogated
by the parties. It follows that, within the framework of the mandatory provisions of the lex loci arbitri,
the parties are free to agree on the application of  foreign procedural rules47.
41As the legal base of  the arbitral proceedings, the place of arbitration must be distinguished from the place where the
hearings are held. This is clearly stated in § 1043 (2), which, in complying with art 20(2) ML, allows the tribunal to meet
and hold meetings in places other than the established place of arbitration. It follows that the place of arbitration is a legal
fiction which serves the purpose of striking a balance between the two opposite needs of anchoring the arbitration to a
particular jurisdiction and granting the principle of party autonomy the widest application possible. By allowing the parties
to  designate  the  place of  arbitration and at  the  same time authorizing the  arbitral  tribunal  to  conduct  the  proceedings
virtually anywhere, the place of arbitration may in fact be chosen for the purpose of determining the applicable procedural
law only. The question of where it is most convenient to meet and hold hearings should really be of no concern in this
context:  once  the  place of  arbitration  has  been determined,  the  parties  may  set  up the  proceedings  anywhere.  Cp.  G.
Wagner, Commentary on § 1025, in  K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The
Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 75-76
42In line with the Model Law, the German Arbitration Act envisages a number of exceptions to the territoriality principle,
i.e. provisions which apply to arbitrations whose place of arbitration is outside Germany, or where the place of arbitration
has not yet been determined. These provisions are listed in sec. 1025 (2)- (4) and concern the court's jurisdiction vis à vis
the enforcement of a valid arbitration agreement and the granting of interim measures, as well as some measures of court
support.
43P. Schlosser,  Bald Neues Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland?, cit, p. 729;  K. Schumacher,  Fragen zum
Anwendungsbereich des künftigen deutschen Schiedsverfahren Recht, cit, p. 347
44P.S. Heigl, Das Deutsche Schiedsverfahrensrecht von 1998 im Vergleich zum English Arbitration Act 1996, cit, p. 96
45Ibidem. The author also quotes the ICC statistics (ICC Arbitration Bullettin vol 9/1 1998, 8), according to which in 85% of
the cases the parties reach an agreement on the place of arbitration.
46K. Schumacher, Fragen zum Anwendungsbereich des künftigen deutschen Schiedsverfahren Recht, cit, p.  351
47P.S. Heigl,  Das Deutsche Schiedsverfahrensrecht von 1998 im Vergleich zum English Arbitration act 1996, cit, p. 97.
Accordingly, where the parties have designated a foreign law as the applicable procedural law, the law of the place of
arbitration takes priority and the choice in favour of a different arbitration law is to be re-interpreted to the effect that the
rules of such law derogate the lex fori only in its suppletive provisions. Cp. G. Wagner, Commentary on § 1025, in  K. H.
Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 75
Another important innovation is the settlement of the issue of the so-called “Kompetenz-Kompetenz”,
that  is  the  arbitral  tribunal's  competence  to  decide  over  its  jurisdiction.  Under  the  old  German
arbitration law, the parties could authorise the arbitral tribunal to adopt a final and binding decision on
its jurisdiction. This agreement was interpreted by the German courts as a separate arbitration clause, in
which the parties agreed that the question of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal should be decided
exclusively by the latter, thus ousting the jurisdiction of  state courts48. However, this broad view of the
Kompetenz-Kompetenz  had  raised  a  number  of  critical  voices:  this  interpretation  was  accused  of
circumventing the principle of mandatory court control on arbitral awards envisaged by the arbitration
law49.  Sec.  1040  of  the  new arbitration  law settles  the  issue  of  the  arbitral  tribunal's  Kompetenz-
Kompetenz,  by  adopting  the  solution  provided  by  art  16  of  the  Model  Law,  which  establishes
mandatory court control of the arbitral tribunal's decision stating in favour of its jurisdiction to hear the
case . Therefore, if the arbitral tribunal finds that it is not competent, this decision is binding; if, on the
other hand,  it acknowledges that it does have competence, this decision is subject to review by the
state court: either party may request the court to decide the matter50. Accordingly, under the new law,
the parties are no longer authorised to exclude the competence of the German courts to decide on the
arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction. As the travaux preparatoires make clear, the issue of the competence of
the arbitral tribunal will in any event be finally decided by the State court; the arbitrator's decision on
its competence is always provisional51. Moreover, the German legislator has taken on board, with some
modifications, those Model Law provisions aimed at minimizing the risk of arbitration proceedings
started in vain because subsequently declared invalid by a state court. They are essentially embodied in
§  1032  of  the  German  arbitration  law,  allowing  the  possibility  of  an  early,  final  decision  on  the
Kompetenz-Kompetenz issue. In particular, § 1032 (1) is concerned with the case where claimant has
initiated the main proceedings before a state court and respondent raises the defence of the existence of
48K. P. Berger,  Drafting History and Principal Features of the New German Arbitration Law, cit, p. 46. 
49By conferring decisions on Kompetenz-Kompetenz  to the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitrators the courts tried to avoid that
parties engaged in arbitration proceedings only to find out at the post-award stage that the arbitral tribunal  lacked the
necessary jurisdiction. Yet, this approach had been criticized as excessively “arbitration-friendly”, all the more that, in many
cases, the courts even implied the existence of a  Kompetenz- Kompetenz agreement even where the parties had expressly
excluded to agree on this  issue.   Besides,  this  attempt had not always  gone in the direction of a simplification of the
arbitration proceedings, since it often entailed that a party claiming the invalidity of the arbitration agreement shall wait
until the constitution of the arbitral tribunal just in order to hear that the latter was not competent to hear the case. Cp. P.
Schlosser,  Bald  neues  Recht  der  Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit  in  Deutschland?,  cit,  p.  732;  p.  P.S.  Heigl,  Das  Deutsche
Schiedsverfahrensrecht  von  1998  im  Vergleich  zum  English  Arbitration  Act  1996, cit,  p.  110;  F.  B.  Weigand,  The
UNCITRAL Model Law: New Draft Arbitration Acts in Germany and Sweden, cit, p. 404-405.
50F.J Semler, German Arbitration Law: The 1998 Reform and Recent Case Law, Journal of International Arbitration, 2001,
18, 5, p. 581
51Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996, p. 44 and seq. 1040(3) of the German Arbitration Law, which states
that decisions on pleas contesting the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction are taken by means of a preliminary ruling.
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an arbitration agreement52. According to this provision, which is largely based on art. 8 of the Model
Law, the court shall, if the respondent raises an objection prior to the beginning of the oral hearing,
reject the action as inadmissible, unless the court finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed53. Paragraph 2, which is not based on the Model Law,
concerns the case where a party applies to the State court to decide on the admissibility of arbitral
proceedings. This provision enables the party to obtain a separate decision by the State court on the
admissibility of arbitral proceedings, albeit only at a very early stage of the dispute, i.e. prior to the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal54. 
Another  important  innovation  of  the  new  arbitration  act   adopting  the  Model  Law  regards  the
composition of the arbitral tribunal. Complying with with art. 10 of the Model Law,  § 1034 (1) of the
new act provides that, unless agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three members, one
appointed by each party and the third one by the arbitral tribunal. Failing an agreement between the
parties,  the appointment  is  made by the court.  Accordingly,  this  rule  abolishes  the old-  fashioned
provision of the previous law, whereby the arbitral tribunal was composed, in the absence of a specific
agreement between parties, by two members.
Finally, a number of innovations with respect to the old German arbitration law regard those provisions
aimed at overcoming deadlocks during the proceedings. For example, § 1054 (1), in line with art 31 (1)
of the Model Law, provides that, where one or more arbitrators refuse to sign the award, the signature
of the refusing arbitrator may be replaced by a written notice by the others that the omitted signature
has been refused for certain specific reasons. This is a significant innovation with respect to the 1877
arbitration  law,  since  the latter  allowed an arbitrator,  sometimes  influenced  by the  party who had
appointed him, to prevent the conclusion of the arbitration and the award from becoming final, simply
52P. Huber, Commentary on § 1032: Arbitration Agreement and Substantive Claim Before Court, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M.
Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, Kluwer Law, 2007, p. 140
53The most important difference with respect to art. 8 ML is that § 1032(1) provides that the court shall “reject the action as
inadmissible”, whereas art.  8 ML provides that the court shall “refer the parties to arbitration”.  The German legislature
decided to deviate from the Model Law because it argued that a rejection of the action as inadmissible would lead to a clear
result  already at an early stage  of the  proceedings:  by rejecting an action as inadmissible  the court  must  engage  in a
comprehensive review of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and could not limit itself to a  prima facie review
which the referral to arbitration would have implied. In addition, § 1032(1) contains a slightly more precise definition of the
time limit  for  raising  the  defence.  Unlike  art 8  ML,  which  establishes  this  limit  in  the submission of the  party's  first
statement on the substance of the dispute, § 1032 (1) provides that the objection must be raised “prior to the oral hearing on
the substance”. P . Huber, Commentary on § 1032: Arbitration Agreement and Substantive Claim Before Court, cit, pp. 141-
145.
54A similar  rule existed in the old German arbitration law before the 1998 reform,  but it  was  limited only to negative
decisions  stating  the  inadmissibility  of  arbitration.  The  German  legislature  decided  to  keep  this  rule  for  reasons  of
procedural economy and to extend it also to the possibility of asking for a positive declaration on the admissibility of the
arbitration.  P . Huber, Commentary on § 1032: Arbitration Agreement and Substantive Claim Before Court, cit, p. 150
259
by refusing his signature55. Moreover, §§ 1034 et seq. provide   several rules ensuring that the arbitral
tribunal may be constituted despite a party's  failure to cooperate or take the necessary steps in the
appointment proceedings. The required appointment will then be made by the courts, not only in cases
where the place of arbitration is in Germany, but also in cases where it has not yet been fixed. This
exception  to  the  territoriality  principle  is  also  an  innovation  with  respect  to  the  correspondent
provisions of the Model Law56.
Provisions modifying the Model Law. 
The new German arbitration law also contains some provisions which differ from those envisaged by
the Model Law. They relate to the scope of the law, the conflict of laws rules and the enforcement
procedures for domestic and foreign arbitral awards.
The most important difference between the new German arbitration law and the Model Law consists in
the  former's  much  larger  scope  of  application57,  since  it  applies  to  all  arbitrations  taking  place  in
Germany,  both  domestic  and  international,  irrespective  of  whether  they  can   be  identified  as
commercial.  German doctrine was always divided on the issue whether the new arbitration law should
follow  a  monistic  approach  and  provide  a  single  discipline  for  both  domestic  and  international
arbitration, or a dualistic approach,  limiting the reform to international arbitration only. This cleavage
was reflected, as we have seen, in the drafting process itself. Whereas at the beginning the 1989 Report
supported the dualistic approach, the monistic one ultimately prevailed.  The reason for this change is
that the drafters realised that, after all, international and domestic arbitration do not differ in so many
respects as to deserve two completely separate regimes.  Accordingly, the original idea of drafting a
55K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration in Germany: A New Era , cit, p. 106. The 1986 Reform had introduced a
rather obscure rule in this respect: it was established that the signature of the majority of the arbitrators was enough to make
an award final, provided that the chairman indicated under the award that the signature could not be obtained.  From the
wording of this rule it was not clear whether the chairman had always to be part of the majority and thus his refusal to sign
could in any case prevent the award from being final. The new rule introduced with the 1998 Reform, by eliminating any
reference to the chairman, clarifies that his sole refusal to sign cannot prevent the award from being final, provided that the
majority of the arbitral  tribunal  has  signed  the award.  On this  point  cp.  O.  Sandrock,  Procedural  Aspects of  the New
German Arbitration Act, Arb Int, 1998, 14, 1, p. 41
56Cp. § 1025 (3) of the German arbitration law: <<if the place of arbitration has not yet been determined, the German courts
are competent to perform the court functions specified in §§ 1034, 1035, 1037 and 1038, if the respondent or the claimant
has his place of business or habitual residence in Germany>>. It follows that if neither party has its habitual residence or
place of business in Germany, German courts must refrain from assistance 
57Cp. G. Lörcher, The New German Arbitration Act, cit., p. 85
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new law for international arbitrations and including a list of special provisions for domestic arbitrations
was abandoned. The number of additional provisions required for domestic arbitrations was simply not
enough to justify the introduction of the problematic distinction between domestic and international
arbitrations58. Likewise, the exclusion of the limitation to commercial arbitrations was decided in order
to spare  the interpreter  the difficulty of defining the term “commercial”,  since the notion thereof
provided in the Model Law was different from the one employed in the German Commercial Code.
Consequently, the drafters wanted to avoid a situation of different notions of “commercial relationship”
in different German laws59 . 
Another  provision  of  the  Model  Law  which  the  German  drafters  agreed  to  modify  was  art.  28,
concerning the choice of law rules. Sec. 1051 of the new German law closely follows the first part of
art 28 of the Model Law: it allows the parties to choose the “rules of law” instead of simply “the law”.
This expression is commonly interpreted as allowing the parties to choose not only single provisions of
different  laws  to  govern  different  parts  of  their  relationship  (the  so-called  depecage),  but  also
transnational legal principles (lex mercatoria, general principles of law, UNIDROIT Principles, and so
on), instead of domestic law, as the law governing their contract60  However, the German arbitration law
modifies the second part of art. 28 of the Model Law which states that, absent a choice of law by the
parties,  the arbitral  tribunal  may apply the  law determined  by the conflict  of  laws  rules  which  it
considers  applicable.  The  Model  Law  has  thus  opted  for  the  so-called  voie  indirecte in  the
determination of the law applicable to the merits of the dispute. Contrary to the approach followed by
the Model Law, the German arbitration law has opted for the so-called voie directe, whereby, absent a
choice of law by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall refer directly to the applicable law it deems
appropriate. The new  § 1051 (2) provides that, failing any designation of the applicable law by the
parties,  the arbitral  tribunal  shall  apply the  law of  the  state  with  which  the  subject  matter  of  the
58Cfr K. H. Böckstiegel, An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act, cit, p. 22. See also   Bundestags-Drucksache n.
13/5274  of  July  12,  1996,  at  p.  5  <<  in  Übereinstimmung  mit  dem  Diskussionsentwurf  sieht  der  Entwurf  weder
Sondervorschriften  fur  nationale  oder  internationale  Verfahren  noch  für  Verfahren  der  (internationalen)
Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit vor. Die wenige Fälle, in denen unterschiedliche Regelungen fur nationale und internationale
Verfahren diskutabel erschienen hatten es von ihrem Gewicht her nicht gerechtfertigt, ein entsprechendes Sonderkapitel mit
der  Folge  der  Notwendigkeit  einer  nicht  nur  fur  den  Gesetzgeber,  sondern  auch  die  Gerichte  und  die  sonstigen
Rechtsanwender schwierigen Abgrenzung internationaler und nationaler Verfahren vorzusehen>>
59K.  P  Berger,  Drafting  History  and  Principal  Features  of  the  New  German  Arbitration  Law,  cit,  p.  47.  See  also
Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996 at p. 5, which observes that the reception of the unclear definition of
“commercial”, as laid down in the Model Law <<hätte für das deutsche Recht einen gespaltenen Handelsbegriff zur Folge
gehabt, dessen Auswirkungen angesichts der in die Wege geleiteten Reformarbeiten zum Handelsrecht und Handelsregister
derzeit nicht überblickbar gewesen wären>>
60Cp. A. Redfern and M. Hunter, op.cit., p. 121, Bundestag Drucksache 13/5274, p. 52; K. H. Böckstiegel, An Introduction
to the New German Arbitration Act, cit, p. 27
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proceedings has the closest connection. The drafters decided to depart from the Model Law, because
they believed that the new law on arbitration should have the same conflicts of law rule that is included
in art. 4 of the 1980 Rome Convention relating to the law applicable to contractual obligations. The
rules provided in this  Convention – they argued -  were public international law obligations with which
Germany  must  comply61. Since  this  provision  limits  the  authority  of  the  arbitral  tribunal  to  the
application of the “law of a state”, it follows that, in the absence of an agreement on the applicable law
by the parties,  the arbitrator is not entitled to apply transnational principles  on its own initiative62.
However, even in those cases where the arbitrators apply domestic rules, transnational elements may be
introduced  by means  of  what  Berger  has  called  the “international  useful  construction  of  domestic
law”63.  This  approach  is  founded  on  the  idea  that  in  international  contexts,  the  interpretation  of
domestic  law  according  to  transnational  principles  (e.g.  the  UNIDROIT  Principles)  shall  be
admissible64. 
Finally,  a minor modification concerns the discipline of recognition and enforcement of the awards.
Art. 36 of the Model Law provides for the same procedure to be applied to both domestic and foreign
awards,  whereas  the  German  arbitration law envisages  two different  procedures,  one  dealing  with
domestic (§ 1060) and the other with foreign arbitral awards (§ 1061). However, for domestic awards §
1060 provides that the enforcement of a domestic award must be refused if it is affected by a ground
which would justify its setting aside under § 1059(2). Both the grounds for setting aside envisaged by
this section and the grounds provided in art. 36 of the Model Law closely follow art. V of the New
York Convention. Moreover, § 1061 of the German law establishes that recognition and enforcement of
foreign awards is regulated by the New York Convention. Thus, as far as the discipline of recognition
and  enforcement  of  arbitral  awards  is  concerned,  the  difference  between  the  Model  Law  and  the
61Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996, p.53. The drafting of this provision resulted in a conflict between the
“traditionalist” and “transnationalist” supporters of international arbitration. The “traditionalist” approach was followed by
the  representative  of  the  Department  on  Conflict  of  Laws  at  the  Federal  Minister  of  Justice,  who  intervened  in  the
discussion  and  claimed  for  the  adoption  of  the  same  conflict  of   laws  rule  envisaged  in  the  Rome  Convention.  The
“transnationalist” were the members of the two working commissions, who tried to convince the minister official that an
arbitral tribunal has no lex fori and for this reason it is generally acknowledged, since a 1957 Resolution of the Institut de
Droit International, that an international arbitral tribunal needs not necessarily apply the conflict of laws provisions in force
at its seat. Yet these arguments failed to convince the Minister representative, who insisted on the need to respect the public
international law commitments contained in the Rome Convention. K. P. Berger,  The New German Arbitration Law in
International Perspective, cit.,p. 14
62O. Sandrock, Procedural Aspects of the New German Arbitration Act, cit p.  39.   
63K. P. Berger, The New German Arbitration Law in International Perspective, cit, p. 15
64Cp. ICC Arbitral award in Clunet 1998, in which the arbitrator interpreted the provision of the applicable Dutch Law on
force  majeure  in  the  light  of  the  corresponding  provision  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  of  International  Commercial
Contracts.
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German law is  more one of system than of substance65, as both sources are closely modelled on the
New York Convention. 
 Another aspect deserves attention in this respect: we have already hinted at the fact that the enactment
of the Model Law in Germany has sometimes entailed the adoption of legal terms which may result
unusual and even misleading to the German reader. The terminology “recognition and enforcement”
used by the New York Convention is a case in point:  the terms “recognition and enforcement” used in
the New York Convention, as well as in § 1060 and 1061 ZPO, must be clearly distinguished from
enforcement proceedings in the proper sense. In the German legal system, like in most systems of the
world, the enforcement of rights is a two-step process, involving two separate and different  sets of
proceedings66.  The  first  stage  (Erkenntnisverfahren)  has  the  purpose  of  reaching  a  binding
determination of whether an alleged right exists. The second stage (Vollstreckungsverfahren) consists
in the enforcement process in the proper sense and is aimed at executing the right whose existence has
been  ascertained  in  the  first  stage  against  the  non-complying  party.  Despite  the  misleading
terminology, the proceedings envisaged in the New York Convention and in §§ 1060 and 1061 ZPO
belong to the first stage: their purpose is to declare the award enforceable, that is to confer upon it a
“title” of enforcement which is the necessary condition for initiating enforcement proceedings in the
proper sense. Once a court has declared an award enforceable, the award  - or,  more precisely, the
court order declaring the award enforceable - can be executed in enforcement proceedings, like any
other  title.  These  latter  proceedings  are  entirely  regulated  by  German  Law  (i.e.  they  have  no
international source) and depend both on the content of the award (title for the payment of money or
non-money title) and on the specific measure sought (enforcement against  movables or immovable
property, or the garnishment of money claims or non-money titles).67
New provisions
65K. P. Berger, Drafting History and Principal Features of the New German Arbitration Law, p. 48; K. H. Böckstiegel, An
Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act, cit, p.  29
66S.M. Kroll, Introduction to §§ 1060, 1061, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany:
The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 481
67S. Rutzel and C. Krapfl, Enforcement of Decisions Declaring Awards Enforceable in Germany, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M.
Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 1063
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In addition to the modifications to the Model Law, the German drafters introduced  a number of new
provisions  regulating  some  aspects  not  envisaged  by  the  Model  Law.  However,  they  generally
refrained  from introducing provisions  on controversial  issues.  This  would have run counter  to  the
general guideline of achieving the maximum degree of user- friendliness for foreign practitioners, by
keeping the text of the new law as close as possible to the wording and spirit  of the Model Law.
Therefore,  issues as multi-party arbitration and set-off are not regulated by the German law. Their
solution is left to the German courts68.
The  most  important  provision  of  this  group  concerns  the  issue  of  arbitrability.  The  UNCITRAL
Working Group refrained  from regulating this subject-matter  in  the Model  Law,  because  this  was
considered as an intolerable interference with the sovereignty of each adopting country. Moreover, it
was deemed impossible to include an exhaustive list of arbitrable disputes in the Model Law on which
all state delegates could agree.  According to the continental  European tradition, arbitrability covers
those claims based on a right of which the parties can freely dispose, or in respect to which the parties
are entitled to conclude a settlement69.  In doing away with this tradition, the German legislature has
adopted a much broader notion of arbitrability, which is modelled on the Swiss arbitration law: § 1030
(1)  provides  that  all  disputes  which  have  an  economic  character  are  arbitrable  70.  The  travaux
preparatoires  clarify that, in order for a dispute to be arbitrable, it suffices that the claimant pursues
any direct or indirect economic interest with his claim, no matter whether the claim belongs to public or
private law71. The reason why the drafters decided to adopt such a broad definition of arbitrability is in
68On these issues see the following paragraph
69P. Schlosser, Bald neues Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland?, cit, p. 725
70The requirement of the old German arbitration law that the parties must be able to conclude a settlement on the issue in
dispute, has not however completely disappeared. The second part of art 1030(1) of the new arbitration law provides that an
arbitration agreement concerning claims not involving an economic interest shall have legal effect to the extent that the
parties are  entitled  to conclude a settlement  on the issue  in dispute.  It  follows that  if  a  given claim has an economic
character, it can be referred to arbitration even if the possibility of concluding a settlement on it is excluded. If a claim has
not an economic character, then the old criterion provided for in the previous law is still into force. Cfr V. Sangiovanni, la
Compromettibilità in Arbitri nel Diritto Tedesco,  Rivista dell'arbitrato, 2006, XVI, 1, p. 221.  This broad conception of
arbitrability has raised some criticism.  Concerns have been expressed that if a claim involving an economic interest is
governed by mandatory provisions which prevent the parties from concluding a settlement over it, the parties cannot settle
the claim outside arbitral proceedings.  In contrast,  they may settle during arbitral proceedings,  since § 1053 (1) of the
German arbitration law allows the parties to agree upon the terms of the award. Accordingly,  this broad conception of
arbitrability could be relied on in order to circumvent those mandatory provisions excluding the possibility of a settlement
over certain claims. Yet, it may be presumed that the arbitrator, in converting a settlement into an award on agreed terms,
will exert some control and not issue the award if the settlement contravenes mandatory provisions of law. R. Trittmann and
I. Hanefeld, Commentary on § 1030, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The
Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 118
71Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996, p. 35: <<Vermögensrechtliche Ansprüche müssen in übrigen nicht
notwendig  privatrechtlicher  Natur  Sein.  Was  fur  öffentliche  Recht  angeht,  bleibt  es  bei  dem  Grundsatz,  dass
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit  in  soweit  möglich  ist,  als  die  Parteien  über  den  Streitgegegenstand  einen  öffentlich-rechtlichen
Vertrag schliessen können>>.
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line with the overall objective of the 1998 reform act: increasing the number of arbitrable disputes
under  German  law  and  promoting  Germany  as  a  venue  for  international  arbitral  proceedings72.
Accordingly, claims involving an economic interest are not only claims for the payment of a sum of
money,  but  also declaratory claims and actions  for  the change  of  a  legal  relationship,  prohibitory
actions  and  actions  for  revocation  raised  to  protect  economic  interests73.  This  new  conception  of
arbitrability seems to be more in line with contemporary developments in international law. On the one
hand, it does away with the old mistrust against arbitration enshrined in the previous arbitration law,
which was a typical expression of 19th century thinking. On the other hand, it provides a much clearer
criterion to distinguish between arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims. Since nowadays the boundaries
between private and public law tend to blur, it may not always be easy to establish whether a given
claim is freely disposable, especially where this ascertainment has to be done by an arbitrator dealing
with a  foreign  applicable  law74.  The  solution provided  in  the  German  and  Swiss  arbitration  laws,
accompanied  by  a  worldwide  tendency  to  extend  the  arbitrability  of  subject  matters75,  makes  the
qualification of a given claim much easier: it suffices that the claimant pursues any direct or indirect
economic interest, immaterial of whether the claim falls within the public or private law  domain  76.
The  travaux  preparatoires reflect  this  worldwide  tendency,  by recommending  to  admit  arbitration
agreements in almost all civil and commercial  matters,  except for claims arising out of family and
matrimonial law and those in respect of private rental agreements for flats and houses77. On the other
hand,  only those issues  will  be  excluded from arbitration for  which a specific  legal  provision has
reserved the right to adjudicate them before domestic courts78. This is for example the case of stock
exchange transactions, and the already mentioned proceedings related to family law, succession and the
validity and existence of non-commercial rental agreements79. However, there are still some disputes
72Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996, p. 34
73R. Trittmann and I. Hanefeld, Commentary on § 1030 , in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration
in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 117-118
74P. Schlosser, Bald Neues Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland?, cit, p.  725
75K. P. Berger, Drafting History and Principal Features of the New German Arbitration Law, p. 49
76Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996, p. 35
77F. B. Weigand,  The UNCITRAL Model Law: New Draft Arbitration Acts in Germany and Sweden, cit, p. 401-402. The
final  version of § 1030 (2) expressly excludes from arbitrability disputes arising under  lease agreements  on residential
accommodation within Germany. On the other hand, the former limitation under German antitrust law has been removed:
the German legislature believed that also the arbitral tribunal can deal with the mandatory provisions of this subject-matter
in the same way as the national courts.  Cp. P.S. Heigl,  Das Deutsche Schiedsverfahrensrecht von 1998 im Vergleich zum
English Arbitration Act 1996, cit, p. 103
78K. P. Berger, Drafting History and Principal Features of the New German Arbitration Law, cit p. 49; F. B. Weigand, The
UNCITRAL Model Law: New Draft Arbitration Acts in Germany and Sweden, cit, p. 401
79However, family law disputes and disputes over succession will be arbitrable if they concern an economic interest, such as
maintenance payments or the dividing of inheritance. By the same token, a claim for the payment of a lease or a claim for
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whose arbitrability remains controversial even under the new arbitration law. The most important case
is  represented  by  claims  related  to  the  validity  of  the  decisions  taken  by  the  general  meeting  in
corporations (Gultigkeit von Beschlussen der Hauptversammlungen von Kapitalgesellschaften).80  Even
if in recent times German case-law has shifted from a general mistrust to a more favorable approach
towards the arbitrability of these claims81, concerns still remain with regard to their effect vis à vis third
parties82.
 The formal requirements for the arbitration agreement laid down in art. 7 of the Model Law have been
further clarified in § 1031 (2) and (4) of the German arbitration law83.  These additional provisions
specify a number of  cases not expressly provided for in the Model Law, in which  the formality of an
arbitration  agreement  is  deemed  nonetheless  absolved.  In  particular,  an  arbitration  agreement
contained in a document transmitted from the other party to the other and not contested in due time is
regarded as valid, provided that this document is to be considered as part of the contract according to
trade  usages  (the  so-called  “half-written  form”)84.  Moreover,  it  is  envisaged  that  a  bill  of  lading
making reference to an arbitration agreement contained in a charter-party constitutes a valid arbitration
agreement.  Finally,  a  special  rule  on  the  formal  validity  of  arbitration  agreements  concerning
consumers has been introduced. This rule was introduced because,  contrary to the Model Law,  the
German  arbitration  law  applies  also  to  non-commercial  disputes  and  therefore  also  to  disputes
involving  consumers.  Accordingly,  §  1031(5)  deals  with  the  formal  validity  of  the  arbitration
the payment of damages will be arbitrable as long as the existence of a lease contract is not in dispute. R. Trittmann and I.
Hanefeld,  Commentary on § 1030, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The
Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 122 and 125
80P. Schlosser, Bald neues Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland?, cit, p.  725
81V. Sangiovanni, La Compromettibilità in Arbitri nel Diritto Tedesco, Rivista dell’Arbitrato, 2006, XVI, 1, p. 229
82Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996, p. 35.  In particular, German law (par. 248.1 AktG) provides that
where a judgement declares the nullity of a general meeting decision, this judgement shall display its effect with respect to
all other shareholders, as well as the executive board and supervisory board members, even if they did not take part to the
process. The issue here arises whether this extension of the effects of the judgement to third parties may find application
also in the arbitral process.  The prevalent doctrine maintains that the arbitral award displays its effects not only with respect
to those who take part to the process, but also those who, although not taking part to it, were invited to do so. Moreover,
according to a well-known decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH, 29.3.1996 – II ZR 124/95, NJW 1996, p. 1753 ff.)
, claims challenging shareholder's resolutions are considered arbitrable, as long as the arbitration agreement provides for
inclusion of all shareholders in the arbitration procedure, and for all shareholders and the claimant to have equal rights in
composing the arbitral tribunal.  Accordingly, the arbitration agreement must be drafted in such a way as to reflect  the
possibility of giving rise to a multi-party arbitration enabling each party to influence the selection of the arbitrator and
ensuring that the binding effect of the award extends to all shareholders and to the company itself.  V. Sangiovanni,  La
Compromettibilità in Arbitri nel Diritto Tedesco, cit, p. 232; H. Raeschke-Kessler, The New German Arbitration Act v. Old
German Case law: Which Case Law of the of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) is to be Applied to
the New Act?, Arb Int, 1998,141, p. 53; R. Trittmann and I. Hanefeld, Commentary on § 1030, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M.
Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 121
83K. H. Böckstiegel, An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act, cit, p.  23
84For example, arbitration agreements concluded orally and later confirmed by one party in a confirmation letter, not simply
an invoice, will fulfill the form requirement. Cp. OLG Hamburg, 14.05.1999, OLGR 2000, p. 19; 
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agreement concluded by a consumer. In this case,  the arbitration agreement must be contained in a
document which is separate from the main contract and no other agreements other than those referring
to the arbitral proceedings may be contained in this document. Only if a contract is concluded before a
public notary, no separate document is required for the arbitration agreement.
In  contrast to the Model Law, the new German arbitration law has provided in § 1057 a provision
imposing on the arbitral tribunal to decide in its award on the costs and legal fees. This rule is very
important for the smooth progress of the arbitration, as party agreements on this issue are frequently
missing in practice85.
Finally, the new German arbitration act has provided a number of additional provisions regarding the
competence of the courts before,  during and after the arbitration. Also these rules comply with the
user's friendliness guideline and thus they do not affect the basic approach of the Model Law towards
court intervention in the arbitral proceedings. Sec. 1026 reiterates art. 5 of the Model Law, which lays
down the basic principle of court  intervention: no court  shall  intervene in the arbitral  proceedings,
except in the cases expressly provided for in the law. The German arbitration law envisages  three
additional  provisions regulating the scope of court  intervention prior  to  the  commencement  of  the
proceedings. Sec. 1025 (3) provides that German courts may  hear motions relating to the composition
of the arbitral tribunal or the rejection or replacement of arbitrators, if the claimant or respondent has
his seat or habitual residence in Germany. This provision has been introduced in oder to overcome a
major  inconvenient  stemming  from  the  territoriality  principle,  namely  the  case  where,  before  the
beginning of the proceedings, the parties have not fixed yet the seat of arbitration. Accordingly, absent
this provision, German courts would deny their competence to hear motions for the appointment of
arbitrators, since the territoriality principle requires the seat to be fixed in that country. Yet, the rule
envisaged by § 1025 (3) does not solve the problem in cases where,  prior to the beginning of the
arbitration, a party wishes to apply to German courts, but it has not his seat or habitual residence in
Germany.  The  second  additional  provision  concerning  the  court's  powers  before  the  beginning  of
arbitration is § 1032 (2), which provides that the courts are competent to determine the admissibility or
non-admissibility of the arbitration. However, parties may apply to the court for this determination only
before  the constitution of  the arbitral  tribunal.  Finally,  §  1034 (2)  lays  down another  special  rule
concerning  the  appointment  of  the  arbitrators.  It  provides  that  if  the  arbitration  agreement  grants
preponderant rights to one party with respect to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, which place the
85K.  P.  Berger,  Drafting  History  and  Principal  Features  of  the  New  German  Arbitration  Law,  cit.,  p.  49-50;  K.  H.
Böckstiegel, An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act, cit, p. 28
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other one at a disadvantage, the latter party may apply to the court to have the arbitrators appointed by
the judge, in deviation from the procedure envisaged in the arbitration agreement. This new rule is in
line with the general tendency to maintain as much as possible the validity of the arbitration agreement.
An arbitration agreement posing one party at a disadvantage has been sometimes considered by courts
as null on grounds of public policy86.  The German drafters believed that it  would be closer  to the
intention of the parties to uphold their referral to arbitration by eliminating the disadvantage concerning
the appointment of the arbitrators87. Examples in which German case-law has found such disadvantage
include cases where one party has the right to nominate the sole arbitrator or the chairman and the
passing of the right of nomination of an arbitrator to the other party following failure by one party to
nominate  an  arbitrator  within  the  time allowed88.  Moreover,  as  we  will  see  in  more  detail  in  the
following paragraphs,  this  provision may be  relied  on in  multi-party  arbitrations  when  parties  are
unable to agree on the appointment of one or more arbitrators. 
The most important provision regarding the power of the courts during arbitral proceedings concerns
the enforcement of interim measures. According to the old German arbitration law, arbitral tribunals
were prevented from issuing interim measures. Now the new law complies with art. 17 of the Model
Law and,  under § 1041 (1), authorises the arbitral tribunal to issue interim measures. Accordingly,
German arbitration law provides for concurrent jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and courts for granting
interim relief: unless otherwise agreed by the parties89, an application for an interim measure may be
submitted to both a state court and an arbitral tribunal90. Sec. 1041 (2) goes beyond the Model Law and
86Cfr Cour de Cassation, Sociétés BKMI et Siemens v. Société Dutco, in Rev. de l'Arb., 1992, pp. 470 et seq.
87K. H. Böckstiegel, An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act, cit, p. 25
88Cfr  P.  Nacimiento  and  A.  Abt,  Commentary  on  §  1034,  in   K.  H.  Böckstiegel,  S.M.  Kroll,  P.  Nacimiento  (eds)  ,
Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 185
89Whereas section 1041 expressly states that the parties may contract out the possibility for the arbitral tribunal to grant
interim measures, the  question whether parties can opt out of access to court for interim relief is highly disputed. The
Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht – OLG) of Munich has excluded the possibility of opting out of court ordered
interim relief (OLG München 26.10.2000, NJW- RR 2001, 711). Whereas some commentators support this view, others
argue in favour of the enforcement of an opt-out agreement. A more nuanced view reads that the opt-out agreement may be
recognised only until the arbitral tribunal has been constituted.  Another position is that, in order for state court's interim
protection to be excluded, the agreement must provide for an alternative institution available to grant interim relief (e.g. The
ICC Pre Arbitral Referee Procedure). Cfr R. Kreindler and J. Schafer, Commentary on § 1033, in   K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M.
Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 159-160
90The wording of § 1041(1),  which provides the arbitral tribunal  with  the power  of ordering such interim measures of
protection as it may consider necessary in respect  of the subject-matter of the dispute, entails a wide margin of discretion
upon the arbitral tribunal. This stands in contrast with the narrower power  State courts enjoy in assessing claims for interim
relief. Under the procedure applicable in the German courts, the judge must order an interim measure once the prescribed
conditions for such measures are fulfilled and thus cannot evaluate further its necessity with reference to the subject-matter
of the dispute. On the other hand, the court has the discretion to decide whether to grant enforcement of an arbitral tribunal-
granted interim measure.  However,  given the above mentioned discretion of the arbitral tribunal to order interim relief,
German courts  have  in practice refrained  from reviewing  on the  merits  the measures  ordered by the arbitral  tribunal.
Nevertheless, according to legal scholars,  the court is  entitled to review the interim measure according to its conformity to
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provides that a party may request the court to enforce interim measures issued by the arbitral tribunal
and the court, in turn, can admit execution, unless the same party has already applied for such a relief to
a  local  court91.  This  latter  rule  strengthens  the  authority  of  the  arbitral  tribunal,  because  in  many
jurisdictions, if permitted, interim measures by arbitral tribunals are not covered by an enforcement
sanction92.  Yet, under the new German arbitration law, interim measures do not constitute enforceable
awards,  nor are they equated with arbitral awards. In regulating the enforcement of interim measures,
the new German arbitration law has envisaged a special  enforcement  regime for interim measures,
which confers to the enforcing court a certain degree of discretion93.  According to par 2 of § 1041 of
the German arbitration law, a court may recast an interim measure of protection issued by the arbitral
tribunal, if this is necessary for the purpose of enforcing the measure. This provision enables the court
to  reconcile  the  extreme  flexibility  arbitrators  may  have  in  ordering  interim  relief  and  the  often
exhaustive  and  limited  list  of  interim  measures  available  under  national  procedural  law94.   The
following paragraphs of § 1041 provide the court with further  powers aimed at modifying or restricting
the effects of an interim measure ordered by the arbitral tribunal. Par. 3 states that the court may upon
request  repeal  or amend an interim measure95,  whereas  par.  4 provides  that  if  the interim measure
proves  to  be  unjustified  from  the  outset,  the  party  who  obtained  its  enforcement  is  obliged  to
compensate the other party for the damage resulting from the enforcement of such a measure.  Finally,
it should be noted that, since the German arbitration law is based on the principle of territoriality, the
enforcement regime of interim measures envisaged therein is applicable only within the territory of
Germany, i.e. to the enforcement in Germany of interim measures granted by arbitral tribunals sitting in
Germany96. On the other hand, the enforcement of interim measures abroad, as well as the enforcement
in Germany of interim measures issued by arbitral tribunals sitting in another country, are not covered
by the New York Convention.  As we have seen, under the New York Convention interim measures
ordre public. 
91Accordingly, this provision confers upon the competent court ( ex § 1062.1, the Higher Regional Court designated in the
arbitration agreement  or located in the district  where the arbitration has its seat)  the task of solving possible  conflicts
between interim relief ordered by a State court and similar measures issued by arbitral tribunals 
92K. H. Böckstiegel, An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act, cit, p. 25. 
93K. P. Berger, The New German Arbitration Law in International Perspective, cit, p. 11
94ibidem
95This will  essentially occur in cases where it is necessary to convert  a measure issued by an arbitral tribunal into one
enforceable under German law (cp. OLG Karlsruhe 19.12.1994, ZZP Int 1996, p. 91) or a party alleges a change of the
circumstances on which the granting of the interim measure was grounded ( cp.  OLG Jena 24.11.1999, BB 2000, Beilage
no 12, p. 22).
96ibidem
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issued by an arbitral tribunal are not considered as enforceable, since by their very nature they do not
constitute  final and enforceable awards.
Art. 6 of the Model Law is an open-ended provision, through which each enacting state should specify
the court competent to perform functions referred to the courts in other articles of the Model Law. The
new German arbitration law entrusts the Court of  Appeal with the primary competence to hear all
motions related to arbitration and in particular on the following matters: appointment and challenge of
arbitrators, statement of the admissibility or inadmissibility of arbitral proceedings, determination of
the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction, enforcement and modification of interim measures ordered by the
arbitral tribunal, setting aside and enforcement of the award. These decisions are final and may not be
appealed before the Supreme Court, except for decisions concerning the arbitrator's competence and
the setting aside and enforcement procedures97. Therefore, the discipline of the proceedings before state
courts goes in the direction of a simplification and speeding up of court procedures in this context98: it
is hoped that this will reduce the amount of time and money the parties have to spend in German
courts99. In addition, it is expected that the concentration of jurisdiction into a small number of higher
level courts100 will foster the rapid formation of  expertise and of a significant body of case-law on
arbitration101. 
Unsettled issues
As we have repeatedly said, in order not to undermine the success of the reform, the German legislator
decided to leave aside from the scope of the new law those controversial issues on which no uniform
solution could be found. In  this paragraph two of the most disputed issues which could not find a
regulatory solution in German arbitration law will be discussed: set-offs and multi-party arbitrations.
97Under the old arbitration law,  judicial decisions on arbitration matters  were taken by the district court;  they could be
appealed to the competent Court of Appeal and its decisions could in turn be brought before the Supreme Court. Now the
much criticized instances of appeal have been finally replaced by a sole one: from the Court of Appeal under very restrictive
conditions to the Supreme Court.
98K. H. Böckstiegel, An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act, cit, p. 29
99K. P. Berger, Drafting History and Principal Features of the New German Arbitration Law, cit, p. 51
100This tendency is also exemplified by section 1062 (5), which authorises those federal states with more than one Court of
Appeal to confer jurisdiction with respect to all arbitral matters to just one court.
101O. Sandrock, Procedural Aspects of the New German Arbitration Act, cit p. 45; K. H. Böckstiegel, An Introduction to the
New German Arbitration Act, cit, p. 29; K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration in Germany: a New Era, cit, p.
113
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Set-off
The admissibility and reach of set-off is one of the most disputed issues in international arbitration,
since it calls into question one of its fundamental principles, namely the will of the parties. Set-off is a
particular  form of  counterclaim whereby defendant  does not object  to the existence  of  plaintiff's
claim, but rather alleges that it has been extinguished or reduced through an opposite claim he has
against plaintiff102. The rules of the most important arbitral institutions  admit that set-off falls within
the scope of the arbitration agreement103. This follows from the basic principle that arbitral jurisdiction
is based on the will of the parties and that the arbitral tribunal may decide only on the issues which fall
under the scope of the arbitration agreement104. Accordingly, this is also the position of most German
commentators,  who recognise  set-off  only in  so  far  as  it  falls  within  the  scope  of  the  arbitration
agreement; if the claim or counterclaim relied upon for set-off exceeds the scope of the arbitration
agreement, such claim may only be  relied upon if the other party does not object to the tribunal's
jurisdiction105.  But  opinions  diverge  in cases  where set-off  stems from a relationship which is  not
covered  by  the  arbitration  agreement.  Most  scholars  argue  that,  since  the  arbitral  jurisdiction  is
founded  on the will  of  the parties,  the arbitral  tribunal  is  prevented  from deciding over  claims or
counterclaims  not  subject  to  the  arbitration  agreement.  On  the  other  hand,  others  argue  that  the
principle of the will of the parties implies that, when the parties agree to submit the decision of their
dispute to an arbitral tribunal, the latter has to decide on all defences raised against the main claim106.
102V. Pavic, Counterclaim and  Set-off in International Commercial Arbitration,  Annals International Edition, 2006, p. 103
available  at   SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015713  .  See  also  definition  provided  in  Black's  Law  Dictionary:  <<a
counter-claim demand which defendant holds against plaintiff, arising out of a transaction extrinsic of plaintiff's cause of
action>>. Although in the common law a distinction between a set-off and a counterclaim is often made, in arbitration
practice it is virtually unknown: as Berger notes, set-off and counterclaim are only a hair breadth's away in international
commercial  arbitration,  since  they are  often based on similar  factual  background  (reciprocal  debts  of  the  parties),  the
motivation and goals of their use is similar and they often result in similar decisions.
103Cp. e.g. Art 3(2) International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association; art 7a Rules of Arbitration and
Conciliation of the Vienna Arbitration Centre; art 25(2) Arbitration Rules of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute; art 19(3)
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. This requirement is however subject to a broad interpretation: it is generally argued that if
the set-off is in relation to the same contract which contains the arbitration clause, or a contract with a sufficiently close
connection to the main contract  and the clause covers all disputes arising under or in connection with the main contract,
then the arbitral tribunal may well have jurisdiction to consider the claim. Cfr A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice
of International commercial Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, 1991, p. 319
104V. Pavic, Counterclaim and  Set-off in International Commercial Arbitration, cit.,  p.105
105K. Sachs and T. Lörcher, Commentary on § 1046, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in
Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 316 and bibliography quoted therein. 
271
This is the rationale underlying art. 21(5) of the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration107, according
to which the arbitral tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear a set-off defence even when the relationship
out of which this defence is said to arise is not within the scope of the arbitration clause, or is the object
of another arbitration agreement or forum selection clause. A mid-ground position admits set-off not
covered by the arbitration agreement only where certain conditions are met, namely the counterclaim is
undisputed  because  it  has  already  been  adjudicated,  or  the  party  against  whom it  is  opposed  has
acknowledged the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction, or the parties have submitted to a set of regulations of
an arbitral institution providing for an extension of jurisdiction108. In such cases it is argued that the
parties  have,  at  least  implicitly,  agreed on the arbitral  tribunal's  jurisdiction to  decide over  set-off
falling outside the arbitration agreement  and therefore reasons of  justice  and procedural  efficiency
should prevail. Set-off may be relevant not only during arbitration proceedings, but also after an award
has been rendered and enforcement is sought. In this case it may happen that a party raises  set-off as a
ground for refusing enforcement. The extent to which substantive defences such set-off, in addition to
those defences listed in § 1059 ZPO, may be raised as a defence in the proceedings for the declaration
of enforceability of the award,  is  controversial109.  Relying on grounds of procedural  efficiency,  the
prevailing view is that such defence, which may be the object of a separate proceeding against the title
of  enforcement  under  §  767 ZPO,  can  already  be  relied  on  in  the  proceedings  to  have  an  award
declared enforceable. However, unlike the defences in § 1059, they do not lead to the setting aside of
the award, but merely prevent the declaration of enforceability110. It is argued that it would  run counter
to the principle of  venire contra factum proprium,  or  at  least  procedural  efficiency,  if  state  courts
should first declare an award enforceable and later deny its execution for reasons already existing at the
time when the award was declared enforceable111. On the other hand, it is observed that this view would
run against the purpose of the proceedings for the declaration of enforceability, which are aimed at
106C. Benedict, Construction Arbitration in Germany, in  K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in
Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 915
107In order to promote international arbitration in Switzerland and to harmonise existing rules of arbitration, in 1994 the
Chambers of Commerce of Basel,  Bern, Geneva, Ticino, Vaud and Zurich have adopted uniform rules of international
arbitration proceedings which replace the Chambers' former rules  and are largely based on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
108Cfr P. Schlosser,  Das Recht des internationalen privaten Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Mohr Siebek Verlag, 1989, p. 301; H.
Raeschke-Kessler,  K.P. Berger,  Recht und Praxis des Schiedsverfahrens,  RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum, 1999, p.
169-170
109For the distinction between proceedings for the declaration of enforceability and enforcement proceedings in the proper
sense see supra, p. 263
110S. Kroll, Commentary on § 1060 , in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The
Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 501 
111S. Kroll, Commentary on § 1061 , in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The
Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 563
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facilitating the obtainment of this declaration. This purpose would be frustrated if, in addition to the
defences listed in art. V  of the New York Convention and §1059 (2) ZPO, material defences could be
raised requiring extensive evidence. Moreover, this would also run counter to the exhaustive character
of the list of defences which may be raised against recognition and enforcement of awards. That is why
some authors maintain that only set-off which is not contested or whose existence has already been
determined in a binding court judgement could be considered, for reason of procedural efficiency, in
proceedings for a declaration of enforceability112.  In any case, it  is agreed that only set-offs which
could not be raised during the arbitral proceedings may be raised at this stage. These are either defences
which only arose after the award was rendered (e.g. fulfilment of the award), or defences for which the
arbitral  tribunal  lacked  jurisdiction  (e.g.  set-off  against  a  claim  not  covered  by  the  arbitration
agreement).
Multi-party arbitrations
 The  lack of regulation,  both in the Model Law and in the German arbitration act,  of multi-party
arbitration issues  has been considered by German doctrine as a regrettable omission113.   Given the
widespread importance of this form of arbitration in international practice – it has been observed  - a
legislator  which is willing to issue a piece of legislation in line with the modern needs of practice,
should necessarily deal with these kinds of problems. Nonetheless, this omission is not without reason:
the drafters did not want to risk the success of the project by dealing in the law with one of the most
disputed issues of modern arbitration law and practice114. Therefore, in the wake of the principle of user
friendliness,  they decided  to  include  in  the  law only those  provisions  reflecting  internationally  or
nationally accepted standards.
Multi-party arbitrations concern disputes with more than two parties on claimant or respondent side. It
is  possible  to  distinguish two different  situations in  which  multi-party disputes  arise:  one is  when
claims are made by several claimants or against several respondents; the other stems from the so-called
112S. Kroll, Commentary on § 1061, cit, p. 564
113Cfr F. B. Weigand, The UNCITRAL Model Law, cit, p. 400; P. Schlosser, Bald neues Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in
Deutschland?, cit, p. 724
114K. P. Berger, The New German Arbitration Law in International Perspective, cit, p. 12
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string contracts,  that is a number of connected contracts generating a chain of connected claims115.
Despite this distinction, the issue related to multi-party disputes are very much the same. In particular,
the most controversial ones are the problem of the joinder of parties and the appointment of the arbitral
tribunal.
As far as the first issue is concerned, the question arises whether, in the absence of agreement of all the
parties potentially involved in the multi-party dispute, the arbitrator or the state court are entitled to
order  a  compulsory  consolidation  of  the  arbitrations.  If  on  the  one  hand  reasons  of  justice  and
procedural  efficiency  (namely,  avoiding  contradictory  decisions,  as  well  as  time  and  cost  saving)
support  the  need  for  a  consolidation  of  multi-party  disputes,  on  the  other  hand  this  may  often
undermine the  will of the parties:  it may well happen that the parties to the main arbitration do not
want other parties involved in “their” arbitration, or conversely that third parties do not want to join
other parties' arbitration. Consequently, arbitral tribunal often repeat that neither can they extend the
effect  of  an  arbitration  agreement  to  third  parties116,  nor  can  they  force   parties  to  an  arbitration
agreement to participate to an arbitration with third parties117.  Although there are some examples to the
contrary118, the general view in most jurisdictions is that neither the state court nor the arbitral tribunal
can order consolidation, lacking a specific agreement among all parties involved. An arbitral procedure
which is imposed upon parties can hardly be said to be in accordance with the agreement of the parties
and recognition and enforcement of an award made in such circumstances may be refused under the
provisions of the New York Convention and the Model Law119. This is also the unanimous position
which is found in German doctrine and case-law.120
115String contracts  are very frequent in the construction sector.  It happens very  often that,  within the framework of an
international construction project, the employer enters into a contract with the main contractor, who in turn has contracted
with various sub-contractors and suppliers.  If the employer has any complaints regarding the work done, he will arbitrate
against the main contractor. The latter, in turn, will then seek to recover from the sub-contractor or supplier concerned with
the defective work, by way of a separate arbitration. It is often considered that, in this situation, it would be better if all
parties involved in the string contracts could be brought into the same set of arbitral proceedings, so as to save time and
expenses and avoid the risk of inconsistent awards.  A. Redfern and M. Hunter,  The Law and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 184
116Cp. e.g. OIAETI v. Sofidif, Rev. Arb. 1987, p. 372
117Cp. e.g. CA Weadlands v CLCand others, 2 Lloyd's Rep. , 1999, p. 739
118Especially  in  the United  States,  some  state  courts  and  legislations  admit  the  possibility  of  a  judicially  consolidated
arbitration, also in the absence of a specific party agreement. This doctrine, which is founded on an analogical interpretation
of  the federal rules of civil procedure, has however been rejected by the Court of Appeals 2nd Cir. in 1993, although the
Supreme Court  has not yet had the chance to rule on this issue. Moreover, art 1046 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure
confers upon the President of the Amsterdam Tribunal of First Instance the power of consolidating two arbitral proceedings
having connected objects and both pending in Holland.  Cfr J. F. Poudret and S. Besson,  Droit Comparé de l'Arbitrage
International, Bruylant, 2002, p. 215-216
119A. Redfern and M. Hunter, The Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p. 186-7
120Cfr  P.  Nacimiento  and  A.  Abt,  Commentary  on §  1035 ,  in  K.  H.  Böckstiegel,  S.M.  Kroll,  P.  Nacimiento  (eds)  ,
Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit,   p. 203
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Similar  underlying  problems characterise  the issue of the appointment of  arbitrators  in multi-party
disputes  when the parties fail to reach an agreement. In this case we find a conflict between needs for
procedural efficiency and the need to respect the principle of equal treatment between the parties, in
particular the need to provide the same degree of influence for each party in appointing the arbitrators.
Where the arbitration agreement or the arbitral institution rules provide for the appointment of  a sole
arbitrator, the plurality of parties deemed to participate to his choice does not pose problems. In the
absence of an agreement among parties, the arbitrator will be designated by the arbitral institution or
the state court. But where,  as it  is now the established custom, a three-member arbitral  tribunal is
envisaged,  the  presence  of  a  plurality  of  parties  may  often  result  in  a  serious  obstacle  to  its
appointment. This happens especially where there are multiple parties only on one side (i.e. multiple
claimants vs one defendant, or multiple defendants vs one claimant) Sec. 1035 ZPO, which establishes
the appointment procedure in the absence of party agreement, is tailored only to the normal case of a
dispute between two parties. Its  application to multi-party disputes would entail that multiple parties
on one side of the dispute should jointly nominate one arbitrator. In case of non-agreement among the
parties combined on one side, the state court will nominate the missing arbitrator. By contrast, the other
side, consisting of only one party, will have no difficulty in nominating its own arbitrator, since it does
not have to reach an agreement with others. This situation has been considered by German case-law
and doctrine as an infringement of the principle of equal treatment between the parties, since it does not
provide each side of the dispute with the same influence on the composition of the arbitral tribunal121. It
is generally accepted that the solution whereby each party will nominate an arbitrator (one party/one
judge)   is  not  practicable  in  this  case,  first  because  the  arbitral  tribunal  may then  consist  of  an
undefined (and possibly too large) number of arbitrators122, secondly because the side consisting of
only one party would be under-represented123. The solution which is emerging in international practice
is that in the absence of an agreement among parties all the arbitrators should be appointed by the
arbitral institution or the state court124. This is for example the approach adopted by the ICC Rules: art.
10 (1) provides that multiple claimants and defendants first have the opportunity to propose jointly an
arbitrator (and this implies that each party gives up the right to nominate his own arbitrator); if they fail
to do so, the ICC will appoint each member of the arbitral tribunal and also designate one of them to
121BGH 03.07.1995, BGHZ 65,69; BGH 29.03.1996, NJW 1996, 1753
122A. Redfern and M. Hunter, The Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p.  188
123Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, 2001, Vol 3, § 1035, par 34
124J. F. Poudret and S. Besson, Droit Comparé de l'Arbitrage International, cit, p. 213-214
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act  as the chairman125.  A similar solution has been adopted in the revised Arbitration Rules of the
German Institution of Arbitration, which entered into force on July, 1, 1998126. Finally, this is also the
prevailing  opinion  followed  by  German  courts127.  This  opinion  is  founded  on  an  analogical
intepretation  of  §  1034(2)  ZPO,  which,  as  we  have  already  seen,  provides  that  if  the  arbitration
agreement  grants  preponderant  rights  to  one  party  with  respect  to  the  composition  of  the  arbitral
tribunal, which place the other one at a disadvantage, the latter party may apply to the court to have the
arbitrators  appointed  by  the  judge,  in  deviation  from  the  procedure  envisaged  in  the  arbitration
agreement. On this reading, the possibility of deviating from the arbitration agreement would allow for
the appointment of  the whole arbitral  tribunal  by the court,  including the chairman.  The rationale
underlying this solution is that in multi-party disputes it is impossible to guarantee the same degree of
influence  for  each  of  the  parties  on  the  appointment  of  the  arbitrators.  Consequently,  procedural
efficiency and the need to avoid deadlocks in arbitral proceedings should prevail over the right of each
party to nominate its own arbitrator. Yet, this view has also been subjected to criticism, since it risks
undermining one of the most important advantages of arbitration with respect to litigation128  One of the
main reason why parties decide to resort to arbitration is arguably the possibility of influencing the
constitution of the tribunal by nominating their own arbitrator; consequently, it is hard to justify why a
party should give up his right  to appoint  his own arbitrator  just because there are multiple parties
involved on the other side. 
Ten years after: is the inferiority complex overcome?
125A similar  provision is  found  in the most  important  arbitral institutions'  regulations:  cfr  e.g.  Arbitration Rules  of the
London Court of International Arbitration art 8;  Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association art 6.5, Swiss
Rules art. 8.
126According to sec. 13(2) of the DIS Arbitration Rules, if the parties cannot agree on the nomination of the two party-
nominated  arbitrators,  these  are  nominated  by  the  arbitral  institution.  Once  they  are  appointed  by  the  DIS,  the  two
arbitrators will in turn nominate the chairman. The solution provided by the DIS Rules slightly differs from that adopted by
the ICC and LCIA Arbitration Rules, according to which, if the parties cannot agree on the nomination of the tribunal in
multi-party situations, the whole tribunal and not only the two party-nominated arbitrators shall be appointed by the arbitral
institution. Cp. K. P. Berger, The New German Arbitration Law in International Perspective, cit, p. 12
127BGH 29.03.1996, NJW 1996, 1753: OLG Frankfurt 24.11.1995, SchiedsVZ 2006, 219
128J.G. Frick, Arbitration and Complex International Contracts, Kluwer, 2001, p. 233
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After ten years since the coming into force of the new German arbitration law, one may wonder if the
strenuous effort carried out by German lawyers to overcome their homeland's “inferiority” vis à vis
arbitration has proved successful. The image of the half-empty, half-full glass illustrates well the case.
Confidentiality in arbitration is a serious hurdle in the study of this subject-matter. As a large part of
awards is unpublished, there are only limited empirical data available and thus it is difficult to draw a
complete picture of the phenomenon. The only statistics available on German arbitration are those
published in the ICC and the DIS reports.  The ICC statistics undoubtedly show not only a constant
increase  of  arbitrations  taking place  in  Germany (which,  as  we have  repeatedly seen,  is  the most
important goal of the 1998 reform), but also an increase of German arbitrators and parties. In the period
1992-1997 the number of German arbitrators, German parties and places of arbitration in Germany was
52, 80 and 10 respectively. In the period 1998-2003 (that is, soon after the coming into force of the
1998 reform) these figures have raised to 76, 115 and 21 respectively129. Accordingly, data show that
the number of arbitrations taking place in Germany has doubled since the adoption of the new law. In
this respect, the 1998 reform can be  considered a success. But if on the other hand we compare these
data to the overall amount of arbitral disputes decided every year by the various arbitral institutions, we
must conclude that Germany still  holds a very small stake in the arbitration business, certainly not
mirroring its leading role in international trade. One can get the whole picture, by considering that more
than 500 new cases  are  decided under  the ICC auspices  every year  and that  the number of  cases
decided by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) increased from 54 cases in 1990
to 281 in 2005, whereas the number of CIETAC arbitrations increased from 238 in 1990 to 979 in
2005130.  Consequently,   with respect  to worldwide arbitration practice,  Germany's  “inferiority”  still
remains,  even  if  the  relatively  steep  increase  in  ICC  arbitrations  taking  place  in  Germany  looks
promising. If we look at the statistics provided by the DIS, which mainly regard domestic arbitration131,
we find an even more significant increase in arbitration practice. From its creation in 1992, the number
of cases decided under the DIS auspices has increased from 20 in 1992 to over 40 in 1997 (with a total
129Data  quoted  in  D.  Kuhner,  ICC  Arbitration  in  Germany,  in  K.  H.  Böckstiegel,  S.M.  Kroll,  P.  Nacimiento  (eds)  ,
Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 839. For the next 6-year period, data are available only for the
years 2004 and 2005: the number of German arbitrators has so far been 74, that of German parties 114 and arbitrations
taking place in Germany have been 17. 
130These data are quoted in C. N. Brower, W(h)ither International Commercial Arbitration? The Goff Lecture 2007, Arb Int,
2008, 24, 2, p. 181-182 
131According to the DIS statistics, only 25-30 percent of the cases involve non-German parties. J. Bredow and I. Mulder,
Introduction to the DIS, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in
Practice, cit, p. 659
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value of approximately EUR 46 million) and to 74 in 2006 (with a total value of EUR 500 million)132.
Accordingly,  after  the  coming  into  force  of  the  1998  reform,  the  number  of  DIS  arbitrations  is
increased nearly for times and their total value has increased of more than ten times. If we also add that
Germany, given the high number of German parties involved, appears now as one of the main user of
ICC arbitration in Europe133, we can argue that the commitment of German lawyers in promoting the
practice of arbitration has not been in vain, but has produced a sort of side-effect: far from promoting
Germany as a venue for international arbitration, their effort has been crucial in the diffusion of an
arbitration  culture  among  German  companies  and  businessmen,  which  now  consider  resort  to
arbitration as the preferred means for the settlement of their disputes.
132Data quoted in in K. H. Böckstiegel,  S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento,  Germany as a Place for International and Domestic
Arbitrations – General Overview, in ID (eds), Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice, cit, p .6
133D. Kuhner, ICC Arbitration in Germany, in K. H. Böckstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento (eds) , Arbitration in Germany:
The Model Law in Practice, cit, p. 838
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SECTION IV: THE RECEPTION OF THE MODEL LAW IN ENGLAND AND
SCOTLAND
The development of English arbitration legislation
The “symbiotic relationship” between the commercial bar and the English arbitration
community
 The large extent of court supervision over the arbitration process has been for many centuries the
distinctive feature of English arbitration law. One cannot understand this   particular aspect without
taking into account  the “symbiotic relationship” among the commercial bar, the London Commercial
Court and the arbitration community which has been crucial in the development of English arbitration
and commercial law.  London’s commercial bar represented – and to a large extent still  represents
today - a small community within the barristers’ elite: it comprises less than 10 percent – some 550 out
of 6,500- of the bar in general1.  Nonetheless, it has until recently laid at the heart of the development
of English business law. The commercial bar has provided the largest number of leading figures within
commercial judges and arbitrators. For example, from the commercial chambers came Justice Michael
Mustill, now Lord Mustill of the House of Lords; sir Michael Kerr, formerly judge to the Court of
Appeal, then president of the London Court of International Arbitration; sir Johan Steyn, former judge
of the Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal and president of the DAC  (Departmental Advisory
Committee, on which see below) and sir Anthony Evans, chief Justice of the Commercial Court.2  All
these commercial judges became also key figures in the London arbitration community in the 1980s
and 1990s3. 
1Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 130
2Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, pp. 131-132
3Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p.  132
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Within the framework of this “symbiotic relationship”, resolution of arbitral disputes occurred largely
under the supervision of the commercial bar and the Commercial Court. The routine administration of
commercial disputes was run by non-legal professionals highly knowledgeable of  a particular trade
sector  (shipping,  construction,  insurance),  but  commercial  barristers  reserved the right  to intervene
whenever a serious legal question was raised4. Accordingly, they acted as “double agents”, serving the
interests of the merchants who retained their services and their own interests as lawyers5. On the one
hand, they assured diffusion of flexible rules for the conduct of business ( e.g. standard contract terms,
“English style “ arbitration rules), on the other hand they contributed to the selection of a small number
of  troubling  legal  issues  which  deserved  to  be  decided  by  professional  lawyers  (namely,  the
commercial  barristers  and  the  Commercial  Court's  judges),  because  they  could  contribute  to  the
enrichment and renovation of commercial caselaw. It comes thus as no surprise that in the 1970s it was
estimated that roughly 40-50 percent of the cases decided by the Commercial Court was represented by
arbitration appeals6.
The earlier legislation
The development of English arbitration law has always been centered on the relationship between the
court and the arbitration process. Starting from 1698 a number of Acts of Parliament have attempted to
solve  what  was  felt  as  one  of  the  major  drawbacks  of  arbitration:  the  non-enforceability  of  the
arbitration  agreement7.   The  1698  Statute8  enabled  a  party  to  an  arbitration  to  enforce  a  written
arbitration agreement  by an action of contempt of court.  This was possible by means of a fiction,
whereby the  agreement to arbitrate was treated as though the reference to arbitration had been made
not by the parties themselves, but by the court under its power to let issues of fact arising in a pending
civil action be decided by a referee rather than by a jury9. The result was that the court could apply to
4Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, pp.  198-199
5Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p.  119
6Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p.  131
7
 Cfr L. Mustill and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, vol II, Butterworths, 2001, p. 4; A. Tweeddale and K. Tweeddale,
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 482
8
 9 & 10 Will 3 c. 15
9L. Mustill and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, vol II, cit, p. 5
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the recalcitrant party to an arbitration the same penalties which could be imposed on a litigant who
failed to co-operate in an order issued by the court10. However, this fiction implied a large degree of
court supervision over the arbitration process. It was natural for the court to consider such reference to
arbitration as though it had stemmed from a real  reference in a pending action and accordingly to
impose on the arbitral process the same orders as though the fiction had been true. So, the court could
not be expected to enforce an award containing manifest errors of law appearing on the face of the
award itself; by the same token, the court would set aside an award which was the result of procedural
unfairness, since the mandate of the arbitrator, like that of the referee, was to reach a conclusion by fair
means.  These  powers  of  review  seriously  undermined  the  practical  importance  of  the  arbitration
process, since it could frequently happen that a minor procedural error or any conflict on a question of
law could result in the complete annulment of the award. Accordingly, the Common Law Procedure
Act 1854 established a framework within which the court's power of review could be exercised. In
particular, judicial control over arbitration proceedings was channelled into two forms of review: the
so-called special case procedure and the power to set aside the award for errors appearing on the face of
the award itself.  The first was a special form of appeal, whereby the parties could ask the arbitral
tribunal  to  submit  to  the  court's  decision  any  question  of  law  arising  out  the  award;  the  second
empowered the court to set aside an award if it appeared from the award itself that the arbitral tribunal
had reached some erroneous conclusions of  fact or law11. Despite these amendments, the tight control
of the court on the arbitration process remained. First, the court had the power to intervene, by orders to
set aside or remit the award, in case of procedural misconduct or error. Secondly,  the parties had a
substantially  unrestricted  right  of  appeal  to  the  High  Court  on questions  of  law arising out  of  an
arbitration  award.12 As a  result,  in  order  to  escape  the  strict  judicial  review,  English  practice  had
developed some devices which undermined arbitration as a rational and effective dispute resolution
process.  For example, in order to avoid that any prima facie error might lead to the annulment of the
award  by the  court,   arbitral  tribunals  frequently   made  two alternative  awards  premised  on  two
opposing views of the law, from which the court could choose according to its opinion on the law13,, or
even declined to give reasons for their decisions and therefore rendered unmotivated awards14.  The
10ibidem
11D. St. J. Sutton  and J. Gill, Russel on Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, 2003, p  19 
12Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? The Response of the Departmental Advisory Committee to
the UNCITRAL Model Law, Arb Int, 1990, 6, 1, p. 8
13L. Mustill and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, vol II, cit, p. 6
14D. St. J. Sutton  and J. Gill, Russel on Arbitration, cit., p. 20; B. Zuffi, L'Arbitrato nel Diritto Inglese, Giappichelli, 2008,
p. 15
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tight judicial control was criticised as being not in line with the concept of arbitration itself. Arbitration,
it  was  said,  is  a  consensual  process  chosen  by  the  parties  precisely  because  they  wish  to  avoid
litigation15.  Consequently, a “minimalist” approach to court intervention was required, limited to the
bare minimum extent necessary to ensure that the arbitration agreement and any resulting award could
be enforced.16
The 1979 reform
 The very close partnership among the commercial bar, arbitration networks and the commercial court
has remained crucial to the development of  arbitration law until the 1970s, when the system had to
confront  with  an  unprecedented  crisis.  The  steep  increase  of  international  trade  had  caused  an
expansion of the arbitration market, which had in turn led to a flood of appeals to the Commercial
Courts  which  was  hard  to  handle17.  In  addition,  American  law-firms,  which  now  dominated  the
arbitration market, started calling into question the excessive involvement of the courts in the English
arbitration  system.  Accordingly,  they  increasingly  preferred  resort  to  ICC  arbitration  in  Paris  or
Switzerland, where they were less likely to get tied up in the courts and thus could provide their clients
with a quicker enforceable decision of their dispute18. As a leading arbitrator has said, referring to the
practice  of  international  arbitration  in  the  1970s,  “no  one  but  an  Englishman  would  recommend
London as a place of international arbitration” 19 . In this new context, a new generation of arbitrators,
made up in part of solicitors,  began to support the dominating ICC-style arbitration partly because of
their cosmopolitan background and partly because, as solicitors, they were given the opportunity to
handle an arbitration from start to finish independently of the barristers' intervention. This has in turn
undermined  the barristers’  dominant  role  in  developing commercial  law20.  This  new generation of
arbitrators,  supported  by  an  avant-garde  of   members  of  the  House  of  Lords  with  a  similar
15Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 9
16Ibidem; L. Mustill and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, vol II, cit, p. 6
17Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p.  134
18Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p. 135
19Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p. 129.This statement is confirmed by the fact that throughout the 1970s
the ICC had refused to designate London as the site of an arbitration unless the parties had specifically designated this city
as the place of arbitration.
20Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p.  144
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cosmopolitan background21, formed a sort of internationalist community within the commercial bar,
which engaged in a reform campaign against excessive control of the courts over arbitration22. In 1979
this avant-garde succeeded in passing a bill for the reform of the arbitration law, which only partly
remedied the flaws in the system. The key feature of this reform was the  abolition of the special case
procedure and the introduction of a general right of appeal to the High Court, confined to questions of
law only, therefore leaving decisions on questions of fact to the exclusive determination of the arbitral
tribunal23. This reform was prompted by the concerns that the unrestricted right to enact the special case
procedure  represented  a  considerable  disincentive  towards  choosing  England  as  a  forum  for
international commercial arbitration. By contrast, it was argued that the special case procedure was
vital  to  the  ability  of  the  Commercial  Court  to  ensure  the  continued  development  of  English
commercial law and thus the pre-eminence of English law in international commerce. The provision of
a general procedure of appeal on a point of law found in the 1979 Act attempted to strike a balance
between those views: the parties could, as a general rule, exclude the possibility of an appeal on  a
question of law except from certain categories of contracts (the so-called special categories: shipping,
commodity, and insurance contracts) which provided for arbitration in London and were accordingly
vital to the flow of cases to the Commercial Court and to the maintenance of the symbiotic relationship
among barristers, courts and arbitration which has been described above24. 
In addition, this enlightened elite managed to confine the right of appeal into very narrow limits. In a
series of judgments in the early 1980s, the House of Lords cut down dramatically the opportunities for
appeal to the courts25. Finally, the cosmopolitan elite secured close ties with the ICC and  various other
international bodies26. For example the LCIA and ICC frequently participated together in conferences;
the ICC committee in London was chaired by sir Michael Kerr of the LCIA; Karl Heinz Bockstiegel,
one of the best known arbitrators of the ICC, succeeded sir Michael Kerr as president of the LCIA.
21For example, to this  group belonged Lord Wilberforce, a cosmopolitan with a French wife  (the daughter of a French
judge), who served as an arbitrator in the ICC already in the early 1970s; Lord Mustill who speaks fluent French and wrote
the early drafts of his well-known treatise on arbitration while he was in France; sir Michael Kerr, who was a German
immigrant and is fluent in French as well.
22Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p. 137
23D. St. J. Sutton  and J. Gill, Russel on Arbitration, cit., p. 20
24Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p.  137
25Cfr e.g.  BTP Dioxide Ltd v. Pioneer Shipping Ltd, the Nema, Lloyd's Rep., 1981, 2,  239, in which the House of Lord
introduced additional  limitations  for the granting of a  leave to  appeal  with  respect  to  that  envisaged  in the 1979 Act.
According to the House of Lord,  not any question of law arising out of an arbitral award  substantially affecting the rights
of the parties can be the object of a leave to appeal by a court: in addition to this requirement it is also necessary that the
court believes that decision of the arbitral tribunal is obviously wrong and that the question of law is one of general public
importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt. These requirements have been subsequently
embodied in section 69(3)(c) of the 1996 Arbitration act.
26Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p. 139
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Since 1985, the LCIA started publishing the journal Arbitration International, which is edited by one of
the leading ICC arbitrators of the new generation, Jan Paulsson, and  has contributed to the integration
of London in the international community. This approach turned out to be successful, since it changed
the attitude of the international arbitral community vis à vis English arbitration  By means of these
reforms, England succeeded in putting an end to the “ICC-boycott”,  so that  London is now third, after
Paris and Geneva, among the cities selected by the ICC for arbitrations where the parties have not
selected a site27. All that notwithstanding, it was still possible to identify, within the commercial bar, a
conflict between the “traditionalists” and the “internationalists”28:  the former were convinced that the
strength of English arbitration relied just on this special relationship among the bar, the commercial
court and the arbitration community; the latter  worried little about the need for courts to supervise
private  justice  and    fostered  the  elimination  of  the  special  treatment  of  shipping,  insurance  and
commodities arbitrations. 
The legislative history of the Arbitration Act 1996
 
 The issue of court intervention in the arbitration process was again the main theme of the debate which
led to the latest reform of the English arbitration law in 1996.  This debate was heavily influenced by
the large attention the UNCITRAL Model Law was paid to in many countries. In the wake of this
success, many commentators took the view that the Model Law offered a simpler and more updated
approach to arbitration, without the delays and unnecessary court intervention mechanisms which were
prevalent in many common law jurisdictions29. Accordingly, in response to the growing interest in the
UNCITRAL  Model  Law  which  the  international  community  was  acknowledging,  the  English
government decided to set up a Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law (hereinafter
referred to as the DAC), whose main purpose was to advice on whether England should adopt the
UNCITRAL Model Law. In  June 1989 the DAC, which at that time was chaired by Lord Mustill,
issued its first report. After a rigorous and detailed analysis of the Model Law history, legal nature,
27ibidem
28Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue, cit, p. 141
29A. Tweeddale and K. Tweeddale, op. cit., p. 489
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international role, possible implementation options, as well as of its substantial rules, the Mustill report
strongly suggested  not  to  adopt  the  Model  Law.  Nonetheless,  it  advised  that  the  new Bill  should
comply with the Model Law's logical structure and language and that at the same time it should use it
as a yardstick by which to assess the quality of English arbitration law. This was clearly stated in the
most important part of the report – paragraph 108 – which laid down the principles on which the future
bill  should rely.  In  particular,  this paragraph envisaged  inter alia not only that the new act  should
comprise  a  statement  in  statutory  form  of  the  more  important  principles  of  the  English  law  of
arbitration,  statutory  and  (to  the  extent  practicable)  common law (sub-paragraph  1),  but  also  that
consideration should be given to ensuring that any such new statute should, so far as possible, have the
same structure and language as the Model Law, so as to enhance its acceptability to those  familiar with
the Model Law. Accordingly,  by recognising the importance of complying as far as possible to the
structure, language and spirit of the Model Law, the report seems to have relied on the same principles
of signalling effect, user- friendliness and arbitration friendliness which lied at the basis of the 1998
reform of the German arbitration law. 
The Mustill Report
If  this  was  the  most  important  indication  stemming from the  Report,  a  more  detailed  analysis  is
nonetheless worthwhile, since it provides a critical, and in many respects sceptical, approach to the
Model Law, which is rarely found in the literature. The scepticism towards the Model Law was evident
from the very beginning of the Report, where the legal nature of this harmonisation tool was analysed
with a clear view to emphasising its drawbacks. The first ground of scepticism was the non-binding
nature of the Model Law: since it had not been drafted in the form of an international convention, states
were under no treaty obligation to enact legislation in accordance with its terms.30  Accordingly, it was
not expected that all states, whatever the characteristics of their arbitration laws, necessarily found it
advantageous or even practicable to adopt the Model Law in its entirety31. The non-binding nature of
the Model law entailed also a lack of certainty as regards the function which this text was intended to
30Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 5
31Ibidem
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fulfil. According to one view, in order not to undermine its harmonisation purpose, the Model Law
should be implemented as a  whole, in relation to all  the aspects of international  arbitration falling
within its  scope.  Any substantial  divergence  from its  text  in  domestic  legislation  would affect  the
balance struck in the Model Law and reduce its value as a harmonisation instrument.32 According to
another view, states may implement the Model Law à la carte, by making use of its text as they may
think  fit  and  without  undermining  its  spirit  and  purpose.  Given  this  difference  of  approach  in
considering what action might be taken in relation to the Model Law, it was legitimate to take into
account the possibility of enacting only some of its articles, or enacting its text with modifications.  The
second ground of scepticism  concerned the Model Law's limited scope of application. First, it was
applicable only to international commercial arbitration and second, even within this scope there were
many aspects  which  were  not  regulated,  such as  the definition of  arbitration  itself,  as  well  as  its
international and commercial character, the powers, duties and liabilities of the arbitrator, the issues of
arbitrability,  multi-party  proceedings,  and  nullity  or  avoidance  of  the  arbitration  agreement33.  This
meant that the Model Law was not designed to achieve  full harmonisation, its aims being relatively
modest, and in the main directed to minimising the opportunities for intervention of the courts, leaving
ample room for diverging national procedures.34 The third ground was that, although English was the
primary drafting language, the Model Law had adopted a language as well as a number of drafting
techniques which differed from those generally practised in the United Kingdom. 
Despite the scepticism vis à vis the Model Law, the Mustill Report did not consider English arbitration
law as so self- evidently superior that it should be maintained in its present form at all costs35. Quite on
the contrary,  the Mustill report  severely criticised the extent of court supervision on the arbitration
process, which had become a matter of criticism both in England and abroad and had led to a wide
debate on the reform of English arbitration law36. This strong judicial control was not only against the
principle of party autonomy but also constituted a potential source of delay and extra expense, which
could be abused by an unscrupulous losing party37. But the most serious drawback of English statutory
32Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 6
33But  see  F.  Davidson,  International  Commercial  Arbitration  in  Scotland, Lloyd's  Maritime  and  Commercial  Law
Quarterly,  1992, 3, p 377-378, who commenting on this point of the report argues :<< yet  it would be quite wrong to
suggest that the Model Law fails to deal with such issues. Article 19 makes it clear that questions of procedure are to be
dealt with by agreement of the parties or, failing which, by the arbitral tribunal... the Model law then takes a facilitative
rather than a directive approach to these questions but that is not the same thing as failing to regulate such matters>>.
34Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 18-19
35Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 10
36Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 8
37Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 9
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law of arbitration was considered its dispersed and fragmentary character: although contained for its
most part in the three Acts of 1950, 1975 and 1979, there were also single provisions on arbitration
embodied in statutes covering mainly  other subjects; moreover, since its development and updating
had essentially been carried out by case law applying the statutes, this application had inevitably been
patchy, with some topics treated in detail and others totally ignored38. As a result, the foreign or non-
specialist user of arbitration could not have a whole picture of how arbitration in England worked in
practice  simply by reading the Arbitration Acts:  in  order  to  enhance  its  “user  friendliness”  it  was
necessary that  the existing arbitration legislation should be replaced by a single Act of Parliament,
systematically arranged, and extending to at least some of the most important aspects of arbitration law
on which the statutes in force were silent39.
In order to answer the core question of its mandate, namely whether and to what extent the United
Kingdom  should  adopt  the  Model  Law,  the  DAC conducted  a  consultation  among  the  “users  of
arbitration”  (i.e.  lawyers,  trade  associations  and  practitioners)  which  closely  resembles  the  one
conducted  by  the  European  Commission  in  2001  with  a  view  to  identifying  a  new  strategy  of
harmonisation in the field of European contract law. The DAC drew up a list of options which were
thought available to the United Kingdom with respect to the enactment of the Model Law (e.g. partial
or total enactment of the Model Law, enactment of the Model Law and extension of its scope also to
national  arbitrations,   enactment  of  the  Model  Law  in  a  form  which  permits  contracting  in  or,
alternatively, contracting out, postponement of  a decision until it is seen to what extent the Model Law
is being adopted by other  states,  rejection of  the Model Law)  and submitted it  to 370 bodies  and
individuals40.  By  judging  from  the  number  of  responses  received,  this  consultation  was  not  very
successful: only 36 replies out of 370 questionnaires were sent; nonetheless, the report emphasised that
the  associations  and  professional  bodies  which  replied  represented  many  hundreds  of  members
concerned with arbitration in one capacity or another and among them there were also some important
foreign users of English arbitration. However, from the responses emerged no support to the adoption
of the Model Law in its entirety;  one third even supported rejection;  the rest was divided between
partial enactment with reservations and limitations, postponement of a decision until it was seen how
the  Model  Law  had  fared  in  other  States,  and  enactment  in  a  form  allowing  contracting  in  or,
alternatively, contracting out41. On the basis of this consultation, the Report analysed the options which
38Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, pp. 34-35
39Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 35
40Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, pp. 15-16
41Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 16
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had received more support, namely the direct choice between total acceptance and total rejection of the
Model Law and the intermediate solutions of a legislation allowing the contracting-in or contracting-
out of the Model Law42.
As  far  as  the  first  group  of  options  was  concerned,  the  report  considered  as  the  most  significant
advantage  of  the  Model  Law  its  systematic  structure:  it  consisted  of  a  collection  of  international
arbitration standards expressed in a statutory form; therefore, its adoption in the English legal system
would foster a restatement of the existing unsystematic and piecemeal statutory law of arbitration. On
the other hand, English arbitration law, although unsystematic, could rely on a well established case-
law and expertise which was accepted and trusted by a very large international commercial community.
In  contrast,  the Model law was still  wholly untried in  practice43 .  Consequently,  were the existing
English arbitration law to be completely replaced by the Model Law, a precious heritage of  rules, case-
law and expertise built upon over the centuries should be given up in favour of a newly made and
therefore unknown body of rules. The courts and lawyers would be required  to familiarise with the
new legislation and the practical expertise which had been developed in the context of the old law
would have to be re-learnt in the new situation.  This was all the more true taking into account the
modest success encountered so far by the Model Law. The number of states which had then enacted, or
were planning to enact it was modest and  none of the major trading nations had shown any signs of an
intention to have their national arbitral legislation completely replaced by the Model Law.  Countries
with no developed or outdated arbitration law and practice had much to gain by enacting the Model
Law: this carefully drafted international text could update their legislation to international standards
and consequently render it more easily accessible to foreign business communities44.  But in countries
like the United Kingdom, or Switzerland and France, where an updated body of arbitration law and a
sufficient volume of arbitrations had permitted the growth of a well-established expertise, one may
wonder whether the losses resulting from full support to the Model law project would outweigh the
gains45. The most serious concern stemming from  rejection of the Model Law was the fear that, since
the  latter  represented  the  accepted  international  standard  in  international  arbitration,  the  United
Kingdom might drive away arbitrations if it did not enact the Model Law. However, this argument was
42Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 17
43Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 23
44Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 13
45Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 13-14
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deemed of little weight, given the scarce number of countries which had so far adopted the Model Law
and the lack of indications that this number would increase in the near future.46
 A major disadvantage related to the total adoption of the Model Law was that it would have entailed
the problem of multiple regimes in the law of arbitration: one applicable to international arbitration and
governed by the law enacting the Model Law and another relating to domestic arbitration and governed
by the existing arbitration Acts together with the existing common law rules, which would therefore
continue to apply notwithstanding the adoption of the Model Law47.  As a result, the difficulties in
distinguishing an international from a national arbitration  would have in turn significantly increased
the uncertainties about whether the proceedings were governed by the ordinary English law or by the
regime of the Model Law. In addition, as the detailed study on the impact of each single Model Law
article on English arbitration law had revealed48, a significant number of Model Law provisions were
either detrimental or of doubtful benefit for the local arbitration law and practice: for example, art.
28(3), by allowing the arbitral tribunal to decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono, would
introduce concepts with no recognised meaning in English law; art. 7, by requiring that the arbitration
agreement should be signed, would run against the well established practice of arbitration agreements
which  are  considered  as  binding although not  signed  by both parties  (e.g.  those in  bill  of  lading,
broker's contract notes etc)49. 
 To sum up, this assessment led the DAC to the conclusion that the disadvantages of a full adoption of
the Model Law outweighed in the end the advantages and accordingly recommended that it should not
be enacted for England, Wales and Northern Ireland50.
As far as the option of contracting in or out were concerned, the DAC argued that allowing the parties
to apply or disapply the Model Law regime by consent would have undermined the balance between
party autonomy and court supervision which had been struck in the 1979 Act and had been accepted
with satisfaction by the arbitration community51. This was because the Model Law was not concerned
primarily with the procedural rules to be applied by the arbitral tribunal: it established a framework for
the relationship between the arbitral tribunal, the parties and the supervising court52. Consequently, had
46Lord Mustill,  A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom?  , cit, p. 20-21 With hindsight, one may argue that  this
consideration, which was refuted only few years later, shows how biased and unjustified the scepticism of  the Report vis à
vis the Model Law was.
47The report completely overlooked to analyse the option of extending the Model Law regulation also to national arbitration.
48Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, Part II Appendix 2
49Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 27
50Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit,. p. 29
51Cp. the 1985 Commercial Court Committee quoted by the Report at p. 24
52Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 30-31
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the parties been allowed to contract in or out the Model Law, they would have been enabled to dictate
the  jurisdiction of  the  court  and  to  determine  the  remedies  available  to  the  judge,  as  well  as  the
circumstances and manner in which he may employ them53. Moreover, the previous assessment had
already showed that  the Model  Law regime could bring only very few advantages  to  the existing
arbitration  law;  therefore,  the  right  of  contracting  in  or  out  its  regime  would  create  only  the
inconvenience of a double regime, without any corresponding practical benefit.54 
The last part of the Report focused on the formulation of a number of proposals for the improvement of
the existing English arbitration law55. The hypothesis of a mere consolidation bringing together in one
text all the provisions of the current statutes was rejected as too modest an enterprise: in order to make
English arbitration  law more accessible,  it   was  also necessary to take into  account  the principles
elaborated by the extensive case law on the topic. By contrast, the solution of a codification of the
entire English law on arbitration was considered too ambitious and also entailing the risk of depriving it
of the flexibility necessary to respond to the changing climate of international arbitration. Also the
intermediate option of a restatement on the American model was rejected, partly because this drafting
technique was unknown in the English system, and partly because its preparation would have been too
long and would have not resulted in a synthetic, rational and comprehensive exposition of the most
important contents of the existing law56. Eventually, the solution  recommended by the  report was that
of  a  new  Act  which,  without  requiring  a  lengthy  period  of  planning  and  drafting  or  prolonged
parliamentary debate, should comprise a statement in statutory form of the most important principles of
English law of arbitration, statutory and (to the extent practicable) common law57. Moreover, the new
act should be limited to those principles whose existence and effect are uncontroversial58, set out in a
logical order and expressed in a language which is sufficiently clear and free from technicalities to be
readily comprehensible to the layman59. Finally, although its scope should not be limited to the subject-
matter of the Model Law60, it should have as far as possible the same structure and language as the
latter, so as to enhance its accessibility to those who are familiar with the Model law itself61.
53Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 31
54Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 32
55Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, pp. 35-36
56Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 37
57Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, par. 108(1)
58Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, par. 108(2)
59Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, par. 108(3)
60Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, par. 108(59
61Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, par. 108(7). This final statement shows the ambiguity
of the report vis à vis the Model Law. After having analysed its weaknesses in much detail (both in terms of form, content,
language  and  lack of  practical  applications)  the  DAC concluded  by emphasising  the  Model  Law's  role  in  ensuring  a
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After  the publication of  the Mustill  report  the parliamentary draftsmen set off  to work in order  to
prepare a draft for the new Arbitration Act, which was issued in February 1994. However, they thought
that the guidelines embodied in paragraph 108 of the Mustill Report were not susceptible of being put
into  legislative  form and  therefore  produced  a  consolidating  statute  bringing  together,  with  some
amendments,  the three main pieces  of legislation which had so far  regulated the subject-matter  of
arbitration: the Arbitration Act 1950, the Arbitration Act 1975 and the Arbitration Act 1979. In an
Interim  Report  in  April  1995  the  DAC rejected  this  draft  as  being  in  contrast  with  the  original
guidelines of the arbitration reform enshrined in paragraph 108  of the Mustill  report62 .  The DAC
Interim Report led to a new draft, which was circulated for public consultation in July 1995. As the first
provision in the preamble illustrated, the 1995 draft was completely in line with sub -paragraph 1 of
paragraph 108 of the Mustill  Report:  an Act to restate  and improve the law relating to arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement. Given the favourable response, the 1995 draft was taken forward,
with some amendments, to form the basis of the final draft, which was enacted as the arbitration Act
1996 and came into force on 31 January 1997. Although the Arbitration Act 1996 did not officially
implement the Model Law provisions, it relied, as the drafters have expressly acknowledged, whenever
possible on its structure, language and spirit.63 The draft on which the Arbitration Act was based moved
closer to the Model Law than what originally envisaged in the Mustill Report: most of the Model Law
appeared in one or other form in the draft, although some new features not included in the Model Law
but considered helpful to the smooth functioning of English arbitration were introduced and whose lack
lied at the basis of the Mustill Report’s decision not to adopt the Model law64.  
systematic structure and a comprehensible language to English arbitration law. As previously observed,  by recognising the
importance of complying as far as possible to the structure, language and spirit of the Model Law, the report seems to have
relied on the same principles of signalling effect, user friendliness and arbitration friendliness which lied at the basis of the
1998 reform of the German arbitration law and were essentially implemented through  full adoption of the Model Law.
62DAC Interim Report, quoted in the 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, Arb Int, 1997, 13, 3, p. 276 <<the view of the
DAC is that a new Bill should still be grounded on the objectives set out in paragraph 108 of the 1989 Report, but that,
reinterpreted, what  is called  for is much more along the lines of a restatement of the law,  in clear and “user-friendly”
language, following as far as possible, the structure and spirit of the Model Law, rather than simply a classic exercise in
consolidation>>. It is worth noting that also the DAC Interim Report, in illustrating the main purpose of the reform, relied
on the same principle  of user-friendliness  which also  constituted a major  guideline  in  the 1998 reform of the German
arbitration act. 
63Cfr DTI Consultative Paper, p. 3
64
 R. Merkin, Arbitration Law, vol. 1, LLP Publisher, 2000 p. 1/9
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The reception of the Model Law in Scotland
The Dervaird Report
The conclusions reached by the Mustill report were valid only for the law districts of England, Wales
and Northern Ireland. As far as Scotland was concerned, in July 1986 a Scottish Advisory Committee
on  Arbitration  Law  was  set  up  (the  Dervaird  Committee,  from  the  name  of  its  chairman,  Lord
Dervaird) with the twofold purpose of advising on whether and to what extent the UNCITRAL Model
Law should be implemented in Scotland  and examining the operation of the system of  arbitration in
Scotland in the light of the Model Law, with a view to making recommendations as how to improve
Scots arbitration law65. The establishment of a special committee for Scotland was due to the marked
differences existing between English and Scots arbitration laws. In particular, the two systems differed
in two main respects:  the extent  of  statutory discipline and the extent  of  court  intervention in  the
arbitral process66. Scots law on arbitration was even more dispersed than English law, since it lacked in
very large measure any statutory regulation67: practice and procedure in arbitration had therefore almost
entirely to be found in case law and  handbooks. Accordingly, whereas in England a consolidation of
the existing law had been carried out by the Arbitration Act 1950, Scots law on arbitration had an
urgent need for  codification in order to make it easy for the foreigner to ascertain how arbitration in
Scotland worked and persuade the overseas party to accept Scots law and jurisdiction68. As to court
intervention,  from the  earliest  times Scots  law had permitted parties  to  exclude the merits  of  any
dispute  between  them  from  the  consideration  of  the  courts,  by  simply  naming  their  arbitrator69;
moreover,  it  had until recently admitted judicial review of arbitral awards only within very narrow
65Lord Dervaird,  Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model  Law: The Report  of the Lord Advocate of the Scottish  Advisory
Committee on Arbitration Law, Arb Int, 1990, 6, 1, p. 63. Although The Scottish Committee pledged to take into account
the conclusions reached in the Mustill Committee ( the chairman of the Scottish Committee, Lord Dervaird and one of its
members, dr Kenneth Chrystie, were also members of the Mustill Committee), it was agreed that the implementation of the
Model Law in Scotland should be a matter for decision of  the Scottish Committee. 
66Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 10
67Lord Dervaird, Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law, cit, p. 66
68Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 11
69per Lord Watson in Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery (1814), 21R (HC), 21 at 27, quoted in Lord Dervaird, Scotland
and the UNCITRAL Model Law, cit., p. 65
292
limits: provided that the arbitrator had not exceeded the mandate given to him by the parties with the
arbitration agreement and had behaved fairly in the conduct of the arbitration, the award could not be
successfully challenged in court, however erroneous the parties and the court could think the award had
been70.  A form of judicial review similar to the English special case procedure had been introduced
only by virtue of Section 3 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972, but this provision had
had very little impact in practice, given the frequent recourse of the parties to agreements excluding
this procedure and the modest amount of reported cases related to this matter 71.
These  marked differences were the grounds on which the Scottish Committee relied in order to justify
full enactment of the Model Law in the Scots arbitration law. The Committee argued that, despite the
introduction of the special case procedure in 1972, a constant feature of Scots law had always been the
principle  that  parties  should  be  free  to  have  their  disputes  determined  privately  and  with  finality
without  the  intervention  of  the  courts.  Accordingly,  the  Model  Law  regime  was  in  line  with  this
foundational principle: central to this system was the purpose of limiting the extent to which the courts
may exercise control over the process of arbitration72. Therefore, the Committee concluded that there
was nothing hostile to the common law of Scotland in the fundamental provisions of the Model Law.
Whereas the argument that adoption of the Model Law would entail multiple regimes applicable to
arbitration was considered by the Mustill Committee as one of the most serious drawbacks, the Scottish
committee  did  not  attach  much  importance  to  it,  since  a  plurality  of  different  arbitration  regimes
already co-existed in Scots law: arbitrations subject to sec. 3 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland)
Act 1972, arbitrations in which parties had opted out this regime, special types of arbitrations subject to
particular  statutory regulations.  But  the most important  argument  in favour of  full  adoption of  the
Model Law was that it would have overcome the lack of statutory regulation in the field of arbitration
which  represented  the  most  important  disincentive  to  the  selection  of  Scotland  as  a  place  of
international commercial arbitration73. By providing a framework for arbitration readily understandable
by people of different legal cultures, the introduction of the Model law in Scotland would have gone in
the direction of making it a more attractive arbitration centre74.
In the wake of the Dervaird committee's recommendations, the Model Law was enacted in Scotland
almost verbatim through the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990, section 66
70Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 11
71Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? , cit, p. 12
72Lord Dervaird, Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law, cit, p. 65
73Lord Dervaird, Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law, cit, p. 66
74Lord Dervaird, Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law, cit, p. 67
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and Schedule 7. Only minor modifications were introduced in order to accommodate its text to the
particularities of the Scottish legal system75. For example, whereas the original art. 10(2) states that in
the absence of an agreement between the parties on the determination of the number of the arbitrators,
the number of the arbitrators shall be three, in order to comply with the tradition in Scots law of the
single arbitrator, the Scottish version provides that failing any determination as to the number of the
arbitrators,  there  shall  be  a  single  arbitrator.  The  only  four  modifications  which  are  of  some
significance regard the provisions on the Kompetenz-Kompetenz , the power to appoint arbitrators, the
grounds on which an award may be set aside and the extension to domestic arbitrations. Whereas art.
11 of the Model Law allows, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, bodies other than
courts to act as appointing authorities, it did not seem to the Dervaird committee necessary or desirable
to nominate  specific  institutions  other  than courts to  exercise these functions76.  As a  result,  unless
expressly provided for  by the parties,  the well  established international  practice to  rely on arbitral
institutions such the ICC and the LCIA as appointing authorities is not possible in Scotland. According
to art. 16(3) of the Model Law, the arbitral tribunal' s decision that it lacks jurisdiction is not subject to
judicial review: it was felt inappropriate to compel an arbitral tribunal which established that it did not
have jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings77;  by contrast, the Scottish version of this article
provides that also the arbitral tribunal's decision excluding its jurisdiction is subject to appeal to the
court. It was thought that in any case the system envisaged by the Model Law conferred upon the court
the last word on the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction: if parties following the arbitral tribunal's decision
excluding its jurisdiction resorted to litigation, each of them could nonetheless  under art. 8 ask the
court to refer the matter to arbitration and the court would be bound to do it if it considered that the
matter was covered by a valid arbitration agreement78. Consequently, it was simpler to allow courts to
review also arbitral decisions of no jurisdiction.  In envisaging the grounds on which an award may be
set aside, the Scottish version of art. 34 adds the case in which the award has been rendered on the basis
of fraud, bribery and corruption.  As the Dervaird committee expressly admitted, the award may be
challenged on such grounds on the basis of public policy infringement; nonetheless, it preferred to add
such specific ground in order to put the matter “beyond doubt”.79 More importantly, whereas the setting
aside of the award is generally subject to a three months time limit, this is not so when the award is
75Ibidem
76Lord Dervaird, Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law, cit, p 71
77UN Doc A/40/17 par. 163
78F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration in Scotland, cit., p. 384
79Lord Dervaird, Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law, cit, p 74
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challenged  on  the  above  ground.  The  Model  Law  drafters  discussed  about  the  opportunity  of
envisaging  a  considerably  longer  period  of  time  for  challenging  an  award  in  case  of  fraud,  but
eventually  it  was  decided  that  such  an  extension  was  contrary  to  the  need  for  speedy  and  final
settlement of international commercial disputes.80 By contrast, parties who choose Scotland as place of
arbitration need not face the frustration of being unable to have the award set aside, although they have
been aware that it was produced by fraud, merely because the three months time limit has elapsed. The
price which is paid as a result is that the award is never secure from challenge in the Scottish courts. It
must be for parties to international commercial arbitrations to judge which is the more advantageous
situation81. Finally, sec. 66(4) allows the parties to agree that the Model Law as set out in Schedule 7
shall  apply even if the arbitration would not be an international  commercial arbitration  within the
meaning of art. 1 of the Model Law. Thus, by virtue of the agreement of the parties, any arbitration
may potentially fall within the scope of the Model Law.82
Towards a new reform
The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law had not, however, sorted the expected effect of attracting
significant  international  arbitration business to Scotland. A number of defects  still  remained in the
arbitration  law  of  Scotland,  which  made  this  country  an  unattractive  arbitration  centre,  the  most
important one being the lack of a domestic arbitration regime to fill the gaps left by the Model Law
regulation. The regulation of domestic arbitration in Scotland was a partial regime, mainly governed by
the common law which was  quite  uncertain  and inadequate  to the effective  conduct  of  arbitration
according to international standards83. As a result, in 1996 the Dervaird committee published a draft
Bill of reform of domestic arbitration law. Yet, this draft dealt with certain specific issues only, filling
some gaps and making some improvements but leaving domestic arbitration law largely uncodified. In
1999  the  Scottish  Council  for  International  Arbitration  and  the  Scottish  branch  of  the  Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators developed the Scottish Arbitration Code. This text (revised in 2007) was meant
80UN  Doc A/40/17 par. 300
81F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration in Scotland, cit, p. 392
82F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration in Scotland, cit, p. 380
83F. Davidson, Some Thoughts on the Draft Arbitration (Scotland) Bill, JBL, 2009, 1, p. 44. 
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to  set  out  a  general  framework  for  arbitration  and  the  rules  under  which  arbitration  should  be
conducted, but it was only a voluntary code, which required all parties to agree to its adoption. In 2002
a new bill was issued aiming to combine Scotland's domestic and international arbitration law into a
single source. Unfortunately, the Bill failed to attract sufficient political backing and did not advance
through the Parliamentary process. In June 2008 the reform process seems to have reached a turning
point: the Scottish Government has launched a public consultation on a new arbitration bill84. Like the
previous attempts, the new bill aims to reform and consolidate the law of arbitration, which is currently
outdated and incomplete.  It is part of a more complex strategy involving not only legislative reform
but  also  the  creation  of  what  in  the  context  of  the  German  arbitration  reform  has  been  called
“arbitration infrastructure”. To support and attract arbitration business to Scotland it is envisaged not
only to introduce an arbitration bill to modernise and codify the law and bring it into line with up-to
date arbitral  practices  in other  jurisdictions,  but  also to develop a self-financing dispute resolution
centre to which arbitration as well as domestic dispute resolution business might be attracted and to
encourage representative bodies of arbitrators to improve the professional expertise of their members85.
In  line  with  the  principle  of  user  friendliness,  the bill  puts  the  vast  majority  of  the  Scots  law of
arbitration into  a  single  statute:  the underlying  idea is  to  enable anyone seeking to do business in
Scotland to find in one place the principles governing the law of arbitration in Scotland in a language
which can be readily understood86. By the same token, the same rules will apply to domestic, cross-
border (i.e. with other parts of the UK) and international arbitrations. The provision of a single regime
applicable to both domestic and international arbitration seems to imply a departure from full adoption
of  the  Model  Law:  the  consultation  paper  announces  that  the  separate  treatment  in  Scotland  of
international commercial arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Model Law will be replaced by a single
code still informed by the Model Law principles, but also by the 2002 draft bill and, more importantly,
the  UK  Arbitration  Act  199687.   It  has  been  observed  that  the  Model  Law  does  not  provide  a
comprehensive  arbitration  regime  and  quite  few  states  have  applied  it  to  both  domestic  and
international arbitration. Accordingly, it would be much better to look at the example of States such as
England which have used the Model Law as the basis for the creation of a comprehensive, modern
84
 The  Scottish Government, Consultation on Arbitration (Scotland) Bill,  Scottish Government  Publication, June 2008,
available on the internet at www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations (July 2009).
85
 The  Scottish Government, Consultation on Arbitration (Scotland) Bill, cit, p. 1
86
 Ibidem
87
 The  Scottish Government, Consultation on Arbitration (Scotland) Bill, cit, pp. 8-9
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arbitration statute, so as to make Scots law on arbitration more consistent with that in force in the rest
of the UK88. 
The reception of the Model Law in the English Arbitration Act 1996 
General Features of the Arbitration Act 1996
The Arbitration Act 1996 is a statute without precedent in English arbitration law89: it has not merely
consolidated the principal statutes of 1950, 1975 and 1979 and codified the most important rules found
in the common law, but it has also introduced drafting techniques which appear radically innovative
with respect to the English traditional standards. Contrary to the previous arbitration acts, which had
disciplined only single aspects of the arbitral procedure, the Arbitration Act 1996 has largely adopted
the logical structure of the Model Law and has dealt comprehensively with the regulation of arbitration
starting from the definition of the arbitration agreement and ending with the enforcement of the arbitral
award90. But its most important innovation has certainly been the provision in statutory form of general
principles of arbitration law: this drafting technique, unconventional in a common law context, is more
usually found in codified legal systems and is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the 1996 Act.91
These principles, embodied in sec. 1 of the Act, are three: due process, party autonomy and minimal
court intervention92. They constitute the “touchstone” by which any of the following provisions may be
tested93: where there is a doubt as to the meaning of any section within the Act, then regard should be
had to these principles94. As we have seen in the previous chapter, such principles also constitute the
inspiring guidelines (the so-called “ Magna Charta”) of the Model Law regulation. 
88
 F. Davidson, Some Thoughts on the Draft Arbitration (Scotland) Bill, cit, p. 45.
89
 J.  Tackaberry  and  A.  Marriott,  Bernstein’s  Handbook  of  Arbitration  and  Dispute  Resolution  Practice,  Sweet  and
Maxwell,  2003, par. 2-059
90J. Tackaberry and A. Marriott, Bernstein’s Handbook of Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Practice, cit, par. 2-065
91J. Tackaberry and A. Marriott, Bernstein’s Handbook of Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Practice, cit, par. 2-066
92cp. A. Tweeddale and K. Tweeddale, op. cit. p. 495-497
93J. Tackaberry and A. Marriott, Bernstein’s Handbook of Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Practice, cit, par. 2-068
94A. Tweeddale and K. Tweeddale, op. cit.,  p. 495
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The principle of due process is stated in sec. 1(a) of the Act in the following terms: “the object of
arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay
and expense”.  Many provisions of the Act can be read as a specification of this principle:  sec.  33
imposes a mandatory duty on the arbitral tribunal to conduct the proceedings fairly and impartially, as
well as to adopt suitable procedures which avoid unnecessary delay and expense; sec. 68 provides that
an award may be challenged on the ground of serious irregularities in the proceedings when the arbitral
tribunal has not complied with its duty under sec. 33; sec. 24 provides that the arbitral tribunal may be
removed  or  have  its  fees  forfeited  for  not  being  impartial  or  failing  to  conduct  the  proceedings
properly,  or  for  not  using all  reasonable  dispatch in  conducting the arbitration;  sec.  40 imposes  a
mandatory duty on the parties to do all things necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the
proceedings; sec. 41 provides that the arbitral tribunal may dismiss a claim where there is inordinate
and inexcusable delay on the part of the claimant in pursuing the claim, which damages the fairness of
the proceedings and prejudices the respondent.
The principle of party autonomy is laid down in sec. 1(b): “the parties should be free to agree how their
disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest”.  This
principle is further emphasised in the Act by envisaging a list of provisions which are mandatory; it is
then provided by sec. 4(2) that any other provisions only apply in the absence of alternative agreements
agreed to by the parties95. 
The  principle  of  limited  court  intervention,  embodied in  sec.  1(c),  was  included  as  a  response  to
international criticism that English courts were too interventionist in the arbitral process and therefore
discouraged the selection of England as a forum for arbitration96.  This principle is closely connected to
that of party autonomy: as the DAC acknowledged, in order to respect the decision of the parties to
choose a  private tribunal rather  than the court  to solve their dispute,  the Act has strengthened the
powers of the arbitrators and limited the role of the court to those occasions in which it is obvious that
either the arbitral process needs assistance, or there has been or it is likely to be a clear denial of justice.
In other words, the court intervention is limited in those cases where it is necessary to safeguard due
process  in  arbitral  proceedings.  This  principle  mirrors  art.  5  of  the  Model  Law;  yet  it  has  been
formulated as a general guideline, rather than a substantive provision as in art. 5 of  the Model Law.
95F. Davidson,  The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law?, JBL, 1997, 2, p. 103. The drafters of the Arbitration Act 1996
managed to confer an even stronger emphasis upon the principle of party autonomy than that found in the Model Law.
During the travaux of the Model Law it was proposed to draw up a  list of mandatory provisions; nonetheless, given the
difficulties related to their identification, this approach was not adopted, the drafters preferring instead  to point out the non-
mandatory nature of most of the provisions of the Model Law. See UN DOC A/CN9/246 paras. 176-177.
96A. Tweeddale and K. Tweeddale, op cit., p. 497
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Account was taken of the concerns expressed in the DAC report that a mandatory prohibition on the
court's  intervention  in  terms  similar  to  article  5  of  the  Model  Law  was  inappropriate,  given  the
difficulty in determining its exact scope, especially in cases where the Model Law was silent upon an
issue. As a result, some commentator has expressed the view that this principle has not the purpose of
limiting the cases of court intervention to those expressly provided for in the Act, but only that of
encouraging a frugal exercise in practice of court intervention wherever in the law the source of this
power may be found: significantly, instead of “shall not  intervene”, like in art. 5 of the Model Law, the
Act uses the expression “should not intervene”97. This view seems however to contradict the drafters'
intention,  who have expressly clarified that the purpose of this principle is to  enable the parties to
know precisely the limits to the powers of the English courts to intervene in arbitral proceedings so that
they will not have any concern that some unexpected form of intervention may be relied on some
principle derived somewhere in the common law98.
The scope of application
Like the Model Law, the English Arbitration Act 1996 founds its scope of application on the territorial
criterion; yet  the latter introduces in lieu of the place of arbitration the more precise concept of the
“seat”: according to sec. 2 (1), the Act applies where the seat of arbitration is in England and Wales or
Northern  Ireland.  Sec.  3  clarifies  that  the  seat  of  the  arbitration  means  the  juridical  seat  of  the
arbitration designated by the parties to the arbitration agreement, by any arbitral or other institution or
person vested by the parties with the powers in that regard, or by the arbitral tribunal if so authorised by
the parties99.  Unlike art.  20 of the Model Law,  which establishes that  the tribunal is  automatically
97Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd,  Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition,  Butterworths,
2001, p. 28; A. Tweeddale and K. Tweeddale, op. cit. , p. 498; contra B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act
1996: A Commentary, Blackwell Publishing, 2000, p. 60. The issue has also been considered in two recent cases. In Vale do
Rio Doce Navegacos SA v SA Shanghai Bao Steel Ocean Shippin Co Ltd and Sea Partners Ltd (All ER Comm, 2000, 2, 70),
relying on the considerations expressed in the DAC report on this matter, the judge concluded that the word “should” rather
than “shall” within the Arbitration Act 1996 sec. 1(c) meant that there was not an absolute prohibition on the court from
intervening in arbitral proceedings in cases other than those specified in the Act.  The same rationale was followed in IT
Mackley and Co Ltd v Gosport Marina Ltd (EWHC, 2002, 1315, TCC), in which the court granted declaratory relief outside
of its power in the Arbitration Act. However, in both cases, the court held that such intervention was contrary to the general
intention of the Arbitration Act and that the courts should usually not intervene outside the general circumstances specified
in the Act itself.
98DTI Consultative Paper
99Cp DAC 1997 Supplementary  Report  on the Arbitration  Act  1996,  Arb  Int,  1997,  13,  3  par.  11:  <<the  seat  of  an
arbitration refers to its legal place, as opposed to its geographical location. It is, of course, perfectly possible to conduct an
arbitration with an English seat at any convenient location, whether in England or abroad>>.
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entitled to determine the place of arbitration at its discretion if the parties have failed to do so, the Act
provides that the arbitrator may designate the seat only if so authorised by the parties. In the absence of
such authorisation, sections 2 (4)(a) and 3 establish that the seat should be determined by the court with
regard to the parties' agreement and all the relevant circumstances100.
There are however a number of provisions which may be seen as generally supportive of the arbitral
process and which apply wherever the seat of arbitration is, or where the seat has not been determined.
They regard  stay  of  legal  proceedings,  enforcement  of  arbitral  awards,  attendance  of  witness  and
interim measures of protection. Furthermore, in cases where there has been no designation of the seat,
the court  may exercise a power derived from the Act if  the power is  exercised for the purpose of
supporting the arbitral process and there is sufficient connection between England and the arbitration in
question. Art. 1(2) of the Model Law embodies a similar, but less detailed rule, limiting the provisions
applying irrespective of the place of arbitration to the stay of legal proceedings, interim measures of
protection and recognition an enforcement of awards. 
But the most significant difference from the Model Law with respect to the scope of application is that
the  Arbitration  Act  1996  is  not  confined  to  international  commercial  arbitrations:  it  applies  to  all
arbitrations having their seat in England, whatever the nationality or place of business of the parties, the
place of performance of the substantive contract and the governing law. In this respect the act differs
radically not only from the Model Law, but also many national laws, which draw a sharp distinction
between international and other types of arbitration101. Actually, sections 85 to 87 of the Arbitration Act
1996 were meant to re-enact those provisions of the old law laying down a special regime for domestic
arbitration with regard to the stay of legal proceedings and the circumstances under which the parties
could  exclude  the  appeal  of  an  award  on  questions  of  law  .  Yet,  with  the  Arbitration  Act  1996
(Commencement no. 1) Order 1996 it was decided not to bring these sections into effect. This decision
was essentially grounded on the considerations expressed in the DAC Report of February 1996: the
special regime for domestic arbitration was deemed to preserve a supervisory role for the courts at the
expense  of  party  autonomy;  in  addition,  concerns  were  expressed  that  such  different  treatment
discriminated against  the European Union nationals who are not  English and was thus contrary to
100
 Cp Tonicstar Ltd v American Home Assurance Co (EWHC, Comm, 2004, 1234), in which the seat of the arbitration had
not been determined by the parties in the arbitration agreement. As the parties could not agree on the seat, Tonicstar  applied
to the court. The court first considered the law applicable to the merits of the dispute:  by applying the Rome Convention
principles,  it  concluded  that  the  applicable  law  was  English  law.  The  court  then  held  that  the  law applicable  to  the
arbitration  agreement  was  the  same  as  the  applicable  law.  The  court  therefore  concluded  that  these  factors  together
suggested that England was the natural forum for the dispute.
101Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 13
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European Law.102. This concern was confirmed some months after the publication of the report in the
case Philip Alexander Securities and Futures Limited v. Bamberger103, where the Court of Appeal held
that  the Consumer Arbitration Agreements  Act 1988, which in its  protection of consumers  drew a
distinction  between  domestic  and  non-domestic  agreements,  contravened  the  treaty  of  Rome  by
distinguishing between UK nationals and EC nationals from outside the UK. Finally, in July 1996 the
Department of Trade and Industry published a consultation document on the commencement of the
Act, in which inter alia views were sought on whether or not the distinction between international and
domestic  arbitration  should be  maintained.  The majority of  the  respondents  were  in  favour of  the
abolition of this distinction and the application of the international regime to all kinds of arbitrations.
Accordingly,  in the supplementary Report of February 1997 the DAC concluded that there was no
option but to abolish this distinction.104
Provisions common to the Model Law
Stay of legal proceedings
The provisions on the stay of legal proceedings, embodied in sec. 9, are founded on art. 8 of the Model
Law, which are in turn drawn form art. 2(3) of the New York Convention. They essentially impose a
mandatory duty on the court to stay an action brought in breach of an agreement to arbitrate, unless the
court  is  satisfied that  the arbitration agreement  is  null  and void,  inoperative or incapable of being
performed105. Although the Model Law and the New York Convention impose an obligation upon the
court  to  refer  the  parties  to  arbitration,  the  English  court  can  only  stay  (i.e.  suspend)  its  own
102DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 326. 
1031996 CLC 1757
104DAC 1997 Supplementary Report on the Arbitration Act 1996, Arb Int, 1997, 13, 3, par. 49
105Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 268
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proceedings106:  nonetheless this is only a difference in language rather than in substance,  since the
parties will have in any case to bring their dispute in front  of the arbitral  tribunal if they wish to
continue the proceedings107.  Two changes introduced by the 1996 Act have contributed to bring the
provisions on the stay of  legal  proceedings  closer  to those of  the Model Law and the  New York
Convention. The first is that a stay may no longer be refused on the grounds that there is in fact no
dispute between the parties, as was the case under the old law. The DAC had considered this extra
ground, not contained in the New York Convention, as confusing and unnecessary  and therefore it was
omitted from sec. 9(4), with the result of bringing English legislation more in line with international
standards. The second change stems from the decision not to bring into force the special regime for
domestic arbitrations envisaged in sections 85-88 of the Act. In particular, as far as the stay of legal
proceedings is concerned,  sec. 86(2)(b) laid down an extra criterion on which the court could rely to
refuse  the  stay:  when  there  were  sufficient  grounds  for  not  requiring  the  parties  to  abide  by  the
arbitration agreement.  Given the lack of definition of what was meant by “sufficient grounds”, this
residual power of refusal was deemed not to comply with the principle of party autonomy and to result
in an interference with rather than a support  for the arbitral  process.  It  was therefore suggested to
abolish  the  distinction  between  domestic  and  non-domestic  arbitrations  and  apply  the  New  York
Convention rules to all cases. Now a single regulation for the stay of legal proceedings applies to all
arbitrations,  both  domestic  and  international  and  this  regulation  closely mirrors  the  corresponding
provisions of the Model Law and the New York Convention.
The conduct of arbitral proceedings
The main principle regulating the conduct of arbitral proceedings is laid down in art. 34(1), which is
largely  based  on  art.  19  of  the  Model  Law:  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  between  parties  on
106R.  Merkin, op.  cit.,  p.  1-12;  V.  Cobb, Domestic  Court's  Obligation  to  Refer  Parties  to  Arbitration, Arbitration
International, 2001, 3, 17, p. 313
107Yet, the concept of a stay of proceedings conveys the idea of an incumbent court jurisdiction ready to intervene whenever
appropriate. As Mustill and Boyd observe: <<where the court exercises its right, and in many instances its duty  to renounce
jurisdiction over a dispute which falls within an agreement to arbitrate, this renunciation is only provisional. Until a valid
award is published, the court retains its underlying jurisdiction for the purpose of making orders in aid of the process of
arbitration>>. (Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, vol I, cit, p. 156).
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procedural matters, the arbitral tribunal is allowed complete freedom on procedural matters, including
freedom  to  decide  on  how  evidence  is  to  be  presented,  this  freedom  being  subject  only  to  the
requirement of sec. 33(1)(a) that it should act fairly and impartially between the parties, giving each of
them a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent. This provision
overrides the practice emerged under the old law, whereby in the absence of a contrary party agreement
the procedures in an arbitration should be modelled on court procedures and therefore an arbitration
should be conducted in an adversarial manner under the normal rules of civil evidence108. By grounding
the arbitral discretion on procedural matters upon a statutory basis, the Act clearly does away with this
old-fashioned  theory  which  contributed  to  make  English  arbitration  law rather  unattractive  to  the
businessman's eyes109. In order to help the arbitral tribunal to correctly use its discretion, sec. 34 sets
out a non-exhaustive list of procedural and evidential matters falling within its power,  many of which
derive from similar provisions of the Model Law: for instance, the power to determine where any part
of  the proceedings  may be held  mirrors  art.  20  ML;  the  power  to  determine  the  language  of  the
arbitration corresponds to art. 22 ML; the power to determine whether evidence should be given orally
or in writing is similar to art. 24(1)ML.
As stated above, sec. 33(1)(a) imposes on the arbitration a clear limitation as to the exercise of its
freedom on procedural matters. This provision, although closely following art. 18 of the Model Law,
contains a noteworthy difference in language: it speaks about a party being allowed a “reasonable”
opportunity to put his case, as opposed to the “full” opportunity found in the Model Law. The term
“reasonable”  has  been  chosen  because  it  was deemed to  remove  any suggestion  that  a  party  was
entitled to take, as long as he required it, to explore every aspect of his case, however unreasonable this
may be.110 . And indeed the duty under sec. 33(1)(a) is reinforced by a further duty under sec. 33(1)(b),
which has no counterpart in the Model Law, to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the
108DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, , par 153; J. Steyn, Towards a New English Arbitration Act, Arb Int, 1991,
7, 1, p. 24; Bremen Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India shipping Corporation, 1981 A.C., 909, at 947-948
109J. Steyn, op.cit.,  p. 23. This theory was strongly criticised by legal doctrine: see e.g. R. Goode, The Adaptation of English
Law to International Commercial Arbitration, Arbitration International, 1992, 8, 1, p. 6 <<One of the reason why parties
opt for arbitration is informality and a commercial approach to the determination of their  dispute. The notion that they
intend the rules of evidence for litigation to be applied in all their rigour is surprising indeed.  The English law of evidence
possess a most  infortunate  tendency to rigidity  in the formulation of rules which fly in the face of experience and are
alleviated only by the robust good sense of our trial judges. Now if we in England wish to tie ourselves hand and foot by
rules of this kind in domestic legislation, so be it. But why, in an international arbitration, should we expect foreign parties
accustomed to business evidence and to relaxed evidential rules in their own countries, to be circumscribed by our arcane
jurisprudence on evidence?>> 
110B. Harris,  R.  Planterose,  J.  Tecks, The Arbitration Act  1996: A Commentary,  cit,  p.  170; DAC 1996 Report on the
Arbitration Bill, cit, , par. 165
particular  case,  avoiding  unnecessary  delay  and  expense,  so  as  to  provide  a  fair  means  for  the
resolution of the matters falling to be determined.
The law applicable to the merits of the dispute
Until sec. 46 of the Arbitration Act 1996 opened up the possibility that the parties could effectively
agree that a dispute would be decided according to rules not based on a particular legal system, there
was a well established rule at common law that in the conduct of arbitration the arbitral tribunal must in
general  apply a  fixed and  recognisable  system of  law111.  English  courts  were  prepared  to  enforce
foreign awards which were not based on the rules of any particular legal system112, but one thing was
accepting the validity of a foreign award made upon a basis which is legally sustainable in the state of
origin and another is considering whether an English award made on such basis should be accorded
validity113. Sec. 46 of the Act, which reflects much, though not all of art.  28 of the Model Law114,
introduces important innovations as to the choice of the rules applicable to the substance of the dispute.
Sec. 46(1) requires the tribunal to decide the dispute in accordance with the law chosen by the parties
as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Sub-sec.2 clarifies that the law chosen by the parties shall
be understood as  the substantive law of  the country and not  its  conflict  of  laws rules.  Unlike the
corresponding art. 28(1) of the Model Law, sec. 46(1) does not make reference to the “rules of law”
which allow the parties to refer to a set of rules not embodied in a national legal system. The possibility
for the parties to agree that the dispute should be decided according to a non-national system of rules
seems to be contemplated by sec.46(1)(b), which allows the parties to authorise the tribunal to decide
the dispute in accordance with “such other considerations as are agreed by them or determined by the
tribunal”. This expression replaces the terms “ex aequo et bono” and “amiable compositeur”, found in
111Orion Compania Espanola de Seguros v. Belfort Maatschappij Voor Algemene Verzekgringen, Lloyd's Rep , 1962, 2, 257
at 264.
112Cp Deutsche Schachtbau und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras al Khaimah National Oil Co, WLR, 1987, 3,1023, where
the Court of Appeal did not consider it contrary to English public policy to enforce an award made in Switzerland which
had been decided according to “internationally accepted principles of law governing contractual relations”.
113F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p. 120
114
 DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 222
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art. 28 (3) of the Model Law: the drafters of the Act refrained from adopting the Latin and French
expressions,  given  the uncertainty which the introduction of  such unfamiliar  terms might  create.115
Accordingly,  in  line  with  the  principle  of  user  friendliness,  they preferred  to  use  a  non-technical
expression closer to the ordinary language. While there seems to be no reason why this expression
should not  extend to non-national  rules116,  its  scope appears  even wider  than those adopted in the
Model Law: it includes not only standards such as equity, but any criteria whatsoever limited only by
public policy117, so that the arbitral tribunal may decide according to its personal view of what fairness
ought to be in that particular dispute118.  Failing any designation by the parties, sec. 46(3), completely
in  line  with  art  28(2)  of  the  Model  Law,  provides  that  the  arbitral  tribunal  shall  apply  the  law
determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. 
Finally, it should be noted that the last part of art 28 of the Model Law, which requires the tribunal to
take into account in all cases the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction, was omitted. The
reason for this omission was that if the applicable law allows this to be done, then the provision is not
necessary;  while  if  it  does  not,  then the  provision  might  override  the  law otherwise  applicable.119
Furthermore, the Act can and often will apply to non-commercial matters where there is no relevant
“trade”120.
Challenge of the award
The Arbitration Act 1996 envisages the grounds on which an award may be challenged in two separate
provisions: sec. 67, which deals with the lack of substantive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, and sec.
68,  which  deals  with  serious  procedural  irregularity  affecting  the  tribunal.  The  reason  for  this
distinction is  that  a  challenge  on grounds  of  lack  of  jurisdiction involves  no issue of  “substantial
justice”121:  an  award  made  by  a  tribunal  which  lacks  jurisdiction  simply  cannot  stand,  whereas
procedural irregularity may be relied upon as a ground for challenging an award only where it is proved
115F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p.  120
116Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 50
117F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p.  121
118Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 125
119DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 222
120B. Harris,  R.  Planterose,  J.  Tecks,  The Arbitration Act  1996: A Commentary, cit,  p.  170,  DAC 1996 Report  on the
Arbitration Bill, cit,  par. 227
121
 DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 279
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that it has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant122. The first provision is spelt out in
much the  same  way as  articles  16  and  34(3)  of  the  Model  Law,  whereas  sec.  68  presents  some
peculiarities which are worth analysing. The Arbitration Act encompasses all the grounds (except lack
of jurisdiction) on which an award may be set aside under the category of “serious irregularity”, which
is unknown under the Model Law. This concept is carefully defined in sec. 68 by providing a closed list
of irregularities which it is not open to the court to extend123, so that they do not give rise to a general
supervisory  jurisdiction  over  arbitral  awards  on  the  general  ground  of  unfairness  or  want  of  due
process124. Accordingly, this list of irregularities is to be interpreted strictly: even where it is proved
that a serious irregularity falling within the cases listed in sec. 68 has occurred, the court may still not
intervene, unless it also considers that the irregularity has caused or will cause substantive injustice to
the applicant: this will happen only in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so far in its conduct of
the arbitration from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process, that justice calls out for
it  to be corrected and thus  we would expect  the court  to take action125.  Although the grounds  for
challenging  an  award  have  been  expressed  in  the  Act  in  a  different  form  from  the  Model  Law
regulation, the two sets of rules are quite similar in substance126. For example, the irregularities listed in
sec. 68(c) (failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed
by the parties) and sec. 68(d) (failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were put to it)
correspond  to  art  34(iv)  (the  arbitral  procedure  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  agreement  of  the
parties);  sec.  68  (a)  (failure  by the  tribunal  to  comply  with  the  general  duty  of  acting  fairly  and
impartially  between  the  parties,  giving  each  party  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  putting  his  case)
corresponds, at least partially, to art. 34 (ii) of the Model Law (the party was not given proper notice of
the appointment of an arbitrator, or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case) of the Model Law; sec . 68(g) (the award being obtained by fraud or the award or the way in
which it was procured being contrary to public policy) is, as we have seen when dealing with Scots
arbitration law, only a specification of the public policy infringement laid down in art. 34(2)(b)(ii) of
the Model Law. 
122B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 305
123
 DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 282
124Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 352; DAC
1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 280
125
 DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 280
126F Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p.  126-127
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Main divergencies
Kompetenz-Kompetenz
Most major arbitration laws observe the two related principles of Kompetenz-Kompetenz (the power of
the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction) and separability of the arbitration agreement (the arbitration
agreement is treated as separated from the main contract, so that the invalidity of the latter does not
affect the former) and the Model Law embodies both principles in the same art. 16. The Arbitration Act
1996 deals with the matter of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in sections 30-32, which are largely
based on art.  16 of  the Model Law.  However,  the two sets of  provisions  differ  in some respects.
Whereas  art.  16(1)  of  the Model  Law simply states that  the arbitral  tribunal  may rule on its  own
jurisdiction,  including  any  objection  with  respect  to  the  existence  or  validity  of  the  arbitration
agreement, sec. 30(1) of the Arbitration Act  1996 provides a more comprehensive definition of what
matters are included in the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, including also whether the tribunal is
properly  constituted  and  what  matters  have  been  submitted  to  arbitration  in  accordance  with  the
arbitration agreement. However, such matters, although not expressly envisaged in art. 16(1) would
probably fall within its scope127. But the most important difference is that, unlike the corresponding
provision of the Model Law, sec. 30 of the Act is not mandatory and therefore the parties, if they wish,
may agree that the arbitral tribunal shall not have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction.128. Another
important difference is that art. 16(3) of the Model law only contemplates judicial review of the arbitral
tribunal  decision  that  it  does  have  jurisdiction,  while  sec.  67  of  the  Act,  which  deals  with  the
challenging  of  the  award  as  to  its  substantive  jurisdiction,  does  not  appear  to  comply  with  this
limitation: consequently, one must conclude that it allows also an appeal against a tribunal decision that
it does not have jurisdiction129. Finally,  sec. 32 envisages a particular procedure for challenging the
arbitral tribunal jurisdiction which is not contemplated by the Model law: a party may apply directly to
127B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 159
128
 DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 139
129F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p. 113. as we have seen above the Scottish version of art. 16(3)
of the Model law was  amended in order  to allow for an  appeal  against  an  arbitral  tribunal  decision that  it  does have
jurisdiction.
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the court in order to decide a question of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in a preliminary ruling
before the latter has taken any decision on the matter. However, this procedure is subject to a number
of restrictions which make it  applicable in exceptional  cases only130:  all  the parties  must agree in
writing or,  alternatively,  the  arbitral  tribunal  must  give  permission and  the  court  is  satisfied  on a
number of conditions, including the determination of the question is likely to produce a substantial
savings in costs and there is good reason why the matter should be decided by the court.
Contrary to the Model Law approach,  the Arbitration Act  1996 has expressed the principle of the
separability of the arbitration agreement in a different provision from that containing the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz rule. This in order to clearly differentiate between the two concepts.131 Nonetheless, sec. 7
closely mirrors art. 16(1) of the Model Law with a significant difference: the doctrine of separability
does not apply if the parties have agreed otherwise.
Appointment of arbitrators
Sec. 15 complies with the basic principles, stated in art. 10(1) of the Model Law, that the parties are
free to agree on the number of arbitrators. But, whereas sec. 15(3) indicates that where the parties do
not agree on the number of arbitrators, the tribunal shall be composed of a sole arbitrator, in the Model
Law the default number is  three. The sole arbitrator is more in keeping with the English tradition  and
also the concern of avoiding unnecessary expenses: as the DAC observed, the cost of three arbitrators
would have amounted to three times the cost of employing one  and it seemed right that this extra
burden should be available if the parties so choose, but not imposed on them. In addition, the three
arbitrators  rule  does  not  cater  for  the  situation  where  there  are  more  than  two  parties  to  the
arbitration132.  On  the  other  hand,  the  default  rule  of  the  Model  Law  reflects  general  practice  in
international commercial arbitration and is more likely to guarantee equal treatment of both parties133,
even if this is not always so in multi-party arbitrations134. Moreover, sec. 15 (2) contains a rule which
130DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, , par. 147
131
 DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 43
132
 DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 79
133UN Doc A/CN9/232 par. 81
134Cp the discussion on multi-party arbitration in the chapter of the reception of the Model law in Germany
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does not appear in the Model Law and represents a derogation of the principle of party autonomy, in
order to ensure that, unless the parties otherwise agree, decisions cannot be deadlocked for want of
majority135: in the absence of a contrary agreement by the parties, an agreement that there should be an
even number of arbitrators shall be understood as requiring the appointment of an additional arbitrator
as  chairman  of  the  tribunal.  By  contrast,  the  drafters  of  the  Model  Law,  while  considering  it
unnecessary to adopt the rule followed by some states that there should always be an uneven number of
arbitrators136, made nonetheless no provision for any of the difficulties which may arise when an even
number were appointed137.
Another important difference in the matter of the composition of the arbitral tribunal is that sections 15
and  21 of  the  Arbitration Act  1996 make reference  to  the possibility  of  appointing an  umpire.  A
tribunal consisting of two arbitrators and an umpire is a well-established feature of English arbitration
practice, but little understood outside England: it is thus not surprising that this particular composition
of the arbitral tribunal is not contemplated by the Model Law. The umpire is an arbitrator who, as long
as the other arbitrators are in agreement, has no real function or status, but as the arbitrators disagree on
any matter  of the dispute, replaces them as deciding tribunal138. The umpire is to be distinguished from
the chairman, who is an arbitrator having the same functions and obligations and whose views rank
equally with those of the other members of the tribunal, save where there is no majority139.
Minor differences relate to the role of the chairman and some default rules applying in case that the
parties fail to reach an agreement on the procedure for the appointment of the arbitrators. If there is
neither majority nor unanimity among the arbitrators, sec. 20 of the Act provides that the chairman's
decision will prevail. By contrast, art. 29 of the Model Law provides no fall-back provision when a
majority or unanimity cannot be reached: the decision-making powers of the presiding arbitrator are
confined to matters of procedure and such powers are in any case subject to the authorisation of the
parties or all members of the arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, the presiding arbitrator will not be able to
exercise these powers to issue an award, nor otherwise to deal with a matter of substance such as a
challenge  to  any  arbitrator  or  a  jurisdictional  challenge140:  in  these  matters  the  arbitrators  will,  in
135Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 281
136UN Doc A/CN 9/207 par. 67
137Un Doc A/CN 9/216 par. 77
138B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks,  The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 104; Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd,
Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 287
139B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 104
140F Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p. 108; UN Doc/ACN9/246 par. 38
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practice,  have  to  persuade  each  other,  until  at  least  a  majority  is  reached141.  Default  rules  for  the
appointment of arbitrators are substantially based on art. 11 of the Model Law, although they deal with
a wider range of situations.142 Whereas art. 11 of the Model Law only provides for in situations where
there  shall  be either  a  one or  a  three arbitrator  tribunal,  sec.  16 of the Act  contemplates  also the
hypothesis of an arbitral tribunal composed by two arbitrators and an umpire, as well as a residual
default provision applying in any other case (and in particular, if there are more than two parties). In
addition, sec. 17 of the Act envisages a special rule applying in a two-party case where each party is to
appoint an arbitrator and one of them fails to do so. In this situation the Act allows the party not in
default to appoint his arbitrator as sole arbitrator, whose award shall be binding on both parties as if it
had been so appointed by agreement. However, this provision has attracted criticism on the grounds
that the resulting tribunal does not comply with the agreement of the parties  and consequently the
resulting award risks not to be enforced under the New York Convention143. Nonetheless, the DAC has
recommended that this rule should be retained, since it spurs the recalcitrant party into prompt action
and reduces the opportunities of those contemplating dilatory tactics144.
Challenge of arbitrators
The provisions of the Act on the challenge of arbitrators  are very similar to the correspondent Model
Law rules, even if they may appear perhaps in a more systematic fashion145. Whereas  the Model Law
generically refers to the challenge of an arbitrator, the Act distinguishes between revocation of the
arbitrator's  authority  by  the  parties  and  removal  of  the  arbitrator  by  the  court.  The  first  case  is
contemplated in sec. 23, which allows an arbitrator to be revoked either at the instance of the parties
acting jointly, or at the instance of a third party (which may be an arbitral institution) to whom the
parties have vested the relevant powers. The most important difference with the Model Law in this
respect is that in the latter's regime, if the parties do not agree otherwise, the arbitral tribunal is entitled
to decide on the challenged arbitrator,  whereas this possibility is not contemplated in the Act.  The
141B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 122
142DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, , par. 80
143Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 283
144DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, , par. 84
145F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p.  110
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reason for this difference is evidently that the Model Law follows the standard of the three arbitrator
tribunal, while the Act that of the single arbitrator. The second case is contemplated by sec. 24, which
allows a party to apply to the court to remove an arbitrator on any of the grounds envisaged in the
following subsections (a)-(d). These grounds closely resemble those found in articles 12 and 14 of the
Model Law: nonetheless, the first of the grounds envisaged in sec. 24 of the Act has given rise to much
debate  because,  unlike  the  Model  Law,  it  refers  only  to  justifiable  doubts  about  the  arbitrator's
impartiality, without making any mention of his independence. The DAC justified this omission on a
number of grounds. First,  the lack of independence, unless it gave rise to justifiable doubts about the
impartiality of the arbitrator, was considered of no significance. Accordingly, the lack of independence
as  a  separate  ground  for  challenge  was  regarded  unnecessary146.  Secondly,  it  was  feared  that  the
inclusion of this further ground could give rise to endless arguments as it had, for example, in Sweden
and in the United States,  where almost any connection (however remote) had been put forward to
challenge the independence of the arbitrator147. Thirdly, it was argued that there may well be situations
in which the parties desire their arbitrators to have familiarity with a specific field, rather than being
entirely independent148.
The problem of the arbitrator's  lack of independence is particularly delicate in the English system,
where it is often the case that members of the same barristers' chambers participate in arbitrations both
as advocates and as arbitrators, as well as judges in a possible appeal in front of the Commercial Court.
The DAC observed that if in such a case the lack of independence were an available ground, the strict
independence of the arbitrator could be called into question and used as a basis for a challenge149.
However, such a challenge has never been successful in English case law because judges have always
considered the lack of independence as relevant to the extent that it gave rise to serious doubts about
the arbitrator's impartiality. Accordingly, the fact that a barrister arbitrator belongs to the same set of
chambers  as  the  barrister  acting  for  one  of  the  parties  has  not  been  regarded  as  jeopardising  his
impartiality: it has been an everyday occurrence for a barrister to appear against a member of his own
chambers,  and for  other  members  of  his  chambers  to  appear  before  him when he is  acting as an
arbitrator or deputy judge or recorder.150
146DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, , par. 101
147DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 102
148DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, , par. 103
149B. Harris,  R.  Planterose,  J.  Tecks,  The Arbitration Act  1996: A Commentary, cit,  p.  133;  DAC 1996 Report on the
Arbitration Bill, cit,  par. 102
150Laker Airways Inc v. FLS Aerospace Ltd, Lloyd's Rep., 1999, 2, 45
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Appeal on a point of law
During  the travaux  preparatoires of  the  Arbitration  Act  1996  there  was  extensive  discussion  on
whether the right  of appeal  on a question of law should be maintained. The trend in legal  systems
around the world had been towards immunising the award from challenge on the ground of error of
law151,  and  indeed  the  Model  Law envisaged  no such  appeal.  Furthermore,  allowing  the court  to
substitute its own view for that of the parties' chosen tribunal amounted to subvert the parties' choice of
arbitration in preference to litigation152.  Finally, from a commercial standpoint the possibility of giving
rise after an award was made to long court proceedings, often of dilatory character,  made England a
less attractive option to parties choosing a forum for international arbitrations153. On the other hand it
was  answered  that,  where  the  parties  have  agreed  that  the  arbitrator  should decide  the  dispute  in
accordance with an established system of law, they have implicitly agreed that the arbitral tribunal
should apply the law properly, with the consequence that, if it failed to do so, it was not reaching the
result contemplated by the arbitration agreement154. 
Accordingly, the choice has been not to abolish the right of appeal on a point of law altogether, but
rather to keep it in a considerably attenuated fashion155, by restating in legislative form  the existing
principles largely found in case law and adding a number of further adjustments which will make it less
easy to bring an appeal156, thus ensuring that only rarely will the award not constitute the final decision
on the substantive issues in the arbitration157. Maybe the most important reform envisaged by the Act in
this respect is the extension of the right of the parties to exclude the appeal to all categories of disputes:
the “special categories” under the 1979 Act have been abolished and, by virtue of the decision not to
bring into force the special regime for domestic arbitrations provided for in the Arbitration Act 1996,
also the limitation laid down in sec.  87(1) has no longer effect158.  It  is now open to the parties to
151A.Redfern and M. Hunter, op. cit. p. 435
152Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 336
153B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 309
154DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit,  par. 285
155Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 49
156F Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p.  123
157B. Harris,  R.  Planterose,  J.  Tecks,  The Arbitration Act  1996: A Commentary,  cit,  p.  310; DAC 1996 Report on the
Arbitration Bill, cit, , par. 170
158According to  sec.  87(1) of the Arbitration Act  1996, in case of  a  domestic  arbitration agreement,  any agreement  to
exclude the jurisdiction of the court will only be valid if entered into during the course of the arbitral proceedings.
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exclude the right of appeal in any category of dispute and at any time, that is to say before or after the
commencement of the arbitration159.  Another significant  limitation to the right  of appeal  is that  the
party intending to appeal must obtain either the agreement of all the other parties, or the leave of the
court;  among the conditions which must be satisfied before the court  grants  the leave are that the
question of law is one of general public importance and is open to serious doubt  or that the decision of
the tribunal on the question of law is obviously wrong; furthermore, an appeal may not be brought
unless  the appellant  has  first  exhausted any available  arbitral  process  of  appeal  or  review,  or  any
available recourse under sec. 57 (correction of award or additional award); finally the appeal may be
submitted within 28 days of the date of the award, although this deadline may be extended by the court.
Despite the significant limitations introduced with the Arbitration Act 1996, the appeal on a point of
law  is  one  of  the  most  striking  differences  between  the  English  and  the  Model  Law  regime  of
arbitration.  Significantly,  during the  travaux preparatoires of the Model Law, the United Kingdom
expressed reservations on the narrowness of the grounds upon which an award may be challenged: the
Model Law – it observed – must set only a minimum of judicial control; it does not follow, however,
that  it  must  set  a  maximum,  eliminating  even  those  means  of  judicial  control  which  the  parties
themselves desire to retain. Consequently, while fully understanding the point of view that the parties
should not be compelled to submit an appeal on question of law, the United Kingdom suggested that
the logical consequence of party autonomy was that the parties should be allowed to have recourse, if
that is what they have agreed160.
However, aware of the fact that foreigners do not like the idea of the courts involving themselves in the
merits of arbitrations161, the drafters of the Arbitration Act  1996 have expressly restated the caveat that
a question of law is, for a court in England and Wales, a question of  the law of England and Wales162:
159B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 310
160UN Doc A/CN9/263/Addendum 1 paras. 37-38
161Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, vol I, cit, p. 454
162Sec. 82 of the Arbitration Act 1996 clarifies that the well-established  common law principle that foreign law is treated as
a  question  of  fact  (see  e.g.  Dicey  and  Morris,  The  Conflicts  of  Laws, Sweet  and  Maxwell,  1993,  p.  226;  Bumper
development  Corporation v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and Others,WLR, 1991, 1, 1362 at 1368) applies
also to the field of arbitration. The reason of this rule is that it is unlikely that an English judge will have any qualifications
or training in the foreign law in question, therefore, in a system which adopts adversarial procedures,  it appears easier to
introduce the legal fiction whereby a foreign law must be proved by the parties as fact to an English judge. However, the
extension of this rule to international arbitration has been considered not in line with the particular features of international
arbitration itself, where the adoption of adversarial procedures is not always the rule and the international composition of
the arbitral tribunal and the parties' counsel ensure that both the arbitral tribunal and the parties will be sufficiently familiar
with the foreign law. As Hunter notes,  one can for example imagine the surprise of an arbitral tribunal composed by three
distinguished French lawyers,  sitting in England, with French advocates representing the parties, on being informed that
French law would be required to be proved to them as “fact” through an adversarial procedure involving the examination
and cross-examination of expert witnesses duly qualified in French  law! (M. Hunter, The Procedural Powers of Arbitrators
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where the parties have chosen a foreign law or some sets of rules which are not law at all, such as
equity or good conscience, there is no right of appeal.
Issues not contemplated in the Model Law
Consolidation
Sec. 35 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 deals with the thorny question of consolidation of arbitral
proceedings: in accordance with the principle of party autonomy, it provides that the arbitral tribunal
has no power to order the consolidation (that is to say the combining of different, but related claims
into a single proceedings) or to order concurrent hearings (where the claims remain separate but are
heard together for reasons of convenience and cost saving) against the will of the parties163. Moreover,
in the absence of an express provision entitling the court to do so, the latter has no power to order
consolidation164. As Hunter has put it, sec. 35 amounts in effect to no more than a general statement of
party autonomy and represents the law as it would be if the topic had not been mentioned in the Act at
all165. Despite a strong body of opinion calling for a provision that would empower either a tribunal or
the court (or both) to order consolidation of concurrent arbitral proceedings, the DAC was eventually
persuaded  by the  objection  that  a  power  of  compulsory  consolidation  would  be  against  the  basic
principle of party autonomy and in particular would frustrate the agreement of the parties to have their
own arbitral tribunal for their own disputes, since at least one set of parties would be compelled to have
their dispute tried by an arbitral tribunal other than the one chosen by them and possibly also by a
procedure other than that which they have agreed166. Accordingly, it concluded that the problem could
be best solved by those in charge of drafting standard forms of contracts or arbitral institutions whose
regulations may include suitable clauses permitting the tribunal to order consolidation in appropriate
cases.167
under the English 1996 Act, Arb Int, 1997, 13,4, p. 356).
163B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 181
164Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit,  p. 309
165M. Hunter, The Procedural Powers of Arbitrators under the English 1996 Act, cit., p. 358
166DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, par. 180;
167DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit, , par. 181; cp e.g. Rule 3.7 of the Construction Industry Model Arbitration
Rules (CIMAR): <<where the same arbitrator is appointed in two or more related arbitral proceedings on the same project
each of which involves some common issue, whether or not involving the same parties, the arbitrator may, if he considers it
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Immunity of the arbitrator
Sec.  29  mirrors  almost  verbatim the  provision  on  the  liability  of  the  arbitrator  as  found  in   the
arbitration laws of most  common law countries168:  the arbitrator  is  as a  general  rule  not  liable for
anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as arbitrator, unless
the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith; this immunity is also extended, by virtue of sub-
sec. (2) to the arbitrator's employees or agents. Yet, par 3 contains a rule which is not found in the other
common law jurisdictions and which specifies further the extent of the arbitrator's immunity: it clarifies
that the consequences of an arbitrator's resignation do not fall within the immunity provision, but are
regulated by sec. 25 under which the court has the power to relieve the arbitrator from any liability
incurred  by him by resigning  his  appointment.  In  this  case the  extent  of  the resigning arbitrator's
liability is much more uncertain because it entirely depends on the court's discretion: according to sec.
25(4), the court may grant relief from liability on such terms as it thinks fit if it is satisfied that in all
the circumstances it was reasonable for the arbitrator to resign.
Costs of the Arbitration
The English Arbitration Act 1996 provides in secs. 59 to 65 a very detailed regulation on the costs and
fees  of the arbitration specifying exactly by whom they should be paid and how much of them is
recoverable.  The length of these provisions (  the DAC itself does not hesitate to define them as a
“code”169),  which extend over  a  considerable  part  of  the Act,  has  raised some concern:  too much
attention seems to have been paid to a subject which is only of subordinate importance in the context of
arbitration  as  a  whole.  Nonetheless,  the  incidence  and  the  amount  of  costs  is  an  issue  of  crucial
importance to parties which is often underestimated by their legal advisers, with the result that the latter
often convince their clients to embark on an arbitral dispute with only the haziest idea of the potential
appropriate, order the concurrent hearing of any two or more such proceedings or of any clam or issue arising in such
proceedings>>.
168See supra pp. 241 ff
169DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, cit,  par. 265
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liability for costs. In  line with the principle of user-friendliness ,  these provisions attempt to make
transparent  to  the first-time user  of  English  arbitration  (especially  overseas  parties  and  their  legal
advisers) the principles on which costs are awarded and their recoverable amount is determined170.
Sec. 59 defines what is meant by “costs of the arbitration”: they include not only the fees and expenses
of the arbitrator but also the fees and expenses of any arbitral institution concerned, the legal or other
costs of the parties and the costs of or incidental to any proceedings to determine the amount of the
recoverable costs of the arbitration. This provision follows the pattern of art. 38 of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules and has its counterpart in the arbitration laws of most common law countries.171 The
following  sections  establish  in  large  detail  how the  costs  of  the  arbitration  are  to  be  determined,
allocated and borne as between the parties. The most important of these provisions is sec. 63 which
envisages three ways of cost determination: the first is the agreement of the parties, which is of course
the most common method; in the absence of such agreement sec. 63(3) provides that the tribunal may
determine by award the recoverable costs of the arbitration on such basis as it thinks fit; if the tribunal
does not determine the recoverable costs of the arbitration, sec. 64(4) provides that any party to the
arbitral proceedings may apply to the court for such determination.
The  Act  also  contains  an  elaborated  provision  (sec.  49)  on  the  award  of  interest  by  the  tribunal
distinguishing between interest up to the date of the award (sec. 49.a) and interest from the date of the
award up to the payment.  In addition sec. 49 empowers the tribunal to award interest on interest (the
so-called compound interest); this is an important innovation brought about by the Arbitration Act 1996
since it confers upon the tribunal a power to which the courts are not entitled: according to sec. 3(1)(a)
of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 the latter are expressly prevented from the
awarding of interest upon interest.
Conclusion: England as a Model Law country?
Most British commentators tend to emphasise the peculiarity of the Arbitration Act 1996  with respect
to the Model Law. Although they acknowledge that the Arbitration Act 1996 has adopted the Model
170Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit,  p. 344
171See supra pp. 235 ff
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Law's structure and language, they are reluctant to consider the Act simply as a mirror of the Model
Law with some special local features, as is the case with many national arbitration laws developed
under its influence172.  Nonetheless, some authors underline the mismatch between the initial scepticism
of the Mustill Report vis à vis the Model Law and the large extent of influence which the latter ended
up exerting on the Arbitration Act 1996, so that not only is virtually every article of the Model Law
reflected in a section of the 1996 Act173, but also the Model Law was eventually taken as the standard
against which pre-existing English law had to be judged174.
The survey above has shown that the Arbitration Act 1996 differs from the Model Law in four main
respects: the scope of application, the rules on the appointment and challenge of arbitrators, the appeal
on a question of law and the rules on Kompetenz Kompetenz. As to the first respect, it must be observed
that also Germany has made the choice of extending its arbitration act to domestic and non-commercial
disputes, but this departure from the Model Law has not prevented it from being regarded as a Model
Law country. As to the second respect, it may be said that such rules are non-mandatory and appear
justified in order to adapt  the Model Law's   standard regime to the local  particularities  of English
arbitration practice, but in no way do they represent a radical departure from the Model law's structure
and inspiring principles. The only substantial differences remain the right to submit an appeal on a
question of law and the rules on  Kompetenz Kompetenz: these divergences have led some author to
conclude that the Arbitration Act 1996 permits a wider extent of court intervention with respect to the
Model Law175. However, it should be noted that the level of judicial intervention will largely depend on
the approach English courts will adopt in interpreting the Arbitration Act provisions. The test of sec 32,
which allows the court to decide on any question as to the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction,  is onerous and
difficult to meet; nonetheless, it has given rise to different interpretations: in some cases the English
courts have rejected the claimant's application under sec. 32 which had been brought without the other
party's agreement and before the arbitration had commenced176; in others they have argued that they
possess an inherent jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief even where sec. 32 had not been satisfied177.
By the same token, given the strict limitations envisaged by the Act, one may expect that an appeal will
172Lord Mustill, and S.C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second Edition, cit, p. 11
173
 J. Tackaberry and A. Marriott, op. cit., par. 2-064
174F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law? cit, p. 128
175A.S. Reid, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the English Arbitration Act: Are the
Two Systems Poles Apart?, Journal of International Arbitration, 2004, 21, 3, p. 229
176Vale Do Rio Navegacos S.A. v. Shanghai Bao Steel Ocean Shipping and Sea Partners Ltd,, All E.R. (Comm), 2000, 2,
270
177JT Mackley & Co. v. Gosport Marina Ltd, 2002, EWHC, 1315
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be  hardly  successful  in  English  courts,  especially  in  the   case  of  international  arbitrations,  since
according  to  English  law arbitral   disputes  in  which  a  foreign  or  transnational  law is  applied  are
excluded from appeal. Yet, English courts have not so far followed a clear-cut approach: for example in
Gbangola v. Smith & Sheriff Ltd178, in interpreting the requirement whereby the question of law should
be one which the  tribunal  was asked to  determine,  it  was  stated  that  this  is  admissible  where the
question of law is integral to the resolution of the dispute which was argued before the arbitrator even it
had not specifically been argued before the tribunal. By contrast, in India Steamship Co. Ltd v. Arab
Potash Co Ltd179, the court argued that in a case where there is more than one arguable construction of
words used in a contract  and the tribunal arrived at  a construction other  than that  which the court
considered might be right, the court should not interfere by virtue of sec. 69(3)(d)180. 
Apart  from the qualification of England as a Model Law country,  it  is  important  to underline the
fundamental role the Model Law has played in the reform of English arbitration law. If  the British
drafters had not taken into careful consideration the Model Law provisions, the Arbitration Act 1996
would have not  probably had that revolutionary character which has been repeatedly emphasised by its
commentators181.
In conclusion, although there may be some relevant differences between the Arbitration Act 1996 and
the Model Law, both sets of rules appear nonetheless linked by the same objective of reducing the level
of judicial intervention in the arbitral process. This may be achieved only through a twin approach: on
the one hand courts  must  learn  to adopt a  laissez  faire approach to arbitration;  on the other  hand
arbitrators, by increasing their professionalism through training and education, must be able to make
decisions which appear to the courts beyond reproach. Given the identity of objective, it is very likely
that the two systems will increasingly converge in the twenty-first century182.
1781998, 3 All ER 730
179Unreported, quoted by B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, cit, p. 312
180This provision envisages that the court shall grant leave of appeal  if it is satisfied that, despite the agreement of the
parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all circumstances for the court to determine the question.
This  supplementary requirement provides in practice the courts with discretion as to grant the leave even where the other
requirements of subsection 69(3) are satisfied, 
181See  J. Tackaberry and A. Marriott,, op. cit. , par. 2-059; B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A
Commentary, cit, p 1 and 11
182A.S. Reid, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the English Arbitration Act: Are the
Two Systems Poles Apart? cit., p. 227 and 238
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE HARMONISATION OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO
THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE – DRAFTING AND DIFFUSION OF THE
UNIDROIT  PRINCIPLES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS
The problem of the choice of law applicable to the merits of the dispute in
international arbitration
The choice of the law applicable to the merits  of the dispute is  a  crucial  issue in international
arbitration and has attracted much scholarly writing: nothing is more important in any international
arbitration than knowing the legal or other standards to apply to assess the rights and obligations of
the parties1. The selection of the substantive law may sometimes be so complex that an interim
award may be required on the issue, preceded by full written and oral submissions2.
As a general rule, international conventions, national laws and the rules of international arbitral
institutions support the free choice by parties of a law to govern their contract3. Accordingly, the
most  important  principle  to  determine  the  law applicable  to  the  merits  of  the  dispute  is  party
autonomy4. Parties may choose as substantive law, for example, a neutral law (i.e. a law with no
connection with the dispute or with no particular relationship to any party), different laws to govern
different aspects of their relationship (the so-called  dépeçage) or even a non-national  system of
rules,  such  as  “general  principles  of  international  law”,  the  lex  mercatoria,  the  UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, or the INCOTERMS5. Where parties have found
an agreement on the applicable substantive law (the so-called choice-of-law clause) most arbitral
tribunals and national courts will normally enforce it. Nonetheless, despite this general recognition
1J.D.M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis, S. Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer, 2003, p. 412.
2W.L. Craig, W.W. Park, J. Paulsson,  International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, Dobbs Ferry Oceana, 2000, p.
320.
3The most important conventions in this matter are the European Community Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contract Obligations (the Rome Convention, I.L.M., 19, p. 1492, now a EU Regulation), the Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the Hague Convention, I.L.M., 24, p. 1573) and the Inter-
American Convention on the Law Applicable to Inyernational Contracts (Mexico City Convention, I.L.M., 33, p. 732).
Choice- of -law agreements are also enforceable under the laws of virtually all trading nations (see e.g. Art. 187.1 of the
Swiss Law on Private International Law and art. 1496 of the French Code of Civil Procedure ). Finally, recognition of
party autonomy in the choice of substantive law is also the unanimous approach of all institutional arbitration rules (see
e.g. art 17(1) of the 1998 ICC Rules, art. 22.3 of the LCIA Rules and art. 29 of the AAA International Rules).
4M. Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, Kluwer, 2001, p. 418. 
5See M. L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Cambridge University Press,
2008, pp. 69-75;.J.D.M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis, S. Kröll;op.cit, pp. 417-8. 
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of party autonomy in the selection of the substantive law, national laws generally impose two limits
on this principle: the mandatory rules and the public policy of the forum6. In the United States, for
example, parties are not free to choose any law. Under the Restatement Second, Conflicts of Laws,
a choice-of -law agreement will be enforced if a)it violates no applicable public policy and b) there
is a substantial relationship between the party or the transaction and the law that is chosen, or a
reasonable basis for the parties'choice7
However, it is not uncommon in international arbitration that parties cannot agree on the substantive
law g overning their dispute:: according to a study in ICC arbitration agreements, this happens in
roughly 25% of the cases8. In case of failure by the parties to designate the applicable substantive
law, arbitration rules and laws uniformly provide that arbitrators will make this determination, and
generally give them broad discretion to do so. The method of determining the law, however, differs
not only from law to law, but also from arbitrator to arbitrator.
Broadly  speaking,  there  are  two  ways  in  which  arbitral  tribunals  determine  the  applicable
substantive law where parties have failed to make a choice: the so-called voie indirecte whereby the
applicable substantive law is determined by applying conflict of laws rules and the so-called voie
directe whereby the arbitral tribunal applies directly the law which appears most appropriate or has
the  closest  connection  with  the  dispute.  Until  recently,  the  traditional  approach  has  been  to
determine the substantive law by applying the conflict of laws rules of the place of arbitration. This
solution,  which  was  recommended by the  International  Law Institute  in  1957 and 19599,  was
6In most cases, it is the forum's public policy that will apply to invalidate a choice-of-law agreement. However, there are
also cases where the public policy of another jurisdiction will be given effrect by the forum court (the so-called “foreign
public policy”, see e.g. § 187(b) of the US Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, according to which the law of the
state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties  does not apply where the application of the law
of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue).
7Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, §§ 6 and 187. The state of New York is, however, an exception. According
to § 5-1401 of New York General Obligations Law, the parties' choice of New York law is enforced under certain
conditions even if there is no reasonable relationship to the state, namely the contract must not involve personal, family,
or household services, or labour, and the amount involved must be at least US $ 250,000. Moreover, under § 5-1402, if
foreign parties stipulate that New York law is the law of the contract, the state of New York provides for personal
jurisdiction and  its  courts  may  not  dismiss  for  forum non  conveniens  if  the  amount  in  question is  at  least  US $
1,000,000. Thus, the state of New York has chosen to accept party autonomy in commercial cases if the amount in
dispute is sufficiently large in an attempt to secure and increase its reputation as an international business centre, with
ease of access to its legal system for parties with relatively significant transactions. (M.L. Moses, op.cit., p. 71-2). 
8S. R. Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited),  in C.R. Drahozal and R.W. Naimark (eds), Towards a
Science  of  International  Arbitration:  Collected  Empirical  Research,  Kluwer,  2005,pp.  65-80.  By  analysing  the
arbitration clauses contained in the 237 arbitration cases submitted to the ICC's International Court of Arbitration in
1987 and  in  the  215 submitted  in  1989,  the  author  found  that  parties  to  ICC arbitration agreements   identified  a
particular substantive law 75% of the time in 1987 and 66% of the time in 1989; it follows a contrario that at least 25%
of the time parties do not choose a substantive law in their arbitration agreements. These figures have been confirmed
by more recent statistics: in 1998 82.1% of the cases submitted to ICC, in 1999 82% and in 2001 77% included an
express choice of law (statistics quoted by  J.D.M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis, S. Kröll, op.cit, p. 413).
9Annuaire de l' Institut du Droit International, 1957, 47, p. 394 and 1959, 48, p. 264: <<the rule of choice of law in the
seat of the arbitral tribunal must be followed to settle the law applicable to the substance of the difference>>.
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founded on the idea that the parties' selection of the place of arbitration was an implied choice that
the law of that place should apply to the substance of the dispute10. Now this approach has been
substantially eroded by contemporary practice, but it has not completely disappeared11: there are
still  cases  in  which  national  courts  and  arbitral  tribunal  have  considered  the  chosen  place  of
arbitration  as  a  n  implied  choice  of  the  law  of  that  place,  but  this  is  no  longer  an  absolute
presumption; the selection of the place of arbitration is no more than another general connecting
factor which may be relevant in the circumstances of the particular case12. Consequently, conflict of
laws rules different from that of the place of arbitration are nowadays frequently applied by arbitral
tribunals  selecting  the  applicable  substantive  law.  In  particular,  three  main  alternatives  to  the
arbitral seat rule have emerged in practice13. The first, which was originally envisaged by art. VII(1)
of the 1961 European Convention on International Arbitration, is that the arbitral tribunal has the
power to select the conflict of laws rules it deems appropriate. This solution has been adopted in art.
28(2)  of  the  UNCITRAL Model  Law  and  has  also  been  followed by several  non-Model  Law
countries,  such  as  England14.  This  approach  confers  a  wide  discretion  upon  the  arbitrator  in
establishing what is meant by “appropriate” conflict of laws rules in relation to the circumstances of
the case15.  The second is the so-called cumulative approach, whereby the arbitral tribunal looks at
the various conflict of laws rules which are potentially applicable in order to conclude that all the
relevant rules point to the same law, and thus that law becomes the applicable law16.  International
arbitration tribunals have often adopted this approach with a view to avoiding to choose a single
system of conflict of laws rules: where the conflict rules of all the jurisdictions related to the dispute
point to the same substantive law, then there is in fact no conflict whatsoever on the law applicable
10J.D.M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis, S. Kröll, op.cit, p. 415; G.B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary
and Materials, Kluwer, 2001 p. 529.
11G.B.Born,  op.cit.,  p. 530. There are still  cases in which arbitrators apply the conflict of laws rules of the place of
arbitration: see e.g. ICC case 5460/1987, YBCA, 1988, XIII, p. 104 and interim award in ICC case 6149/1990, YBCA,
1995, XX, p. 41.
12J.D.M. Lew,  L. A.  Mistelis,  S.  Kröll,  op.cit,  pp.  415-16. See e.g.  Oberlandesgericht  Hamm,  15 November  1994,
Slovenian Company, formerly State Enterprise v Agent (Germany), YBCA, 1997, XXII, p. 707 in which the court held
that the choice of Zurich as the seat of the arbitration may imply the choice of the law of the canton of Zurich as law
governing the substance of the dispute; ICC case 2735/1976, Clunet, 1977, 104, p. 947 in which the arbitral tribunal
stated that the applicable law can be implied from the determination of the seat of arbitration; by contrast, in the ICC
case 5717/1988 (ICC Bullettin, 1990, 1, 2, p. 22) the arbitral tribunal held that the choice of England as the place of
arbitration and English as the language of the contract did not manifest the parties' interntion that English law should
apply to the contract.
13Cp. W.L. Craig, W.W. Park, J. Paulsson,  International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, cit., pp. 288ff
14Art. 46(3) English Arbitration Act 1996
15See e.g. ICC case 7319/1992, YBCA, 1999, XXIV, p. 141 and ICC case 6527/1991, YBCA, 1993, XVIII, p. 44. Cp
also O.  Lando,  The Law Applicable to the Merits  of  the Dispute,  in  J.D.M. Lew (ed),  Contemporary Problems in
International Arbitration, Kluwer, 1987, p. 106, who argues that often arbitrators consider the law of the unsuccessful
party as the most appropriate in order to show that this law confirms their findings. 
16M.L. Moses, op.cit., p. 77.
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to  the  merits  and  therefore  the  arbitrator  can  proceed  to  apply  that  substantive  law directly17.
According to the third approach, the arbitral tribunal embarks on a comparative analysis of all the
main  systems  of  conflict  of  laws  rules  in  an  attempt  to  establish  the  existence  of  universally
recognised  principles  of  conflict  of  laws18.   Yet,  while  a  number  of  alternative  criteria  to  the
traditional approach may be identified, there is no consensus regarding any of these alternatives. As
a result, substantial uncertainty often surrounds the selection of the applicable substantive law by
arbitral  tribunals  and  this  does  not  match  with  the  ideals  of  predictability  and  efficiency  that
arbitration promises19 .
 Dissatisfaction with the functioning of conflict  of laws rules has led most national  legislators,
arbitral  institutions  and  tribunal  to  abandon  the  voie  indirecte approach  in  favour  of  the  voie
directe20. Although the Model Law and some other national laws opt for the voie indirecte, most of
the modern arbitration rules and laws (and among them the arbitration laws of many Model Law
countries21) allow the arbitral tribunal to determine the substantive law directly without applying
conflicts of laws rules. There is an increasing consensus that arbitrators, unlike judges, have no
particular  obligation  to  a  state  to  use  its  conflict  of  laws  rules  for  determining  the  applicable
substantive law. A national court judge derives his powers from the state and therefore must apply
the forum's conflict of laws rules which express the state policies as to the correct determination of
the extent of legislative jurisdiction of other states.  By contrast, an arbitral tribunal derives his
powers from an arbitration agreement between private parties and does not excercise public powers
in the name of the state. Since international arbitrators owe a duty to the parties rather than the state,
they do not need to implement or follow state policies; hence, they shall not be bound to comply
with any state conflict  of laws rules.  It  follows that,  even if  there are conflict  of laws rules in
national arbitration laws, these provide a tool that the arbitrators may use  rather than an obligation
to  apply  them.  22.  Moreover,  the  place  of  arbitration  may  be  chosen  for  many  reasons,  not
necessarily connected to the particular conflict of laws rules in the jurisdiction. When the parties
17J.D.M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis, S. Kröll, op.cit, p. 432. See e.g. interim award in ICC case 5314/1988, YBCA, 1995, XX,
p. 35; ICC case 6281/1989, YBCA, 1990, XV, p. 96.
18There are two main variations of this approach. In the first, arbitral tribunals have expressly referred to “international
principles of private international law” derived from a perceived consensus among the various national laws on conflict
of laws rules.  In the second, arbitral tribunals have derived conflict rules from international conventions on private
international  law,  which,  although  not  strictly  applicable,  were  thought  to  embody commonly  shared  international
principles. See e.g. ICC cases 2096/1972 and 2585/1977 cited by W.L. Craig, W.W. Park, J. Paulsson, op. cit., p. 326
notes 26 and 27; O. Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, cit., p. 107.
19G.B.Born, op.cit., p. 525 and 530.
20See also the discussion at pp. 96ff
21See e.g. Sec. 1051(2) of the 1998 German Arbitration Act and art. 75(2) of the 1993 Tunisia Arbitration Code.
22J.D.M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis, S. Kröll, op.cit, p. 426; W.L. Craig, W.W. Park, J. Paulsson, op. cit., p. 322.
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have not chosen a place of arbitration, and it has been selected by an arbitral instiution or tribunal,
there is even less reason for the state's conflict of laws rules to be considered23. 
The direct determination approach (voie directe) allows the arbitral tribunal to select the applicable
substantive law or rules relevant for the particular case without reference to any conflict of laws
rules. There are two variations of this approach: the voie directe limited to national laws and  the
unlimited  voie directe, allowing the tribunal to apply any appropriate rules or standards, even of
non-national character. Whereas most national arbitration laws still opt for the voie directe limited
to national laws24, the unlimited voie directe has been introduced by a number of countries with a
long tradition in arbitration, such as Switzerland25, France26 and the Netherlands27 and also by most
international  arbitration  rules,  such  as  the  ICC28 the  LCIA29 and  the  AAA30.  In  adopting  the
unlimited  voie directe the term “rules  of  law” has  generally  been  used.  This  term,  which  was
originally adopted in the 1987 Swiss Law on Private International Law, is commonly interpreted as
allowing the arbitrator not only to apply directly any national legal system but also non-national
rules, such as the lex mercatoria or the UNIDROIT Principles. 
As  we  will  see  in  the  following  paragraphs,  the  application  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  in
international arbitration may help to overcome, or at least reduce, the problems related to the choice
of the substantive law applicable to the merits of the dispute. This may be done in essentially two
ways. The first is by fostering further harmonisation among the various national contract laws, or at
least  an  internationally  oriented  interpretation  of  these  laws,  so  that  they  become  somewhat
23M.L.  Moses,  op.cit.,  p.  77.  Contra G.B.  Born  who  argues  that  the  direct  application  of  national  law is  not  an
appropriate response to the problem of conflict of laws rules. The purpose of conflict of laws rules is to provide parties
with certainty about the substantive law governing the contract: directly applying a substantive law without conflict of
laws analysis leaves the parties' substantive rights to the arbitrators' unpredictable discretion. Accordingly the better
(albeit difficult) solution would be to develop uniform conflict of laws rules which can predictably and transparently
consulted and applied in reasones awards. (G.B.Born, op.cit.,p. 531).
24
 See e.g. art. 39(2) of the 1994 Egyptian Law enacting a Law concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters
and sec. 1051(2) of the 1998 German Arbitration Law
25Art. 187 of Swiss Law of Private International Law: <<the tribunal shall decide the dispute according to the rules of
law with which the case has the closest connection>>.
26Art. 1496 of the French Code of Civil Procedure: << the arbitrator shall resolve the dispute in accordance with the
rules of law he considers appropriate>>.
27Art. 1054(2) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure: <<the tribunal shall make its award in accordance with the rules of
law which it considers appropriate>>
28Art. 17(1) of the 1998 ICC Rules: <<The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the
arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the
rules of law which it determines to be appropriate>>.
29Art. 22(3) of the LCIA Rules: <<The arbitral tribunal shall decide the parties' dispute in accordance with the law(s) or
rules of law chosen by the parties as applicable to the merits of their dispute. If and to the extent that the arbitral tribunal
determines that the parties have made no such choice, the srbitral tribunal shall apply the law(s) or rules of law which it
considers appropriate>>. 
30Art. 28(1) of the International Arbitration Rules of the AAA: <<The tribunal shall apply the substantive law(s) or rules
of law designated by the parties as applicable to the dispute. Failing such a designation by the parties, the tribunal shall
apply such law(s) or rules of law as it determines to be appropriate>>. 
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interchangeable and the degree of conflict among them is significantly reduced31.  The second is
through the development of an articulated body of non-national  rules  of substantive law which
arbitrators  may directly apply to  the merits  of the dispute without prior recourse to any set  of
conflict of laws rules32.
SECTION I:  LEGISLATIVE  HISTORY,  SCOPE  OF APPLICATION AND
GENERAL  FEATURES  OF  THE  UNIDROIT  PRINCIPLES  OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
The legislative history of the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts
The legislative history of the UNIDROIT Principles can be traced back to 1968, when the then
Secretary-General  of UNIDROIT,  Mario Matteucci,  in the course of an international conference
held in Rome to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Institute, launched the proposal of drafting a
‘restatement” of the general part of the law of international commercial contracts on the pattern of
the “Restatements of the law” in the United States of America. The idea was to identify <<a body of
rules  reflecting  the  common principles  that  can  be  extracted  from the  case  law of  the  various
countries>>,  which,  although not bestowed with binding force,  could <<represent  the first  step
towards a uniform code>>1. This proposal was further developed by the UNIDROIT Secretariat,
which in 1970 submitted a report to the third session of UNCITRAL on the progressive codification
of  the  law  of  international  trade2.  The  report  emphasised  the  particular  characteristics  of
international  transactions  with  respect  to  domestic  ones  and  consequently  called  upon  the
development of <<an ordinary law of international trade>>, altogether different from the regulation
of domestic relationships, which alone could provide the legal framework needed by international
31Cp what G. Kaufmann-Kohler writes with reference to the law applicble to arbitration proceedings: <<Arbitration
laws are increasingly harmonized. As a result, they tend to become interchangeable. Admittedly, most of them have not
yet reached this stage, but the overall trend is undisputable. If arbitration laws are truly interchangeable, which one
applies becomes irrelevant. In this sense, the impact of individual national laws decreases>>. (G. Kaufmann-Kohler,
Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, Va. J. Trans. L., 2003, 36, p. 1320).
32Cp G.B.Born, op.cit., p. 43.
1UNIDROIT Annuaire, 1967-1968, II, pp. 267-268
2
 UN Doc A/CN.9/L. 19
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trade to prosper3. This ordinary law of international trade should take the shape of a uniform code:
the report  underlined the weakenesses of the fragmentary unification of international  trade law,
which had so far been achieved only in limited sectors, such as transport, the sale of goods and
intellectual  property,  namely  contradictory  provisions,  divergent  interpretations  due  to  lack  of
common  general  principles,  overlapping  and  duplication4.  In  particular,  the  existing  sectoral
unification was severely undermined by the lack of common general  principles,  since the gaps
within uniform instruments needed to be filled by drawing on basic principles of some domestic
law. Accordingly, the report proposed to go beyond the stage of partial and fragmentary unification
and undertake systematic codification at least of the basic principles of the law of international
trade. This codification should have been gradual: at the beginning, the preparation of an outline of
an ideal code was envisaged, examining all the subjects which should be covered; once this overall
plan had been drafted, a project for the general part of the code should be prepared, containing the
basic principles which would be the foundations of the unification; finally, the drafts related to the
special parts should be drawn up, including the uniform laws already into force or in the process of
elaboration,  which  should  be  nonetheless  revised  and  harmonised  to  comply  with  the  basic
principles of the general part. As a result, it was expected that codification would have gradually
grown within the framework  of  uniform general  principles,  until  it  covered  the whole field  of
international  trade  law5.  Accordingly,  the  initial  approach  of  UNIDROIT  to  the  unification  of
international  trade  law  envisaged  the  creation  of  uniform  rules  through  the  drafting  of  an
international convention or model law which, by their reception into domestic law, would have led
to special statutes for international commercial law.6
Despite the enthusiastic claims of the report, the idea of a progressive codification of the whole
subject-matter of international trade law was subsequently regarded by the experts in charge of the
project  as  over-ambitious,  if  not  misleading7.  In  1971, the UNIDROIT Governing Council  (the
Institute's highest scientific body) set up a restricted steering committee of experts (René David,
Clive M. Schmitthoff,  and Tudor Popescu, representing the civil  law, the common law and the
former  socialist  systems),  with  the  task  of  studying  the  feasibility  of  the  proposed  uniform
international trade code8. In its first report of 1974, the steering committee decided to narrow down
the codification plan to the general part of the law of contract and to deal with specific contracts
3Par. 6
4Ibidem
5par.7
6
 R. David, UNIDROIT Annuaire, 1967-1968, p. 80
7M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 21
8M. J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Initiative for the Progressive Codification of International Trade Law, ICLQ, 1978, 27,
2, p. 414
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only at a later stage9. As to the scope of application of the code, there was agreement on restricting
it to international  commercial  contracts only,  but to leave aside for the time being the difficult
problem  of  defining  the  terms  “international”  and  “commercial”  contracts.  This  and  other
preliminary questions, such as the mandatory or non-mandatory character of the code or its single
provisions, or the exact definition of some other basic concepts (e.g. good faith, public policy, etc.)
should have been  dealt with at a later stage and then included in an introductory paragraph or
section of the code10. As we will see, apart from that of the  mandatory or non-mandatory character
of the future code, each of these questions has so far remained unsettled even in the latest version of
the UNIDROIT Principles in 2004. 
 As far as the problem of the future code's binding force  was concerned, the steering committee
envisaged three possible options: the future code could be the object of an international convention
by which states would undertake an obligation to bring it into force within their national systems of
law; or it could be approved in the form of model law, which each national legislator would be free
to adopt in whole or in part; or the code could assume a purely private character, which, simply
because of the authority of the institution which elaborated it, would be used by arbitrators when
called  upon  to  decide  on  disputes  concerning  international  trade  relationships11.  Whereas  the
steering  committee  supported  the  first  option12,  when  in  1979  the  project  of  the  progressive
codification  of  international  trade  law  was  taken  up  by  an  enlarged  study  group,  most  of  its
members rejected the idea of the convention13. However, the final decision as to the binding force of
the  uniform  instrument  was  not  taken  until  1985,  when  the  Secretariat  was  entrusted  by  the
Governing Council with the task of preparing a paper illustrating the purposes of the project, its
state of work, as well its particular problem areas, with a view to enabling it to take decisions,
especially as to whether work on the project should be pursued and, if so, the speed at which such
work should progress14. In its 1985 report, the Secretariat dealt,  inter alia, with the issue of the
binding  character  of  the  codification  project.  It  observed  that  the  term  “codification”  was
misleading, as it might give the impression that what was envisaged was the elaboration of a “code”
of the kind known in many civil law countries, i.e. a single piece of legislation providing a logically
perfect and complete system of general principles and rules replacing national laws15. Yet, this was
not the case: at least in the near future, the only realistic objective of the project was the preparation
9Explanatory Report, UNIDROIT 1979, Study L, Doc. 15, p. 7
10Ibidem
11Explanatory  Report,  UNIDROIT 1979,  Study L,  Doc.  15,  p.  9;  M. J.  Bonell,  The  UNIDROIT  Initiative for the
Progressive Codification of International Trade Law, cit., pp. 440-441
12Explanatory Report, UNIDROIT 1979, Study L, Doc. 15, p. 9
13UNIDROIT 1979, Study L, Doc. 16,  par.4
14UNIDROIT, 1984, C.D. 63rd session, p. 27
15Secretariat Note, UNIDROIT 1985, C.D. 64, Doc. 6, par. 10
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of a sort of international restatement of contract law (this was, after all, the original idea launched in
1968),  i.e.  an  instrument  of  a  purely  private  character  which,  relying  on  the  authority  of  the
institution  under  whose  auspices  it  was  drafted,  would  have  been  used  in  practice  by  parties,
arbitrators and national legislators16. The Secretariat considered as anachronistic the drafting of an
international trade law code in the traditional sense, i.e. a single piece of legislation constituting the
primary source for the regulation of international trade relationships, capable of providing a definite
solution for all cases which might arise in practice: international trade was an area subject by its
very nature to continuous changes and new developments, which therefore required a sufficiently
flexible  legal  regime17.  It  was  also  emphasised  that,  although  in  the  past  UNIDROIT  had
exclusively been engaged in initiatives aiming at the unification of law at a legislative level,  the
concept of unification itself had recently become less and less attractive to states18. An increasing
number of  conventions  already adopted  at  international  level  were  not  ratified  and  thus  risked
remaining dead letter; moreover, states were even more reluctant to embark on initiatives for the
elaboration  of  new  uniform  conventions  and  model  laws.  Accordingly,  all  international
organizations dealing with the unification and harmonisation of law had to reconsider the working
methods so far followed19. In the case of UNIDROIT the difficulties were particularly evident, since
after  the  creation  of  UNCITRAL in 1968 there had been a growing tendency,  also among the
member states of UNIDROIT, to consider UNCITRAL, at least in the field of international trade
law, the most appropriate forum for the elaboration of legislative means of harmonisation and to
confer on UNIDROIT the task of carrying out the preparatory studies. Although such a task still had
its merits, it was realised that the Institute should in addition pursue separate activities, so as to
reinforce its unique position in relation to other international organisations and that the drafting of
the proposed restatement could be seen as one of these initiatives20.  This being so, in order to avoid
any misunderstanding in this  respect,  the UNIDROIT Governing Council  ultimately decided in
1985  to  change  the  name  of  the  project:  the  misleading  title  of  “Progressive  Codification  of
International  Trade Law” was renamed “Preparation of Principles for International  Commercial
Contracts”21, in order to make clear that what was intended was not the elaboration of provisions of
16M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit., p. 21, n. 7 and UNIDROIT 1975, C.D. 54th Session,
pp. 9-13
17Secretariat  Note,  UNIDROIT  1985,  C.D.  64,  Doc.  6,  par.  10;  M.  J.  Bonell,  A  Restatement  of  Principles  for
International Commercial Contracts, Revue de Droit des Affaires Internationales, 1988, 7, p. 877.
18M. J. Bonell, A Restatement of Principles for International Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 886
19These arguments have subsequently been included in the Introduction to the official text of the UNIDROIT Principles:
<<Efforts towards the international unification of law have hitherto essentially taken the form of binding instruments,
such as supranational  legislation or international conventions,  or of model  laws.  Since these instruments  often risk
remaining little more than dead letter and tend to be rather fragmentary in character, calls are increasingly being made
for recourse to non-legislative means of unification or harmonisation of law>> (p. vii).
20M. J. Bonell, A Restatement of Principles for International Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 887
21UNIDROIT, 1985, C.D. 64 – Doc. 14 pp. 10-37
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a binding nature, but of principles of a purely private character which would be applied in practice
because of their persuasive value22.
The project lagged behind for some years among the priorities of the UNIDROIT activities, until in
1980 a special Working Group was set up with the task of preparing the various draft chapters of
the Principles. The Working Group's membership and decision-making method closely mirrored the
typical  features  of  an  epistemic  community:  it  was  not  composed  by  delegations  of  state
representatives, as it would have been the case for the preparation of an international treaty23; rather,
it  was  made  up  of  leading  experts  in  the  field  of  contract  law  and  international  trade  law,
representing all the major legal and socio-economic systems of the world; most of the members
were academics24 , some high ranking judges or civil servants, but, most importantly, they all sat in
a personal capacity and did not express the views of their governments. These latter features made it
easier for the Working Group to make the “better argument” (in Habermas’ terms) prevail25, i.e.
reach  a  consensus  on  rules  representing  only “best  solutions”,  and  not  reflecting  the  solutions
common to all the legal systems of the world26. Of course, also the non-binding character of the
project was a crucial factor facilitating compromise among experts stemming from different legal
cultures27. Accordingly,  the fact that these experts sat in their personal capacity, together with the
awareness that whatever solution would have been adopted,  this would not have had a binding
force, allowed them to depart, where necessary, from their national preferences and be ready to be
persuaded to change them in view of the choice of the better solution, more in line with the needs of
international trade. 
22M. J. Bonell, A Restatement of Principles for International Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 878
23C.  Kessedian,  Un  Exercise  de  Rénovation  des  Sources  du  Droit  des  Contrats  du  Commerce  International:  les
Principes Proposés par l' Unidroit, Rev. crit. dr. internat. privé, 1995, 84, 4, p. 644
2414 members of the Working Group out of 17 were academic professors
25
 See supra pp. 77
26Cp.  M.  P.  Furmston,  The  UNIDROIT  Principles  and  International  Commercial  Arbitration,  in  Institute  of
International Business Law and Practice (ed), UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts: a New
Lex Mercatoria?, ICC Publication, 490/1, 1995, p. 100: <<It made it strikingly more possible to conduct a realistic
search for the “best” solution. An automatic assumption that one's own domestic solution is always the “best” would
have been a very serious handicap to any member of the working group>>. On the distinction between “best solutions”
and “common solutions”, see infra pp. 333 ff.
27As noted by R. Goode,  H. Kronke,  E. McKendrick,  Transnational Commercial Law: Text,  Cases and Materials,
Oxford University  Press,  2007,  p.  509,  the non-binding character  of the Principles  entailed that  it  was  not  always
necessary to reach an agreement among all members of the Working Group,   in order to obtain approval for the text;
moreover, the possibility of one member holding the others to ransom was substantially reduced, if not eliminated. By
contrast,  the process of reaching agreement  in the drafting of the Vienna Convention on the International  Sales of
Goods was much more difficult, largely as a result of the need to produce a text which states would be willing to ratify.
A  good  example  of  the  different  outcomes  to  which  these  two  different  decision-making  processes  have  led  is
represented by the issue of interest payment. The controversy surrounding the entitlement of a party to recover interest
was such that it was only possible to the CISG drafters to reach agreement in art. 78 to the principle that interest should
be paid. By contrast, art. 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles is more detailed: the fact that there was no need to achieve
unanimity on the text of the articles made it easier to reach agreement on their content and scope and gave the drafters
greater latitude in developing new or best solutions to the various issues of contract law.
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 A  particular  decision-making  process  was  followed,  which  was  closer  to  the  model  of
communicative  action28 than  to  the  typical  negotiation  among government  representatives.  The
Working Group appointed among its members some rapporteurs for each of the different chapters
of the Principles, who were entrusted to prepare,  after the necessary comparative studies, a first
draft, together with comments. These preliminary drafts were discussed by the Group as a whole
and then revised again by the rapporteurs in light of the comments expressed during the Group
sessions. The revised drafts were circulated, together with a list of the most controversial issues,
among a wider group of experts, mostly law professors29, throughout the world. In addition, they
were examined at the annual sessions of the UNIDROIT Governing Council, which provided its
advice, especially in those cases where the Working Group had not reached a consensus. All the
observations and proposal for amendment received were submitted to the Working Group, so as to
enable it to take them into account when proceeding to the third and final reading of the drafts. As a
result, contrary to the usual procedure followed by  UNIDROIT, the Principles were at no stage
submitted to a committee of government experts, lobbyists or interest groups30: their preparation has
mostly involved academics with particular expertise in international commercial law.
The Working Group concluded the last reading of the different draft chapters in February 1994 and
in May, after the necessary editing work, the final text of the UNIDROIT Principles was submitted
to the  Governing Council for approval. The Governing Council decided that it would not formally
approve  the  Principles,  but  rather  authorise  their  publication31,  a  procedure  which  is  not
contemplated in the UNIDROIT Statute, had never before been followed and that does not amount
to a formal approval by the UNIDROIT member states32. This is not surprisingly, given that the
Principles were prepared without the involvement of government representatives. The UNIDROIT
Principles  were originally drafted in English,  which was the working language of the Working
Group. In order to facilitate its use throughout the world, it was decided that, once completed, the
text of the articles and the accompanying comments should be published in as many as possible
other language versions. At present, the UNIDROIT Principles (1994 edition) exist in five official
versions (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish). Other complete versions of the Principles are
available in Chinese, Russian and Slovak. Moreover, the black letter rules have been translated into
Arabic, Bulgarian, Czech, Dutch, Hungarian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Romanian and Serbian.
28
 See supra pp. 77 ff.
29The list appears in UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts  2004, p. XX-XXI
30S.Vogenaurer,  Introduction,  in  S.  Vogenauer  and  J.  Kleinheitsterkamp  (eds),  Commentary  on  the  UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009,  p. 9
31UNIDROIT 1994, CD (73) 18, p. 22
32S.Vogenaurer, Introduction, cit.  p. 9
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The UNIDROIT Principles 2004
When  deciding  in  1994  to  publish  the  UNIDROIT  Principles,  the  Governing  Council  of
UNIDROIT stressed the need “to monitor their use with a view to a possible reconsideration of
them at some time in the future"33.  To this end, in September 1996  the Secretariat of UNIDROIT
undertook an inquiry on the use of the UNIDROIT Principles in practice, which showed that their
content  had  generally  met  with  approval  and  not  given  rise  to  any  significant  difficulties  of
application: only few provisions of the Principles were subject to critical remarks, and not all of
them referred  to  the  substance  of  the  provision,  but  merely considered  the  wording not  to  be
sufficiently clear34. Consequently, the Governing Council deemed it inappropriate to proceed to a
major  revision  of  the  Principles.  Rather,  in  1997  it  decided  to  set  up  a  new Working  Group
entrusted with the task of preparing an enlarged second edition of the UNIDROIT Principles to
include additional topics concerning certain aspects of international commercial contracts, which
had not been taken into consideration in the previous edition. In particular, the Governing Council
decided to submit to the Working Group eight topics for consideration: agency, limitation of actions
(extinctive prescription), assignment of contractual rights and duties, contracts for the benefit of a
third  party,  price  reduction,  conditions,  set-off  and  waiver35.  The  new  Working  Group  was
composed of seventeen members, some of whom having already taken part to the old group which
had prepared the 1994 edition of the UNIDROIT Principles, while for the first time a number of
representatives  of  international  organisations  and  arbitral  institutions  (the  United  Nations
commission on International Trade law (UNCITRAL), the International Court of Arbitration (ICC),
33
 UNIDROIT 1994, C.D.(73) 18, p. 22
34
 Study L 55 par. 5.  More in detail, the Secretariat prepared a questionnaire to be circulated to all those known to have
received the  Principles,  with  a  view to  obtaining  from them information as to whether  they had made use  of  the
Principles in their respective fields of activity and, if so, whether the Principles had provided satisfactory solutions.  Of
the nearly 200 replies received, only 20 made critical remarks on  individual provisions, and not all of them referred to
the substance of the provisions, but merely considered the wording not to be sufficiently clear; moreover, of the 120
provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles 7 had been criticised by more than one reply, while another 51 provisions had
been criticised only once; finally,  80% of all critical remarks had been made by one and the same person. Yet, the
Secretariat recognised that in order to have a complete picture, it would also have been necessary to take into account
the body of case law relating to the UNIDROIT Principles which might have revealed additional difficulties as concerns
their application in practice; nonetheless, a significant body of case law was not yet available, since at that time only 3
state court decisions and 22 arbitral awards had been collected.
35UNIDROIT 1997, CD (76) 17, p. 24.  At a later stage it was decided to restrict the topic of waiver to inconsistent
behaviour and to have a new provision on release of rights.
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the Milan Chamber of National and International Arbitration and the Swiss Arbitration Association)
were invited to attend its sessions as observers.  The working method followed by the new Working
group was substantially the same as that adopted for the drafting of the 1994 edition: for each
chapter, a Rapporteur was appointed with the task of preparing a position paper, on the basis of
which  the  Working  Group  would  decide  the  basic  outline  of  the  chapter.  Subsequently,  the
Rapporteurs prepared preliminary drafts  of both the black letter rules and the comments, which
were submitted to the Working Group as a whole and then revised by the rapporteurs to take into
account the Group's comments and amendments36. Exactly ten years after the publication of the first
edition of the UNIDROIT Principles, the new edition was approved by the Governing Council in
April 2004. The integral version of the 2004 edition of the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial  Contracts  has  been published in the UNIDROIT four official  languages -English ,
French,  Italian and  Spanish -  ,  as  well  as  in Chinese,  Farsi  ,  Korean,  Romanian,  Russian and
Vietnamese. 
The UNIDROIT Principles 2004 do not make major amendments to the provisions of the 1994
edition37; rather, their coverage has been significantly extended by the inclusion of  a number of
additional topics: authority of agents, contracts for the benefit of third parties, set-off, limitation
periods, assignment of rights, transfer of obligations, assignments of contracts. Furtheromer, two
new rules dealing with inconsistent behaviour (art. 1.8) and release by agreement (art. 5.1.9) were
inserted. Accordingly, the number of articles in the Principles has increased from 119 to 185 and
the numbering of some of the existing articles has changed.
Towards a new edition of the UNIDROIT Principles
The Publication of the UNIDROIT Principles 2004 does not signal the end of work on this project38:
already by adopting the 2004 edition, the Governing Council pointed out that this was by its very
nature an on-going project and therefore should remain as an on-going item on the UNIDROIT
36M.J. Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles 2004 – The New Edition of the Principles of International Commercial Contracts
adopted by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, ULR, 2004, 1, p. 18.  
37The only significant  amendment is represented by the addition of two new paragraphs (paragraph 4 and 6) to the
Preamble.
38
 R.  Zimmermann,  The  UNIDROIT  Principles  of  International  Commercial  contracts  2004  in  Comparative
Perspective, The Tulane European and Civil Law Forum, 2006, 21, p. 28
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working program39 . Accordingly, at its 84th session in 2005, the Governing Council set up a new
Working Group of nineteen members with the task of preparing a third edition of the UNIDROIT
Principles to include the following new topics: unwinding of failed contracts; illegality; plurality of
debtors and of creditors; conditions; termination of long-term contracts for just cause. The Working
Group  for  the  preparation  of  a  third  edition  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  of  International
Commercial Contracts held its first session in Rome from 29 May to 1 June 2006. Significantly, an
unprecedented  number  of  international  organizations  and  arbitral  institutions  sent  their
representatives  to  attend  as  observers:  the  Cairo  Regional  Center  for  International  Commercial
Arbitration,  the International  Bar Association,  the Swiss Arbitration Association,  the New York
City Bar,  the German Arbitration Institution,  the Milan Chamber of  National  and International
Arbitration, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Study
Group for a European Civil Code, the ICC International Court of Arbitration, the London Court of
International Arbitration, to mention only a few. The Working Group attached to this fact particular
importance: by accepting the invitation to send observers, such organisations clearly demonstrated
their interest in the project, and therefore it is expected that they would do their best to further
promote the use of the Principles within their respective spheres of influence40. During the same
session, the Working Group appointed the Rapporteurs for each of the five topics alleged to be
included in the third edition of the Principles, which were asked to prepare on their respective topics
preliminary draft rules, together with explanatory notes to be submitted to the Group for discussion
at its next plenary sessions. At the time of writing, two more sessions have so far taken place: one
from 4 to 7 June 2007 and the other from 26 to 29 May 2008.  The next session is to be held from
25 to 29 May 2009. It is difficult to foresee when the work on the envisaged third edition of the
UNIDROIT Principles  will  be accomplished,  although 2010 or  2011 seems to  be  a  reasonable
target41. 
39
 M.J. Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles 2004, cit., p. 39
40
 Working Group for the Preparation of Principles of International  Commercial  Contracts  (3rd ),  Note on the first
Session (2006), available on http://www.unidroit.org/english/workprogramme/study050/main.htm
41M.J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles a Decade After Their First Appearance: What Have They Achieved and What
Are Their Prospects for the Future? In Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004:
Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codification- Reports of the IDSC Colloquium 8/9 June 2006,
Schulthess, 2007, p. 264; S.Vogenaurer, Introduction, in S. Vogenauer and J. Kleinheitsterkamp (eds), Commentary on
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009,  p. 20
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The drafting method: “common core” and “best solution” approach
The idea of drafting a restatement of  the law of international commercial contracts entailed that the
Working Group's effort was not directed towards the unification of existing national contract laws,
but  rather  toward  the  elaboration  of  principles  common  to  most  existing  legal  systems.   The
literature usually refers to this first approach to the drafting of the Principles as the “common core”
approach. But on the other hand, the task of those engaged in the work of harmonisation, whether it
takes  the  form of  a  convention,  a  set  of  standard  contract  terms,  a  model  law or  a  scholarly
restatement, is to find best solutions to existing problems, and thus to improve the law, not merely
to reproduce it42. As a result, when a common solution could not be found, the Working Group
attempted to select the rule which seemed best adapted to the special requirements of international
trade43: this second approach is usually known as the best solution approach. But not every legal
system had  an  equal  influence  on  every  issue  considered  in  the  preparation  of  the  Principles:
whenever it was necessary to choose between conflicting rules,  what was decisive was not just
which  rule  was  adopted  by  the  majority  of  countries,  but  rather  which  of  the  rules  under
consideration  had  the  most  persuasive  force  or  appeared  to  be   well-suited  for  international
transactions. In particular, among national contract laws or compilations of law, greater attention
was given to those which were the most recent ones at the time of drafting and which represented
rare examples of national legislation that was specifically designed for international transactions
rather  than  domestic  ones44,  such  as  the  United  States  Uniform  Commercial  Code  and  the
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contract, the Algerian Civil Code of 1975, the 1985 Foreign
Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, the drafts of the new Dutch Civil Code
and of the new Civil Code of Quebec, which entered into force in 1992 and 1994 respectively. The
Working Group's  sources  of inspiration were not only national,  but  also international  and non-
national systems. As far as international legislation was concerned, the most important reference
was the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG), which
at that time was the most important instrument regulating international contracts. Finally, special
attention  was  also  given  to  non-legislative  instruments  drafted  by  professional  bodies,  trade
associations or formulating agencies and widely used in international trade, such as the International
42R. Goode, International Restatements of Contract and English Contract Law, ULR, 1997, 2, p. 234
43M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit.,  p. 31
44S.Vogenaurer,  Introduction,  in  S.  Vogenauer  and  J.  Kleinheitsterkamp  (eds),  Commentary  on  the  UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009,  p. 9
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Commercial  Terms  (INCOTERMS)  and  the  Uniform  Customs  and  Practice  for  Documentary
Credits, published by the International Chamber of Commerce and the UNCITRAL Legal Guides
on Electronic Funds Transfer and on International Countertrade Transactions.
An example of “best solution” rule designed to meet the special needs of international trade practice
is  art.  1.10  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles,  which  defines  the  written  form  as  any  mode  of
communication that preserves a record of the information contained therein and is capable of being
reproduced  in  tangible  form:  this  statement  takes  into  account  the  fact  that  nowadays
communications are usually exchanged in a paperless fashion by electronic means. Other examples
are represented by the many favor contractus rules, i.e. those provisions aiming at preserving the
contract by limiting the number of cases in which its existence or validity may be questioned, or in
which it  may be terminated beforehand,  such as  art.  3.2  on the irrelevance  of  “consideration”,
“cause”  and similar  requirements  for  the valid  conclusion of  a  contract,  or  arts.  6.2.1-6.2.3  on
hardship.  Finally,  other  “best  solution” rules are inspired by political  considerations  in  a broad
sense,  and  namely  by  the  special  conditions  existing  in  North-South  and  East-West  economic
relationships. The most important provisions among this group are arts . 6.1.15-6.1.18 on public
permission requirements affecting the valid conclusion or the performance of the contract, which
states frequently impose on foreign trade counterparts. 
It is difficult to assess to what extent the UNIDROIT Principles' provisions follow the first rather
than the second approach: the drafters decided not to include the comparative notes referring to
national laws in order to explain the origin of the solution adopted45. This was done with a view to
underlying the Principles' character of autonomous source with respect to the various legal systems
taken into consideration46: as we have seen,  it was inevitable in the preparation of the UNIDROIT
Principles  that  the laws  of  some countries  played  a more  significant  role than those of  others;
consequently, it might have been counterproductive to highlight this fact by including comparative
45Some Rapporteurs of the Working Group have nonetheless stressed that the objective of enunciating rules which were
common to most legal systems played a less significant role with respect to that of finding best solutions more tailored
to  the  needs  of  international  trade.  Cp  M.  Furmston,  The  UNIDROIT  Principles  and  International  Commercial
Arbitration,  in  Institute  of  International  Business  Law  and  Practice  (ed),  UNIDROIT  Principles  for  International
Commercial Contracts: A New Lex Mercatoria?, ICC Publication 490/1, 1995, p. 205: <<it is important to emphasise
that the Working Group did not attempt to find a lowest common denominator of contract rules; (..) the Working Group
tried to produce a set of principles which was internally coherent. Obviously, this objective could not be reached simply
by taking a series of majority views on a whole range of contract problems>>. Similarly, B. Favarque-Cosson, France,
in  M.J.  Bonell  (ed.),  A  New  Approach  to  International  Commercial  Contracts:  The  UNIDROIT  Principles  of
International Commewcial Contracts, Kluwer, 1999, p. 97: <<[Les Principes UNIDROIT] s'insipirent de solutions en
vigeur dans très nombreuses pays et opèrent une synthèse étrangère a tout système existant. [Ils] sont donc le fruit d'un
travail beaucoup plus crèatif. L'objectif n'ètait pas de recherecher le plus petit dénominateur commun aux contrats, mais
de dépasser les législations nationales pour poser une séries de principes internationalement cohérents>>.
46This purpose is confirmed in the Introduction to the official text of the UNIDROIT Principles:  <<The objective of the
UNIDROIT  Principles  is  to  establish  a  neutral  and  balanced  set  of  rules  designed  for  use  throughout  the  world
irrespective  of  the legal  traditions  and economic and political consitions  of  the countiries  in which  they are  to  be
applied>> (UNIDROIT (ed) Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 1994, p. VIII).
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notes in the official text of the Principles47. This has raised some criticism, since the indication of
the national  sources  underlying the solutions adopted in the UNIDROIT Principles would have
conferred upon them greater authoritative force. By contrast, this lack of transparency, justified with
the need to emphasise the international character of the Principles, risks to undermine the credibility
of  the entire  project48.  As neither  the black  letter  rules  nor  the Official  Comments  explain the
criteria underlying the Working Group's choices it is difficult to verify whether these choices indeed
represent “common” or “best” solutions. Moreover, concerns that the Working Group has almost
exclusively relied on Western sources and that at many stances the rapporteurs were not willing to
detach  themselves  from  their  own  legal  background  and  favoured  the  solution  of  their  own
jurisdiction are hard to dispell.  As we will see in more detail in the following paragraphs, this lack
of transparency has posed some problems to the acknowledgement of the Principles as a set of
general principles of law. 
The structure and legal nature of the UNIDROIT Principles
The UNIDROIT Principles 1994 are composed of a Preamble and 119 articles set out in seven
chapters:  “General  Provisions”,  “Formation”,  “Validity”,  “Interpretation”,  “Content”,
“Performance”,  “Non-Performance”.  By  contrast,  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  2004  consist  of  a
Preamble and 185 articles divided into ten chapters, namely  “General Provisions”, “Formation  and
Authority  of  Agents”,  “Validity”,  “Interpretation”,  “Content  and  Third  Party  Rights”,
“Performance”,  “Non-Performance”,  “Set-Off”,  “Assignment of Rights,  Transfer  of Obligations,
Assignments of Contracts”,  ‘Limitation Periods”. The articles (the so-called “black letter rules”)
read like ordinary legislative provisions in a domestic contract law statute or in an international
convention, so that, by looking exclusively at the Principles' black letter rules one may have the
impression of a non-binding codification that attempts to provide a complete and coherent set of
rules for the area of general contract law49. Nonetheless, unlike in ordinary domestic statutes and
international  treaties,  in  both  editions each  article  is  accompanied  by  comments  and,  where
47M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit., p. 88
48S.Vogenaurer, Introduction, cit., p. 11
49S.Vogenaurer, Introduction, cit, p. 13
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appropriate, by factual illustrations intended to explain the reasons for the black letter rule and the
different ways in which it may operate in practice. Comments and illustrations are part and parcel of
the Principles and were designed as a key to the interpretation of the rules50. Moreover, as far as the
drafting style is concerned,  some provisions are very concise and formulated in general terms (e.g.
art. 1.1, which lays down the principle of freedom of contract), while others (e.g. art. 6.1.9 on the
currency  of  payment)  are  more  detailed.  This  has  raised  the  criticism  that  the  UNIDROIT
Principles' drafters have departed from the original idea of elaborating a set of general and neutral
principles of law and ended up creating a set of precise and technical rules having little to do with
the  notions  of  common principles  and  jus  commune51.  However,  the  fact  that  the  UNIDROIT
Principles  contain,  in  addition  to  specific  rules  of  a  technical  character,  general  statements  of
principles  and  standards,  far  from being  a  defect  or  inconsistency,  on  the  contrary  makes  the
Principles an autonomous normative system52: the interaction between detailed rules and general
principles is an essential feature of any normative system53, and also in the case of the UNIDROIT
Principles the exact meaning of the detailed rules can only be determined by referring to the general
principles laid down in the introductory chapter. 
In order to enhance their neutral and transnational character, the UNIDROIT Principles deliberately
avoid the use of terminology typical of a particular legal system and privilege those expressions
which are commonly adopted in international contract practice: this is the case, for instance, with
the term “hardship”, which covers situations otherwise known within the various legal systems as
“impracticability”,  “frustration  of  purpose”,  “imprévision”,  “Wegfall  der  Geschaftsgrundlage”,
“eccessiva  onerosità  sopravvenuta”  and  so on;  another  example is  provided by the term “non-
performance”, which replaces the traditional notions of “default”, “breach”, “Nichtleistung wegen
Unmöglichkeit”, “indadempimento”, etc.
The  UNIDROIT  Working  Group's  choice  to  abandon  traditional  legislative  approaches  to  the
unification and harmonisation of international trade law in favour of the elaboration of a collection
of non-binding rules and principles has raised a major problem concerning the legal nature of this
unconventional  instrument.  The  UNIDROIT  Principles  do  not  fit  into  any  of  the  traditional
categories of legal instruments that have so far been conceived at internatonal level54. They are not
simple contract forms, nor are they cast in the form of an international convention.  They partly
50K. Boele-Woelki, Principles and Private International Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of International  Commercial
Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law: How to Apply them to International Contracts, ULR, 1996, p.
655; O. Lando, Is Codification needed in Europe? Principles of European Contract Law and the Relationship to Dutch
Law, ERPL, 1993, p. 167.
51C. Kessedian, Un exercise de Rénovation des Sources du Droit des Contrats du Commerce International, cit., p. 655.
52M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit., p. 44
53K. P. Berger,  The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 
54
 M. J. Bonell, General Report, in ID (ed),  A new Approach to International Commercial Contracts , cit.,  p. 3
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constitute a collection of international  usages  and partly a doctrinal attempt, a sort  of scholarly
study55,  to identify the best  rules for  international  trade.  Also the attempt to define them as an
expression of the modern  lex mercatoria is not convincing.  As we have seen above56,  the very
notion of lex mercatoria is highly disputed. Whatever its meaning – a set of non-national rules and
practices developed by the interested business circles themselves, or a mixed system composed of
both  trade  usages  and  universally  recognised  principles  of  law  –  the  identification  of  the
UNIDROIT Principles with such a notion would appear rather problematic. The Principles do not
claim to lay down rules which are all generally accepted at international level as general principles
of the law or lex mercatoria. As the Preamble reads, they simply “may be applied when the parties
have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles of law, lex mercatoria or the like”.
This means that they represent only one of the various sources available to determine the content of
these (or similar) rather vague expressions used by the parties57. In no way are judges and arbitrators
bound to apply them to solve their disputes: the Principles do not have any binding force as such
and will be applied in practice by reason of their persuasive value only. Accordingly, judges and
arbitrators are free to use other means to attain knowledge of general contractual principles if they
find them more suitable or convincing.
The existing legal instrument to which UNIDROIT Principles bear the  closest resemblance is the
American Restatement58, which in the US legal system is used not only to re-state the law, but also
to  “gently  push”  the  common  law  into  a  direction  that  it  is  favoured  by  the  drafters  of  the
Restatements  themselves59.  The  UNIDROIT  Working  Group  pursued  a  similar  approach:  they
adopted solutions that were not necessarily common to all the legal systems of the world, but were
best suited to the needs of international trade. This choice is in line with the particular nature of
international trade law, which is a process in constant evolution: every attempt to unify this field of
the law must therefore take into account the possible future developments and consequently assume
a creative rather than a descriptive quality60.
 Despite this background similarity, there are two important differnces between the two projects.
The first concernes the geographical scope of the projects. The scope of the American Restatement
is  limited  to  an  area  with a  more  or  less  homogeneous  socio-economic  structure,  whereas  the
UNIDROIT Principles are designed to be applied all over the world and accordingly they cover
55In  this  sense  see  C.  Kessedian,  Un  Exercise  de  Rénovation  des  Sources  du  Droit  des  Contrats  du  Commerce
International, cit., p. 651-652
56
 See supra pp. 85 ff.
57
 M. J. Bonell, General Report,  M.J. Bonell (ed.), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 5
58See supra pp. 113 ff
59
 K.P. Berger,  The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, cit., p. 154
60
 K.P. Berger,  The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, cit.,154
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areas with totally different legal  cultures and utterly heterogeneous socio-economic structures. This
much broader scope has made not only the Working Group’s research more demanding, but also the
degree of uniformity which may be accomplished much lower than in the case of the American
Restatements.  Besides,  given  this  extreme  heterogeneity,  the  UNIDROIT  principles’  drafters
needed to resort more often to creative solutions, with the ultimate consequence that this new rules
might not be accepted in legal practice,  because they were perceived as not reflecting the existing
principles within the international business community.
The second is related to the fact that the American Restatements are embedded in a well-defined
legal tradition based on the generally acknowledged “stare decisis doctrine”, whereas in the context
of the UNIDROIT Principles the very existence of the rules reproduced therein is vividly disputed61.
In this respect, the American Restatements are endowed with a higher degree of authoritative force
than the UNIDROIT principles62.
Yet, despite the appropriateness of such a comparison at a purely descriptive level, the question of
the legal nature of the UNIDROIT Principles still remains largely unanswered. What is the point in
drawing  a  parallel  between  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  and  the  American  Restatements  if  even
within the United States the precise nature of the latter instruments is highly controversial? How
then could the characterisation of the UNIDROIT Principles as an international restatement be more
conclusive, given the much less homogeneous legal framework in which they operate?63
 The fact is that the UNIDROIT Principles challenge the traditional categories of law. Their legal
nature can only be assesed by a new approach to legal theory,  which overcomes the traditional
conception that law-making is an exclusive prerogative of the state and admits that the borders
between  state  and non-state  law are  increasingly overlapping64:  in this respect,  the UNIDROIT
Principles can be considered as one of the most important examples of “global law without the
state”. However, only the future will tell if they will grow into something different, in the sense of
establishing themselves as the most genuine expression of the general principles of law or the lex
mercatoria in the field of contract law65.
61
 A. S. Hartkamp, Principles of Contract Law, in  A. S. Hartkamp, M. W. Hesselink, E. H. Hondius, C. Joustra, E. Du
Perron (Eds),  Towards a European Civil Code, Kluwer Law International, 1994, p. 39
62
 K.P. Berger,  The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, cit.,p. 156
63
 M.J. Bonell, General Report, cit., p. 4
64J. Basedow, Germany, in  M.J. Bonell (ed.), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, cit.,p. 128
65M.J. Bonell, General Report, cit., p.  5
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The scope of application of the UNIDROIT Principles
Despite their worldwide vocation, the UNIDROIT principles apply to a restricted range of legal
relations,  namely  international  commercial  contracts66.  The  international  character  of  the
transactions covered by the Principles draws a clear  line between them and national  codes  and
statutes, which  mainly purport to regulate domestic transactions.  It follows that, in order to fully
understand the exact scope of the Principles, one has to determine the meaning of the concepts
“international contracts” and “commercial contracts”.  Nonetheless, the Working Group refrained
from providing a definition of these two terms. The reason was that, on account of past experiences
in the field of unification of the law67, the drafters believed that an attempt to reach an agreement on
a definition of these criteria would have seriously hampered the unification process itself. In the
general  context  of  the  unification  of  international  commercial  law,  disputes  around  the
internationality of a certain transaction stem from the fact that this concept determines the extent to
which states will accept the loss of sovereignty which is necessarily connected with the creation of a
uniform law68.  In  the more specific  context of  the UNIDROIT Principles,  the definition of  the
internationality of the contract determines the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law and to
evade the mandatory norms of the otherwise applicable domestic legal system. Similar uncertainties
surround  the  term  “commercial”:  in  some  jurisdictions  this  concept  is  defined  according  to
subjective  criteria  (commercial  are  those  contracts  in  which  both  parties  have  the  status  of
merchants),  in  others  according  to  objective  criteria  (commercial  are  those  contracts  having  a
commercial  object  or  involving  a  commercial  transaction),  in  others  the  distinction  between
commercial and non-commercial contracts is unknown.  Given such implications, as had already
happened in the case of other uniform law instruments, the drafters of the UNIDROIT Principles
preferred to leave the questions of the  internationality and the commercial character of the contract
to the case law of domestic courts and of international arbitral tribunals69.
Yet, the Comment to Article 1 of the UNIDROIT Principles provides important guidelines for the
ascertainment of what an international and commercial  contract is: the concept of internationality
should be interpreted in the broadest way possible, so as to exclude only those situations where no
66Cp.  the  Preamble  to  the  UNIDROIT  Principles:  <<These  Principles  set  forth  general  rules  for  international
commercial contracts>>.
67In particular, the controversial discussions related to the definition of internationality in the drafting of the Hague
Sales Law,  the CISG and the UNCITRAL Model  Law on International  Commercial  Arbitration.  Cfr  G.  de Nova,
Quando un contratto è internazionale, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, 1978, pp. 666 et seq
68
 J. Honnold, Uniform Law of International Sales, Kluwer, 1987, p. 58
69
 G. Delaume, What is an International Contract? An American and a Gallic Dilemma, ICLQ 1979, 28 p. 258 
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international  element  at  all  is  involved,  i.e  where  all  the  relevant  elements  of  the  contract  in
question  (nationality  of  the  parties,  applicable  substantive  law,  place  of  performance,  etc.)  are
connected with one country only70.
Likewise,  as to the restriction to “commercial” contracts, in order to ensure the widest possible
application  of  the  Principles,  the  Comment  suggests  that  only  consumer  contracts,  i.e.  those
contracts which relate to transactions involving a party which is not acting in the course of his trade
or profession, fall outside the concept of commercial contracts and are therefore excluded from the
scope of the Principles71. This broad interpretation of the term “commercial contracts” allows the
UNIDROIT Principles to be applied not only to the classical exchange contracts of cross-border
trade, but also to more complex contracts, such as investment, concession, joint ventures, licensing,
technical assistance, franchising, leasing and other highly specialized contracts. 
The UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL): differences and similarities
The UNIDROIT Principles are often associated to a similar project in the field of harmonisation of
contract law in the European context, the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), so that the
two instruments are commonly referred to as “the Principles”72 or “sister projects”73.  The PECL
consist of 131 articles laying down what in the drafters’ opinion are the most appropriate common
contract rules for Europe. They have been drawn up by the Commission on European Contract Law
70A similarly  broad  concept  of  “internationality”  is  also  adopted  in  the  UNCITRAL Model  Law on International
Commercial Arbitration: according to art. 1(3) of the Model Law, an arbitration is international not only if the parties to
an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, their places of business in different states,
but also if  either the place of arbitration or the place with  which the subject-matter  of the dispute is  most  closely
connected are situated outside the state in which the parties have their place of business, or even if the parties have
expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.
71Again,  also  the  footnote  to  art.  1  of  the  Model  Law on  International  Commercial  Arbitration  suggests  a  broad
interpretation of the term “commercial”: <<relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the
following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods and services; distribution agreement;
commercial  representation  or  agency;  factoring;  leasing;  construction  of  works;  consulting;  engineering;  licensing;
investment;  financing;  banking;  insurance;  exploitation  agreement  or  concession;  joint  venture  and  other  form  of
industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or passangers by air, sea, rail or road>>.
72K. Boele-Woelki, Principles and Private International Law, cit., p. 653
73A. S. Hartkamp, Principles of Contract Law, cit. p. 37
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–  a  research  group  gathering  both  academics  and  practicing  lawyers  from  various  European
jurisdictions, founded in 1982 by the Danish professor Ole Lando – and have been published for the
first time in 199574; updated issues have been published in 200075 and 200376. They cover  all the
main  areas  of  general  contract  law,  such  as  formation,  validity,  interpretation,  performance  of
contractual obligations and remedies for non performance.
 Not only are the two sets of principles resembling in formal or structural terms, but also, and more
importantly, in the solutions they provide to legal problems.  First of all, they resemble one another
in  the  membership  of  the  working  groups  which  were  in  charge  of  drafting  them.  Like  the
UNIDROIT  Working  Group,  the  Commission  on  European  Contract  Law  was  composed  by
academics and practitioners in their personal capacity, that is they were not representative of their
national governments. Some experts were even members of both working groups77; but, whereas in
the UNIDROIT case experts were selected from all over the world, in the PECL case membership
was obviously restricted to lawyers from the member states of the European Union. Secondly, the
working method followed in both projects was characterised by a large use of comparative analysis
among not only national laws, but also international instruments of uniform law, such as the CISG,
the UNCITRAL model laws, and INCOTERMS. Moreover, each working group was aware of the
work  being  conducted  by  the  other,  since,  as  already  mentioned,  a  number  of  members  were
common to both working groups. Thirdly, as far as structural features are concerned, the two sets of
principles essentially consist of a collection of articles divided into a number of chapters laying
down provisions regarding the general part of contract law: every article is then supplemented by a
Comment,  explaining  the  scope  of  the  rule  and  the  interrelations  with  the  other  rules  of  the
Principles  and  by  an  Illustration,  a  brief  summary  of  cases  providing  examples  of  practical
applications of the rule78.
74
 O. Lando and H. Beale (Eds),  Principles of European Contract Law, Part I: Performance, Non-performance and
Remedies, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995.
75
 O. Lando and H. Beale (Eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II Combined and Revised, Kluwer
Law International, 2000
76
 O. Lando, E. Clive, A. Prum and R. Zimmermann (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III, Kluwer Law
International, 2003
77Apart from Bonell and Lando, there three other scholars who were members of both working groups are: Drobnig,
Hatkamp and Tallon.
78There is in this respect a difference between the PECL and the UNIDROIT Principles: in the PECL, articles are also
accompanied by notes identifying the main sources used in drafting the rule and also describing how the issue regulated
by  the  rule  itself  is  dealt  with  in  the  various  member  states’  legal  systems,  whereas  the  UNIDROIT  Principles
systematically refrain from stating the legal systems constituting the origin of the various rules. This particular choice
makes the UNIDROIT Principles’ structure,  which are expressly excluded as being an attempt of codification on a
global scale, more similar to that of a code; whereas the presence of Notes in the PECL’ s structure, which are claimed
by some as constituting a first step towards the codification of European contract law, makes them more similar to a
Restatement.  This inconsistency is anyway only apparent: the UNIDROIT Principles’ drafters deliberately sought to
avoid any reference to national laws, because they intended to elaborate a system of non-national rules applicable to
international  transactions,  whereas the PECL were meant  from the outset  as a potential  civil  code for  Europe and
therefore they needed to be founded on the common core of member states’ national legal systems. 
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 Given  all  these  formal  and  structural  similarities,  it  is  no surprise  that  the  two projects  have
produced the same substantive rules in many respects, so as to have been rightly defined as “sister
projects”.  About  70  out  of  the  119  articles  constituting  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  have
corresponding  provisions  in  the  European  Principles.  Among these,  some  are  even  reproduced
verbatim in the the PECL, while others contain substantially the same rules79.
Of course,  the PECL cannot be considered as a mere duplication of the UNIDROIT Principles,
since there are important differences between the two instruments. The most important differences
regard  the  scope  and  the  purpose  the  two sets  of  principles  intend  to  serve.  The UNIDROIT
Principles  have been drafted  in order  to be applied on a worldwide scale:  they are  deemed to
operate  in a  context where  differences  among the various  legal  systems will  inevitably remain
strong for many years to come and therefore their scope is limited to those transactions which are
less  dependent  on  state  control  and more  likely to  be  regulated  by non-national  rules,  namely
international  commercial  contracts.  Conversely,  the  PECL  operate  in  a  more  restricted  and
homogeneous region of the world – the European Union – which aims at abolishing the differences
between national and cross-border transactions, and in which a legal regime of consumer protection
has reached a considerable degree of harmonisation80. It is thus essential to the main purpose they
have been conceived for – promoting the smooth functioning of the common market – that they
apply to all kinds of contracts, including both national and cross border contracts and both “B2B”
and “B2C” contracts. Accordingly, the UNIDROIT Principles' scope of application is at once wider
and narrower than that of the PECL: wider because it is meant to be universal, whereas the PECL
are designed for contracts within Europe; narrower, because it is limited to international commercial
contracts, whereas the PECL apply to all types contracts,  whether domestic or international and
whether commercial and non-commercial81. 
This difference in terms of scope and purpose is also reflected in divergent provisions. One group of
different  provisions is  due to the fact  that  the UNIDROIT Principles address only international
commercial contracts, whereas the PECL cover all types of contracts, including domestic contracts.
For example, whereas the PECL adopt a general definition of good faith and fair dealing82, building
on the  way these concepts  are  intended in  most  of  member  states’  national  legal  systems,  the
79Cfr e.g. art 2.5 Unidroit (Rejection of Offer) and 2.203 Pecl (rejection); art 2.6 (1) Unidroit (Mode of Acceptance) and
art 2.204 Pecl (acceptance);  art 3.6 Unidroit (Error in Expression or Transmission) and art 4:104 Pecl (Inaccuracy in
Communication); art 3.9 Unidroit (Threat) and art 4:108 Pecl (Threats); art 4.1 Unidroit (Intention of the Parties) and
art Article 5:101 (1) (3) Pecl  (General Rules of Interpretation); art 6.1.1 Unidroit (Time of Performance) and art 7:102
(Time of Performance); art 6.1.11 Unidroit (Costs of Performance) and art 7:112 Pecl (Costs of Performance). 
80
 M.J. Bonell,  The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of  European
Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same Purposes?, ULR, 1996, 2, p. 242
81R. Goode, International Restatement of Contract and English Contract Law, ULR, 1997, 2, p. 235
82
 Art 1:201(1)  PECL (Good Faith and Fair Dealing) Each party must  act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing.
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UNIDROIT Principles do not refer to the way these concepts are intended in most of the states of
the world, but refer to the special meaning they assume in international trade83. Other important
substantial differences are due to the fact that the UNIDROIT Principles are concerned only with
B2B contracts,  whereas the PECL apply also to consumer contracts and therefore cannot adopt
solutions suitable only for parties having the same bargaining power84.  For example, as far as the
function of standard contract terms is concerned, according to the UNIDROIT Principles, a mere
reference to the standards terms is regarded as  sufficient to incorporate them in the contract85; on
the contrary, the PECL specify that a mere reference is not sufficient for incorporation: the terms
will be binding only if the party invoking them demonstrates that  he has taken appropriate steps to
bring the other party’s attention to them before or when the contract was concluded86. 
 Despite these important divergences, it is nonetheless a fact that the two harmonisation projects
have in many cases produced similar, if not identical, results. This substantial convergence has led
some commentator  to  suggest  that  divergences  among  the  various  national  laws  of  the  world
applicable to international  commercial  transactions are not so unbridgeable and accordingly the
unification of general contract law on a global scale does not appear a project entirely far from
reality as many consider to be87.
 Even without going that far, the “striking” resemblance between the two sets of principles may be
considered as a strong indication of the emergence of a transnational system of rules which seek to
combine the best solutions from the various laws and traditions of the world in order to meet the
needs of globalised markets88. This new global order does not depend on the authority of a state or a
supranational entity, but will develop only to the extent that it is able to embody the values of the
global community that makes use of commercial contracts89.
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 Article 1.7(1)Unidroit (Good Faith and Fair Dealing)  Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing  in international trade.(emphasis added)
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 M.J. Bonell, ,The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of  European
Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same Purposes?, cit.  p. 239
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 Article 2.19(1)  (Contracting Under Standard Term) Where one party or both parties use standard terms in concluding
a contract, the general rules of formation apply, subject to Articles 2.20 - 2.22.
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bring them to the other party's attention before or when the contract was concluded.
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 A.S. Hartkamp, The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European
Contract Law, ERPL, 1994, 2, p. 357; ID,  Modernisation and Harmonisation of Contract Law: Objectives, Methods
and Scope, ULR, 2003, 1/ 2, p. 88-89; ID,  Principles of Contract Law, in Towards a European Civil Code, ch 7. In
these articles the author has   cautiously supported the old idea suggested by Schmitthoff and recently relaunched by the
former  Secretary  of  UNCITRAL  Herrmann,  of  a  Global  Commercial  Code,  which  would  <<weld  together  and
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 M.J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles – A Modern Approach to Contract Law, in H.L. Weyers (Ed), Europaisches
Vertragsrecht, 1997, Baden-Baden, p. 9
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 A. Rosett and M. Wallace Gordon,  United States Report,  in M.J. Bonell (Ed), A New Approach to International
Commercial Contracts, the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Kluwer Law, 1999, p. 390
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The substantive content of the UNIDROIT Principles
Freedom of contract
One of the most fundamental ideas underlying the UNIDROIT Principles is freedom of contract,
spelled out in art. 1.1, which states: <<the parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine
its content>>. This article encompasses two aspects of the principle of freedom of contract: the
freedom of concluding contracts with any other person, irrespective of their legal status and their
nationality, and the freedom of the parties to determine the content of their contract. The first aspect
is stated in the UNIDROIT Principles only in very broad terms, since its full implemenatation falls
outside their scope and depends on the particular trade policy adopted by each single State and by
the community of states as a whole90. The second aspect is further specified in art. 1.5, which lays
down the freedom of the parties to derogate from or vary the provisions of the Principles, except for
the  mandatory  rules  envisaged  by  the  Principles  themselves:  <<the  parties  may  exclude  the
application of these Principles or derogate from or vary the effect of any of their provisions, except
as otherwise provided>>.  In  most cases,  the mandatory character  of the provisions is  expressly
declared: for example, art. 1.7 on good faith and fair dealing, art. 5.7(2) on price determination and
art.  7.4.13(2)  on  agreed  payment  for  non-performance.  Exceptionally,  however,  the  mandatory
character of a provision may follow from the content and purpose of the provision itself, as in the
case of art. 7.16 on exemption clauses91.
At first  sight,  it  may seem contradictory that  Principles,  which have only a soft  law character,
should incorporate mandatory rules of any kind. Yet, this may not be as strange as it seems, if one
takes into account the various ways in which the UNIDROIT Principles may be used in practice. In
the first place, where the parties select the Principles as the rules of law governing the contract, they
90M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit, p. 106
91See Comment on art. 1.5
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implictly agree to be subject to their mandatory rules. Secondly, where the UNIDROIT Principles
are applied by judges or arbitrators, in the absence of an express reference to them by the parties,
provisions expressly declared as mandatory make it less likely that a court or arbitral tribunal will
conclude that those provisions have been impliedly excluded by a contract term which is difficult to
reconcile with them. Thirdly, where the Principles are merely incorporated as terms of the contract,
their  adoption  will  indicate  an  intention  to  give  overriding  effect  to  those  rules  envisaged  as
mandatory,  to the extent  that this is not  incompatible with the construction of the contract  as a
whole. Fourthly, where the Principles serve as a model for national and international legislators,
their  mandatory  provisions  are  an  indication  to  provide  some  rules  with  binding  force  in  the
enacting law.
In  addition  to  the  mandatory  provisions  contained  in  the  UNIDROIT  Principles,  freedom  to
determine the content of the contract is further restricted by otherwise applicable mandatory rules,
be they of national, international or supranational origin.  This is stated in art. 1.4: <<nothing in
these Principles shall restrict the application of mandatory rules, whether of national, international
or  supranational  origin,  which  are  applicable  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  rules  of  private
international law>>. Yet, the Principles deliberately refrain from indicating which mandatory rules
are  applicable  in  each  given  case:  whether  only  mandatory  rules  applying  regardless  of  any
governing law (the so-called internationally mandatory rules or  lois d'application necessaire), or
also  the  other  rules  from  which  the  parties  cannot  derogate  (so-called  internal  or  ordinary
mandatory rules)  and  whether  in  addition to  the mandatory rules  of  the  forum and  of  the  lex
contractus also those of other states are to be taken into consideration: these very controversial
issues have been left to the relevant rules of private international law.
Good faith and fair dealing
One of the UNIDROIT Principles' main purposes is to provide to the largest possible extent fair and
equitable conditions in international transactions. The fundamental provision serving this purpose is
art. 1.7, which lays down in broad terms the principle of good faith and fair dealing and is further
specified in a number of other articles of the Principles. An analysis of such provisions shows that
good faith displays three distinctive features within the system of the UNIDROIT Principles. First
of all,  this duty is to be observed throughout the life of the contract,  also during pre-contrctual
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negotiations.  Accordingly,  the  Principles  provide numerous specific  applications  of  the duty of
good faith for every aspect of contract law. For example,  art. 2.15(1) imposes liability on a party
who acts in bad faith during negotiations; art. 2.4, which relates to the formation of the contract,
provides that an offer cannot be revoked, if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as
being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer; art. 4.8, on the interpretation of
the contract,  refers to good faith and fair dealing as one of the criteria to be used whenever it
becomes  necessary  to  supply  a  term  on  which  the  parties  have  failed  to  agree,  but  which  is
important  for  determining  their  rights  and  duties;  likewise,  art.  5.2,  concerning  performance,
indicates good faith and fair dealing among the sources of the parties' implied obligations arising
out of a given contract; art. 7.1.7 on force majeure excludes a party's liability for non-performance
due  to  an  impediment  beyond  that  party's  control  and  which  could  not  have  been  reasonably
expected to be taken into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
Secondly, although no definition is given as to what is meant by “good faith”, the fact that this term
is coupled with “fair dealing” makes it clear that it is to be understood in an objective sense, as a
synomym of “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” and not in the subjective sense, of a
state of mind or “honesty”92.
Thirdly,  the UNIDROIT  Principles refer to “good faith and fair dealing in international  trade”,
therefore the definition of good faith and fair dealing is not to be found in the laws of any one
nation state, but is to be located in an international context93: domestic standards may be taken into
account only to the extent that they are shown to be generally accepted among the various legal
systems94.
Important applications of the principle of good faith and fair dealing are to be considered the series
of provisions laying down remedies against the unfair behaviour of a party: the choice of  including
such rules in the UNIDROIT Principles is a departure from the traditional belief that in the so-
called “B2B transactions” the parties have equal bargaining power and therefore there is no weaker
party deserving protection95; quite on the contrary,  business people may have different levels of
education  and  technical  skills  and  are  no  less  likely than  the rest  of  humanity  to  yield  to  the
temptation to exploit the weaknesses or needs of others96. Worth mentioning among this group are
92cp.  O.  Lando  and H.  Beale  (eds),  Principles  of  European Contract  Law:  parts  I  and II,  Kluwer,  2000,  p.  115:
<<”Good faith “ means honesty and fairness in mind, which are subjective concepts (...). Fair dealing means observance
of fairness in fact which is an objective test>>.
93R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University
Press, 2007, p. 529
94Comment 2 to art. 1.7
95
 cp.  U.  Drobnig,  Protection  of  the  Weaker  Party,  in  M.J.  Bonell  and  F.  Bonelli  (eds.),  Contratti  Commerciali
Internazionali e Principi UNIDROIT, Giuffrè, 1997, p.217
96M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit, p. 151
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art. 3.8, according to which a party may avoid the contract whenever it has been led to conclude the
contract by the other party's fraudulent representation or non-disclosure of relevant facts; art. 2.20
on surprising terms, that is terms contained in standard terms, which, by virtue of their content,
language and presentation, are of such a character that the other party could not reasonably have
expected them: such terms are ineffective, unless they have been expressly accepted by that party97;
and  art.  7.4.13  on  the  so-called  “penalty  clauses”,  i.e.  those  contract  terms  providing  for  the
payment of a specified sum in the event of non-performance, irrespective of the correspondence
between the sum and the anticipated or actual harm: the agreed sum may be reduced to a resonable
amount  whenever  it  is  grossly  excessive  in  relation  to  the  actual  harm  caused  by  the  non-
performance and other circumstances.
The duty of  good faith  is  so widely recognized by the UNIDROIT Principles that  it  can even
constrain  the  other  fundamental  idea  of  this  restatement,  namely  freedom  of  contract.  This  is
acknowledged in art. 1.7(2), which expressly gives to the general duty of good faith and fair dealing
a mandatory character, so that it may not be excluded or limited by agreement of the parties. This
raises the problem of whether all the specific applications of the same principle of good faith and
fair dealing are also beyond the parties' power to exclude them. A number of these provisions are
explicitly declared as mandatory, such as those on fraud, threat and gross disparity; as far as those
not expressly designated as mandatory are concerned,  they seem to be mere default  rules:  they
provide what may be considered the most appropriate solution in the generality of cases, but the
parties  are free to depart  from them in order  to accommodate  their  particular  expectations  and
needs98.
Openness to usages
Another essential characteristic of the UNIDROIT Principles is the central role usages and practices
play in the determination of the rigths and duties of the contractual parties. The reason for this is to
97The ratio of protecting the weaker party underlying this provision is clearly expressed is Comment 1 to this article:
<<to avoid that a party which uses standard terms taking undue advantage of its position by surreptitiously attempting
to impose terms on the other party which that other party would scarcely have accepted had it been aware of them>>.
98For example, the parties are free to agree that , contrary to what is provided for in art. 5.8, each of them may end the
contract  without  advance notice;  similarly,  the parties are  free to  exclude in case of hardship  any right  to  request
renegotiation.
347
be found in the general  objective pursued by the UNIDROIT Principles to provide a regulation
sufficiently flexible to permit the constant adaptation of its rules to the ever-changing technical and
economic conditions of international trade99. As art. 1.8 states, not only are the parties bound by any
usage  to  which  they  have  agreed  and  any  practices  which  they  have  established  between
themselves, but also by a usage that is widely known and regularly observed in international trade
by parties in the particular trade concerned, except where the application of such a usage would be
unreasonable.  The UNIDROIT Principles restrict the range of relevant trade usages to those which
are widely known and regularly observed in international trade, with the consequence that usages of
a purely local or national origin are not normally  applicable without explicit reference thereto by
the  parties100.  Two other  important  provisions  where  usages  play a crucial  role  are  art.  4.3  on
contract  interpretation,  establishing,  inter  alia,  that  usages  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in
establishing the common intention of the parties or the meaning that reasonble persons of the same
kind as the parties would give to the statement or conduct or to the contract in question; and art. 5.2,
indicating usages as a possible source of implied obligations.
Favor contractus
Most provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles are inspired by the idea of favor contractus, that is
the aim of preserving the contract whenever possible, thus limiting the number of cases in which its
existence or validity may be questioned or in which it may be terminated before time. For example,
art. 2.1, in establishing that a contract may be concluded not only by the acceptance of an offer, but
also by the conduct of the parties which is sufficient to show agreement lays down the rule that a
contract may be formed without the traditional process of offer and acceptance101. The comment to
this article explains that this rule reflects commercial practice in that contracts, especially when
related  to  complex  transactions,  are  often  concluded  after  prolonged  negotiations,  without  an
99M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit, p. 113
100Comment 4 to art. 1.8 states that national or local usages may be relevant even without express reference by the
parties in the case of usages existing on certain commodities exchanges or at trade exhibitions or ports, provided that
they are regularly followed vis à vis foreigners also, or whenever business persons have already entered into a number
of similar contracts in a foreign country, so that they should be bound by the usages established within that country for
such contracts.
101J.M. Perillo,  UNIDROIT Principles  of  International  Commercial  Contracts:  the Black-letter  Text  and a  Review,
Fordham Law Review, 1994, 63, p. 284.
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identifiable sequence of offer and acceptance. In such cases, it may be difficult to determine if and
when a binding agreement has been reached; it is therefore important to establish that a contract
may be considered to be concluded even though the moment of its formation cannot be determined,
provided that the conduct  of the parties is sufficient  to show agreement102.  Likewise,  the hotly-
debated103 art. 3.2 challenges the traditional process of contract formation: by establishing that a
contract is concluded by the mere agreement of the parties, without any further requirement, it does
away with a series of elements – in primis consideration or cause, but also the delivery of the thing
in the so-called real contracts – which are considered essential to the valid formation of the contract
in many national laws.  Another group of provisions inspired by the idea of  favor contractus is a
number of exceptions to the traditional “mirror image rule”, i.e. the rule that an acceptance must be
the mirror image of the offer, so that a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance, but
contains additional or different terms, amounts to a counter-offer. For instance, art. 2.11(2) provides
that a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance, but contains additions or modifications,
may nonetheless lead to the conclusion of a contract, if the additional or different terms do not
materially alter the terms of the offer and the offeror does not object to the discrepancy without
undue delay: accordingly, if the offeror does not object, the terms of the contract are the terms of
the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance. An important provision within this
group, which provides a solution to a problem emerging very frequently in practice, is art. 2.22 on
the  so-called  battle  of  the  forms,  that  is  the  situation  where,  during  negotiations,  both  parties
exchange forms containing standard terms which differ.  The battle of the form is solved in the
UNIDROIT Principle by the so-called “knock-out rule”,  whereby the conflicting terms “knock”
102This latter expression used by the Principes is a rather broad and sweeping statement,  which leaves much to the
interpretation of the courts and arbitral tribunals as to what constitutes a conduct “sufficient to show agreement” (G. A.
Moens,  L.  Cohn  and  D.  Peacock,  Australia,  in  M.J.  Bonell  (ed.),  A New Approach  to  International  Commercial
Contracts, cit., p. 29).
103Legal scholars are divided on the opportunity of narrowing down to the mere agreement the number of requirements
necessary to the formation of the contract.  Most of the debate has been focusing on the opportunity of doing away with
the element  of consideration or cause.  Some common lawyers  observe that   the doctrine of consideration is  being
progressively eroded by case law (see e.g. G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, Sweet and Maxwell, 1995, pp. 147ff and
M. Chen-Wishart,  Consideration: Practical Benefit and the Emperor's New Clothes, in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann
(eds.), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Clarendon press, 1995, pp. 123ff), others that, at least in the context of
international  commercial  contracts,  neither  consideration  nor  cause  serve  any  substantially  useful  purpose  (M.
Furmston, United Kingdom, in M.J. Bonell (ed.), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 384).
French lawyers suggest that in the UNIDROIT Principles system the functions of cause have been taken over by an
enlarged  notion  of  gross  disparity,  which  consequently  renders  superfluous  the  need   for  a  contractual  cause  (B.
Favarque-Cosson, France, in, M.J. Bonell (ed.), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 100-
101; similarly, A.Di Maio, I “Principles” dei contratti commerciali internazionali tra Civil Law e Common Law, Riv.
Dir. Civ., 1995, 1, p. 620 and J. Gordley,  An American Perspective on the UNIDROIT Principles, Centro di Studi e
ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero: saggi e conferenze e seminari n. 22). Finally, some English lawyers underline
that, although the consideration requirement is normally of minimal importance in international trade, there are still
some cases in which the enforcement of a commercial obligation has been called into question on the ground of the
absence of consideration, such as the bank's abstract obligation to pay the beneficiary of a letter of credit or a bank
guarantee (R. Goode, Commercial Law, Sweet and Maxwell, 1995, p. 986).
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each other out, so that only those terms of each party's  respective standard terms which are not
contradictory are incorporated into the contract104. This approach departs from the traditional “last
shot rule”, adopted in common law systems and under the CISG, whereby only the party's standard
terms that are referred to last are incorporated into the contract. The last shot rule is derived from
the principle of the “mirror image” rule: reference to different standard terms in an acceptance is
considered as a modification of the terms of the offer and therefore constitutes a counter-offer105. By
contrast,  the approach adopted by the UNIDROIT Principles is justified by the fact that  parties
often refer in practice to their respective standard terms, without paying much attention to them: in
such cases, they will normally not even be aware of a conflict between their respective standard
terms, with the result that they should not be allowed to subsequently question the existence of the
contract or, if performance has commenced, to insist on the application of the terms last sent or
referred  to.  Only where  a  party clearly  indicates  in  advance,  or  later  and without undue delay
informs the other, that he does not intend to be bound by a contract which is not based on his own
standard terms, can he exclude the application of the knock out doctrine and therefore avoid being
bound by a contract consisting of terms different from its own106.
But probably the most innovative solution provided by the UNIDROIT Principles and inspired by
the favor contractus is the provision on hardship. Hardship is defined in art. 6.2.2 as an unexpected
event  fundamentally altering the equilibrium of  the contract,  by either  increasing the cost  of  a
party's  performance or  by decreasing  its  value.  Where  hardship  occurs,  art.  6.2.3   entitles  the
aggrieved party to request the renegotiation of the contract in order to adapt its terms to the changed
circumstances; if the parties fail to reach agreement within a reasonable time, either of them may
resort to the court or arbitral tribunal, which is authorised either to terminate the contract or to adapt
it with a view to restoring its equilibrium. By contrast, many national systems, both of civil and
common law origin, provide no remedy in case that an unexpected event occurs which does not
make performance impossible, but merely more onerous and, if they do, they only allow discharge
of the contract107.  Consequently,  the UNIDROIT Principles provision on hardship is innovative,
because it provides courts and arbitrators with  greater flexibility required by international trade. In
104K. P. Berger,  Private  Dispute Resolution in  International  Business:  Negotiation,  Mediation,  Arbitration,  vol.  II:
Handbook, Kluwer, 2006, p. 406.  
105K. P. Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business, cit., p. 6 and 405.
106Comment 3 to art. 2.22
107
 In a  number  of civil  law countries,  such as  Germany,  Italy,  Switzerland,  Greece,  Argentine,  Brazil,  courts  are
empowered to modify the terms of the contract to adapt them to the changed circumstances; in France this possibility is
recognised only with respect to public law contracts (contrats administratifs) by the doctine of imprévision developed
by the Conseil d'Etat. Finally, common law countries generally adopt an “all-or nothing” approach: they either deny any
effect to the unexpected event or consider the contract terminated as a consequence thereof. Yet, in US case law there
have been two cases in which the court has modified the contract (ALCOA v. Essex Group Inc., 499 F. Supp 53 (WD Pa
1980)) and compelled renegotiation ( In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp 440 (E.D.
va. 1981)), in order to adapt it to changed circumstances.
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case of long-term contracts, what often happens in practice is that parties tend to avoid termination
and  prefer  to  have  their  contract  adapted  to  the  changed  circumstances:  in  fact,  sophisticated
international trade agreements of long duration tipically contain a “hardship clause”, allowing the
right of renegotiation or other adaptation means, which provide flexibility to the relationship. If
such a clause is lacking, it might be that it has been rejected by one or more parties, but it is more
likely to have been overlooked by unsophisticated parties or deliberately omitted by a sophisticated
drafter108. In the last two cases, reasons of faireness require that the court or the arbitral tribunal
shall be authorised to intervene in order to restore the equilibrium of the contract.
108J.M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, cit., pp. 301-302
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SECTION  II  :  THE  PURPOSES  OF  THE  UNIDROIT  PRINCIPLES  AND  
THEIR  APPLICATION  IN  INTERNATIONAL   COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
The purposes of the UNIDROIT Principles: introduction
The Preamble to the UNIDROIT Principles 2004 sets out six possible ways in which they may be
applied  in  practice:  as  rules  governing  the  contract  expressly  chosen  by  the  parties;  as lex
contractus  where the  parties have not chosen any law to govern  their  contract;  as  a  source of
general  principles of law or  lex mercatoria;  as means to interpret  and supplement international
uniform law instruments;  as  means  to  interpret  and  supplement  domestic  law;  as  a  model  for
international and international legislators. Yet, given the soft-law character of the Principles, this
list is not meant to be exhaustive, so that other options are also conceivable. Thus, some of the
additional applications of the Principles, which have emerged in practice and scholarly writings, but
had not been originally conceived by its drafters, have been encompassed in a Comment to the
Preamble added in the 2004 edition. It was feared that too long a list of possible applications might
have detracted the parties'  attention from the main purposes  of the Principles, that  should have
remained those for which they had originally been conceived1. As a result, the new Comment 8 to
the Preamble envisages three additional uses of the Principles: as a guide for drafting contracts, as
course material in legal education, and as a substitute for the domestic law otherwise applicable.
This latter purpose  was originally included in the black-letter rules of the 1994 Preamble, but, due
to its scarce practical application, was downgraded to an additional use. 
The UNIDROIT Principles as a guide for drafting contracts
Although confined to Comment 8 of the Preamble as an additional purpose of the Principles, the use
of the UNIDROIT Principles as a guide in contract negotiations and drafting has turned out to be
1UNIDROIT 2003 Study L – Misc. 25, Working Group for the Preparation of Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, Sixth Session 2-6 June 2003, Secretariat Report, par. 585
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one of the most important use2. In 1996 the UNIDROIT Secretariat launched an inquiry with a view
to gathering information as to the different  ways in which the Principles had been used so far:
roughly two thirds of those who replied declared that they had used the UNIDROIT Principles
during  contract  negotiations.  In  particular,  the  use  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  in  contract
negotiations and drafting may serve two essential purposes: they may represent an instrument to
overcome language barriers3 and they may assist the parties in identifying the main legal issues
underlying  the  negotiation  and  suggest  possible  solutions.  Parties  to  international  commercial
contracts  belong  by  definition  to  different  countries  and  may  therefore  find  it  difficult  to
communicate with each other on the basis of a terminology which is taken from a specific national
system: in this sense, the UNIDROIT Principles provide a neutral glossary of uniform definitions,
which is available in some of the main languages of the world. Moreover, especially in cases where
one or both parties  lack sufficient  expertise to conduct contract  negotiations at  an international
level, the Principles may represent a checklist of the most iportant issues to be dealt with and offer
examples of possible solutions4. For instance, the rule laid down in art. 1.9(2), whereby a notice is
effective when it reaches the person to whom it is given, should draw the attention of the parties to
the fact that normally the risk of loss, mistake or delay in the transmission of the message lies on
the sender: therefore, if under the specific circumstances of the case, this does not appear suitable or
fair,  the parties  should provide differently in  the contract;  again,  articles  5.4  and 5.5 draw the
parties' attention on the distinction between the duty to achieve a specific result and the duty to use
best efforts: accordingly, given the different degrees of diligence required in the performance of the
obligation, the parties should be urged to indicate in the clearest way possible in their contract the
type of duty involved.
On the other hand, the use of the UNIDROIT Principles as a model for contract drafting has some
drawbacks.  The  Principles  do  not  contain  provisions  for  specific  types  of  contracts  and  are
incomplete even for matters of general contract law5; moreover, their often general and open-ended
style  is  frequently  not  in  accordance  with  the  needs  for  specificity  and  accuracy  in  contract
practice6. Arguably, these drawbacks restrict their use in this regard; as a result, some author has
suggested that, rather than as a model for contracts, the Principles are designed as background law
2M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, Transnational Publishers, 1997, p. 238
3The 1996 inquiry has also shown that, among those who declared to have used the Principles during negotiations, one
third have done so in order to overcome language barriers.
4M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit., p. 177 ; G. de Nova, The UNIDROIT Principles as a
Guide for Drafting International Contracts, in Institute of International Business Law and Practice (ed.), UNIDROIT
Principles for International Commerc ial Contracts: a New Lex Mercatoria?, ICC Publication n. 490/1, 1995, p.  129
5G. de Nova, op. cit., pp. 133-134
6R. Michaels,  Preamble I: Purposes of the PICC, in S. Vogenauer and J. Kleinheitsterkamp (eds), Commentary on the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009,  p.  78
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for contracts to be used in order to clarify unclear terms or address issues arising under the contract,
but not directly dealt with by its terms7.
The UNIDROIT Principles as a model for national and international legislatures
As stated in paragraph 6 of the Preamble, the UNIDROIT Principles may constitute a model law on
which national and international legislators may rely for the elaboration of new legilsation in the
field  of  general  contract  law  or  with  respect  to  special  types  of  transactions.  The  use  of  the
Principles as a model for legislation has become perhaps their most succesful one8. In particular, at
the national level they may turn out to be useful for two categories of countries9: countries lacking a
developed body of rules relating to contracts and which therefore intend to update their law  to
current international standards, and countries with a well-defined legal system which, after recent
dramatic changes in their socio-political structure,  have an urgent need to rewrite their laws, in
particular those relating to economic and business activities. 
To  the  first  category  belong  the  developing  countries:  the  opportunity  to  use  the  UNIDROIT
Principles as a model for the revision and improvement of  national contract laws in the ASEAN
countries  has  been  repeatedly  emphasised10 and  in  one  ASEAN  country  –  Cambodia  –  the
Principles  have  already  exerted  some  influence  in  the  drafting  of  the  2007  Civil  Code11.  The
UNIDROIT Principles have also served as source of inspiration of the latest codification reforms in
7M. Fontaine,  The  UNIDROIT  Principles:  An  Expression  of  Current  Contract  Practice?,  ICC International  Court
Bullettin, Special Supplement on the UNIDROIT Principles, ICC Publication, 2002, p. 95; M. Scherer,  Preamble II:
The Use of the PICC in Arbitration, in S. Vogenauer and J. Kleinheitsterkamp (eds), Commentary on the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009,  p. 101.
8R. Michaels,  Preamble I: Purposes of the PICC, cit., p. 68.
9Comment 7 to the Preamble
10
 B. S. Hardjowahono,  The UNIDROIT Principles and the Law Governing Commercial Contracts in Southeast Asia,
ULR, 2002, 4, p. 1013. Yet, ASEAN’s current co-operation efforts with regard to trade law, let alone contract law are
for the time being mostly confined to preliminary accords on general objectives and the overall framework of such
cooperation. 
11
 M. Monichariya and T. Kazuko, Drafting a New Civil code and Code of Civil Procedure in Cambodia with Japanese
Technical Assistance, ULR, 2002, 4, p. 1051. Cambodia is a telling example of a country <<lacking a developed body
of  rules>>:  when  the  royal  government  was  established  in  1993,  the  Cambodian  society  was  without  those  basic
institutions and structures normally associated with the protection of fundamental rights and the functioning of a market
economy, that is to say it had no independent judiciary, no legal professionals, no effective civil service, no free press
and so on. In 1996 the Cambodian government announced the first Social and Economic Development Plan to launch
the necessary judicial and legal reforms which were supported by countries such as France (mainly in drafting the
Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure) and Japan (preparation of the Civil Code and the code of Civil
Procedure).  The Cambodian Civil Code was passed and promulgated in December 2007, but the date of enforcement
has not yet been fixed.
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many developed countries: this is said for the new Dutch Civil Code12, the 2001 reform of the Law
of Obligations in German Law13, the drafts for the revision of art. 2 on Sales of the United States
Uniform Commercial Code14, and the proposal of the reform of the Spanish Commercial Code15.
To the second category belong essentially the former soviet countries,  which are  or have been
under  a  process  of  transition  to  a  market  economy:  in  some  Eastern  European  countries  the
UNIDROIT Principles (together with the PECL) have been taken into account as one of the most
important and authoritative terms of reference in the drafting of new contract laws complying with
international standards16. But the most significant examples of countries belonging to this group are
undoubtedly the Russian Federation and China. In the former, the adoption of the new Civil Code
has confirmed the transition to private law principles in regulating economic activities17: although
part one of the Code, which includes general rules of contract, was completed before the Principles
were officially adopted and published18, it is beyond dispute that they were often relied upon as the
document  best  reflecting in  concise  form the current  state  of  and  recent  tendencies  in  modern
contract law19. Likewise, the UNIDROIT Principles 1994 inspired many rules of the 1999 Chinese
12The drafting of the Dutch Civil Code, which entered into force on 1 January 1992, was carried out in parallel with that
of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  1994:  many  scholars  have  underlined  the  mutual  interactions  between  the  two
instruments, so that it is fair to say that they share a common ideology of the law of contract and are based on largely
similar rules and concepts (cp. e.g. A.S. Hartkamp, The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts
and  the  New  Dutch  Civil  Code,  in  Festschrift  Christian  Johan  Henri  Brunner,   Kluwer,  1994,.  p.  137;  P.  Van
Schilfgaarde,  System,  Good  Faith  and  Equity  in  the  New Dutch Civil  Code,  ERPL,  1997,  p.  6;  B.  Volders,  The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and Dutch Law, in E. C. Cashin Ritaine and E. Lein
(eds),   The  UNIDROIT  Principles  2004:  Their  Impact  on  Contractual  Practice,  Jurisprudence  and  Codification-
Reports of the IDSC Colloquium 8/9 June 2006, Schulthess, 2007, pp. 137-139).
13
 O. Meyer,  Principi Internazionali del Diritto dei Contratti  nella Riforma del Diritto Tedesco delle Obbligazioni,
Contratto e Impresa – Europa, 2004,2, pp. 824-833; R. Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations: Historical
and Comparative Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 77.
14A. Rossett and M.W. Gordon,  United States, in  M.J. Bonell (ed.), A New Approach to International Commercial
Contracts: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commewcial Contracts, Kluwer, 1999, p. 393
15In 2004 the Spanish Ministry of Justice published a proposal for the reform of the Spanish Commercial Code, drafted
by the General Commission of Codification: this proposal is aimed at modifying the regulation of domestic commercial
contracts, contained in the 19th century Spanish Commercial Code, in order to adapt it to the current needs of trade. The
draft shows the strong  influence of the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, notwithstanding some differences in
matters such as invalidity, limitation periods and assignment of rights (A. M. Canellas, The Influence of the UNIDROIT
Principles on the Proposal of the Reform of the Spanish Commercial Code, in E. C. Cashin Ritaine and E. Lein (eds),
The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codification, cit., p. 215).
16This is the case of Estonia, Lithuania and Czech Republic.
17A.S. Komarov, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Russian View, ULR, 1996, 2, p.
250
18Part One of the Russian Civil Code was approved by the State Duma on 21 October 1994 and entered into force on 1
January 1995
19A.S. Komarov, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Russian View, cit., p. 248. The
most important provisions of the Russian Civil Code which were directly inspired by the UNIDROIT Principles were
arts. 451 and 452 on substantial alteration of contractual equilibrium. These provision, which were patterned after arts.
6.2.1- 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles on hardship represent completely new rules for Russian law. The importance
of these provision lies in the fact that Russia's unstable development during the period of transition towards a market
economy (especially in the light of the financial crisis of the 90s) has turned the problem of hardship into one of the
greatest  issues  in Russian law:  whereas  in the former  socialist  system the problem of changed circumstances  was
considered of small importance, now arts. 451 and 452 of the Russian Civil Code allow  the disadvantaged party to
request the court to adapt the contract to the changed circumstances. (cp A.G. Doudko,  Hardship in Contract: The
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Contract  Law20,  especially  those  which,  within  a  context  of  market  economy,  strike  a  balance
between economic efficiency and social justice, such as the validity of an acceptance containing a
non-material modification of the offer or the principle of pre-contractual liability21.
The diffusion of the UNIDROIT Principles as a model for national legislation has a number of
common  features22.  First,  despite  their  international  character,  they  have  often  been  used  for
domestic  rather than international contract law reform. This seems to be an indication of the fact
that the distinction between international and domestic contracts tends to blur, as most domestic
laws on commercial contracts are now drawn also with international commerce in mind. Secondly,
the Principles have rarely been used as a model in their entirety; more frequently, only individual
chapters or even individual rules thereof have been relied on. This is because not all provisions of
the  Principles  represent  “common”  or  “best”  solutions,  but  their  suitability  for  the  particular
national context must be verified on a case by case basis. Thirdly, where the Principles have exerted
substantial influence, this was frequently due to the presence of individual advisors in law reform
committees  who  had  participated  to  the  drafting  of  the  Principles  themselves  or  had  been
particularly active in their scholarly diffusion. This is the case for example of Zimmermann for the
reform of the German Law of Obligation and Komarov for the reform of the Russian Civil Code.
At an international level, the UNIDROIT Principles may become an important term of reference for
the  drafting  of  new  conventions,  model  laws  and  other  harmonisation  tools  in  the  field  of
international contract law. Apart from the mutual influences between the two “sister-projects” of the
UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, the most significant instance is represented by the Uniform
Act on Contract Law (Acte uniforme sur le droit des contrats) drafted by the Organisation for the
Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit
des Affaires, OHADA)23. In 2002 the OHADA Secretariat approached the International Institute for
Approach of the UNIDROIT Principles and Legal Developments in Russia, ULR, 2000, 3, pp. 483-509). 
20According to the statistics published quoted in Z. Shaohui, L'Influence des Principes d' UNIDROIT sur la Réforme du
Droit Chinois des Obligations, ULR, 2008, 1/2, pp. 161-162, 47.3% of the provisions of the General Part of the 1999
Chinese Contract Law have been remarkably influenced by the UNIDROIT Principles.
21J. Xi, The Impact of the UNIDROIT Principles on Chinese Legislation, in E. C. Cashin Ritaine and E. Lein (eds), The
UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact  on Contractual  Practice,  Jurisprudence and Codification-  Reports  of the
IDSC Colloquium 8/9 June 2006, Schulthess, 2007, p. 113. During the drafting process of the Chinese contract law
there have been discussions  concerning what  rules should be adopted from which legal  systems.  Whereas no one
disputed the necessity of borrowing rules from outside the Chinese legal system, some expressed their concern that such
borrowed  rules  necessarily  carried  some  unique  social  and  political  charactersistc  of  the  country  concerned  and
therefore they may be incompatible with Chinese social reality. This concern gave further incentives to the drafters to
thoroughly consider the UNIDROIT Principles as rules drafted by juristis representing all the major systems of the
world and thus not reflecting the legal tradition of any particular country  (L. Hx, Controversies in the drafting Process
of Chinese Contract Law, in China Law Web, available at www. iolaw.org.cn). 
22R. Michaels,  Preamble I: Purposes of the PICC, cit., p. 69.
23The Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du
Droit des Affaires, OHADA) was set up by a treaty signed on 17 October 1993 and its main purpose is   to promote
regional  integration  and  economic  growth  and to  ensure  a  secure  legal  environment  through  the  harmonization  of
business law within its member states  (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa, Comoros, Congo, Ivory Coast,
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the Unification of Private Law in order to ask assistance in the drafting of a uniform act on contract
law. UNIDROIT agreed to the OHADA's request and proposed that one of the members of the
UNIDROIT Principles Working Group – Marcel Fontaine – be entrusted with the preparation of  a
preliminary draft. To this aim, the rapporteur completed three exploratory missions in nine OHADA
member states selected by the OHADA Secretariat, in the course of  which more than one hundred
interviews with local jurists (such as senior civil servants, magistrates, lawyers, notaries, academics,
representatives of the business world) were carried out, with a view to collecting information on the
current state of contract law in the countries concerned, the uniquely African features to be taken
into  account,  the  guiding  principles  to  be  adopted  in  the  drafting  of  the  future  act  and  the
opportunity of choosing the UNIDROIT Principles as a model for the act itself24.
In  2005  a  preliminary  draft  comprising  213  articles  was  prepared   and  it  is  currently  under
examination  before  the  OHADA  national  commissions:  once  it  is  approved  by  the  OHADA
Ministry Council,  the Uniform Act  will  be directly applicable and binding within the OHADA
Member states. Following the suggestions stemming from the earlier consultations, it was decided
to stick to the model of the UNIDROIT Principles as close as possible: most of the articles of the
draft are very similar and at times identical to the text of the UNIDROIT Principles. Accordingly,
the  draft  Uniform  Act  represents  a  complete  codification  of  general  contract  law25:  like  the
UNIDROIT Principles, it covers formation, validity, intepretation, content, performance and non-
performance, transfer of obligations and limitation periods. Moreover, new provisions have been
added  covering  subject-matters  not  yet  addressed  by  the  UNIDROIT  Principles,  such  as
Gabon, Guinea,  Bissau Guinea,  Equatorial Guinea,  Mali, Niger,  Senegal,  Chad, Togo; the Democratic  Republic  of
Congo  has  officially  announced  its  decision  to  become  an OHADA member).  The OHADA institutional  structure
includes four  main bodies: the Council  of Ministers which is made up of the Finance and Justice Ministers of the
member  states  and  is  the  executive  and  legislative  body  in  charge  of  adopting  the  uniform  acts;  the  Permanent
Secretariat  which  is  the  administrative  body and implements  the adopted texts;  the Common Court  of Justice and
Arbitration which is  the  supreme authority  in charge  of reviewing  decisions  rendered by Courts  of Appeal  of the
member states in cases involving the application of the OHADA uniform law; the Regional Training School of the
Judiciary,  providing for the training of judges and judiciary staff  and ensuring their  specialization in the OHADA
uniform laws. The OHADA Council of Ministers has so far adopted following uniform laws:  General commercial law,
Corporate law and rules concerning different types of joint ventures, Laws concerning secured transactions (guarantees
and collaterals), Debt recovery and enforcement law, Bankruptcy law, Arbitration law, Accounting law. Law regulating
contracts for the carriage of goods by road. According to art. 10 of the OHADA Treaty, Uniform Acts adopted by the
Council of Ministers are directly applicable and overriding in the contracting states. The OHADA Council of Ministers
made the decision in 2001 to go ahead, within a rapid time frame, with the unification of the following additional
business and legal regulations: competitions law intellectual property law, banking law, laws related to unincorporated
forms of business, law of contract and law of evidence.
24M. Fontaine, Explanatory Note to the Preliinary Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law, ULR, 2008, 1/2, par.
4, p. 634.
25The question  of  the  scope  of  application  of  the  future  Act  has  been  for  the  moment  left  open:  in  view of  the
rapporteur's  preference for  a unified contract  law,  the preliminary draft  makes an a priori case for  a Uniform Act
applicable to both commercial and non-commercial contracts; yet, a variant has also been included whereby the Act
would apply to commercial contracts only, but national legislators would have discretion to extend its scope to contracts
in general. (M. Fontaine,  Explanatory Note to the Preliminary Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law, cit., p.
634).
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conditional, joint and several obligations and the protection of creditors26. On the other hand, the
elaboration of the preliminary draft has also followed a second guiding principle, namely seeking
appropriate adjustments to accommodate the specific features of Africa's legal, social and cultural
context, such as the widespread illiteracy and scant legal culture27. Nonetheless, it is still doubtful
whether OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law will be successful28. Concerns have been raised on
OHADA's  influence  on  its  member  states,  since  its  uniform acts  are  not  yet  widely  enforced.
Furthermore, the question has been raised whether unification of the law of contract on the basis of
a text conceived by drafters foreign to African legal traditions is legitimate. Finally, the fact that
French is the exclusive language of OHADA may pose problems given the degree of affinity the
UNIDROIT Principles have towards the common law and given that most of their materials are in
English.
The impact of the UNIDROIT Principles on national legislations is also fostering the emergence of
a  particular  legislative  technique,  which  is  becoming the  standard  for  national  or  international
codification of private  law29.   This  drafting approach is  characterised by two main features:  an
extensive comparative law research underlying the elaboration of each provision, which takes into
account an even larger  number of foreign sources  of both national and non-national  origin;  the
involvement  in  the  drafting  process  of  a  wide  range  of  outside  experts  and  stakeholders  not
belonging to the state or formulating agency's bureaucracy, in order to strengthen the legitimacy of
the harmonisation tool and facilitate its reception in practice30. In turn, the diffusion of such national
and international instruments, reflecting widely accepted contract rules, ends up constraining the
choice of legislatures embarking on new law-making projects, since they need to provide reasonable
grounds every time they decide to adopt rules departing from internationally accepted standards31.
26M. Fontaine, L'avant-projet d'Acte Uniforme OHADA sur le Droit des Contrats: Vue d'Ensemble, ULR, 2008, 1/2, p.
214
27Most African lawyers are illiterate and therefore legal rules are frequently ignored or very badly known by them. In
case of dispute, very few resort to the judiciary or legal professionals; most people prefer non-legal mechanisms of
dispute settlement or self-help. cp.  M. Fontaine, Harmonisation du Droit des Contrats en Afrique,  in E. C. Cashin
Ritaine and E. Lein (eds), op. cit., p. 99
28R. Michaels,  Preamble I: Purposes of the PICC, cit., p. 71
29B. Volders,  The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial  Contracts and Dutch Law,  in  E. C. Cashin
Ritaine and E. Lein (eds), op. cit., p. 142; D. Tallon,  The New Dutch Civil Code in a Comparative Perspective – a
French View- Point, ERPL, 1993, p. 190
30B. Volders, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and Dutch Law, cit, pp. 139-141
31B. Volders, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and Dutch Law, cit., pp. 142-143
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 The adoption of the UNIDROIT Principles in the form of a model law
Shortly after  the publication of the first edition of the UNIDROIT Principles,  the early idea of
drafting a binding code of international commercial contracts, which had already emerged during
the  1971  Steering  Committee's  work,  rekindled:  some  UNIDROIT  Working  Group  members
suggested  that  it  would  be  worthwhile  to  resume and  continue  the  Working  Group's  work  in
UNCITRAL  with a view to preparing an international convention on the general part of the law of
contracts32, or even a binding Global Commercial Code33. Yet, the conversion of the UNIDROIT
Principles into a binding instrument in the form of an international convention is not, for the time
being, a realistic objective34. Already in the early 1980s, when the Working group embarked upon
the preparation of the UNIDROIT Principles, the prolonged negotiations leading to the CISG had
clearly showed that this Convention was the maximum that could be achieved at the legislative
level35; nowadays it is very unlikely that governments will be willing to embark upon a far-reaching
project  such  as  the  adoption  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  by  an  international  convention36.
Nonetheless,  less  radical  but  more feasible  options for  the further  diffusion of  the UNIDROIT
Principles  need  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  Given  the  remarkable  influence  exerted  by the
Principles  on  national  legislations,  an  increasing  number  of  scholars  is  now claiming for  their
adoption in the form of a model law37.  The direct involvement of governments would enhance the
UNIDROIT Principles'  authority;  at  the same time,  the most innovative rules contained therein
would not constitute an obstacle to their enactment in the various national systems, given the non-
binding nature of the model law. Finally, a further advantage would stem from the different path of
diffusion of the model law with respect to a restatement. Whereas the latter is primarly addressed to
contracting parties, judges and arbitrators throughout the world, with the consequent difficulties in
ensuring its  diffusion among such a huge and indefinite  moltitude of  people,  the model  law is
addressed  to  national  legislatures,  which  are  much  more  identifiable  and  limited  in  number.
32
 J.P. Beraudo, Les Principes d'UNIDROIT relatifs au droit du commerce international, La Semaine Juridique, 1995, 1,
p. 194
33O.  Lando,  Principles  of  European  Contract  Law  and  UNIDROIT  Principles:  Moving  from  Harmonisation  to
Unification?, ULR, 2003, 1, p. 132
34M. J. Bonell, Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT Principles?, ULR, 2007, 2, p. 244
35M. J. Bonell, Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT Principles?, cit., p. 234
36M. J. Bonell, Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT Principles?, cit., p. 239
37A. S. Hartkamp,  Modernisation and Harmonisation of Contract Law: Objectives, Methods and Scope, ULR, 2003,
1/2,  pp.  88-89;  O.  Lando,  Principles  of  European  Contract  Law  and  UNIDROIT  Principles:  Moving  from
Harmonisation to Unification?, cit. pp. 132-133; M. J. Bonell,  Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT
Principles?, cit., pp. 244-245; for a skeptical note, see E.A. Farnsworth, Modernization and Harmonization of Contract
law: an American Perspective, ULR, 2003, 1/2, pp. 103-106.  Contra, R. Michaels,  op. cit., p. 69, who argues that a
binding global code seems both improbable and unattractive; whereas a non-binding global code would presumably not
look very different from the UNIDROIT Principles as they exist now.
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Accordingly, the adoption of the UNIDROIT Principles in the form of a model law might enhance
their diffusion within the international community, since it would address directly those who, within
their  respective  national  governments,  are  in  charge  of  adopting  legislation  in  the  field  of
international commercial law.  Of course, an adequate promotional work should be carried out, with
a view to convincing national legislatures of the need for reforming outdated national contract laws
in accordance to international standards and of the advantages stemming from the adoption of the
UNIDROIT Principles as a model for these reforms. This persuasive work may be facilitated by the
fact that the experts who at the national level are entrusted with the task of preparing legislative
drafts  in  the  field  of  contract  law  are  frequently  involved  in  the  UNIDROIT  activities,  either
directly  as  members  or  as  external  observers.  As  a  result,  the  epistemic  community  within
UNIDROIT may benefit from the “double-track” activity of its members, acting as experts at both
international and national level: once persuaded of the usefulness of the UNIDROIT Principles as a
model  law for  national  legislatures,  the UNIDROIT  expert  members  may exert  a  considerable
pressure  on  their  respective  governments  to  enact  legislative  reforms  on  the  pattern  of  the
UNIDROIT Principles.
It is still to be seen whether the UNIDROIT Principles should be the subject of a model law on its
own or be part of a broader project, such as a non-binding Global Commercial Code to be adopted
in  the  form of  a  model  law by  UNCITRAL in  co-opeation  with  other  interested  international
organisations. Such a Code would be a sort of consolidation of existing uniform law instruments
(e.g.  the CISG,  various transport  law conventions,  the UNIDROIT Conventions on leasing and
factoring,  INCOTERMS)38,  or  a  universal  glossary  of  commercial  terms  to  be  used  in  future
harmonisation projects. The UNIDROIT Principles may be included as the general contract law of
this Code, applicable to the specific contracts regulated therein,  unless otherwise agreed by the
parties.
The UNIDROIT Principles as governing law chosen by the parties
The second paragraph of the Preamble states that the UNIDROIT Principles shall be applied when
the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by them. Despite the very scarce number of
38M. J. Bonell, Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT Principles?, cit., p. 244.
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practical applications in this respect, speculations on the use of the Principles as lex contractus have
given rise to a burgeoning amount of literature. This issue is fascinating for legal theory39, since
ideological clashes on  what constitutes “law” come into play when deciding whether the Principles
may be employed as governing law of the contract. One of the most disputed questions is whether
national courts are bound to apply the UNIDROIT Principles in case that the parties expressly refer
to them as the law governing their contract. The prevailing opinion is that state courts are bound to
apply their own national law, which includes the relevant conflict of law rules and the latter restrict
the choice of the laws applicable to international contracts to the law of a state, to the exclusion of
any supra-national or non-national set of rules. The reasons underlying this opinion are that only a
state can create a law which protects equally and fairly the interests of parties to a contract and
provides legal certainty; moreover, only state law rules, as recognised by a sovereign State, can be
enforced by a state court40.  This view is confirmed by the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable  to  Contractual  Obligations,  which  unifies  the  conflict  of  law rules  with  respect  to
contracts within the member states of the EU: by repeatedly referring to the “law” of a country or a
contracting state41, it leaves no doubt as to the fact that the law applicable in the respective cases
must necessarily be the law of a particular State. Accordingly,  a reference by the parties to the
Principles as the law governing their contract will be normally interpreted by state courts as a mere
agreement to incorporate them into the contract as standard terms, with the consequence that the lex
contractus will still have to be determined on the basis of private international law rules of the
forum42.  Yet,  in  the  wake  of  the  profound change in  circumstances  occurred   since  the  Rome
Convention  was  drafted,  some commentators  have  claimed for  a  broader  interpretation  of  this
instrument.  In  particular,  they  have  emphasised  the  growing  number  of  autonomous  uniform
regulations in international commercial law, of which the UNIDROIT Principles represent one of
the most important examples. These set of non-national rules are now both coherent and indicate
ways  of  filling  possible  lacunae;  consequently,  they  may be  chosen  by  the  parties  as  the  law
governing the contract43. Accordingly, the meaning of “law” within the Rome Convention should be
39H. van Houtte, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Arbitration International, 1995, 11,
4, p. 374
40J.C. Wichard,  Die Anwendung der UNIDROIT-Prinzipien fur internationale Hadelsvertrage durch Schiedsgerichte
und nationale Gerichte, Rabels Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht, 1996, 60, p. 269 quoted in
M. Heidemann, Methodology of Uniform Contract Law- the UNIDROIT Principles in International Legal Doctrine and
Practice, Springer, 2007, p. 152
41Cp art. 2 <<law of a Contracting State>>; art. 3(3) <<foreign law>>; art. 4(1) <<law of the country with which the
contract  is  most  closely  connected>>;  art.  5(2)  <<law  of  the  country  in  which  the  consumer  has  his  habitual
residence>>.
42Comment 4a to the Preamble
43K. Boele-Woelki, Principles and Private International Law- The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law: How to Apply Them to International Contracts , ULR, 1996,
4, p.  666
361
expanded in light  of the on-going emergence of a body of rules relating to the law of contract
outside the boundaries of national laws44.  In  addition, it  has been suggested that the purpose of
choice of law rules is not the protection of the interest of a state to apply its own law , but rather the
idea  of  letting  the  parties  find  the  best  law  to  govern  their  contract  according  to  subjective
considerations45.  Parties  know  the  best  way  of  regulating  their  own  affairs:  under  the  Rome
Convention system, the principle of free choice is of such fundamental importance that it cannot be
limited by a restricting intepretation of its provisions46. In fact, according to the Rome Convention,
the parties are allowed to choose any law of any country, even if it is totally unrelated to themselves
and their contract, and even if the contract is purely domestic. It is therefore a small step from there
to allow parties also to designate non-national law as the governing law of the contract, taking into
account that the mandatory provisions of the law of the connected countries are to be applied via
art. 7 of the Convention47. This doctrinal debate has exerted a significant influence on the drafting
of the EU Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (the so-called Rome I),
which is due to replace the Rome Convention. The  EU Commission  has put forward a proposal
containing a revised version of art. 3 of the Rome Convention reading that <<the parties may also
choose as the applicable law the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognised
internationally or in the Community>>48. As the commentary to this article expressly states, <<the
form of words used would authorise the choice of the UNIDROIT Principles,  the Principles of
European Contract Law or a possible future optional Community instrument, while excluding the
lex mercatoria, which is not precise enough, or private codifications not adequately recognised by
the  international  community>>.  Had  this  proposal  been  accepted,  it  might  have  encouraged
contracting parties to make greater use of the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL even in the
context of litigation; moreover, it would have eliminated the totally unjustified differentiation in the
parties'  freedom to  choose  the  applicable  law depending on whether  they decide  to  have  their
disputes settled by arbitration or in court49.  Yet, the proposal advanced by the EU Commission has
not been retained in the final text of Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008  on the Law Applicable to
Contractual  Obligations (Rome I)50,  which has been adopted on 17 June 2008 by the European
44O. Toth,  The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts as the Governing Law – Reflections in
Light of the Reform of the Rome Convention, in E. C. Cashin Ritaine and E. Lein (eds), op. cit.,  p. 201
45M. Heidemann, Methodology of Uniform Contract Law, cit., p. 152
46J. Basedow, Germany, in M.J. Bonell (ed.), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, cit.,  p. 146
47K. Boele-Woelki, Principles and Private International Law, cit., p.  666
48Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  Law  Applicable  to  Contractual
obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 Final, 2005/0261 (COD), 15 December 2005.
49M. J. Bonell, Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT Principles?, ULR, 2007, 2, p. 243
50Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I), 2008, OJ L 177/6. 
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Parliament and the Council. Accordingly, also within this new regime the parties' choice of the law
applicable to their contractual obligations is restricted to the law of a state.
The situation is entirely different where the parties have chosen the UNIDROIT Principles as  lex
contractus and  have at the same time opted for arbitration to settle their dispute.  It  is a well-
established rule under most national arbitration laws that arbitrators are not bound to base their
decision  on  a  particular  domestic  law:  all  “Model  Law  countries”  have  adopted  the  solution
provided  for  in  art.  28(1)  of  the  1985  UNICITRAL  Model  Law  on  International  Commercial
Arbitration, whereby <<the arbitrator shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law
as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute>> and a similar solution is
found  in the law of most countries, which have not enacted the Model Law  but have nonetheless a
long tradition in arbitration51.  As we have seen above52,   it  is unanimously recognised by legal
scholars and arbitration practitioners that the term “rules of law” indicates that the arbitrators  are
not  confined to national laws, but may apply rules not stemming from a national or supra-national
legislator to the substance of the dispute, such as the lex mercatoria or the UNIDROIT Principles53.
Accordingly,  the  diffusion  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  is  essentially  related  to  international
commercial arbitration, since it is in this context that they  find the most favourable conditions for
their application54. Subject to any applicable mandatory rules55, where the parties have expressly
chosen the Principles as the law governing their contract, their application should not be left to the
arbitrator's discretion. This results both from art. 28 of the Model Law and par. 2 of the Preamble to
the UNIDROIT Principles, which envisage that in this case the arbitral tribunal shall apply them to
the dispute.   Not surprisingly,  Comment 4 to the Preamble recommends that parties wishing to
adopt the UNIDROIT Principles as rules applicable to their contract should combine such reference
to the Principles with an arbitration agreement.
51cp. art. 1496 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, art.  182 of the Swiss Law on Private International Law and  art.
46(1) of the English Arbitration Act.
52
 See supra pp. 230 ff
53K. P. Berger,  The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 80; D. Oser, The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Governing Law?, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008,
p. 25.
54Cp P. Meyer,  The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in ICC Arbitration Practice, in The UNIDROIT Principles of
International  Commercial  Contracts  – Special  Suppleent  2002,  ICC International  Court  Bullettin,  p.  105 <<Parties
never (or practically never) make their contracts subject to the UNIDROIT Principles and the courts do not see it as
their job to apply them unasked. So, it is arbitrators who are likely to ensure their success , so much so that they become
a true lex mercatoria, albeit of a different kind from that imagined forty years ago. At the other extreme, arbitrators
could frustrate the potentiality of the principles in this field by applying them only when they have been expressly
chosen by the parties>>.
55These  mandatory  rules  are  not  purely  domestic  mandatory  rules  (rules  applicable  despite  any  agreement  to  the
contrary on the assumption that the relevant domestic law applies), but overriding super-mandatory rules (the so-called
Eingriffsnormen or règles d'application immédiates) applicable irrespective of the governing law.
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Yet, it is extremely rare in practice that parties provide in express terms that their contract shall be
governed by the UNIDROIT Principles56. Cases in which the UNIDROIT Principles are found to be
applicable as a result of the consent of the parties tend to be cases in which the contract does not
contain  a  choice  of  law clause,  but  the  parties  subsequently  consent  to  the  application  of  the
Principles to the contract by the arbitrators  57. The most serious obstacle to the application of the
UNIDROIT Principles as lex contractus, wholly replacing the national law otherwise applicable, is
the fact that they do not represent a complete body of contract law, let alone a fully developed and
self-sufficient  legal  system58:  a  number  of  issues,  such  as  capacity  and  validity,  are  explicitly
excluded; moreover, they yield to all relevant mandatory rules of domestic law59. For this reason, a
footnote added to  the Preamble in the 2004 edition provides for a model clause which parties
opting for  the UNIDROIT Principles as governing law are adivsed to include in their contract:
<<this  contract  shall  be  governed  by the  UNIDROIT  Principles  (2004)60 supplemented,  where
necessary, by the law of (country x)>>.  The inclusion of this clause has nonetheless raised some
concern:  suggesting  the  parties  to  supplement  the  choice  of  the  Principles  with  a  reference  to
domestic law seems to be at odds with the most important idea underlying the elaboration of the
Principles itself, namely that of overcoming the problems related to the application of national law
to international commercial contracts and promoting instead the use of a non-national body of rules
better tailored to the needs of international trade61.
56One of the few examples of awards applying the UNIDROIT Principles by virtue of an express choice made by the
parties in their contract is a decision of the Centro de Arbitraje de Mexico dated 30 November 2006: the Mexican
arbitral tribunal expressly confirmed the validity of the parties'choice of the Principles and their character of  rules of
law within the meaning of art. 1445 of the applicable Mexican Commercial Code. See www.unilex.info
57R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University
Press, 2007,  p. 520.
58M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit, p. 192
59H. van Houtte, The UNIDROIT Principles, cit., p. 373
60The model clause carefully specifies the edition of the UNIDROIT Principles which is to be applied. In the absence of
such specification by the parties, the question may arise of which version of the UNIDROIT Principles applies. If the
choice of the Principles is made after 2004, it can be presumed to be the 2004 edition: this has been the solution adopted
by the Mexican arbitral tribunal in the case referred to above in n. 48. If the choice was made earlier, the issue arises
whether the choice is a dynamic one (designating the Principles in whatever the version is current at the time of the
dipute) or a static one (designating the Principles in the state in which they are at the time of choice). The traditional
solution in private international law is to interpret parties' choice as dynamic. R. Michaels, Preamble I: Purposes of the
PICC, in S. Vogenauer  and J.  Kleinheitsterkamp (eds),  Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009,  p. 40.
61D. Oser, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Governing Law?, cit., pp. 35-36
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The UNIDROIT Principles as a source of general principles of law and lex
mercatoria
The third paragraph of the Preamble states that the UNIDROIT Principles may be applied when the
parties have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria
and the like.
Parties to an international contract who cannot agree on the choice of a partcular domestic law as
the law applicable to their contract  sometimes provide that it  shall be governed by “the general
principles  of  law”,  “lex  mercatoria”,  usages  and  customs  of  international  trade”,  “principles
common to the domestic laws of all the parties concerned”, “principles of law normally recognised
by civilized nations in general”. Whatever the expression used, the parties' common purpose in such
cases is to “internationalise” the legal regime of the contract at issue, by avoiding the application of
any particular domestic legal system62. In arbitration practice, this particular choice of the parties is
frequently referred to as “negative choice”, i.e. the situation in which the parties are assumed to
have, by tacit agreement,  excluded the application of any given national law and authorised the
arbitral  tribunal  to resort  to non-national  sources  of law63.   Nonetheless,  the precise nature and
content of the principles and rules in question remain extremely uncertain. In order to avoid, or at
least considerably reduce, the uncertainty related to such vague concepts, it might be advisable to
have recourse to  a systematic and well-defined set of rules such as the UNIDROIT Principles64.
However,  the possibility of  recognising the  UNIDROIT Principles  as  an  expression of  general
principles of law or  lex mercatoria is highly disputed. The most significant criticism is that the
Principles' aim is not simply to reflect  common rules or existing practices,  but to adopt,  where
appropriate, best solutions to old and new issues of contract law. To the extent that the Principles
prescribe such innovative solutions, it is difficult to see how they may be considered as part of the
lex mercatoria when they are not based, and do not claim to be based, on any established practice65.
Accordingly, the Principles are only an indication of the existence of a transnational legal rule, a
possible source of lex mercatoria66 and therefore should not automatically be applied in case of such
a reference. But it would be presumptious for a text drafted by a group of academic experts to claim
62M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit, p. 204
63P. Lalive,  The UNIDROIT Principles as Lex Contractus, With or Without an Explicit or Tacit Choice of Law: An
Arbitrator's Perspective, in The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts – Special Supplement,
ICC International  Court of Arbitration Bullettin,  2002, p. 81; D. Oser,  The UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts: a Governing Law?, cit., p. 47.  
64Comment 4b to the Preamble
65R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, cit., pp. 522-523 
66K. P. Berger,  The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, cit., p. 179
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to  be  the  genuine  expression  of  the  law merchant67.  As  the  careful  language  of  par.  3  of  the
Preamble makes clear68,  the Principles do not demand their direct and exclusive applicability as
general principles of law or lex mercatoria, but they merely provide for the possibility to resort to
them as one of the various sources available to determine the content of these (or similar) vague
formulations by the parties69. As a result, the question whether the Principles are part of the  lex
mercatoria is not susceptible of a single answer: it will be necessary to verify on a case by case
basis whether the single provision at issue is in line with current practice in international trade70.
There is, however, great uncertainty how arbitrators should actually assess whether the Principles
provisions do reflect general principles of law or lex mercatoria. Some arbitral decisions have, in
view of this difficulty, forgone any verification process and adopted the UNIDROIT Principles in
their entirety as genuine expression of the parties' choice. The most frequently quoted decision in
this  respect  is  the  ICC  interim  award  No.  7110,  rendered  on  13  July  1995,  which  has  been
considered as the official  entrée of the Principles into international arbitration71. A choice by the
parties  of  “principles  of  natural  justice”  was  interpreted  by the  arbitral  tribunal  as  a  “negative
choice”: the arbitration agreement should be interpreted as indicating that the parties intended their
contract  to be governed by rules and principles which, though not necessarily enshrined in any
specific national legal system, are specifically adapted to the needs of international transactions and
enjoy wide international recognition. The arbitral tribunal had no hesitation to affirm that such rules
and principles were primarly reflected in the UNIDROIT Principles and this although the arbitration
agreement was concluded over fifteen years prior to the publication of the Principles. Five reasons
were  given:  1)  the  Principles  are  a  restatement  of  law  drafted  by  distinguished,  neutral  and
independent experts; 2) the Principles are largely inspired by the CISG, which already enjoys wide
international recognition and reflects international trade usages and practices; 3) the Principles were
especially designed to deal with cases such as the one at issue; 4) the Principles may apply when the
parties have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles of law, lex mercatoria or
the like and this appeared the case where parties referred to natural justice; 5) rather than providing
vague rules and general guidelines, the Principles are clearly articulated and organised in a coherent
and systematic way and this characteristic makes them well fit for application to concrete cases72.
Despite  the  variety  of  grounds  put  forward  in  order  to  justify  its  choice  of  the  UNIDROIT
67D. Oser, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Governing Law?, cit, p. 50
68
 In par. 3 the expression “may “ instead of  “shall” is adopted
69M.J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit, pp. 211-212
70R.  Goode,  H.  Kronke,  E.  McKendrick,  Transnational  Commercial  Law,  cit.  p.  523;  D.  Oser,  The  UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Governing Law?, cit, p. 56
71K. Boele-Woelki, Principles and Private International Law, cit., p. 661
72F. de Ly, The Netherlands, in M.J. Bonell (ed.), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 223
K. Boele-Woelki, Principles and Private International Law, cit., p. 661
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Principles, the arbitral tribunal failed to clarify to what extent they reflected general principles of
law enjoying wide international recognition. Indeed, when faced with the decision on the merits in
the 4 May 1998 final award, the arbitral tribunal appeared less enthusiastic on the Principles: for
example, when dealing with the question of hardship, the tribunal held in one sentence that the
theory of changed circumstances does not form part of widely recognised and generally accepted
legal  principles  and  therefore  did  not  rely  on  the  corresponding  hardship  provisions  of  the
UNIDROIT Principles; this indicates that in fact the arbitral tribunal did not consider them as the
primary  law governing  the  contract,  but  only  as  a  source  which  may help  it   to  find  general
principles of law73. 
Other arbitral tribunals have taken a more cautious approach.  In the ICC award No. 7375 of 5 June
199674, the arbitral tribunal, although recognising the UNIDROIT Principles' universal acceptance,
pointed out at  the same time that  not  all  of their  provisions  could be considered  to reflect  the
international consensus and therefore held that it would take them into account only in so far as they
could  be  regarded  to  comply  with  generally  accepted  principles  and  rules.  In  particular,  this
cautious approach has been frequently adopted where issues of hardship were involved75. We have
already mentioned the final award related to the ICC case No 7110; a similar but clearer rationale
has  been followed in  another  ICC award rendered in  1997, in which the tribunal held that  the
provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles on hardship do not correspond, at least presently, to current
practices  in  international  trade  and  consequently  can  be  applied  only  where  the  parties  have
expressly referred to them in their contract76.
 In conclusion, the current applications of the Principles as a source of transnational law seem to be
at odds with the purpose of par. 3 of the Preamble, which is to reduce considerably the uncertainty
and unpredictability affecting the decisions of arbitrators called upon to apply general principles of
law or lex mercatoria to the dispute.
73F. de Ly, op. cit., pp. 231-232 and  p. 234.
74ICC No. 7375/1996, in  M.J. Bonell (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles  in Practice: Caselaw and Bibliography on the
Principles of Commercial Contracts, Transnational Publishers, 2002, p. 425
75R. Goode, H. Kronke,  E. McKendrick,  Transnational Commercial Law,  cit.,  p.  523 ; P. Meyer,  The Role of the
UNIDROIT  Principles  in  ICC  Arbitration  Practice,  in  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  of  International  Commercial
Contracts, ICC International Court of  Arbitration Bulletin, Special Supplement 2002,, p. 112; nonetleless, the author
observes that in ICC cases 7356 and 9479 the Principles provisions on hardship have been applied unhesitatingly.
76ICC No. 8873/1997 in M.J. Bonell (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles  in Paractice: Caselaw and Bibliography on the
Principles of Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 499; more recently, in the ICC case  10422/2003 (quoted by E. Jolivet,  The
UNIDROIT Principles in ICC Arbitration,  in UNIDROIT Principles: New Developments and Applications, in  ICC
International  Court  of   Arbitration  Bulletin,  2005  Special  Supplement,  p.  67),  the  arbitral  tribunal  stated  that  the
Principles were part of lex mercatoria inasmuch as they constitute a faithful transposition of the rules which business
people  involved  in  international  trade  recognize  as  applicable  to  international  contracts;  this  qualification  led  the
arbitrator to exclude some of the Principles provision from the scope of lex meractoria, including, notably hardship.
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The application of the UNIDROIT Principles in the absence of a choice of law by
the parties
The final  version of the 1994 edition of the UNIDROIT Principles had expressly excluded the
proposal that the Principles may be applied when the parties have not chosen any law to govern
their contract. This exclusion was aimed at avoiding to take a stance on such highly controversial
issue  among  the  various  national  legislatures.  Some arbitration  laws  had  adopted  the  solution
provided in art. 28(2) of the Model Law, whereby, failing any designation of the applicable law by
the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it
considers applicable (the so-called  voie indirecte)77, but most of them had opted for the different
voie  directe solution78;  finally,  a  significant  number  of  countries,  including some “Model  Law
countries” have even enabled the arbitrator to apply on its own initiative the rules of law79. Despite
the uncertainty in the various arbitration statutes, the revised versions of the arbitration rules of the
main  arbitral  institutions  had  provided,  in  essentially  identical  terms,  that  the  arbitral  tribunal,
failing the parties' designation of the applicable law, shall apply such laws or rules of law as it
determines to be appropriate. The parties' decision to submit their dispute to an arbitral institution
had been normally interpreted as an incorporation of the latter's arbitration rules into the contract,
including those on the applicable law: given the non-mandatory character of these rules, the parties'
reference to institutional arbitration had been generally considered as an implicit derogation to the
choice-of  law provisions  of  the  relevant  domestic  law.  Relying  on  the  more  flexible  approach
envisaged by the arbitration rules of most arbitral institutions, arbitrators have increasingly applied
transnational  rules  in  situations  where  no law had  been  chosen by the parties,   because of  the
international character of the contract and the suitability of transnational rules for the resolution of
transnational disputes80.  As far as the specific issue of the application of the UNIDROIT Principles
77See e.g. Sec. 46(3) of the English Arbitration Act
78See e.g. Sec. 1051(2) of the German Arbitration Act and Art. 39(2) of the 1994 Egypt Law enacting a Law concerning
Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters
79See e.g. Art. 1054(2) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, art. 187(1) of the Swiss Private International Law Act; art.
1496 of the French Code of Civil Procedure and, among the Model Law countries,  S. 1297.283 of  the California
International Conciliation and Arbitration Code and S. 2712.53 of the Ohio Arbitration Code.
80
 The leading case was the  Norsolor award (YBCA, XI, 1986, p. 484). No applicable law had been agreed by the
parties, nor had the parties given the arbitrators the power to act as amiable compositeurs. The arbitral tribunal had
applied no single national law, but had simply based its decision on a rule of  lex mercatoria requiring good faith in
business  relations.  The court of Appeal of Vienna set  aside part of the award reasoning that,  under the applicable
arbitration rules, the arbitral tribunal was required to ground its decision on a national law and could not refer to lex
mercatoria.  The Austrian Supreme Court  reversed the decision,  since it  argued that  the award did not  violate  any
mandatory provision of either of the relevant national laws which might otherwise have applied. Further, recognition
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in these situations was concerned, the arbitral tribunal in the above-mentioned ICC case No. 7110
made  clear  that  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  cannot  decisively  determine  their  own  criteria  for
application, the Preamble not preventing arbitrators from making their own determination on the
basis of the arbitration agreement and the applicable arbitration rules81. Accordingly, in view of the
fact that there was a growing body of international case law where arbitrators applied the Principles
as the lex contractus in case of negative choice of law by the parties82, during the last session of the
Working  Group  for  the  preparation  of  the  2004  version  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles,  it  was
eventually decided to add a fourth paragraph to the Preamble expressly providing for this purpose
of the Principles83.
 It should however be noted that the situation of absence of choice should be distinguished from the
above mentioned negative choice84. The latter occurs where the parties, in phrasing their choice of
law clause, have used expressions that impliedly show their will to exclude the application of any
national  law to  their  dispute;  the  former,  which  is  sometimes  referred  to  with  the  misleading
expression  “implied  negative  choice”,  occurs  where  the  parties  have  made  no  choice  of  law
whatsoever.  In  case  of  negative choice,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  a more  logical  or  appropriate
solution for the arbitrator than to consider the particular expression used by the parties as a general
reference to transnational  principles or to the  lex mercatoria;  by contrast, in case of absence of
choice, the application of transnational rules to the dispute is not so straightforward: much, if not
everything, will depend on the positions and arguments adopted by the parties and their counsel
before the arbitral tribunal85. The lack of a choice of  law clause may be due to a number of reasons,
none  of  which  necessarily  indicates  the  parties'  intention  to  “transnationalise”  their  contract.
Accordingly, the arbitrator faced with the absence of a choice by the parties will have to look for
positive, objective criteria which justify the application of transnational law, such as the special
character of the legal problems involved, which would be difficult to solve under domestic law, the
conduct of the parties during negotiations, which may provide sufficient and clear evidence of the
parties' rejection of any domestic law, or the fact that the  contract presents connecting factors with
and enforcement of the award was granted in France.
81F. de Ly, op. cit., p. 225
82For example, in the above-mentioned ICC case No. 7335, the arbitral tribunal found that, in the circumstances of the
case, the absence of a choice-of -law clause revealed that neither party was prepared to accept the other party's domestic
law. Referring expressly to award 7110, it decided to apply truly international standards as reflected in, and forming
part of, the so-called general principles of law. This, it argued, would maintain the equilibrium between the parties and
meet the reasonble expectations of both of them. Moreover, it decided to take into account the UNIDROIT Principles,
as far as they can be considerd to reflect generally accepted principles and rules.
83UNIDROIT 2003 Study L – Misc. 25, Working Group for the Preparation of Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, Sixth Session 2-6 June 2003, Secretariat Report, pars. 406-409. 
84P. Lalive,  The UNIDROIT Principles as a Lex Contractus with or without an Explicit or Tacit Choice of Law: an
Arbitrator's Perspective, in The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, ICC International Court
of  Arbitration Bulletin, Special Supplement 2002, p. 82
85Ibidem
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many countries, none of which is predominant enough to justify the application of one domestic law
to the exclusion of all the others86. This objective approach in case of absence of choice of law by
the parties has for example been followed in the ICC case 9875/199987 which concerned a licence
agreement between a French and a Japanese company, which did not contain a choice of law clause.
The  arbitral  tribunal  observed  that  from  the  contract  provisions  it  was  impossible  to  imply  a
decisive connection with a particular national law, since they contained references to France and
other European and non-European countries, as well as to Japan; the licence was granted for patents
held by Japanese companies; technical assistance would be provided at the claimant's factory in
France or at the defendant's premises in Japan and royalties were to be paid in Japanese currency.
Moreover, although in licence agreements the charachteristic performance was often considered that
of the licensor, the arbitral tribunal argued that the obligations contemplated in the contract were
wider than those related to the licensor's transfer of technology to the licensee and therefore there
were  some  doubts  as  to  what  the  most  characteristic  obligation  of  the  contract  exactly  was.
Accordingly, the difficulties in finding decisive factors qualifying either Japanese or French law as
applicable  to  the contract showed that the latter was not appropriately governed by the national
law of either party, failing an agreement on such a choice. The arbitral tribunal concluded that the
most  appropriate  rules  of  law  to  be  applied  to  the  merits  of  the  case  were  those  of  the  lex
mercatoria, defined as the rules which have been  gradually elaborated by different sources, such as
the UNIDROIT Principles. 
The Principles as a means to interpret and supplement the applicable domestic
law
A provision concerning the use of the Principles as means of interpretation and supplementation of
domestic law was not included in the original 1994 version: yet, given the importance this use  had
shown in practice, it was decided to highlight this particular application in the Preamble of the 2004
edition88. Indeed, the UNILEX database89 suggests that the UNIDROIT Principles have been mostly
86
 Comment 4 to the Preamble
87ICC  9875/1999  of  20.1.1999,  in   M.J.  Bonell  (ed),  The  UNIDROIT  Principles   in  Paractice:  Caselaw  and
Bibliography on the Principles of Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 581
88UNIDROIT 2003 Study L – Misc. 23 pars. 594 and 603.
89See infra p. 373
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used to interpret and supplement the applicable domestic law: nearly half of the reported cases show
that the Principles have been applied in this respect90.  These cases are not exclusively related to
arbitral diputes: the UNIDROIT Principles have entered state courts predominantely under this title
of  application91.  The  cases  cited  in  this  category  are  an  interesting  mix92.  In  a  first  group  of
decisions the UNIDROIT Principles have been referred to in a confirmatory role, i.e. to demonstrate
that the solution found by the arbitrators and judges under the applicable domestic law conforms to
internationally accepted standards. In an award rendered in 199693, the arbitral tribunal had regard
to the  Principles,  although they were  not  directly  applicable to  the dispute,  for  the purpose  of
comparing  the  conclusions  which  resulted  from  the  application  of  the  proper  law  with  the
conclusions that would be obtained, were the tribunal to apply general principles of international
commercial  contracts.  In  this  way,  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  have  provided  support  for  the
conclusion  the  arbitrators  had  reached  in  the  application  of  the  relevant  domestic  law,  i.e.  the
enforceability of the parties' express obligation to negotiate in good faith, which was contemplated
in many articles of the Principles. In  a state court decision rendered by the Court of Appeal of
Grenoble94, the judge held a standard contract term providing for limitation of liability as invalid, on
the grounds that  it  ran counter to the principle of acceptance of full liability spelled out in the
contract. Whereas  his conclusion rested on  the application of French law, the judge reinforced his
argument  by  stating  that  there  was  a  principle  in  international  trade  law that,  in  the  event  of
incompatibility  between  a  standard  clause  and  a  non-standard  clause,  the  latter  prevails
(UNIDROIT Principles, art. 2.21) and that if  contract terms are unclear, an interpretation against
the party that supplied them is preferred (UNIDROIT Principles, art. 4.6). 
 In other cases, the role of the Principles has been to “gently push” the development of the chosen
domestic law in a particular direction, especially where the latter did not provide a clear answer to
the question which had arisen on the facts of the case. In one ad hoc arbitration rendered in 199595,
the law governing the contract  was the law of  New Zealand:  the question arose whether  post-
contractual conduct by the parties could be taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the
contract.  Since on this point the law of New Zealand was found to be uncertain, the arbitrators
sought  confirmation  in  art.  4.3(c)  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  as  a  “definitive  contemporary
90UNIDROIT 2003 Study L – Misc. 25, par. 594. 
91D. Oser, op. cit., p. 132
92
  R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, cit., p. 525
93ICC  8540/1996  of  04.09.1996,  in   M.J.  Bonell  (ed),  The  UNIDROIT  Principles   in  Paractice:  Caselaw  and
Bibliography on the Principles of Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 441.
94Societé Harper Robinson v. Societe Internationale de Maintenance et de Realisations Industrielles (SIMRI) et autres,
ULR, 1997, 1, p. 181
95Quoted in M.J. Bonell (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles  in Paractice: Caselaw and Bibliography on the Principles of
Commercial Contracts, cit., p. 369
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international statement governing the interpretation of contractual terms”, in order to establish that
they could actually take such conduct into account in interpreting the contact. But the provision of
the UNIDROIT Principles which has most frequently been applied in this respect is art. 1.7 on good
faith96. This has been done in order to foster the acceptance of this principle in international trade,
and in particular in common law jurisdictions97. For instance, in a case before the Federal Court of
Australia, the dispute had arisen between a Californian company and an Australian governmental
agency after the latter awarded the contract to another bidder. The court was asked to rule on the
issue whether a duty of good faith and fair dealing was implied by law in pre-award contexts: after
reviewing  the  controversial  judicial  and  scholarly  opinions  on  the  matter,  it  concluded  in  the
affirmative. In support of its conclusions it stated that a general duty of good faith and fair dealing
was a fundamental principle to be honoured in international commercial contracts, as envisaged by
art.  1.7  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles.  Although the Principles  have  exerted  some influence  in
persuading common law courts to recognise the existence of a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
international  trade,  it  would  be  too  hazardous  to  conclude  that,  as  a  result  of  art.  1.7  of  the
UNIDROIT  Principles,  all  differences  between  common law and  civil  law systems  have  been
eliminated on this issue, since common law systems still remain generally reluctant to enforce a
duty of good faith and fair dealing98.
The Principles as an instrument to interpret and supplement international
uniform law instruments
The  UNIDROIT  Principles  may  be  used  to  provide  existing  international  instruments  with  an
internationally  oriented  interpretation.  Nowadays  judges  and  arbitrators  increasingly  seek  to
interpret  and  supplement  international  instruments  according  to  autonomous and  internationally
uniform principles. The assumption underlying this approach is that internatonal law, even after its
incorporation into the various national legal systems, from a substantive point of view does not lose
its original character of a special body of law autonomously elaborated at international level and
intended to be applied in a uniform manner throughout the world. Accordingly, were each court to
96R. Michaels,  Preamble I: Purposes of the PICC, cit., p. 67.
97R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, cit., p. 526
98R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, cit., p. 529.
372
interpret  international  law  in  accordance  to  its  own  domestic  criteria,  the  goal  of  achieving
uniformity would be undermined. Until now, such autonomous principles and criteria had to be
found  in  each  single  case  by  the  judges  and  arbitrators  themselves;  the  Principles  could
considerably facilitate their task in this respect99.
 Most of all,  the Principles have been applied to supplement the CISG: art 7.1 CISG expressly
provides that in the interpretation of the Convention regard is to be had to its international character
and to the need to promote unifromity in its application. Relying on this provision, the application
of the UNIDROIT Principles to interpret and supplement the CISG has been generally justified on
the grounds that the UNIDROIT Principles are an expression of  the general principles on which the
CISG is based100.
The UNILEX database contains 25 cases in which they have been used in this respect.  Almost half
of the reported cases refer to art. 78 CISG, which makes provision for the entitlement to recover
interest but is silent on the rate at which interest is payable and the time from which it is payable.
For  example,  in  two awards  rendered  by the  International  Court  of  Arbitration  of  the  Federal
Chamber of Commerce of Vienna101, the arbitral tribunal filled the gap found in the CISG as to the
applicable interest rate by referring to the avarage bank short-term lending rate applied with respect
to the currency of payment in the creditor's country (as the payment had to be made there) and in
support of this solution it expressly relied on art. 7.4.9(2) of the UNIDROIT Principles; in other
awards, art. 7.4.9(2) has been interpreted as allowing 1% or 2% to be added to the Interbank offered
rate102, even if the Principles do not provide for this when mentioning “the average bank short-term
lending rate to prime borrowers”.
Conclusions: assessing the impact of the UNIDROIT Principles on commercial
practice
99Comment 6 to the Preamble
100Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft – Wien, SCH-4366, and SCH-4318,
15-06 -1994 in M.J. Bonell (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles  in Paractice: Caselaw and Bibliography on the Principles
of Commercial Contracts, cit.,  p. 351 and p. 357
101Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft – Wien, SCH-4366, and SCH-4318,
15-06 -1994 in M.J. Bonell (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles  in Paractice: Caselaw and Bibliography on the Principles
of Commercial Contracts, cit.,  p. 351 and p. 357
102e.g. ICC 8128/1995 at www.unilex.info
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Given  the  confidentiality  of  arbitration,  there  are  very  scarce  data  on  the  application  of  the
UNIDROIT  Principles  in  commercial  practice.  The  only  two  institutions  which  have  so  far
published statistics on this issue are the ICC and, of course, UNIDROIT. Nonetheless, in both cases
such statistics are incomplete and therefore it is impossible to have a clear picture of the effective
impact of the UNIDROIT Principles in practice. The most recent ICC statistics on the UNIDROIT
Principles show that out of the approximately 600 awards rendered during the period 1999-2000,
only 14 were found to have applied the Principles103 and that in 2005  the ICC received around
fifteen new cases making reference to the Principles104.  Assuming that this figure has remained
constant until now and considering that the total amount of awards rendered every year by the ICC
is  currently  around  350-400105,  it  follows  that  in  ICC case  law the  UNIDROIT  Principles  are
referred  to  in  roughly  2% of  the  total  cases.  However,  ICC  statistics  do  not  show for  which
purposes the Principles are more frequently applied.  Some indication in this sense can be found in
the UNILEX database, the database maintained by UNIDROIT in collaboration with the University
of  Rome  “La  Sapienza”,  which  attempts  to  collect  all  decisions  and  awards  referring  to  the
UNIDROIT Principles106. Since the publication of the 1994 edition of the Principles, UNILEX has
so far collected around 170 decisions. It must however be noted that the UNILEX database collects
decisions indistinctively  from arbitral tribunals and courts throughout the world and therefore we
must assume that each arbitral institution or court of the globe adopts the same approach vis à vis
the UNIDROIT Principles. The UNILEX database shows that the Principles are mostly used as
means to interpret  and supplement the applicable domestic law: more than half of the reported
decisions (96 out of 171) refer to the application of the UNIDROIT Principles in this respect. The
second most popular use of the Principles is as means to interpret and supplement international
uniform law instruments (31 reported decisions, 25 of which referring to CISG); the cases in which
the Principles have been applied as a source of general principles of law and lex mercatoria amount
to 15; those in which they have been taken into account as relevant trade usages are 11; those in
which they have been applied in the absence of a choice of law in the contract are 9.  If we compare
these data, which refer to the end of 2008, with those available at the end of 2005, we find that in
the past three years the amount of decisions available in the UNILEX database has increased of
nearly 50% (the cases were 113 at the end of 2005 and are now 171), but the only two applications
103P.  Mayer,  The Role of  the UNIDROIT  Principles  in  ICC Arbitration Practice,  in  the  UNIDROIT Principles  of
International Commercial Contracts, ICC International Court of  Arbitration Bulletin, Special Supplement 2002, p. 106
104E.  Jolivet,  The  UNIDROIT  Principles  in  ICC  Arbitration,   in  UNIDROIT  Principles:  New  Developments  and
Applications, in  ICC International Court of  Arbitration Bulletin, 2005 Special Supplement, p.  72
105
 According to the statistics published on the ICC website, in 2005 325 awards were rendered, in 2006 293, in 2007
349 and in 2008 407.
106The database is accessible online at www.unilex.info.
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in which a significant increase has been registered are those related to the gap-filling functions of
the Principles: in 2005 the cases in which the UNIDROIT Principles have been employed as means
to interpret and supplement the applicable domestic law and international instruments were 50 and
13 respectively, whereas in 2008 they have increased to 96 and 31 respectively.
As far as the diffusion of the UNIDROIT Principles among business and practitioners circles is
concerned, the most recent surveys have shown contradictory results. We have already mentioned
the  survey  launched  in  1996 by the  UNIDROIT  Secretariat,  which  emphasised  the  Principles'
succesful reception in commercial practice by showing that 13% of the respondents had at least
once expressly chosen the Principles as the applicable contract law and that 60% had used them in
the course of contract negotiations. Yet, it must be considered that in this case the questionnaires
had only been sent to persons who had shown a particular interest in the UNIDROIT Principles
during their preparation and/or after their publication107. More recent surveys conducted by more
independent bodies have shown more modest results.  According to an online survey carried out
between August 2006 and May 2007 among 236 individuals mostly from the USA, two thirds of
them practitioners and roughly a quarter of them legal academics, only 20% of the respondents felt
“thoroughly” or “moderately” familiar with the Principles; moreover, almost two thirds of the US
practitioners never  applied them in their contracts108.  Nonetheless,  a recent  survey conducted in
2008 among 100 in-house counsel of European businesses by the Oxford Institute of European and
Comparative Law showed more widespread use of the UNIDROIT Principles: nearly 40% had, in
the course of a cross-border transaction, at least once agreed that the contract be governed by the
Principles or had incorporated them into their contracts, but only 4% claimed that they had done
this often109.
 By reading these statistics, one may conclude that the wealth of scholarly writings devoted to the
UNIDROIT Princiles seems to stand in stark contrast to the paucity of reported cases in which they
have found application. Fifteen years after their publication they are still far from representing an
authentic governing law or a veritable source of  lex mercatoria. Nonetheless, the keen attention
paid by scholars to the UNIDROIT Principles is largely driven by the hope that past experience is
no necessary guide of future practice110 and that in order to enhance their use in practice a long and
patient work of persuasion is needed. It has been repeatedly stressed that it is necessary to urge
arbitral institutions to publish more often and in full the arbitral awards referring to the Principles,
so that  a  body of  case  law concerning their  interpretation  and clarifying  their  wording can be
107M.J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law, cit, p. 235
108P.L. Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey Project, J L & Com, 2008, 27
109Survey quoted by S.Vogenauer in  Introduction, cit., p. 19.
110
 R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law, cit., p. 520
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formed111.  However,  one  of  the  reason  why parties  often  resort  to  arbitration  in  lieu  of  court
litigation is that the former's proceedings and decisions will not become a matter of public record or
knowledge112.  Moreover,  many  arbitrators  shy  away  from  idea  that  their  awards  should  set
precedents, since they consider that  their role is only to  render justice in the best way possible in
the  individual  case  and,  without  an  overarching  authority  ensuring  uniform  interpretation  in
international arbitration, there will probably be too many contradictions among awards for them to
be cited as precedents113. Nonetheless, should the decisions referring to the UNIDROIT Principles
become numerous and consistent, they might be relied on as an expression of the consensus within
the business community providing the court or arbitral tribunal with reassurance that it would be not
too far from prevailing wisdom to apply the Principles to the relevant case114
Whereas  the  literature  on  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  has  so  far  almost  exclusively  focused  on
assessing their role in arbitration and litigation, comparatively less attention seems to have been
paid in evaluating their impact on national and international law-making. This appears somewhat
paradoxical, since, as we have seen above, the UNIDROIT Principles have exerted a significant
influence on the drafting or reform of many national and international legal systems. As a result, it
might  turn  out  useful  to  further  explore  the  UNIDROIT  Principles'  potentials  as  a  model  for
national and international legislations. The uniform rules provided by this international restatement
seem to have reached a sort of “tipping point”, whereby any law-maker involved in the drafing of a
piece  of  legislation  on  international  commercial  contracts  cannot  avoid  taking  them  into
consideration and providing reasonable justifications when it decides to depart from this model. It
may therefore be worth considering whether the Principles may be turned into either a model law or
a  sort  of  uniform  glossary  for  law-makers,  in  order  to  promote  their  impact  on  national  and
international legislations.
111E. Jolivet, op. cit., p. 70
112G. G. Lettermann,  UNIDROIT's Rules in Practice: Standard International Contracts and Applicable Legal Rules,
Kluwer, 2001, p. 262
113F. Dessemontet,  Use of the UNIDROIT Principles to Interpret and Supplement Domestic Law, in, The UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, ICC International Court of  Arbitration Bulletin, Special Supplement
2002, p. 45; cp ICC award 7375/1996, in M.J. Bonell (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles  in Paractice: Caselaw and
Bibliography on the Principles of Commercial Contracts, cit. p. 433: <<the tribunal does not wish to refer extensivley
to other cases, because no other case would qualify as a “precedent”. This tribunal must reach, and in actual fact has
reached, its decision independently of what other tribunals in the past may have considered and decided in somehow
comparable situations>>.
114G. G. Lettermann, op. cit.,  p. 263
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CHAPTER  SIX:  THE  HARMONISATION  OF  THE  ENFORCEMENT
STAGE-  DRAFTING  AND  DIFFUSION  OF  THE  1958  NEW  YORK
CONVENTION  ON  THE  RECOGNITION  AND  ENFORCEMENT  OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
SECTION  I:  THE  1958  NEW  YORK  CONVENTION  ON  THE
RECOGNITION  AND  ENFORCEMENT  OF  FOREIGN  ARBITRAL
AWARDS:  LEGISLATIVE  HISTORY,  SCOPE  OF  APPLICATION  AND
GENERAL FEATURES
The enforcement problem
When litigation proceedings come to an end, and a judgment is rendered, all national legal systems
provide for the enforcement  of the court’s judgment:  enforcement is  one of the most important
prerogatives of state sovereignty. If enforcement is sought in a country other than that where the
judgment was rendered, recourse has to be made to an international treaty, for example the Lugano
or Brussels Convention1, which provides that decisions from one of the member states’ courts must
be enforced in all the other member states, save a limited number of cases envisaged by the treaty
itself. In case of   foreign court judgments, the basis for their international enforcement is therefore
that each member state respects the sovereignty of the other member states.
As far  as arbitration is  concerned,  the enforcement  of  the award is  not  a  consequence  of  state
sovereignty. Arbitration rests upon the parties’ agreement, which has specifically been stipulated for
the  purpose  of  settling  disputes  arising  out  of  or  in  connection  with  a  particular  contract.
1
 The  Convention of 16 September 1988 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters  (the  so-called  Lugano  Convention)  and  the  Convention  of  27  September  1968  on  Jurisdiction  and  the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the so-called Brussels Convention) were agreed among
the EU member  states in order to regulate  the allocation of jurisdiction in international legal disputes of a civil  or
commercial nature involving persons resident in a member state of the European Union.  Now the two conventions have
been largely  replaced by a European regulation,  the so-called  Brussels  I  Regulation (Council  Regulation (EC) No
44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on the jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters). The discipline introduced by the Brussels I regulation is largely similar to the previous conventions and has
come into force on March, 1 2002. 
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Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal is a private tribunal which does not have sovereign powers: once it
has  rendered  its  final  award,  its  mandate  is  terminated  and  in  no  case  can  it  provide  for
enforcement. Enforcement depends on specific national provisions which assign national courts the
task of recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards. Accordingly, when it comes to the enforcement
of the award, the arbitration system is confronted with a paradox: on the one hand, the parties have
opted for arbitration because they wanted to avoid litigation (the relative autonomy of arbitration
with respect to litigation is what renders the former particularly attractive); on the other hand, the
parties must ultimately rely on domestic courts for the enforcement (or rejection) of their award2.
Contemporary statutes and treaties dealing with the issue of enforcement of arbitral awards attempt
to accommodate this paradox by resorting to two principles: 1) a general presumption in favour of
enforcement of arbitral  awards;  2) a limited number of grounds on which enforcement of these
awards may be refused.  As we will see below, this is also the path followed by the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
 Recognition and enforcement may be regarded as two different stages of the parties’ set of rights
and  obligations  arising  after  an  award  has  been  rendered3.  Recognition  relates  to  the
acknowledgment of what has been decided by the arbitral tribunal in the award. It is a defensive
process aimed at preventing an attempt to bring new proceedings raising the same issues as those
dealt with in the award in respect of which recognition is sought4. Enforcement goes a step further
than recognition: it is aimed at altering the parties’ positions in order to reflect the decision taken by
the arbitral tribunal. By resorting to  enforcement, the successful party seeks the court’s assistance
in order to ensure that the award is carried out and it can obtain the redress to which it is entitled.
Legislative history
The most important treaty regulating the matter of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in
the  field  of  international  arbitration  is  undoubtedly  the  1958  New  York  Convention  on  the
2D. P. Stewart,  National Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under Treaties and Conventions, in R.. B. Lillich and C. N.
Brower (eds), International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards “Judicialization” and Uniformity?, Transnational
Publishers, 1994, p. 164
3
  D. di Pietro and M. Platte, Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards: The New York Convention of 1958,
Cameron May Publisher, 2001, p. 22
4
 R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University
Press, 2007, p. 674
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,  which can be considered as the most
important treaty in the field of arbitration and a cornerstone of current international commercial
arbitration5. In order to understand the important innovations envisaged by this convention, it may
be useful to briefly overview the main provisions of the previous treaties which regulated the matter
of the enforcement of international  arbitral  awards before the New York Convention came into
force.
In the aftermath of the First World War the newly established International Chamber of Commerce
decided to promote an international convention aimed at the removal of what was perceived as one
of the most serious hurdles to the development of international commercial arbitration: the limited
enforceability of the arbitral clause6.  This proposal was subsequently taken over by the League of
Nations and eventually resulted in the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses7.  Article 1 of
the Geneva Protocol recognized the validity of arbitration agreements between parties belonging to
different contracting states, whether relating to existing or future disputes, and whether or not the
arbitration was to take place in a country to whose jurisdiction none of the parties was subject. The
protocol  also provided  for  the obligation of  the court’s  contracting state  to  refer  the parties  to
arbitration if it  was called upon to judge over a dispute which was the object  of an arbitration
agreement  under  art.  1  of  the Protocol.  The international  validity and enforceability  of  arbitral
clauses being established, the next step was the international enforcement of  arbitral awards. This
objective was achieved not long after the Geneva Protocol by the 1927 Geneva Convention on the
Execution of Foreign Awards8. This Convention regulated the enforcement of arbitral awards made
in pursuance of an arbitration agreement falling under  the 1923 Geneva Protocol. Although the
Geneva treaties  represented two important accomplishments in the development of international
enforcement of arbitral awards,  they were still  considered inadequate9. Their field of application
5
 A.J.  Van den Berg,  The New York Arbitration Convention of  1958:  Towards  a  Uniform Judicial  Interpretation,
Kluwer Law, 1981, p. 1; A. Redefern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet
and Maxwell, 1991, p. 63.
6
 Section 1026 of the German code of civil procedure which was in force at that time provided for example that an
arbitral agreement concerning future disputes is not effective if it does not refer to a definite legal relationship and the
legal disputes arising therefrom. Accordingly, under the German law of civil procedure, an agreement establishing that
all disputes arising between the parties from their business relations shall be submitted to arbitration was invalid. Only
an arbitration agreement referring to disputes arising under a specific contract was considered valid. Likewise, art 1006
of the French code of civil procedure required that the arbitration agreement should designate the object of the dispute
and the name of the arbitrators, thus limiting the validity of this kind of agreement to already existing disputes between
parties.  Cfr  E. G. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration.  International and Interstate  Aspects,   The Yale Law Journal,
1934, 43, p. 721-722.
727  LNTS  158,  1924,  available  online  at  www.interarb.com/vl/g_pr1923;  Cfr  also  A.  Nussbaum,  Treaties  on
Commercial Arbitration: A Test of International Private Law Legislation,  Harvard Law Review, 1942, pp. 219-244
8
 Convention for the Execution of  Foreign Arbitral Awards signed at Geneva, September 26, 1927, League of Nations
Treaty Series (1929-1930), Vol. XCII, p. 302 available online at www.interarb.com/vl/g_co1927.
9
 Cfr  P.  Contini,  International  Commercial  Arbitration:  The  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Recognition  and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Am J Comp Law, 1959, 8, 3, p. 290 <<without necessarily subscribing to the
views of the writers who regard the Geneva treaties as  total failure, it must be concluded that they did not live up to the
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was limited: the parties had to be subject to the jurisdiction of different contracting States10 and the
arbitral award had to be made in a contracting state11. Moreover, the Geneva Convention placed
upon the party seeking enforcement the heavy burden of proving the conditions necessary to the
enforcement. One of these conditions was that the award had to become final (i.e. not subject to any
form of appeal, such as opposition appel, or pouvoir en cassation, or the equivalent) in the country
where it was made (the country of origin). Since a leave for enforcement was also needed in the
country where  enforcement  was sought,  the enforcement  system under  the Geneva  Convention
amounted in practice to a double exequatur requirement. Another drawback was that, according to
article 2 of the Geneva Protocol,  the arbitral proceedings, including the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal, should  be regulated by the law of the country where the arbitration took place (the lex loci
arbitri). Especially this latter condition prompted the ICC to launch a project for a new international
convention after the Second World War. According to the ICC,  the Geneva Convention’s main
defect was the requirement that, in order to be enforced, an award must be strictly in accordance
with the rules of procedure laid down in the law of the country where arbitration took place12.
Consequently,  the Draft Convention which the ICC completed in 1953 advocated the idea of an
international  award,  i.e.  an  award  completely independent  of  national  laws,  and  suggested  that
awards based on the will of the parties should be automatically enforceable. To this aim, the ICC
Draft Convention envisaged as the most important requirement for the enforcement of the award
that the composition of the arbitral authority and the arbitral procedure must be in accordance with
the agreement of the parties. Only in the absence of such an agreement  should the composition of
the arbitral authority and the arbitral  procedure comply with the law of the place of arbitration.
Another important  innovation proposed by the ICC was the omission of the requirement of the
finality of the award, regarded as a provision fostering dilatory measures. But the idea of a truly
international award, completely detached from national law, was unacceptable for most states13. The
expectations of those who had viewed them as a decisive step in the progress of international commercial arbitration>>.
10
 Some  commentator  underlined  also  the  ambiguity  of  the  expression  <<subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  different
contracting States>> : it was not clear whether the scope of application of the Geneva treaties should be meant in terms
of  nationality or residence of the parties. Cfr P. Contini,  International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, cit., p. 289 ; A. Nussbaum,  Treaties on
Commercial Arbitration: A Test of International Private-Law Legislation , cit., p. 235
11
 Art. 1  of the Geneva Convention stated that an arbitral award falling within the scope of the Convention << shall be
recognised as binding and shall be enforced in accordance with the rules of the procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon, provided that the said award has been made in a territory of the High Contracting Parties to which
the present Convention applies and between persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of one of the High Contracting
Parties>>.
12
 International Chamber of Commerce, Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards. Report and Preliminary Draft
Convention, ICC Brochure n. 174, 1953, reproduced in UN DOC E/C.2/373
13
 For example,  Greece, while  recognizing the merits  of the ICC draft  in general,  emphasized that  the Convention
should  only apply if all the parties to the arbitration are nationals of states which are bound by the Convention itself;
Luxembourg regarded the idea of the internationalized, or better denationalized, award as producing an anarchical state
of affairs, which could unsuitably be translated into juridical reality; Yugoslavia observed that the ICC draft did not
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United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), to which the ICC Draft Convention was
presented, elaborated another draft convention, which was much closer to the Geneva treaties. The
ECOSOC established an ad hoc Committee of governmental experts from eight countries14.  The
Committee met in New York in March 1955 and prepared a Draft Convention on the Recognition
and  Enforcement  of  Foreign  Arbitral  Awards.  Although  unwilling  to  support  the  idea  of  the
international  arbitral  award15,  the  Committee  considered  as  vague  and  ambiguous  the  Geneva
treaties  provisions  limiting  their  application  to  awards  made  between  persons  subject  to  the
jurisdiction of different contracting states. Accordingly,  the Committee’s draft omitted this latter
requirement and extended the application of the convention to awards made in any other State (i.e.
also in  non-contracting states), anywhere outside of the state where enforcement is sought. At the
same time, it provided the possibility for any contracting states to limit the scope of the Convention
to awards rendered in the territory of other contracting states and to awards relating to commercial
disputes16. Apart from an extended scope of application, the committee’s draft did not overcome
what had been identified by the ICC as the Geneva’s Treaties major drawbacks. In particular, it still
left  on  the  party  invoking  enforcement  the  onus  of  proving  the  existence  of  the  enforcement
requirements  and  it  reintroduced  the  requirement  of  the  finality  of  the  award,  which  was
deliberately omitted in the ICC project. Finally, as far as the thorny question of the law governing
the arbitral procedure was concerned, the draft convention adopted a compromise text between the
cumbersome Geneva treaties’ solution prescribing that the arbitral procedure should follow in all
details  the  requirements  of  the  national  lex  loci  arbitri, and  the  idea  of  an  arbitral  procedure
completely detached from national law, which would have entailed an unacceptable exclusion of
guarantee the principle of reciprocity, which was seen as an expression of the equality between states enshrined in the
UN Charter . Cfr UN Doc E/ AC.42/1 - Comments received from Governments regarding the Draft Convention on the
Enforcement of International Arbitral  Awards
14
  The opening statement found in the Committee’s Report reveals the awareness of its member that they constitute an
epistemic community and not a mere intergovernmental body bound to their respective states' instructions.  The first
general  consideration  expressed  by  the  Committee  members  was  that  they  were  aware  of  being  appointed  as
government members; nonetheless, in view of the technical nature of the subject matter, they considered themselves as
acting essentially as technical experts with the understanding that the views expressed by them in the course of the
Committee’s deliberations would not necessarily constitute the position of their respective governments. 
15The Committee recognized that it would be desirable to establish a new Convention, which, while going further than
the Geneva Convention in facilitating the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,  would at the same time maintain
generally recognized principles of justice and respect the sovereign rights of states: E/2704  par. 14. According to van
den Berg, the fact that the Committee’s draft convention no longer referred to <<international>> but to <<foreign>>
awards is an indication of the will of differentiating the new project from that elaborated by the ICC. Cfr A.J. van den
Berg, op. cit., pp. 7-8.  Yet, while in the Report the Committee expressly emphasised the will of differentiating its Draft
Convention from the project elaborated by the ICC, it also decided to use the latter as a <<working paper>> for its
deliberations. Moreover,  the Committee clarified that the referral to “foreign” instead of “international” was due to the
fact that it more accurately reflected the object of the Convention. The expression “international arbitral awards” – the
Committee  observed  –  normally  refers  to  arbitration  between  states,  whereas  the  Convention  did  not  deal  with
arbitration between states, but with the recognition and enforcement in one country of arbitral awards made in another
country: pars. 15-17.
16
 Pars. 22-23
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any control by national courts and might have led to injustice and abuse. The compromise finally
agreed upon by the Committee members envisaged that the recognition or enforcement could be
refused  if  either  the  composition  of  the  arbitral  authority  or  the  arbitral  procedure  was  not  in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, to the extent that such agreement was lawful in the
country where the arbitration took place. On this reading, the agreement of the parties would be
valid even if the arbitral procedure established therein did not follow in all respects the provisions
of the law of the country where arbitration took place, provided that such agreement was lawful in
that  country17.  The  Committee's  draft  convention  also  specified  that,  in  the  absence  of  party
agreement on these issues, recognition and enforcement could be refused if the constitution of the
arbitral authority and the arbitral procedure were not in accordance with the law of the place of
arbitration18. 
The draft was sent to governments and interested organizations for comments19. In the light of the
comments received,  ECOSOC decided to convene a diplomatic conference,  known as  the New
York Conference of 1958, which was due to conclude an international convention on the basis of
the draft prepared by the  ad hoc Committee. The conference was held in the headquarters of the
United Nations in New York from May 20 to June 10, 1958, with the participation of 45 States. The
decision-making method adopted by the Conference was to consider the UN draft article by article
and,  where  necessary,  to  refer  specific  matters  to  small  working  groups,  before  completing
discussions on those matters in plenary meetings. Votes were taken on the various amendments to
the provisions of the draft Convention and upon each article as a whole. A two-thirds majority was
required for adoption20. On its last day, the Conference adopted the Convention on the Recognition
17
 During the New York Conference  the  Committee’s  formula  was  hotly disputed. What  should  be understood by
“lawful in the country where the arbitration took place”? On the one hand, France, Germany and Switzerland pointed
out that this expression could cause the frustration of awards if any difference, however small and insignificant, would
be found between the arbitral procedure agreed upon by the parties and the law where the arbitration took place.  On the
other hand, Italy, Norway and Turkey wished to keep the formula, on the grounds that the impression should not be left
that the parties could agree on the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral procedure independent of any
national law. Eventually, it was decided to delete the committee’s formula and to adopt the text which is now embodied
in art V(1) (d) of the Convention, which is similar to that envisaged by the ICC draft: the composition of the arbitral
authority or the arbitral procedure should be in accordance with the agreement of the parties; failing this agreement,
they should be in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration takes place. However, it does not seem
that  with  this  formula  the  drafters  wanted  to  support  the  ICC's  idea  of  an  international  award.  As  the  Italian
representative made clear, the final text was agreed <<on the understanding that the parties enjoyed discretion only to
the extent that they could select the national law applicable to the matter>> (CONF 26/SR 17). Consequently, art V (1)
(d) should not be interpreted to mean that the parties could agree to disregard all national laws and determine some
special procedure applicable to their case alone (P .Contini, op. cit, p. 303)
18
 Pars.43-46
19
 By July 16, 1956, twenty-eight  governments  and six non-governmental organizations (including the International
Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the International Institute for the Unification
of  Private Law, and the International Law Association)  had replied to the ECOSOC ‘s invitation. Cfr  A. Sultan, The
United Nations Arbitration Convention and United States Policy,  Am. J. Int. Law, 1959, 53,4, p.  816.; UN Doc E/2822
and Add. 1-6
20R.Briner and V. Hamilton, The History and General Purpose of the Convention, in  E. Gaillard and D. di Pietro (eds),
Enforcement  of  Arbitration Agreements  and International  Arbitral  Awards:  the New York Convention in  Practice,
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and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The Convention was initially signed by 10 States
and, within the period open for signature (until December, 31 1958), by 13 more States. It came into
force on June, 7 1959.
In sum, and as we will see in more detail in the overview of the New York Convention’s main
provisions, this treaty has led to three major innovations in the discipline of the enforcement  of
foreign arbitral awards with respect to the previous 1927 Geneva Convention. The first is that it has
eliminated the need for judicial confirmation of the award in the country where it is rendered (i.e.
the so-called double exequatur); the second is that it has restricted the range of grounds on which
enforcement of the awards may be refused; the third is that it has shifted the burden of proof from
the enforcing to the resisting party21.
Scope of application
The concepts of foreign and non-domestic awards
The  New  York  Convention  applies  to  two  categories  of  arbitral  awards:  “foreign”  and  “non-
domestic” awards.  The first part of article 1 defines a foreign award according to a territoriality
criterion: a foreign award  is an award made in the territory of a state other than the state where the
recognition and enforcement of the award itself is sought. The second part of article 1 leaves the
definition of a non-domestic award to the law of the place of enforcement: the Convention – it is
stated -  also apply to awards not considered as domestic in the state where their recognition and
enforcement  are  sought.  The inclusion of  these two criteria  in article  1  resulted from a highly
controversial  discussion during the  travaux preparatoires.  The New York Conference was split
roughly  between  the  countries  of  western  Europe,  on  one  side,  and  the  common  law,  Latin
American  and  Eastern  European  countries  on  the  other22.  The  delegates  of   Italy,  France  and
Western Germany were against the territoriality criterion and argued that there were other criteria,
Cameron May, 2008, p. 14
21
 D. P. Stewart, National Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under Treaties and Conventions, in R. B. Lillich and C. N.
Brower (eds), International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards “Judicialization” and Uniformity?, Transnational
Publishers, 1994, p. 165
22
 P. Contini, op. cit, p. 292
383
such as the nationality of the parties, the object of the dispute and most of all the rules of the arbitral
procedure, which should be taken into account in determining the nationality of the award.  This
was because in some countries, like France and Germany, the nationality of the award depended on
the law governing the procedure and thus it was observed that states where this criterion prevailed
should not be forced by the Convention to regard all awards made abroad as foreign awards, even
though some of these awards could be qualified as domestic according to their national arbitration
laws. On the other hand, countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Argentina and
Japan emphasized that the territorial criterion was the only one which could be understood in their
jurisdictions in order to determine the nationality of an award. Whereas the territorial criterion was
clear, the others were regarded as vague, susceptible of giving rise to diverging interpretations and
ultimately not providing the business world with any certainty as to which awards would fall under
the scope of the Convention23. Criteria other than the place of arbitration – they concluded -  would
doubtless be the joy of jurists, but might be a torment for plaintiffs24. The issue was then referred to
a Working Group of ten states,  which attempted to strike a balance between the two views by
proposing to retain the territorial criterion, which had the merit of clarity, and add a further criterion
to encompass awards that might be considered as foreign even though rendered in the territory of
the  state  where  enforcement  was  sought25.  Eventually,  this  was  the  formulation  which  the
Conference  adopted  as  first  paragraph  of  article  1  of  the Convention.  Paradoxically,  while  the
Working Group had initially the purpose of finding a compromise which would somewhat restrict
the Convention’s scope of application, it ended up producing the opposite outcome. According to
most commentators, the “non-domestic character” criterion is additional to the territoriality criterion
(the letter of article 1 expressly states “it shall also apply…”) and therefore the two criteria cannot
be  used alternatively26.  The  cumulative  application  of  both  criteria  entails  that  the  Convention
applies to all arbitral awards rendered in a country other than the state of enforcement, whether or
not these awards may be regarded as domestic in that state27:   it  also applies to all awards not
considered as domestic in the state of enforcement, whether or not any of such awards may have
been rendered in the territory of that state.28     Even admitting the cumulative application of these
23
 P. Contini, op. cit, p. 293
24
 UN DOC E/CONF.26/SR.24 p. 10
25R.Briner and V. Hamilton, The History and General Purpose of the Convention, cit., p. 15
26
 A.J. Van den Berg, op. cit,  p. 25
27
 If for example parties have agreed to arbitrate in country A under the arbitration law of country B and enforcement is
sought in country B, the Convention will apply by virtue of the territoriality criterion (arbitration has taken place in
country A, which is different from country B, the country of enforcement), even if the award is considered as domestic
in that country. The second criterion does not apply in this case 
28
 P. Contini,  op. cit, p. 294.  If for example parties have agreed to arbitrate in country A under the arbitration law of
country B and  country A allows to arbitrate under a foreign arbitration law, the latter country will consider the award
resulting from this arbitration as non-domestic. Accordingly, if the enforcement of the award is sought in country A, the
Convention may be applicable by virtue of the second criterion. If the Convention had not provided for the latter, it
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two criteria, the problem still remains of defining what a non-domestic award is. The Convention's
legislative history shows that the non-domestic character of the award was included at the insistence
of certain civil law countries, whose procedural law  allowed parties to agree that an arbitration
shall  be  governed  by  a  lex  arbitri  which  is  not  the lex  loci  arbitri29.  On  this  reading,  the
Convention's  legislative  history prevents the interpreter  from applying the non-domestic rule to
other cases involving some other significant foreign element, such as the nationality or residence of
the  parties30.  If  we adopt  this  restrictive  interpretation  of  the non-domestic  rule,  then  we must
conclude that this criterion amounts to a sort of dead letter and that the compromise reached by the
working party is strongly unbalanced in favour of the territorialists31.  Yet, case law referring to
article  1  of  the  Convention  does  not  seem to  comply  with  this  interpretation.  An  example  is
represented by the US Bergesen case 32: the court adopted the view that awards “not considered as
domestic” in the sense of art.  I(1)  NYC meant awards which are subject  to the convention not
because  made  abroad,  but  because  made  within  the  legal  framework  of  another  country,  e.g.
pronounced in accordance not only with foreign law, but also involving parties domiciled or having
their principal place of business outside the enforcing jurisdiction. Consequently, the non-domestic
rule  allows  a  large  degree  of  discretion  upon  states,  since  article  1  does  not  specify  which
characteristics make an award domestic or non-domestic: such elements are identified differently by
different jurisdictions. Moreover, in the absence of legislative provisions on this point,  the actual
determination is left to the authority dealing with enforcement. 
Excluded criteria: parties  nationality and internationality of the award
would not have been applicable in this case, because, according to the territoriality criterion it only applies to an award
rendered in another state.
29A.J.  Van  den  Berg,  The  New  York  Convention  of  1958:  an  Overview, in  E.  Gaillard  and  D.  di  Pietro  (eds),
Enforcement  of  Arbitration Agreements  and International  Arbitral  Awards:  the New York Convention in  Practice,
Cameron May Publisher, 2008, p. 41.
30
 As  we  have  seen,  the  members  of  the  Working  Party  representing  the  Western  European  group  agreed  to  the
compromise text , provided that each nation, by relying on the non-domestic rule, would be allowed to exclude certain
categories of awards,  but at the conclusion of the conference this possibility was omitted.
31
 A. J. Van den Berg,  When is an Arbitral Award Non-Domestic under the New York Convention of 1958?, Pace L.
Rev. 1985, 6, p. 39
32Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp, 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the court enforced an award made in New
York under New York law between a Norwegian and a Swiss party by relying on the second definition contained in art.
I(1) NYC. 
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The Convention excludes the nationality of the parties as a criterion for its application. As we have
seen above, this criterion was envisaged by the Geneva Convention, which required that the parties
should be subject to the jurisdiction of different contracting states. The expression “subject to the
jurisdiction of a state” had led to diverging interpretations, as some courts had interpreted it in terms
of nationality, others in terms of residence of the parties. Thus, the omission of this criterion has
made  the  scope  of  the  Convention  broader  and  clearer  with  respect  to  its  predecessor.  The
abolishment of the nationality criterion means that the Convention will apply irrespective of the
nationality (or residence) of the parties, namely also where one or even  both parties are  nationals
of a non-contracting state, but the award has been rendered in the territory of a contracting State33.
By the same token, it  will  also apply where an award has  been made abroad in  an arbitration
between parties of the same nationality34.
In defining the scope of the Convention, no reference is made also to the international character of
the transaction underlying the arbitral dispute. It  follows that in theory the Convention may also
apply to an award made in a foreign country in respect of a matter which is purely domestic for the
country where the award was made35. Although there is no reported case so far of the enforcement
of an award concerning a domestic affair which is sought abroad, it is not excluded that parties may
exploit this possibility in the future. In particular, in cases where the losing party has assets abroad
or parties want to overcome the obstacles of an unfavorable arbitration law36, they may decide to
resort to arbitration abroad even if their dispute is purely domestic.
33
 Cfr Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Barauch Foster Corp, U.S. Court of Appeals (5th cir.), July 19, 1976, YBCA,
II, 1977, p. 252, which applied the Convention to an award made in France between a United States corporation and an
Ethiopian party, even though Ethiopia was not at the time a contracting state.
34
 This aspect of the Convention has caused problems for the Italian courts, since, according to article 2 of the Italian
code of civil procedure, the Italian jurisdiction may not be derogated by agreement in favour of a foreign jurisdiction or
arbitrators sitting abroad. Relying on this provision, the court of Ravenna refused to enforce an award made in London
in an arbitration between two Italian parties (Tribunale di Ravenna, 15 Aprile 1970, Paolo Agnesi S.p.A. V Augusto
Miserocchi, YBCA, I, 1976, p. 190). The Italian Supreme Court, however, revised the decision on this point. It held that
the Convention, as jus superveniens, had superseded art 2 of the Italian code of civil procedure (Corte di Cassazione,
sez. un. 13 Dicembre 1971, n. 3620, YBCA, I, 1976, p. 190). Nonetheless,  in a subsequent case, the court of Milan did
not take account of the Supreme Court's decision and rejected the enforcement of an award made in Hamburg between
two Italian parties (Tribunale di Milano, 11 Dicembre 1972, YBCA, I, 1976, p. 191). The Court of Appeal , however,
corrected what expressely termed as an <<oversight>> by the lower court (Corte d'Appello di Milano, 13 Dicembre
1974, YBCA, II, 1977, p. 247). In subsequent decisions, the Italian courts have stuck to the Supreme Court's statement
and thus the issue seems now to be settled.
35
 For example,  the enforcement of an award in Switzerland made in Paris in  a dispute between a merchant  from
Bordeaux  and  a  retailer  of  Nice  concerning  the  sale  of  bottles  of  French  wine  may  fall  under  the  scope  of  the
Convention. 
36
 This may happen for example when English parties decide to settle a pure domestic dispute by arbitration abroad in
order  to  avoid the supervision of English  courts  over  arbitration.  Section 69 of  the  1996 English  Arbitration Act
envisages the right of appeal on the merits of an award made in England to the High Court, review on the merits is
however limited to cases where the award is either “obviously wrong” or has broad public importance and is “open to
serious doubt”. Moreover, this right of exclusion is subject to exclusion by parties agreement.  The enforcement in the
United Kingdom of an award made abroad but regarding a purely domestic dispute would fall under the Convention,
thus excluding any form of judicial review of the merits of the arbitral decision. Another situation may be where the
country of the parties does not have arbitral institutions to ensure adequate conduct of the arbitration.
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Reciprocity and commercial reservations
Paragraph 3 allows states to restrict the scope of application by opting for two reservations when
joining the Convention: the reservation of reciprocity and the commercial  reservation.  The first
allows states to limit  the application of  the Convention only to arbitral  awards  rendered in the
territory of another contracting state, whereas the second restricts the application of the Convention
only to awards relating to commercial disputes. The reservation of reciprocity was adopted because
during the drafting of the Convention some of the state delegates did not accept the principle of
universality,  which  would  have  allowed  the  enforcement  of  arbitral  awards  irrespective  of  the
country where the award had been made.  As a consequence of the adoption of such reservation, an
award made in a non-contracting state does not benefit  from the enforcement regime under the
Convention in a state which has adopted the reciprocity reservation.  This reservation has however
lost much of its practical importance, since nowadays most of the leading trading nations are parties
to the Convention. 
The  commercial  reservation  was  adopted  because  it  was  believed  that,  otherwise,  it  would  be
impossible  for  certain  civil  law  countries,  whose  national  legal  systems  allowed  referral  to
arbitration  only  for  commercial  disputes,  to  adhere  to  the  Convention37.  In  such  countries,
arbitration is not extended to those areas of law which are generally considered sensitive, such as
family law or labour law, and which should consequently be reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction
of national courts. The test as to whether a matter is to be considered commercial is to be carried out
with reference to the law of the place of enforcement.  Comparative analyses of the case law on this
point in the various national systems show that the term “commercial” is understood differently in
the various countries, since the idea of commerce may be affected by political, economic, social,
historical  and even religious beliefs38.  On the one hand, most courts have so far  given a broad
interpretation to the term “commercial”,  which is consistent with the goal of achieving a wide,
37
 This  was  for  example  the  case  of  France,  whose  1925  Commercial  Code  provided  that  only  arbitral  clauses
concerning commercial matters were valid. Belgium declared at the New York Conference that it could not adhere to
the Convention if the possibility to limit  its application to commercial transaction was not envisaged. Nonetheless,
when it came to the signature of the Convention, Belgium did not resort to the commercial reservation. 
38
  D. di Pietro and M. Platte, Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards, cit, p. 58
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uniform application  of  the  New York  Convention39.  A very  clear  example  of  this  tendency  is
represented  by  a  case  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  India  decided  in  199440.  In  considering  as  a
commercial transaction the provision of consulting services by a company for promoting a related
commercial  deal,  the  Supreme  Court   argued  that  the  expression  “commercial”  should  be
interpreted in light of the aim of the Convention, which is facilitating international trade through the
promotion  of  suitable  alternative  ways  of  international  dispute  settlement.  Accordingly,  any
expression adopted in the Convention should be given a <<liberal>> and <<broad>> interpretation,
having regard to the manifold activities which are integral part of international trade nowadays. But
on  the  other  hand,  countries  which  are  traditionally  known  for  their  liberal  approach  towards
international trade have sometimes adopted a narrow construction of the term “commercial”. This is
for example the case of the United States, which, while in most cases have relied upon a broad
interpretation of the term41, in a limited number of them have shifted to a narrower approach42. Also
Indian case law shows contrary examples to the liberal tendency outlined above. This shows the
difficulties in interpreting the commercial reservation even within the same state. In an earlier case43
involving transfer of technology, the High Court of Bombay gave a rather restrictive approach of
the commercial reservation: the contract underlying the dispute regarded the supply of technical
designs and transfer of technical information required for the establishment of a  plant in India. The
court rejected the commercial nature of this transaction simply on the grounds that the party had
failed to submit any statutory provision or any operative legal principle of Indian law which could
qualify it as commercial. In order to invoke the Indian Arbitration Act (i.e. the act implementing the
New York Convention in India),  the Court  argued that   it  was not enough to establish that  an
agreement is commercial; it must also be proved that it is commercial by virtue of a provision of
39
 A.  J.  Van  den  Berg,  op.  cit,  p.  51;  M.  Prylers,  Reservations  Available  to  Member  States:  the Reciprocal  and
Commercial  Reservations, in  E.  Gaillard  and  D.  di  Pietro  (eds),  Enforcement  of  Arbitration  Agreements  and
International Arbitral Awards: the New York Convention in Practice, Cameron May Publisher, 2008, p. 178.
40
 Supreme Court of India, 10 February 1994, RM Investment & Trading Co. Pvt Limited v Boeing Company, Supreme
Court Journal, 1994, vol. I pp. 657-664,  quoted by D. di Pietro and M. Platte, Enforcement of International Arbitration
Awards, cit, p. 59
41
 Cfr e.g.  Prograph Intl et al v Ralph Barhydt, 928 FS (n.d. Cal. 1996) p. 983, which qualified the employment of a
United States citizen working in his country for a foreign corporation as a commercial relationship related to interstate
foreign commerce. Such an approach may arguably not be shared by other jurisdictions where employment contracts
and, more generality,  labour law issues are not  considered as  commercial,  but sensitive matters in which dispute
resolution is only possible through litigation in front of a national court or a mediation/arbitration process under the
supervision of a governmental body.
42
 cfr U.S. District Court of New York, S.D., December 21, 1976, B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States of America,
YBCA,  III,  1978, p.  290,  concerning the  qualification as commercial  transaction of salvage services  rendered to a
United States warship. In this case the court rejected their commercial nature: <<whatever uncertainties may arise when
agencies of governments engage in commercial transactions, relations arising out of the activities of warships have
never been regarded as commercial within the context of sovereign immunity>>. The case, however, involved more
considerations of public policy, rather than the mere issue of defining the scope of the term commercial: in the field of
sovereign immunity it is not always easy to distinguish between commercial and non- commercial transactions. 
43Indian Organic Chemical Limited v. Subsidiary 1 (U.S.) Subsidiary 2 (U.S.) and Chemtex Fibres Inc , YBCA, IV,
1979, p. 271
388
law or an operative legal principle in force in India. This narrow interpretation hardly complies with
the Convention statutory purpose of facilitating enforcement of international commercial arbitration
awards. What is more, this approach makes foreign companies uncertain as to whether an arbitral
clause relating to a contract concluded under Indian law will be enforceable. 
Since the New York Convention contains no provision supporting a uniform interpretation of the
term “commercial”, it becomes extremely important for the parties to ascertain whether the state
where the future award is likely to be enforced has adopted the commercial reservation and, if so,
whether the subject matter of their dispute is considered as commercial under the law of that state.
Scholars have however made some suggestions in order to overcome the risk that the commercial
reservation turns into a “stumbling-block” for the uniform interpretation of the Convention44. Some
have attempted to identify a commonly acceptable definition of the term in the international contest.
On this  reading,  it  is  argued  that  the commercial  character  of  the transaction  is  related  to  the
professional status of the parties involved in the transaction. Accordingly, commercial transactions
should be considered those where the characteristic performance is rendered by either a person or a
body,  company or  other  institution,  acting  in  the  sphere  of  his  professional  activity.  Yet,  this
definition  has  the  drawback  of  relying  on  other  uncertain  and  highly  disputed  terms  such  as
“characteristic performance” and “professional activity”. Consequently,  it does not seem to be able
to solve the problem of diverging interpretations, but merely to transfer it to the interpretation of
different expressions. Others have recommended that courts whose domestic law gives a narrow
definition of the term commercial should nonetheless interpret it under the Convention in a broader
sense, by applying by analogy the international public policy test45. When it comes to public policy,
national courts normally adopt an interpretation of this term which is broader at the international
level than that adopted at national level: what is a violation of public policy under their domestic
law, they often argue, dose not necessarily constitute a violation of public policy at the international
level. By the same token, the same may happen with the commercial test, in the sense that what is
non-commercial  in  domestic  relations  may be  considered  by the  courts  as  commercial  for  the
purpose of the Convention.
Awards excluded: the issue of a-national and interim awards
44
  A J.Van den Berg, op. cit, p. 54
45
 A. J.Van den Berg, op. cit, p. 54
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The letter of the Convention allows the enforcement of only two types of awards: awards made in
the territory of a state other that that of enforcement and awards not considered as domestic in the
state  of  enforcement.  However,  two  other  categories  of  arbitral  awards  have  emerged  in
international  commercial  arbitration  practice:  “a-national”  awards  and   interim  awards.  The
question whether these two categories of awards fall within the scope of the Convention is one of
the presently most discussed issues of international commercial arbitration. 
 As we have seen above46,  the concept of the “a-national” award is related to the theory of the
floating  or  de-localised  arbitration.  It  essentially  consists  in  an  award  resulting  from  a  de-
nationalised or de-localised arbitration, that is an arbitration detached from the ambit of a national
arbitration law by means of an agreement of the parties.47 On this reading, the arbitration can take
place in the same way everywhere, since the place of arbitration would not entail the application of
the arbitration law of the country concerned.  In the previous pages we have already analysed the
Gotaverken decision48,  which  is  the  leading  case  supporting  the  delocalisation  theory.  In  this
section,  we  discuss  the  issue  whether  the  “a-national”  award  falls  within  the  scope  of  the
Convention. The most important grounds supporting the view that this kind of award  falls within
the scope of the Convention are related to a particular interpretation of articles I (1) and V (1) (d)
respectively. On this reading,  article I (1), which states that the Convention applies also to arbitral
awards  not considered as domestic,  would also include “a-national” awards.   Article V (1)  (d),
provides that the enforcement of the award may be refused where the composition of the arbitral
authority or the arbitral  procedure  was not  in accordance  with the agreement  of  the parties,  or
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where arbitration took
place. Is argued that, according to the letter of this provision, the agreement of the parties on the
composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral procedure ranks first and only in the absence of
such agreement should the  lex loci arbitri  be taken into account. It follows that article V (1) (d)
should be interpreted in the sense that if there is an agreement of the parties on the composition of
the arbitral  tribunal  and the arbitral  procedure,  then this  agreement  need not  be governed by a
national arbitration law. Despite these arguments, the inclusion of the “a-national” awards within
the scope of the Convention does not seem convincing with respect to its history, system and text.49
If we read article 1 in conjunction with the other provisions of the Convention, we realise that the
latter is  premised on the essential requirement that the award should be governed by a national
46
 See supra pp. 177 ff
47
 A.J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 29
48
 See supra pp. 182 ff. 
49
  A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 39
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arbitration law. In particular, Article  V(1)(e) provides that enforcement of an award may be refused
if the respondent can prove that the award has been set aside by a court of the country in which, or
under the law of which, the award was made. By the same token, article V(1) (a) envisages as a
ground for refusing the enforcement the case that an arbitration agreement is invalid under the law
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country
where the award was made. Similar arguments may be used to contrast the proposed interpretation
of art. V(1) (d): it would be inconsistent with the system of the Convention admitting that, whereas
art. V(1)(a) and art. V (1) (e) refer to an award and arbitration agreement regulated by a national
law, art. V(d) allows an agreement on the composition of the arbitral authority and the procedure
completely detached from a national law. In conclusion, a coherent interpretation of the Convention
seems to imply that, for the purpose of the convention itself, the arbitral procedure should always
comply with the requirements of the law of the place of arbitration. Such role will be supplementary
if parties have provided nothing with respect to this matter, i.e. only the lex loci arbitri will be taken
into account. The  lex loci arbitri will play a complementary role where there is an agreement on
the arbitral procedure between the parties, i.e. it will regulate the aspects not provided for by the
parties in their agreement50. More importantly, in no case can the arbitral procedure derogate the
public policy provisions of the law of the place of enforcement.
 Interim measures are orders  issued by the courts  aimed at  preserving a situation which would
otherwise irremediably be affected during the course of the proceedings. As arbitration is becoming
more and more institutionalized, the average duration of the proceedings is growing increasingly
longer  and consequently  interim protection has  become a frequent  necessity also in this field.
Nonetheless, the adoption of interim measures in arbitration entails specific problems which are not
arising in litigation, namely who is entitled to issue the  interim measures and how these measures
can be enforced.  As far as the first issue is concerned, the approach which is becoming prevalent
today is that arbitral tribunals are entitled to issue interim measures, but the parties are also given
the opportunity to request  them to national courts where they think it  is more appropriate.  Yet,
recourse to national courts, either before the start or during arbitral proceedings, does not amount to
a waiver of their right to arbitrate. This is the approach followed by the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration: article 17 enables the arbitral tribunal to issue interim measures and article
9 expressly states that is is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request,
before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protection and for a court
to grant such measure.       
50
  A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p 325
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As far as the enforcement of arbitrator-granted interim measures is concerned, there is an ongoing
debate on their applicability to the Convention. On one side, it is argued that interim measures differ
radically  from proper  arbitral  awards:  interim  measures  are  essentially  temporary  in  character,
whereas one of the main features of arbitral awards is to finally decide part or the whole dispute.
Accordingly, since the Convention expressly refers to arbitral awards, interim measures fall outside
its scope. On the other side, despite the undoubted difference between interim measures and final
awards,  distinguished  authors  have  attempted  to  promote  a  broader  interpretation  of  the
Convention. These authors are prompted by the consideration that  the enforceability of arbitral
interim measures  under  the Convention could greatly enhance the effectiveness  of  international
arbitration Their main argument is that interim measures present two essential features which are
consistent with the requirements envisaged by the Convention. The first characteristic is that the
subject matters normally dealt with by interim measures fall in the broad category of “differences
between  the  parties”  mentioned  in many articles  of  the convention.  The second is  that  interim
measures may be considered as binding between the parties within the meaning of art V(1)(e) of the
Convention. Notwithstanding these arguments, most national courts do not seem, for the time being,
to take into account these suggestions. The leading case is represented by  Resort Condominiums
International Inc. v. Resort Condominiums Ltd51, in which the enforcement of an interim measure
was sought in front of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The court refused enforcement on the
grounds that it was not an arbitral award within the meaning of the New York Convention; the order
issued by the arbitral tribunal was clearly of an interlocutory nature and in no way was it meant to
finally resolve the dispute or part thereof. On the contrary, it was provisional only and liable to be
rescinded,  suspended,  varied  or  reopened  by  the  tribunal  which  had  pronounced  it.  Important
contributions to the development of a case-law favourable to the enforcement of arbitral-granted
interim measures are coming from US jurisprudence. Paradoxically, whereas they usually argue that
the  New York  Convention  prevents  national  courts   from granting  provisional  relief  in  aid  of
arbitration, they have generally been willing to recognise and enforce arbitral awards of provisional
measures, but in doing so they have not relied on the New York Convention, but on the Federal
Arbitration Act. Yet, the only case which has so far dealt with the issue whether the New York
Convention  precludes  courts  from  recognising  and  enforcing  provisional  relief  ordered  by
arbitrators has answered in the negative52.
51
 Resort Condominiums International Inc. v. Resort Condominiums Ltd, Supreme Court of Queensland, 29 October
1993, International Arbitration Report, 1994, 9, 4 quoted by  D. di Pietro and M. Platte, op. cit, p. 46
52
 Ministry of Finance and Planning v. Onyx Development Corp.,  1989 U.S. Dist.  Lexis 11995 (S.D.N.Y. June 24,
1988), quoted by G. Born, op.cit, p. 980.
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The relationship between the Convention and domestic law on enforcement and
other treaties in the field of arbitration
Art. VII contains two provisions regulating the relationship between the Convention and concurrent
national  laws  or  international  treaties  concerning  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  foreign
arbitration agreement and awards. The first permits a party seeking enforcement of an award or
arbitration  agreement  to  base  his  request  on  national  law  or  other  treaties,  instead  of  the
Convention. This provision is commonly referred to as the most favourable right provision (“mfr-
provision”). The second states that the Convention does not affect the validity of other treaties in
the field of arbitration and is commonly called the compatibility provision. An exception to these
two provisions is envisaged in the second paragraph of art. 7, which states that the Geneva Protocol
on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
awards of 1927  shall cease to have effect between the states that become party to the New York
Convention.
The purpose of  both the mfr and the compatibility provisions  is to facilitate the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards and agreements.53 Their  rationale is that the Convention shall not deprive
any party seeking enforcement of the more favourable possibilities under the national law of the
state where enforcement is sought or under the treaties to which that state has adhered. Accordingly,
both provisions open the door to  more “arbitration-friendly”  statutes and treaties,  which would
otherwise  not  be  applicable:  in  the  absence  of  art.  VII,  international  law  would  impose  the
contracting states to apply the Convention and not their own, possibly more favourable, municipal
law as well as the more favourable international treaties they have entered into prior to joining the
Convention.54. The other side of the coin is that the mfr and compatibility provisions, favourable to
enforcement  as  they  may  be,  may  prevent  the  establishment  of  a  uniform  regime  for  the
enforcement  of  foreign  arbitration  agreements  and  awards.   The  exclusive  applicability  of  the
Convention to foreign arbitration agreements and awards would increase the degree of certainty as
to which agreements and awards are enforceable and which are not. Pursuant to these provisions,
those awards and agreements not complying with the Convention have an uncertain status, since
53
  A.J.Van den Berg, op. cit,  p. 82
54
  D. di Pietro and M. Platte, op. cit, p. 171
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parties may engage in forum shopping and seek for more favourable regimes on which to rely for
enforcement. Art. VII has so far relied on in practice especially for seeking the enforcement of
awards  which had been set  aside in the place of enforcement.  An often quoted example is  the
Hilmatron case55,  in which an award had been made and subsequently set aside in Switzerland.
The enforcing party brought  the award  in front  of  a  French court  and relied on art  VII  of  the
Convention in conjunction with art. 1502 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, which does not list
setting aside by the country where award was made as a ground for  resisting enforcement.  An
important question related to art. VII  is whether the domestic law or other treaties must be relied on
in toto, or whether it is possible to ask for enforcement on a combination between some provisions
of the Convention and others stemming from the more favourable national law or treaty. As we will
see in the following section, the problem has emerged especially with reference to art II (2) of the
Convention, which lays  down strict  requirements concerning the written form of the arbitration
agreement. 
The only multilateral arbitration convention which has been applied in connection with the New
York Convention is the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 56,
which  was  signed  in  Geneva  in  1961  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Nations  Economic
Commission for Europe as a supplement of the New York Convention. It is designed mainly to deal
with the problems of establishing procedures for disputes arising out of contracts between European
parties, in particular East-West disputes, even if it does not limit membership to European states.
The  European  Convention  deals  with  several  aspects  of  the  arbitral  procedure  such  as  the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the jurisdiction of the courts in relation to arbitration, the law
applicable  to  the  substance  of  the dispute.  On account  of  the  complexity  of  its  provision,  this
Convention has however found scarce application in practice. The relationship between the latter
and the New York Convention is problematic because the two conventions have different scopes of
application:  the  main  difference  is  that,  contrary  to  the  New  York  Convention,  the  European
Convention requires that the parties to the arbitration agreement have their habitual residence or
their  seat  in  different  contracting  states57.  In  this  respect,  the New York  Convention’s  field  of
application is broader than that of the European Convention. But on the other hand, the European
Convention contains provisions for stages of the arbitration to which the New York Convention
does not apply58, such as the organization and functioning of the arbitral tribunal, the choice of law
applicable to the merits of the dispute and the motivation of the arbitral award. In this respect, the
55
 Himalton LtD v OTV, YBCA, XX, 1995, p. 663
56
 1961 United Nations, Treaty Series , vol. 484, p. 364 No. 7041 (1963-1964)
57
 Cfr  art.  I(1)(a) of the European Convention.   This requirement has  been provided for because the object of the
Convention is to regulate the conduct of arbitral disputes in East-West trade:  A.J.Van den Berg, op. cit,  p. 94
58
 A.J.Van den Berg, op. cit,  p. 94
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European Convention’s scope of application is thus broader than that of the New York Convention.
It  follows  that,  when  the  arbitration  agreement  or  the  arbitral  award  falls  under  the  scope  of
application of both conventions, the European Convention can be deemed to complement the New
York Convention59. For example, as far as the form of the arbitration agreement is concerned, art.
I(2)(a) of the European Convention contains a definition of “form in writing” which is similar to
that provided for in the New York Convention; it adds, however, that the written form is also met, if
in  relation  between  states  whose  laws  do not  require  that  an  arbitration  agreement  may be  in
writing, the agreement is concluded in the form authorised by these laws. Another example can be
found in the discipline of the enforcement of the award. Although the latter convention does not
contain provisions in this regard, and therefore for this matter one has to refer to the New York
Convention, it nonetheless provides a limitation to the right of invoking the ground for refusal of
enforcement that the award has been set aside in the country where it was made, as provided in art.
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention60.
Despite  the complementary  nature  of  the  European  Convention  with respect  to  the  New York
Convention, the relationship between the two conventions has been more often than that considered
by the courts in terms of conflicts of treaties61 and seldom in terms of complementarity62.
Enforcement of the arbitration agreement
Although  the  title  of  the  Convention  only  refers  to  arbitral  awards63,  this  international  treaty
basically contemplates two actions: the enforcement of the arbitral awards and the enforcement of
59
 A.J.Van den Berg, op. cit,  p. 94
60
 On this point see infra pp. 407 ff.
61
 Cfr Bundesgerichtshof, May 25, 1970, YBCA, II, 1977, p. 237, in which the German Supreme Court justified the
application of the European Convention on grounds that the latter <<prevails as being of a younger (sic) date over the
New York Convention>> 
62
 Cfr Tradax v. Carapelli,  Corte d’Appello of Florence, October 22, 1976, YBCA, III, 1978, p. 279 in which the court
argued that the European Convention and the New york Convention are integrally related.
63
 The Convention does not make any reference to the arbitration agreement in its title, because the drafters' initial
intention was to leave the provisions concerning the enforcement of the arbitration agreement to a separate Protocol.
Towards the end of the Conference it was however realised that this choice was not desirable, since the purpose of the
Convention would be defeated if a court called upon to enforce an arbitral award under the Convention was permitted to
refuse recognition of the validity  of the arbitration agreement  on which the award was  based. Accordingly,  art.  II,
dealing with the enforcement of the arbitration agreement, was drafted the last day of the conference in a rush against
time omitting any indication as to many crucial issues,  such as the arbitration agreements to which the Convention
should apply.
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the arbitration agreement. The enforcement of the arbitration agreement is envisaged in art. 2 (3),
where it is stated that a court of a contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of article II, shall, at the request of
one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, i.e. it must declare itself incompetent64 to decide
the  case  and  must  stay  proceedings.  Yet,  the  Convention  does  not  clarify  which  arbitration
agreements fall within its scope. The most common view is that, since the Convention defines its
scope with respect to arbitral awards,  it should be applied to arbitration agreements which would
produce foreign or non-domestic awards subject to its scope of application65.  Others claim for the
application  of  the  Convention  to  a  wider  range  of  agreements,  such  as  those  providing  for
arbitration in the state of the forum and having an international element (foreign nationality of at
least one party or international character of the underlying transaction).66Article II (1)  and (3) set
out five requirements that an arbitration agreement should satisfy in order to become enforceable: 
- the agreement must be in writing. Art II seems also to provide a definition of what constitutes an
agreement in writing under the Convention: “it shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams”.
(The issue of the uniform interpretation of this definition will be dealt with below.)
−it must deal with disputes which have arisen or may arise between the parties
−these disputes must arise with reference to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
This latter specification suggests that also actions framed in tort can be submitted to arbitration,
provided that the claims framed in tort fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement67.
−the disputes should concern a subject-matter capable of settlement by arbitration (the so-called
arbitrability requirement)
64
 As a consequence of referral to arbitration, the court becomes partially incompetent, i.e. incompetent to try the merits
of the case. The court, however, retains competence for procedural matters relating to arbitration, such as the ordering
of interim measures, decision on the setting aside of the award, appointment or replacement of arbitrators if the parties
have not made arrangements in this respect in their agreement.
65
 G. B.Born,  International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials, Kluwer Law, 2001, p. 124;  M. R.
Sammartano, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, Kluwer Law, 2001, p. 949
66
 Cfr P. Contini, op. cit, p. 296, who argues that, in the absence of any provision defining the territorial application of
article II, the latter should be applied also to arbitration agreements made in the state where their enforcement is sought;
see also  A.J. van den Berg, op. cit, 61-71. This is also the solution found in the US Federal Arbitration Act, the law
implementing the Convention in the United States.  According to sections 202 and 206 of this  Act,  the Convention
applies in the first place to all arbitration agreements in which at least one of the parties is a non-US citizen, irrespective
of whether the place of arbitration is within or without the United States. In the second place,  it also applies to all
arbitration agreements between two US parties, irrespective of whether the place of arbitration is within or without the
United States, , if the agreement relates to a subject  matter which is international.
67
 A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 148. The original text of art. II (1) referred only to contractual relationships (it stated
“all or any differences in respect of such contract”). The extension to non -contractual relationships was due to the
Italian delegate, who pointed out that there are also non-contractual matters which may be covered by an arbitration
agreement, such as the question of damages resulting from a collision at sea. He therefore proposed to introduce in art II
the words “in respect of a determined legal relationship, or contract”; eventually the drafting committee adopted the
actual text “in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not”.
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−the agreement must not be null, void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The expression
null and void is generally interpreted as referring to those cases where the arbitration agreement is
affected by some invalidity from the very beginning. It would then cover matters such as the lack of
consent due to mispresentation, duress, fraud or undue influence68. The word inoperative covers
cases where the arbitration agreement has ceased to have effect, for example because the parties
have  explicitly  or  implicitly  revoked  the  agreement  to  arbitrate,  or  because  the  same  dispute
between the same parties has already been decided in arbitration or court proceedings, or because
the parties have already settled their dispute on their own before arbitration has started69. Finally,
the requirement of incapability of being performed applies to cases where the arbitration cannot be
effectively set into motion; this may happen where the arbitral clause is too vaguely worded, or
other terms of the contract contradict the parties' intention to arbitrate. It may also apply to cases
where the arbitrator nominated in the agreement refuses to accept his nomination, or the appointed
authority designated in the agreement refuses to appoint the arbitrator.70
Another  requirement can be implied from article V(1)(1) concerning the enforcement of the award:
−the parties to the arbitration agreement must have legal capacity under the applicable law to them.
The  question  which  must  be  preliminary  answered  in  order  to  understand  the  scope  of  these
requirements  is  under  which  law they should be assessed,  or  in  other  words  which  is  the law
applicable to the arbitration agreement.  Most commentators believe that, for the purpose of the
Convention, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement is the lex loci arbitri and therefore, with
the sole exception of the capacity of the parties71 and the arbitrability72, the requirements for the
68
 A.J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 156
69
 A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 158
70
  A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p.  159
71
 Art. V. 1(a) provides that the capacity of the parties should be decided under the law applicable to the party without
specifying how this law should be determined. The question should therefore be solved by means of the conflict of laws
rules of the law of the forum. Although the requisites determining the capacity of a party to enter into an arbitration
agreement will vary in different national laws, it may me observed that in general terms any natural or legal person may
have the capacity to conclude an arbitration agreement, provided that he has the capacity to enter any other form of
contract. This capacity is normally excluded for persons such as minors, bankrupts and persons of unsound mind. Cfr A.
Redfern and M. Hunter, op. cit.,  p. 147-148 , A.J.van den Berg, op. cit, p. 276 
72
 Among commentators there is no agreement on which governing law should apply to the issue of arbitrability. As
Bockstiegel  has  put  it,  <<agreement  on  the  conclusion  that  there  is  disagreement  seems  to  be  the  only  common
denominator that one can find between arbitrators, courts, and publicists regarding the question which is the applicable
law on arbitrability>> (Public Policy and Arbitrability, in P. Sanders (ed),  Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public
Policy in Arbitration , ICCA Congress Series No. 3, Kluwer, 1987, p. 184). According to some, although art II (1) is
silent on the applicable law, it should be read in connection with art. V(2)(a), concerning the enforcement of the award,
which provides that the issue of arbitrability should be governed by the law of the place where the enforcement is
sought, i.e. the lex fori. On this reading, it may be implied that also for the enforcement of the arbitration agreement the
lex fori should govern the issue of arbitrability.  It is also argued that,  since arbitrability is closely linked to public
policy, a court would find it difficult to decide on this issue, if it were deemed to do it according to a foreign law. This
is because the notion of public policy is difficult to ascertain as it is not generally embodied in statutes, but developed
by case-law with all kinds of subtle distinctions. Others interpret arbitrability as a cause of validity of the contract and
therefore read art II.1 in connection with not only art V(2)(a), but also V(1)(a). On this reading, in order to determine
whether  a  given dispute is  arbitrable,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  at  least  three  different  national  systems:  the  law
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enforcement of the arbitration agreement should be evaluated according to this law. This view is
supported by an analogical interpretation of art V (1) (a) of the Convention, which expressly states
that  recognition  of  the  award  may be  refused  where  the  underlying  arbitration  agreement  was
invalid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, the
law of the country where the arbitration was made73. Accordingly, the analogical interpretation of
art. V (1)(a) would suggest that for the purpose of the enforcement of the arbitration agreement the
law governing the latter should be the law of the country where the award will be made. It would
make no sense – it is argued – to apply the Convention's uniform conflict rules at the time of the
enforcement of the award and the possibly different conflict rules of the forum at the time of the
enforcement  of  the  arbitration  agreement.  It  is  not  consistent  with  the  purpose  of  promoting
uniformity in arbitration to give rise to a situation in which the same arbitration agreement may be
governed  by two different  laws  at  two different  stages  of  the arbitration  proceedings:  one  law
determined  according  to  the  conflict  rules  of  the forum at  the  time of  the  enforcement  of  the
agreement and the other determined according to art V (1)(a) at the time of enforcement of the
award. Only when the place where the arbitration is to be held is not yet known (or the parties have
not designated the law applicable to the arbitration agreement) should the conflict rules of the forum
be applicable.
 Although the requirements  for  enforcement  of the arbitration agreement  should be ascertained
according to the national  lex loci arbitri, it is commonly accepted that the interpreter should also
take account of the so-called pro-enforcement bias of the Convention and consequently construct
these requirements narrowly, so as to declare the invalidity of the arbitration agreement in manifest
cases only.74 This approach has for example been followed by some US courts, which have claimed
for an “internationally neutral” interpretation of the expression “null and void”. They have argued
that the parochial  interests of any given state cannot be the measure of how the “null and void
clause”  is  to  be  interpreted.  Rather,  the  clause  should  be  interpreted  to  encompass  only  those
situations  (such  as  fraud,  mistake,  duress,  and  waiver),  that  can  be  applied  neutrally  on  an
international scale75. 
governing the arbitration agreement, the law of the place of arbitration, the law of he country of enforcement. Despite
the academic debate, in all reported cases related to the issue of arbitrability , the courts decided exclusively under their
own law and did not take into account the law of the country where the arbitration was to take place or was taking
place. 
73
 Although this provision envisages as the primary criterion party autonomy and  theoretically entails that the parties
have the liberty to subject the arbitration agreement to a law of their choice,  there are in practice no reported cases in
which parties have subjected the arbitration agreement to a law which was different from the law of the country in
which the award was made It follows that the only useful criterion to determine the law applicable to the arbitration
agreement is the place where the award is made. Cfr A. Redfern and M. Hunter, op. cit.,  p. 291 and A. J. van den Berg,
op. cit.,  p. 276
74
 A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 155
75
 Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982) quoted by G. Born, op. cit, p. 99
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Enforcement of foreign awards
The New York Convention constitutes a great improvement in the regime of enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards with respect to the Geneva Convention of 1927. Under the latter, the party seeking
enforcement needed to prove the fulfillment of a number of conditions (proof that the award had
become “final” in the country in which it was made, proof that the award was falling under the
scope  of  the  Convention,  proof  that  the  award  had  been  made  in  pursuance  of  an  arbitration
agreement valid under the law applicable thereto, etc.),  in order to see his request upheld by the
enforcing court. One of the most important innovations of the Convention is the transformation of
most of the “positive” conditions to be fulfilled by the party seeking enforcement into “negative”
conditions, i.e.  grounds for refusal  of enforcement to be proved by the party against whom the
enforcement  is  sought76.  This  innovation is  due to one of  the most  important  principles  of  the
Convention, the so-called presumption of enforcement  (or  pro-enforcement  bias),  whereby each
contracting state must, as a general rule, recognise foreign awards as binding  and enforce them
using  procedures  comparable  with  those  applicable  to  domestic  awards.  The  party  seeking
enforcement needs only to comply with two basic requirements: it shall submit the original award
and  the  original  arbitration  agreement  (or  a  duly  certified  copy  thereof),  accompanied  by  a
translation  when  necessary.  These  documents  constitute  prima facie  evidence  that  the  party  is
entitled to obtain enforcement of the award.77 Once such requirements are met, article III  of the
Convention expressly states that there shall not be other substantially more onerous conditions or
higher  fees  or  charges  for  the  recognition  or  enforcement  of  arbitral  awards  to  which  the
Convention applies  compared  to  those imposed on the recognition or  enforcement  of  domestic
arbitral awards78. It  is then up to the other party resisting enforcement to prove that enforcement
76
 A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 247
77
 P. Sanders,  The New York Convention, in International Commercial Arbitration, vol II, 1960, p. 313: A. J. van den
Berg, op. cit, p. 247
78Also this provision, like most of the Convention's provisions, is the result of a compromise.  At the beginning of the
Conference  the  United  Kingdom  proposed  that  the  procedure  for  the  enforcement  of  arbitral  awards  under  the
Convention should not be more complicated or more onerous than that applicable to domestic awards. It was objected
that in some countries (e.g. Sweden, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador) the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is subject
to  special  formalities,  and it  would  be  very difficult  to  change  existing  procedural  law.  Accordingly,  the  Belgian
proposal that the same rules of procedure should be applied  both to foreign and domestic awards was rejected. The text
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should not be granted on the grounds envisaged by the Convention: the respondent has therefore the
burden of proof in order to show the existence of the grounds for refusal enumerated in article V79.
In addition, the Convention’s pro-enforcement bias implies that the defences to enforcement are to
be interpreted narrowly and accepted in serious cases only.80 This is because the Convention’s main
purpose is to create a truly mobile and universal award which may be readily enforceable in all
contracting states.81
 Another important improvement is the elimination of the system of the double  exequatur. Under
the Geneva Convention the party seeking enforcement had to prove that the award had become final
in the country where it was made.  This meant that the party had to produce an  exequatur  (i.e. a
leave for enforcement) issued in the country where the award was made.  Since the party had also to
obtain a leave for enforcement in the country in which enforcement was sought, this system ended
up imposing on the party seeking enforcement a double exequatur. The drafters of the New York
Convention believed that the requirement of a leave for enforcement in the country where the award
was  made  amounted  to  an  unnecessary  and  time-consuming  hurdle,  especially  where  no
enforcement was sought in that country. Moreover, it was feared that it could be easily turned  into
a delaying device in the hands of the respondent, who could prevent the award from being final by
instituting setting aside procedures in the country where the award was made. The elimination of
the double  exequatur system has been carried out by replacing the requisite of the finality of the
award with that of its binding character82. On this reading, an award need no longer be final in order
to  be  enforceable:  a  leave  for  enforcement,  stating  that  the  award  is  not  open  to  any kind  of
opposition for the purpose of contesting its validity, is no longer necessary.
Recognition and enforcement may be refused only on the basis of the limited criteria laid down in
article  V,  which constitute “fundamental  requirements  of  natural  justice  and legality”83.   These
criteria are exhaustive and  supersede domestic law in respect of the conditions to be fulfilled by a
party seeking enforcement of an award falling under the scope of the Convention84. The exhaustive
character of these criteria also implies that no review of the merits of the award is allowed: the
finally adopted was similar to the initial UK proposal, since it envisages that arbitral awards covered by the Convention
cannot  be subject  to  more  onerous enforcement   conditions  or  higher  fees  or  charges  than domestic  awards.  This
compromise solution recognises the principle of non-discrimination and at the same time is  flexible  enough not to
require states to apply to foreign awards identical enforcement procedures as to domestic awards. Cfr E/CONF 26/L.11
and E/CONF 26/SR.11, P. Contini, op. cit, p. 297
79
  A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 264
80
 R. Garnett, H. Gabriel, J. Waincymer, J. Epstein, A Practical Guide to International Commercial Arbitration, Oceana,
2000, p. 101-102; A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 268
81R. Garnett, H. Gabriel, J. Waincymer, J. Epstein, A Practical Guide to International Commercial Arbitration, cit, p.
102
82On this point, see infra pp. 407 ff.
83C.  Schmitthoff, Finality  of  Arbitral  Awards  and  Judicial  Review,  in  J.  Lew  (ed),  Contemporary  Problems  in
International Arbitration, Kluwer, 1987, p. 230  
84
 A. J. van den Berg, op. cit,  p. 248
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exhaustive  list  of  grounds  for  refusal  for  enforcement  embodied  in  article  V does  not  include
mistake in fact or law by the arbitrator85.  Notwithstanding this, exclusion of review of the merits
does not mean that the court  is prevented from looking into the award where it  is necessary to
ascertain whether a ground for refusal of enforcement is present.86 A court may for example look
into the award in order to find out whether it contains decisions or matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, or if it violates public policy. However, the court's scrutiny of the award
should be strictly limited to ascertaining the presence of elements which may give rise to refusal of
the enforcement on one of the grounds envisaged in article V and consequently cannot involve an
evaluation of its merits.
   The grounds envisaged by art V of the Convention may be divided into two groups. The first
group of grounds are embodied in the first paragraph of art. V and must be  proved by the resisting
party only.  They deal with serious defects in the arbitration and the award: the invalidity of the
arbitration agreement, the violation of due process, the award extra or ultra petita, the irregularity in
the composition of the arbitral tribunal or arbitral procedure, the non-binding force of the award, the
setting aside of the award in the country of origin. The situation is different for  the second group of
criteria,  embodied  in  the  second paragraph  of  art.  V;  for  these  grounds,  the  court  may refuse
recognition and enforcement  on its  own motion, without any application of the parties.  This is
because the second group of grounds concerns violations of public policy of the law of the forum;
these criteria  provide the enforcing court  with a “safety net” allowing it not  to enforce awards
violating basic rules and principles of its own jurisdiction.
 In both the first and second paragraph of article V the Convention uses the permissive expression
“the  enforcement  may be  refused”.  This  is  commonly interpreted  in  the sense that  even  if  the
grounds  for  refusal  are  fulfilled  the  enforcing  court  still  retains  some  “residual  discretion”  to
enforce the award87. This may happen for example where a court decides that, although the award
would violate the domestic public policy of the court's own law, the violation is not such as to
prevent enforcement of the award in international relations.
85
 A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 269. On this point, the Convention departs from a number of legal systems which allow
appeals to the courts at the seat of arbitration on questions of law, unless agreed otherwise by the parties; see e.g.
section 69(1) of the English Arbitration Act and section 38(2) of the 1984 Australian uniform arbitration legislation.
86
 A. J. van den Berg,  op.cit, p. 270
87
 Cfr  China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Cpn v Gee Tai Holdings co Ltd, ,  YBCA, XX, 1995, p. 671, in which the
Supreme Court of Hong Kong held that <<even if a ground of opposition is proved, there is still a residual discretion
left in the enforcing Court to enforce nonetheless. This shows that the grounds of opposition are not to be inflexibly
applied. The residual discretion enables the enforcing court to achieve a just result in all the circumstances>>.
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Grounds for refusal of enforcement to be proven by the respondent
Incapacity of the party
The first part of art.  V(1)(a) provides that the enforcement of the award may me refused if the
parties to the arbitration agreement were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity.
Unlike  the  Geneva  Convention,  which  only  dealt  with  incapacity  in  the  sense  of  irregular
procedural  representation  of  the  party  in  the  arbitral  proceedings88,  the  New York  Convention
focuses  on  the  substantive  aspect  of  the  incapacity,  namely  the  incapacity  to  conclude  the
arbitration agreement. This choice is due to the fact that cases related to the improper representation
of the party in the arbitral proceedings were considered to occur very rarely in practice, whereas
cases related to the incapacity of concluding the arbitration agreement were more frequent89.  As we
have seen  supra,  the Convention  leaves  open  the question of  which  law should determine  the
capacity of the parties, which should therefore be solved by means of the conflict of laws rules of
the  law of  the  forum.  The  most  important  examples  of  this  form of  incapacity  concern  those
arbitration agreements in which one of the parties is a state or a public body90. In these cases, a first
preliminary question is to determine whether the state or the public body has the capacity to agree
to arbitration: it may happen that, under the relevant law, those subjects may not be allowed to refer
88
 Cfr art 2(1)(b) of the Geneva Convention, which envisaged that enforcement of an award should be refused if the
court was satisfied,  inter alia, that the party against whom enforcement was sought , being under  a legal incapacity,
was not properly represented.
89
  A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 276
90
 There are no reported cases  in which a state  has invoked its  incapacity  to agree to  arbitration in  the context  of
enforcement of the award. However, there are cases is which the incapacity of the state was invoked in the context of
enforcement of an arbitration agreement, which can nonetheless be quoted to illustrate how the principle of incapacity
of  the state  has  been interpreted by the  courts.   In the  case  Societè Tunisienne d'Electricite  et  de Gaz  v.  Societe
Entrepose (Court of First Instance of Tunis, 22 March 1976, YBCA, 1978, p. 283) the respondent, a Tunisian public
company,  had asserted that  it  was  prohibited from resorting to  arbitration under Tunisian law.  The Tunisian court
rejected this defense on the grounds that this prohibition, although existing at national level, should not apply in the case
of international commercial arbitration. The court relied on French case law, according to which French public bodies
may not resort to arbitration in domestic relations, but are bound by an arbitral clause in international contracts. A
similar rationale has been followed by the Italian Supreme Court in a more recent case (Corte di Cassazione, 9 May
1996, no 4342, quoted by  D. di Pietro and M. Platte,  op. cit, p. 140): <<legal persons of public law may, unless the
parties have explicitly agreed otherwise, undoubtedly agree to arbitration, independently of domestic prohibitions, by
expressing their consent and sharing in the international marketplace the conditions common to all operators>>.
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their disputes to arbitration, or may only be allowed to have their dispute solved by arbitration upon
formal permission to be given by a controlling state body91. This question depends in the first place
on the law of the state concerned. However, sometimes it may also depend on either the law of the
place where the state is sued or the international conventions to which the state has adhered. 
Invalidity of the arbitration agreement
The second ground for refusal is that the arbitration agreement is invalid. As we have seen when
dealing  with the enforcement  of  the  arbitration agreement,  the  most  important  problem in this
respect  is  to  determine  under  which  law the  invalidity  of  the  arbitration  agreement  should  be
ascertained.  We  have  also  seen  that  the  Convention  envisages  in  art.  V(1)(a)  two  criteria92
determining the law applicable to the arbitration agreement (choice of the parties and  law where the
award was made), but that the latter has in practice overshadowed the former. Here suffice it to say
that the invalidity of the arbitration agreement is not always ascertained according to the criteria
laid down in art V(1)(a). In other words, there are some cases of invalidity which fall outside the
scope of this article and are consequently ascertained according to special criteria laid down in other
provisions of the Convention. This is the case of the invalidity stemming from non- compliance
with the written form requirement  under art.  II  (which is the most frequently invoked cause of
invalidity),  non-arbitrability of the subject-matter (falling under art. V(2)(a) and to be ascertained
according to the law of the country where enforcement is sought) and the composition of the arbitral
tribunal and the arbitral procedure (falling under art. V(1)(d). The only cases on which article V(a)
may be relied seem to be in practice those concerned with the lack of consent (mispresentation,
duress, fraud, or undue influence).
  
91D. di Pietro and M. Platte, op. cit, p. 138
92
 The question of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement remained unsettled until the very end of the New York
Conference.  Some  delegates  thought  that  the  Convention  should  specify  the  criteria  according  to  which  the  law
applicable to the validity of the arbitration agreement should be determined, while  others maintained that  this very
controversial issue of private international law should be left to the courts applying their own conflict of laws rules. The
Working Party dealing with this issue decided to adopt the latter view and proposed  that art V(1)(a) should read:<<the
arbitration agreement or the arbitral clause is not valid under the law applicable to it>>. The last day of the Conference
the Dutch delegate made another oral proposal which was adopted by the Conference and became the present text of art
V(1)(a). Cfr P. Contini, op. cit, p. 300.
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Lack of due process
Art.  V(1)(b)  envisages  as  a  ground for  refusal  of  enforcement  the situation in which the party
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or of the arbitration proceedings,  or was otherwise unable to present his case. This provision is
essentially aimed at ensuring that the parties to an arbitration are given a minimum standard of
fairness  during  the  arbitral  proceedings,  i.e.  what  is  commonly  known  as  due  process93.  The
principle of due process constitutes a determining factor for the credibility of any form of dispute
resolution and is  widely accepted  in  most  jurisdictions,  although its  actual  features  are  largely
affected  by  the  existing  differences  among  the  various  legal  systems.  Some  jurisdictions,  for
example, recognize this principle at the constitutional level and leave to national courts the task to
determine its actual content in every single case; others have adopted a more detailed regulation of
the  matter,  providing  indications  as  to  how  the  principle  at  hand  should  be  reflected  on  the
conduction of the hearings. Accordingly,  due process as conceived at the place of enforcement may
substantially differ from that in force at the place of arbitration. This may in turn lead to a situation
of  inconsistency  between  the  two jurisdictions  involved  and  to  unforeseeable  outcomes  of  the
arbitration.  This is also the reason why the ground of violation of due process is one of the most
frequently invoked defences against enforcement94. Nevertheless, claims based on violation of due
process  have  rarely been successful,  on account  of  the restrictive  interpretation  adopted by the
courts  on  this  point.  The  narrow interpretation  of  the  principle  of  due  process  in  the  field  of
international arbitration is premised on the idea that the latter should be given a higher degree of
freedom as compared  to national proceedings; consequently, a violation of domestic notions of due
process does not necessarily constitute a violation of due  process in a case where the award is
foreign, since the principle of due process in international arbitration should be given  homogeneous
93D. di Pietro and M. Platte, op. cit, p. 148
94
 Cfr P. Sanders, Consolidated Commentary vols III and IV, YBCA, IV, 1979, p. 248, who argues that the defence of
violation of due process has been made by respondents in many cases for a “mere chicanery” . An example of how
frivolous the defence grounded on violation of due process may be is represented by a case decided by the Court of
First Instance of Zweibruecken.  (Landgericht of Zweibruecken, 11 January 1978, YBCA, IV, 1979, p. 262).  In this
case, the German respondent had asserted that the letter of the claimant to the Secretary of the arbitration institution
concerned was  not  a sufficient  notice.  The court  rejected the claim,  as it  found that  the letter contained sufficient
description of the matter in dispute and the relief sought, so that with this letter the respondent could have known that
arbitration  had  started.  Moreover,  the  respondent  had  been  requested  three  times  by  the  secretary  to  appoint  his
arbitrator, which he had  not done.  Another example is a case decided by the Court of Appeal of Florence (Court of
Appeal of Florence, October 8, 1977, YBCA, IV, 1979, p. 289),  in which the Italian respondent asserted  that he had
not been informed in conformity  with Section 39 of the Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA). The court rejected his claim as it found that from the facts of the case it had emerged that the respondent had
refused explicitly to participate in the arbitration and the AAA had continued to keep him informed of the progress of
the arbitration.
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meaning, aimed at preserving the core of the fundamental rights of the parties, that is to say an
“internationally neutral” interpretation.95
  The concept of due process is developed by the Convention with reference to two different aspects
of this principle. The first (proper notice) refers to the right of the parties to be given proper notice
of the commencement of the arbitral proceedings. The second (inability to present the case) refers to
any serious irregularity in the arbitral proceedings which may result in the violation of the right of
the parties to be given equal opportunity to be heard. An interesting example of a decision referring
to the  first  aspect  of  the  principle  of  due  process  is  a  case  decided  by the  Mexican  Court  of
Appeal96. In this case, the respondents had asserted that they had not been given proper notice of the
arbitration proceedings, since all notices (including summons) had been served by mail. Although
service by mail was envisaged by the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce
and the American Arbitration Association, they argued that it violated Mexican law, under which
the first notice of summons should be served personally upon a respondent. The Court of Appeal
rejected the claim on the grounds that the parties, by inserting an arbitral clause in the contract, had
tacitly  waived  the  formalities  established  by  Mexican  procedural  legislation  and  submitted
themselves to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, which permit notices by mail. An
example  of  a  decision  referring  to  the  second  aspect  of  the  principle  of  due  process  (equal
opportunity to present the case) is represented by a decision issued by the High Court of Hong
Kong97. The case concerned an arbitration in which three experts had been appointed by the tribunal
in order to undertake an inspection of the equipment which constituted the object of the dispute.
The expert representing one of the parties was not informed of the inspection and therefore did not
attend the session of discovery. The court held that this amounted to a violation of the party's right
to present his case: the defendant's expert did not have the opportunity to hearing what the plaintiff's
expert said during the inspection and hence he was not able to present his view of the facts in the
inspection's report.
Extra petita and ultra petita claims
95
  A. J.van den Berg, op. cit, p. 297. Cfr the RAKTA case (Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc v  Societe Generale
de  l'Industrie  du  Papier RAKTA,  508  F.2d  969  975  2d  Cir.  1974),  where  the  court  recognised  that  the  arbitral
proceedings differ from those in litigation and that it would be inappropriate to import the entire panoply of due process
standards that govern litigation.
96
 Malden Mills Inc (U.S.) v. Hilaturas Lourdes S.A, Mexican Court of Appeal, 1977, YBCA, IV, 1979, p. 302
97Politek v. Hebei,  High Court of Hong Kong, 16 January 1998, YBCA, XXII, 1998, p. 666
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Art. V(c) deals with cases where the arbitral tribunal has exceeded its authority,   because it has
decided on issues which either the parties did not intend to refer to arbitration (extra petita claims)
or  fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement (ultra petita claims). The first case concerns
claims not contemplated by the arbitration agreement  and falling therefore outside the mandate
granted by the parties to the arbitral  tribunal. The second case concerns situations in which the
arbitral tribunal, although deciding on an issue falling within the mandate given by the parties, has
gone beyond what the parties themselves have requested to it .98 Art. V(c) also provides for the
possibility of a partial enforcement of an award containing  extra or  ultra petita claims, provided
that the part in which the arbitrator has exceeded his authority can be separated from the rest. The
rules on excess of authority have encountered very scarce application in practice:  it  is the least
invoked ground of all the grounds for refusal of enforcement envisaged in article V. Moreover, in
the few cases where this defence was made, it  has always  been dismissed99.  Also the provision
concerning partial enforcement has rarely been applied100.
Irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure
Art. V(d) states that the enforcing court may refuse recognition and enforcement of the award if the
composition  of  the  arbitral  tribunal  or  the  arbitral  procedure  was  not  in  accordance  with  the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, the law of the place where arbitration took
place.  This  provision  embodies  a  fundamental  principle  regulating  the  conduct  of  arbitral
proceedings: the supremacy of party autonomy. The arbitral process is in the first place regulated by
the agreement of the parties and only in its absence (or for the aspects not regulated by it) can the
law of the place of arbitration be resorted to. It follows that if the parties have made an agreement
on the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral procedure, according to art V(1)(d), the
alleged irregularity of these matters has to be determined under that agreement alone. Failing such
98D. di Pietro and M. Platte, op. cit,  p. 160
99
 An example is given by the Fertilizer Corporation of India case (Fertilizer Corporation of India v IDI Management,
Inc.  517  F.  Supp.  948  S.D.  Ohio  1981),  where  the  losing  party  contended,  under  art.  V(1)(c)  of  the  New York
Convention, that an award of consequential  damages exceeded the arbitrator's mandate because the contract  clearly
excluded consequential damages. After a careful review of the arbitral tribunal's decision, the court refused to overrule
it, because it found it contained at least a <<barely colorable justification>> for the conclusion reached. 
100M. Rubino Sammartano, op. cit, p. 957
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agreement, or for the matters not regulated by it, the alleged irregularity of the arbitral procedure
will  be determined under  the law of  the  country where  the arbitration  took place.  Despite  the
supremacy of party autonomy, the generally accepted interpretation is that the agreement on the
composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral procedure must comply with the fundamental
requirements  of  due  process  and  that  a  violation  thereof  constitutes  a  ground  for  refusal  of
enforcement under art. V(1)(b) or V(2)(b). Finally, it should be mentioned that  it rarely happens in
practice that the arbitral procedure has not been conducted in accordance with the agreement of the
parties. This is mainly because the latter usually refers to the arbitration rules of a specific arbitral
institution and these rules in turn generally afford wide discretionary powers to the arbitral tribunal
as to the conduct of the proceedings.
Award not yet binding or set aside
Art. V(1)(e) contains two distinct grounds for refusing enforcement. The first is the award which
has not become binding, the second is the award which has been set aside or suspended. According
to the first part of art V(1)(e), enforcement of the award may be refused if the respondent can prove
that the award has not become binding on the parties. The term “binding” was heavily discussed
during the  travaux preparatoires  and there is still no agreement both in case law and academic
writings on its meaning. The Convention's legislative history indicates that this term was chosen in
order to eliminate the system of the double  exequatur, which was considered as one of the most
serious hurdles to the enforcement of arbitral awards. In particular, the drafters wanted to abolish
the  leave for enforcement from the court in which the award was made, which was implied in the
requirement of  finality of the award provided for under the 1927 Geneva Convention101. This intent
has been then confirmed in case law102. Although there is agreement on what the term “binding”
does  not  mean (binding  does  not  mean  final),  there  is  no uniform interpretation as  to  what  it
101
 Cfr UN DOC E/CONF.26/SR.17 Summary Records :<<The Working Party agreed that the award should not be
enforced if, under the applicable arbitral rules, it was still subject to an appeal which had suspensive effect , but at the
same time felt it would be unrealistic to delay enforcement of an award until all the time limits provided for by the
statutes  had  expired  or  until  all  the  possible  means  of  recourse,  including  those  which  normally  do  not  have  a
suspensive effect, have been exhausted and the award had become “final”>>.
102
 Cfr e.g. Tribunal de Grande Instance of Strasbourg, October 9, 1970, YBCA, II, 1977, p. 244, in which the court
rejected the objection for the enforcement of an award made in Germany that no leave for enforcement had been issued
in that country. The court held that, since the Convention has done away with the system of the double exequatur, it
does not require a leave for enforcement from the country in which the award was made.
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actually means. In particular, there is no agreement on the question at which moment an award can
be considered to have become binding under art. V(1)(e) of the Convention. The most common
interpretation is that this question should be determined under the law governing the award. Yet,
this view presents two serious drawbacks. The first is that by leaving  the interpretation of the term
binding to the various national laws, the requirement of the double exequatur risks to be de facto
reintroduced  under  the  enforcement  regime  of  the  Convention,  if  the  relevant  national  law so
provides. The second is that national laws are often unclear as to the moment in which an award
becomes binding, with the consequence that there may often be diverging opinions on the binding
character of an award even within a single national law103. Accordingly, some author has claimed
for  an  autonomous interpretation  of  the  term.  Relying  on  the  legislative  history related  to  this
term104, it is suggested that an award should be considered binding when it is no longer open to an
appeal on the merits. Although this interpretation still implies that the relevant national law has to
be relied on in oder to ascertain whether the award is open to a recourse on the merits, it exempts
the interpreter from difficult inquiries under that law, such as that of determining the moment in
which the award becomes binding or that of finding an equivalent of the term “binding” under that
law. This autonomous interpretation has so far found limited application by the courts. An often
quoted  example  is  the  already  mentioned  Gotaverken case:  in  interpreting  the  implementing
national provision of art.  V(1)(e) of the Convention, the Swedish Supreme Court observed that
<<the legislative history states unequivocally that the possibility of an action for setting aside the
award shall not mean that the award is not to be considered as not being binding. A case in which a
foreign award is not binding is when its merits are open to appeal to a higher jurisdiction>>.
The second part of art V(1)(e) envisages as ground for refusal that the award has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award
was made. In order to understand this provision, one has to remind that the Convention does not
regulate the validity of arbitral awards: it only deals with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
and the grounds for refusing enforcement. Accordingly, it does not apply in cases where a party
103
 This has happened for example with the enforcement of German awards.  The Court of Strasbourg (Tribunal de
Grande Instance of Strasbourg, October 9, 1970, YBCA, II, 1977, p. 244,) has considered an award binding when it had
been  deposited  with  a  German  court,  whereas  the  Court  of  Basle  (Appellationsgericht  of  the  Canton  of  Basle,
September  6,  1968,  YBCA,  I,  1976,  p.  200)  held  that  a  German  award  was  binding pursuant  to  a  declaration of
enforceability issued by a German court.
104
 At the New York Conference of 1958 the Dutch delegate tried to introduce the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary means  of recourse in order to define  the  meaning of the term “binding”:  an award had not  become
binding, if it was still open to ordinary means of recourse., i.e. those means implying a second decision on the merits of
the dispute. On this reading, if an award was still open to the possibility of another decision on the merits, it was not to
be considered as binding, whereas if it was open to  other, extraordinary means of recourse (i.e. those not involving a
decision on the merits but reserved for procedural irregularities affecting the decision), this would not prevent the award
from becoming binding. This proposal was not accepted because this distinction was unknown in many common law
countries, which would have thus had difficulties in determining the exact meaning of ordinary and extraordinary means
of recourse.
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seeks to set aside -  as opposed to resist enforcement of -  a foreign arbitral award. Any challenge to
the validity of an award made in a given state must be determined in the courts of that state and in
accordance with the  lex loci arbitri, that is the law of arbitration of that particular state.105   This
principle is confirmed in article V(1)(e), which implies that it is the court of the country  in which,
or under the law of which, the award was made that has the exclusive competence to decide on the
action for setting aside the award. The grounds for setting aside the award are therefore a matter of
municipal  law, with the consequence  that  they may vary considerably from one jurisdiction to
another. This is considered one of the most serious indirect obstacles undermining the degree of
uniformity established by the Convention in the field of award enforcement. The feared effect of
this ground for refusal is that  if enforcement is denied every time an award has been set aside in the
country of origin on all grounds contained in the arbitration law of that country, the grounds for
refusal of enforcement under the Convention may indirectly be extended ad libitum to include all
kinds of particularities of the arbitration law of the country of origin. The solution to this problem
has  been  generally  identified  in  the  convergence  between  the  grounds  for  setting  aside  in  the
country of origin and the grounds for refusal of enforcement under the Convention: a party should
only be permitted to institute proceedings for setting aside an award if the enforcement of such
award could be refused abroad on the basis of article V of the New York Convention106.
  A  partial  result  in  this  sense  has  been  achieved  by  the  above-mentioned  1961  European
Convention  on  International  Commercial  Arbitration.  According  to  art.  IX(2)  of  the  European
Convention, in relations between states that are also party to the New York Convention, the setting
aside  of  awards  in  the  country  of  origin  does  not per  se  constitute  a  ground  for  refusal  of
enforcement. Only the grounds mentioned in art. IX(2) of the European Convention can constitute
valid grounds for refusal of enforcement under art V(1)(e) of the New York  Convention.  The
grounds mentioned in art. IX(2) of the European Convention mirror exactly the grounds for refusal
of enforcement envisaged in art. V(1)(a)-(d) of the New York Convention. On the one hand, this
solution  has  the  advantage  of  excluding  that  the  limited  grounds  for  refusal  of  enforcement
envisaged by the New York Convention may be extended by the particularities for setting aside
contained in the various national laws.  On the other hand, it has the disadvantage of creating an
unequal situation in the field of the enforcement of the award. Where the  enforcement is sought in
the country of origin, it will be denied in all those cases in which the award has been set aside in
that country; whereas, where the enforcement of the same award is sought in another contracting
state, the enforcement will be denied only if the award has been set aside on the limited grounds
105
 J.Lookofsky and K. Hertz, op. cit, pp. 785-6
106
 A. Bucher, Court Intervention in Arbitration, in R. B. Lillich and C. N. Brower (eds), International Arbitration in the
21st Century: Towards “Judicialization” and Uniformity?, Transnational Publishers, 1994, p. 39
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envisaged by the Convention. Accordingly, the best solution to the problem would have been if the
European Convention had provided that the award could be set aside in the country of origin only
on the grounds listed in the New York Convention as grounds for refusing enforcement .  As we
have seen above107,  this result is on the way of being achieved as the provisions concerning the
setting  aside  envisaged  by  the   Model  Law  on  International  Commercial  Arbitration  are
increasingly adopted in the various national arbitration laws.  On the other hand, the scope of this
ground for refusal  is frequently limited by article  VII  of the Convention, which allows a party
seeking enforcement to base his request on national law instead of the Convention’s provisions.
Accordingly, even where an award has been set aside in the place where it was made, enforcement
may still be possible by invoking art VII of the Convention. This is the solution which was adopted
in the leading Chromalloy case108, in which it was held that an award may be enforced under the law
of  the  place  of  enforcement,  if,  under  such  law,  the  award  would have  been  enforceable  as  a
domestic award notwithstanding the existence of a defence under article V.
Art. VI of the Convention provides that if an application for the setting aside or suspension of the
award has been made to a competent authority at the place of arbitration, the enforcing court may
adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award. The purpose of this provision is to avoid that
the possibility of applying for the  setting aside or suspension of an award turns into a dilatory tactic
on which the opposing party may rely in order to delay the enforcement of the award. Contrary to
what provided for in the Geneva Convention, in which the mere application for the setting aside of
the award in the country of origin was a sufficient ground to refuse enforcement of the award in
other contracting states, according to art. VI of the New York Convention the mere application for
the suspension or setting aside can possibly lead  only to the adjournment of the decision on the
enforcement.  Art.  V(1)(e)  of  the  New  York  Convention  establishes  that  enforcement  may  be
refused only if  the award has  been effectively suspended or set  aside in  the country of origin.
Moreover, the enforcing court has discretionary power as to whether adjourn its decision: art. VI
expressly states that it may adjourn the decision <<if it considers it proper>>. It may be observed
that  the  court  will  adjourn  its  decision  on  enforcement  if  it  is  prima facie convinced  that  the
application for the setting aside or suspension of the award in the country of origin is not made on
account of dilatory tactics, but is based on reasonable grounds. Finally, art. VI also provides that the
enforcing court may, on the application of the party claiming enforcement, order the other party (i.e.
the one which has applied for setting aside or suspension) to give suitable security.
107
 See supra p. 218.
108
 Chromalloy Aeroservices v Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F Supp 907 (DDC 1996)
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 Grounds for refusal of enforcement ex officio
The concept of public policy
Art.  V(2)(b)  provides  that  recognition  and  enforcement  of  the  award  may  be  refused  if  the
competent  authority in the country where  recognition  and enforcement  is  sought  finds that  the
recognition and enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.
Public  policy is  a  traditional  ground for  refusal  of  enforcement  of  foreign  arbitral  awards  and
judgments, as well as for the refusal to apply a foreign law: a public policy provision can be found
in almost every treaty dealing with these matters.109 Public policy is essentially the guardian of the
fundamental moral convictions or policies of the forum110.  Accordingly, public policy as ground for
refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards,  embodied in art. V(2)(a), is aimed at preventing that such
awards  collide  with  the  basic  morals  and  legal  principles  of  the  place  where  enforcement  is
sought111.  Although public policy is strongly rooted in the moral beliefs and policies of the various
states,  a  uniform  notion  thereof  is  slowly  emerging   in  the  field  of  international  commercial
arbitration.  This uniform notion is  based  on the distinction between  domestic  and international
public policy: the former is aimed at confronting the laws of a given country with the beliefs and
moral  standards  considered  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  a  civilised  way  of  living  in  that
particular country at a certain period of time112; the latter, although also based on national law, deals
with international relations, that is to say relations characterised by elements of extraneity with the
local jurisdiction which implies the application of a foreign law.113  It follows that, in light of the
different purposes public policy has with respect to domestic and international relations,  what is
considered to pertain to public policy in domestic relations does not necessarily pertain to public
policy in international relations.  The number of matters considered to fall under public policy in
international cases is smaller than that in domestic cases: international public policy results in a
more limited set of rules, representing the very basic beliefs of a particular country. Only that very
109
  A. J. van den Berg, op. cit, p. 360
110J. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration,  Oceana Publishing,1978, p. 403
111D. di Pietro and M. Platte ,  op.cit, p. 180
112D. di Pietro and M. Platte , op. cit, p. 181
113
 Ibidem
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core of the  principles of a country whose application is believed to be absolutely necessary belong
to the notion of international public policy. The 2002 Recommendations of the International Law
Association on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards are a further
attempt  to  define  a  common  and  global  approach  to  public  policy114.  The  fundamental  notion
underlying  the Recommendations is  that  an international  commercial  arbitration award must be
upheld save exceptional circumstances,  and  such exceptional circumstances may in particular be
found to exist if recognition and enforcement of the award is contrary to the international public
policy of any state115, which includes: 1) fundamental principles pertaining to justice or morality
that the state wishes to protect even when it is not directly concerned; 2) rules designed to serve the
essential political, social or economic interests of the state, these being known as loi de police; 3)
the duty of the state to respect its obligations toward other states or international organisations116.
Nonetheless, in order to ascertain whether a given principle forming part of its legal system must be
considered  sufficiently fundamental  to justify refusal  to recognise or  enforce an award,  a court
should take into account the international nature of the case and its connection with the legal system
of the forum, as well as the existence of a consensus within the international community as regards
the principle under consideration117. With respect to  lois de police, the Recommendations suggest
that a court should only refuse recognition or enforcement when this would manifestly disrupt the
essential political, social or economic interests protected by the rule118. 
The distinction between  domestic and international  public policy is  found in numerous judicial
decisions reported under the Convention: in Fritz Scherk v Alberto Culver Co119, the US Supreme
Court  stated  that  an  international  contract  involves  considerations  and  policies  significantly
different from contracts only dealing with domestic matters and that this aspect should be taken into
account, when ascertaining the compliance of such contract with the public policy of the country.
Accordingly, it held that although disputes arising out of securities transactions cannot be submitted
to arbitration if the contract is domestic, disputes arising out of such transactions are arbitrable if the
contract is international. The necessity of a narrow approach to the notion of public policy has been
114B. Hanotiau and O. Caprasse, Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitration, in E. Gaillard and D. di Pietro
(eds),  Enforcement  of  Arbitration  Agreements  and  International  Arbitral  Awards:  the  New  York  Convention  in
Practice, cit. p. 796. The International Law Association Recommmendations on the Application of Public Policy as a
Ground for Refusing Recognition or Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards were adopted by ILA at its 70th
Conference held in New Delhi on 2-6 April 2002. The text of the Recommendations is available online at www .  ila-
hq.org/download.cfm/docid/032880D5-46CE-4CB0-912A0B91832E11AF
115Recommendation 1(a) and (b)
116Recommendation 1(d)
117Recomendation 2(b)
118Recommendation 3(b)
119
 YBCA, I, 1976, p. 203
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confirmed by many US courts in subsequent decisions120. A similar approach is found in many other
jurisdictions, such as Germany121 and Switzerland122. This explains why the public policy ground,
although often invoked, is rarely successful123. If we look at the few cases in which a public policy
claim effectively led to refusal of enforcement, we find that for their most part they were based on
provisions other than art V(2)(b) (namely arbitability and lack of due process), so that the latter
appears a provision of residual application124. Among successful public policy defences based on
art. V(2)(b), are worth mentioning  the cases in which the subject matter of the dispute was found
illegal. An example is represented by the case Soleimany v Soleimany125 , where the English Court
of Appeal was called upon to decide on the enforcement of an award which had expressly stated the
illegal nature of the business undertaken by the parties. The Court of Appeal denied enforcement by
stating that its main concern was to <<preserve the integrity of its process and to see that it is not
abused. The parties cannot override that concern by private agreement. They cannot by procuring an
arbitration conceal that they are seeking to enforce an illegal contract. Public policy will not allow
it>>. 
120
 In the Rakta case (Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508
F.2d  969  2d  Cir.  1974),  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Second  Circuit  expressly  stated  that  <<the
Convention's  public  policy defence  should  be construed  narrowly.  Enforcement  of foreign  arbitral  awards  may be
denied  on this  basis  only  where  enforcement  would  violate  the  forum state's  most  basic  notions  of  morality  and
justice>>. In the same decision it also observed that <<in equating national policy with United States public policy, the
appellant quite plainly misses the mark. To read the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of national
policy interests would seriously undermine the Convention's utility. Rather, a circumscribed public policy doctrine was
contemplated by the Convention's framers and every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the Convention,
meant to  subscribe to this supranational emphasis>>
121
 In Germany courts have repeatedly held that in the case of a foreign award not every infringement of mandatory
provisions of German law constitutes a violation of public policy; they accept a violation of public policy in extreme
cases only. Cfr e.g. Oberlandesgericht of Hamburg, April 3 1975, YBCA, II, 1977, p. 241
122
 Cfr  Lazarous Ltd v Chrome Resources S.A, September 17,1976, YBCA, III, 1978, p. 311, in which the Court of
Appeal of  the Canton Geneva held that <<the extent of the exception of Swiss public order is more restrictive in
respect of the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards than in respect of the application of foreign law by Swiss
courts. Accordingly, this limitation means that an irregularity in the procedure does not necessarily entail the refusal of
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award, even if such an irregularity would imply the setting aside of an award made
in Switzerland. There must be a violation of fundamental principles of the Swiss legal order, hurting intolerably the
feeling of justice... this exception of public order should not be twisted in order to avoid application of international
conventions which are signed by Switzerland and which form part of Swiss law>>. 
123
  In 1981 van den Berg estimated that out of some 140 decisions reported under the Convention, enforcement of an
arbitration agreement and arbitral award was refused only in five decisions on account of public policy. Cfr also D. P.
Stewart, National Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under Treaties and Conventions, cit, p. 189: <<public policy appears
to have been the most frequently asserted defense, it has also been the least successful one, at least in U.S. Courts,
where it has been given an appropriately narrow interpretation>>.
124
 A. J. Van den Berg, op. cit, p. 376
125Solemany v Solemany, Court of Appeal of England and Wales, 19 February 1998, All ER, 1999, 3, p. 847
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The concept of arbitrability
Art. V(2)(a) provides that a court may refuse enforcement of an award if the dispute is not capable
of settlement by arbitration under its  own law.  The capability of a dispute of being settled by
arbitration is commonly referred to as arbitrability. It  is also generally accepted that arbitrability
forms part of the general concept of public policy and that therefore art. V(2)(a) can be considered
superfluous126. As part of the public policy of a given country, arbitrability reflects special national
interests in referring the resolution of a given dispute to courts rather  than to arbitral  tribunals.
Traditional  examples  of  non-arbitrable  subject  matters  are  disputes  related  to  anti-trust  law,
intellectual property, family law, labour law, bankruptcy law and criminal law. The various subject-
matters differ, however, from country to country. Despite this divergence, also for the question of
arbitrability  courts  generally  rely  on  the  distinction  between  domestic  and  international  public
policy:  they  often  recognise  that  matters  which  might  be  not  arbitrable  in  a  domestic  context
because of national public policy may be capable of settlement by arbitration in an international
context. The result of this tendency is that arbitral tribunals and courts are more often inclined to
view an international matter as arbitrable than they would have been ten or fifteen years ago.127
Accordingly, when it comes to international commercial arbitration,  the range of matters which are
non-arbitrable in the different  countries is shrinking as the courts'  pro-arbitration bias increases.
This does not exempt a party from carefully checking the arbitrability of the dispute before seeking
enforcement, since arbitrability is still one of the most frequently and most successfully invoked
defences.
126
 The reason why the Convention envisages arbitrability as a separate ground for refusal is historical:  as it was a
distinct  ground   in  the  1927  Geneva  convention,  the  1953  ICC  Draft  Convention,  and  the  1955  ECOSOC  Draft
Convention,  it  was decided without  discussion to keep the question of non-arbitrable subject-matters as a separate
defence also in the New York Convention 
127
 A. Kirry, Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe, Arb Int, 1996, 12, 4, p. 373. The most quoted example illustrating
this tendency is the US case Mitsubishi (Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc, 473 U.S. 614,
105 S.Ct.3346, 87 L.ed.2d 444, 1985) , which reversed a tradition of reserving anti-trust  disputes to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts. In deciding that anti-trust issues arising out of international contracts were arbitrable under the
Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court argued that <<concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability
in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming  in  a  domestic  context>>.  Yet,  at  the  end  of  its  decision,  the  Supreme  Court  added  the  following
sibylline  caveat,  which has been termed the “second look” doctrine: <<The national courts of the  United States will
have  the  opportunity  at  the award-enforcement  state  (the  case  at  issue  regarded the  enforcement  of an arbitration
agreement) to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of antitrust laws has been addressed>>.
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Towards a new New York Convention?
In 1998, when the 40th anniversary of the New York Convention was celebrated, there was still
wide agreement that no formal emendment of this treaty was needed, since any problem related to
its interpretation and updating to current arbitration practice could be solved through less drastic
means  than  a  new  convention.  In  2008,  at  the  ICCA  Dublin  Congress  held  to  celebrate  the
Convention's 50th anniversary, two different schools of thought have emerged on the issue of the
need for a modification of the New York Convention. The first school of thought, still prevailing,
relies on the ability of bending the Convention's provisions by creative interpretation and on the
spill-over effect of such creative interpretation through soft law instruments128.  In 2006, this school
of  thought  has  given rise to  an informal  modification  of  the New Convetion by means of  the
“Recommendation  regarding  the  interpretation  of  articles  II(2)  and  VII(1)  of  the  Convention”,
which will be analysed in the following section of this chapter. The second school of thought claims
that, given the ample number of modifications required to overcome the problems related to the
New Convention, an entirely new treaty is needed. The most authoritative representative of this
school of thought  is  van den Berg,  who, at  the ICCA Dublin Congress  on 10 June 2008 ,  has
submitted his proposal for a new New York Convention (the so-called Dublin Convention). Articles
1 to 7 of this draft Convention deal with matters that are similar to those contained in article I to VII
of the actual  New York Convention and the object and purpose of the draft Convention mirror
those of the New York Convention129. Nonetheless, the Dublin Convention contains a considerable
number of additional and revised provisions, which are aimed at moderninsing and filling the gaps
of the New York Convention. For example, the Convention's scope of application is much more
clearly defined: the title of the draft Convention points out  that it also covers the enforcement of the
arbitration agreement; besides, it  no longer refers to the enforcement of “foreign” arbitral awards,
but  rather  to  the  “international”  enforcement  of  arbitral  awards130.  This  is  because  the  Draft
Convention’s  applicability  is  dependent  on  whether  the  agreement  or  award  is  international
according to the criteria set forth in article 1(1), which is a  condensed version of the definition set
forth in article 1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law131.  As a result, the notions of “foreign” and “non-
128A. Uzelac, Written Form of the Arbitration Agreement towards a Revision of the UNCITRAL Model Law, Croat. Arb.
Yearb., 2005, 12, p.  121 available online at alanuzelac.from.hr  (July 2009)
129A. J. Van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and
Awards – Explanatory Note- 26 May 2008, pars 5-6, available online at arbitration-icca.org/articles.html (July 2009)
130The title of the draft Convention is “Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements and Awards”
131Art 1 of the draft Convention reads: << Field of Application. 1. This Convention applies to the enforcement of an
arbitration  agreement  if:  (a)  the  parties  to  the  arbitration  agreement  have,  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  that
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domestic” awards are deleted. Another important modification is the abolition of the written form
requirement for the arbitration agreement, which will be dealt with in the following section. Equally
important are the emendments to art V concerning the grounds for refusal of enforcement. Article 5
of the draft Convention envisages that the grounds for refusal of enforcement of an arbitral award
are exhaustive and introduces the principle that enforcement shall be refused “in manifest cases
only”132: this formulation excludes the existence of a residual discretion upon the enforcing court to
enforce the award, even if grounds for refusals under the Convention are fulfilled133. Moreover, the
new list of grounds for refusals often constitutes an opportune simplification and offers a solution to
several  issues  which  have  emerged  in  practice.  For  instance,  ground  a)  refers  to  an  invalid
arbitration agreement  under  the law of the country where the award was made134 and therefore
solves the problem of the law determining the incapacity of the parties and the invalidity of the
arbitration agreement135; ground b) modernises the language referring to due process, by mirroring
the corresponding provision of the UNCITRAL Model Law136; ground c) on excess of authority
removes the unclear language of the current New York Convention which refers to a “difference”,
“terms of submission”, “scope of the submission”137; ground f) replaces the misleading term “ non
-binding award” with the clearer expression “ award not subject to appeal on  the merits before an
arbitral appeal tribunal or a court in the country where the award was made” and deletes the current
Convention’s reference to “suspended” awards in its art. v(1)(e) because its meaning is unclear138;
ground g) establishes the principle of the convergence between the grounds for setting aside in the
agreement, their place of business or residence in different states; or (b) the subject matter of the arbitration agreement
relates to more than one state. 2.  . This Convention applies also to the enforcement of an arbitral award based on an
arbitration agreement referred to in paragraph 1>>.
132Art. 5 Draft Convention reads: << 5 Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement.1. enforcement of an arbitral award shall
not be refused on any ground other than the grounds expressly set forth in this article. 2. enforcement shall be refused
on the grounds set forth in this article in manifest cases only.
133A. J. Van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and
Awards – Explanatory Note- 26 May 2008, pars. 72-73
134Art. 5(a) draft Convention provides that enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused if << there is no valid
arbitration agreement under the law of the country where the award was made>>
135A. J. Van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and
Awards – Explanatory Note- 26 May 2008, par. 77
136Art.  5(b) draft Convention provides that enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused if <<the party against
whom the award is invoked was not treated with equality or was not given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its
case>>
137Art. 5(c) draft Convention provides that enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused if << the relief granted in
the award is more than, or different from, the relief sought in the arbitration and such relief cannot be severed from the
relief sought and granted>>
138Art. 5(f) draft Convention provides that enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused if <<the award is subject to
appeal on the merits before an arbitral appeal tribunal or a court in the country where the award was made>>
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country of origin and the grounds for refusal of enforcement under the Convention139; ground h)
narrows down the notion of “public policy” to that of “international public policy”140.
As we will see in the following section, UNCITRAL experts have mostly drawn a sceptical note on
the opportunity of carrying out a formal modification of the New York Convention through the
drafting of an additional Protocol, let alone of an entirely new treaty. Nonethless, if on the one hand
persuading the judiciary to a more liberal interpretation through soft law instruments may be easier
than embarking upon the drafting and ratification of a new New York Convention, on the other
hand such work of persuasion may be more effective  with a simple, user -friendly text than with a
50-year-old complex, and at times confusing, text141.
139Art. 5(g) draft Convention provides that enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused if  <<the award has been
set aside by the court in the country where the award was made on grounds equivalent to grounds (a) to (e) of this
paragraph>>
140Art. 5(h) draft Convention provides that enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused if << enforcement of the
award would violate international public policy as prevailing in the country where enforcement is sought>>.
141Q&A with  Albert  van  den  Berg,  Global  Arbitration  Review,  2008,  3,  3,  p.  21,  available  online  at  arbitration-
icca.org/articles.html (July 2009).
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SECTION II  : THE REVISION OF THE WRITTEN FORM REQUIREMENT  
OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT UNDER ART II(2) OF THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION 
The written form requirement under art. II of the Convention
The written form requirement  imposed  by art.  II  New York Convention has  traditionally been
considered  to  serve  the  “cautionary”  purpose  of  making  the  parties  aware  of  the  fact  that,  by
agreeing on arbitration, they oust the jurisdiction of the otherwise competent domestic courts1. In
concluding an arbitration agreement, the parties decide to relinquish the right to have their dispute
solved judicially and, since the right of access to court is a fundamental right of every citizen in a
civilized state, the written form requirement is an essential means of protection alerting the parties
to the special  significance of the arbitration agreement and urging them to proper consideration
before consent to the agreement is given2.
In  the  past  50  years,  art.  II  has  proven  to  be  one  of  the  most  problematic  provisions  of  the
Convention and the only one which has been formally revised by UNCITRAL and made the subject
of   further  regulation.  The  issue  whether  the  arbitration  agreement  complies  with  the  writing
requirement under art. II of the Convention represents a potential threat to the arbitral process at
every stage3. In particular, the issue is likely to arise where a party seeks to renege on his agreement
to arbitrate and may therefore commence litigation on the grounds that, by reason of its form, the
arbitration agreement is null and void. By the same token, a question as to the formal validity of an
arbitration clause or agreement might impede the initial appointment of an arbitrator and even if a
tribunal is constituted, the issue may be raised as a ground for contesting the tibunal's jurisdiction.
At the conclusion of the arbitral process, the issue may be put forward as a ground for setting aside
the award and at the stage of enforcement the issue may be raised pursuant to art. V(1)(a)4 as a
ground for resisting recognition and enforcement of the award.
1K. P. Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business, Kluwer, 2006, p. 402.
2T. Landau and S. Moolan,  Article II and the Requirement of Form, in E. Gaillard and D. di Pietro, Enforcement of
Arbitration  Agreements  and  International  Arbitral  Awards:  the  New York  Convention  in  Practice,  Cameron  May
Publisher, 2008, p. 189 and 219.
3T. Landau and S. Moolan, Article II and the Requirement of Form, cit., p. 201
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Problematic aspects of art II of the Convention
art. II(2) defines what is meant by “agreement in writing” under the Convention. First, it clarifies
that the writing requirement may be complied with either by a clause in the contract or a separate
agreement to arbitrate (the so-called arbitration or submission agreement); then, it envisages two
alternative requirements of written form: the agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration clause must be
either signed by all parties, or contained in an exchange of documents which may consist in letters
or telegrams. The formulation of these requirements raises four orders of interpretation problems. A
first group is related to the literal interpretation of this provision: does the signature requirement
apply only to the submission agreement or also to the contract containing the arbitration clause?
Does the signature requirement also apply to the exchange of letters or telegrams?5 There have been
conflicting decisions not only in the various countries, but also among different courts within the
same country. For example, the US. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that only the separate
agreement must be signed, and not the contract containing the arbitration clause6; on the other hand,
the  U.S.  Second  and  Third  Circuits  have  disagreed  with  this  interpretation,  claiming  that  the
signature requirement applies to both7. With respect to the exchange of letters and telegrams, the
4Art.  V(1)(a)   envisages  as  a  ground  for  resisting  recognition  and enforcement  of  the  award  the  invalidity  of  the
agreement referred to in art II and lays down two criteria determining the law applicable to the arbitration agreement
(choice of the parties and  law where the award was made). Nonetheless, no court has doubted that matters regarding
the form of the arbitration agreement are not to be determined under the law governing the arbitration agreement, but
under the requirements of art. II(2). In other words, the expression “the agreement referred to in article II” in ground (a)
of art. V(1) implies that  the lack of the written form of the arbitration agreement as required by art. II(2) constitutes a
ground for refusal of enforcement of an arbitral award. A. J. van den Berg,  The New York Convention of 1958: an
Overview, in E. Gaillard and D. di Pietro, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards:
the New York Convention in Practice, cit., p. 57
5M. L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Cambridge University Press, 2008,
p. 20.
6Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, 16 F. 3d 666, 667-69, 1994. The court held that the definition of “agreeent
in writing “ under art II(2) of the Convention included either : (1) an arbitral clause in a contract or (2) an arbitration
agreement, (2a) signed by the parties or (2b) contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. Thus, an arbitral clause in
a contract was sufficient to comply with the Convention's written requirement, because an “agreement in writing” had
not necessarily to be either signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams, as long as the court
was otherwise able to find an arbitral clause in a contract 
7Kahn Lucas Lancaster,  Inc. v.  Lark International Ltd,  186 F. 3d 210, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1999).  The court expressly
rejected the view expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court in  Sphere Drake. It held that the definition of “agreement in
writing” in the Convention required that such an agreement, whether it be an arbitration agreement or an arbitral clause
in a contract , be signed by the parties or contained in a series of letters or telegrams.  It essentially relied on two
arguments. The first was that the grammatical structure of the provision contained in art. II(2) was of the type “A or B,
with C” and therefore the comma immediately preceeding  the expression “signed by the parties or contained in an
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Swiss  Federal  Tribunal  has  held  that,  if  the  parties  expressed  their  intention  to  enter  into  an
arbitration agreement by an exchange of documents, signatures were not necessary8. Similarly, the
U.S. Third Circuit has held that the arbitral agreement may be unsigned if it is exchanged in a series
of letters9. It is generally the rule today in most jurisdictions that both the contract containing the
arbitration clause or the submission agreement must be signed, but there is no signature requirement
for the exchange of documents10. 
 A second group of problems stem from the fact that the writing requirement under art II(2) seems
to have  been outgrown  by advances   in  technology  which have  taken  place  since  1958.   The
emergence of electronic means of communication renders the reference to “letters” and “telegrams”
completely  obsolete:  relying  on  a  strict  interpretation  of  art.  II(2),  an  arbitration  agreement
concluded for instance by exchance of electronic mail would not be deemed to comply with the
writing requirement envisaged by the Convention. Nonetheless, this particular aspect of art. II(2)
does not appear to have given rise to many difficulties, since most courts have accepted that the
reference to letters and telegrams must be interpreted in the light of developing technologies: hence,
it has been held that telexes should be assimilated with telegrams and that both the terms “letters”
and “telegrams” should include other forms of written communications regularly used to conduct
commerce in the various signatory nations11. 
exchange of letters or telegrams” (C) suggested that this expression was meant to apply to both elements of the series
“an arbitral clause in a contract (A) or an arbitration agreement (B)”. The second was that the plain language of the
other working-language versions of the Convention compelled the conclusion that, in order to be enforceable under the
Convention, both an arbitral clause in a contract and an arbitration agreement must be either signed or exchanged: in the
French and Spanish- language versions, the word for “signed” appeared in the plural form, “signés” and “firmados”
respectively. Of course, with respect to an arbitral clause in a contract, the clause itlself does not have to be separately
signed: it is sufficient for the parties to sign the contract as a whole.
8Compagnie de Navigation et Transports S.A. v. MSC (Mediterranean Shipping Company) S.A., Swiss Federal Tribunal,
16 January 1995, YBCA, XXI, 1996
9Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots OY, 333 F. 3d 440, 449, 2003
10M.L. Moses,  op. cit., p. 21; A. Redfern and M. Hunter,  Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration,
Sweet and Maxwell, 1993, p. 135. As far as the signature requirement in case of exchange of letters is concerned, see
e.g. Obergericht of Basle, 3 June 1971, YBCA, IV, 1979, p. 199 which stated that a written agreement exists not only
where letters signed by the parties can be produced, but also when a written demonstration  of both parties' agreement
can be submitted: if the New York Convention had required a signature in the case of letters, then it would have said so
expressly. Likewise, the Italian Corte di Cassazione in Niserocchi v. Soc. Agnesi (13 December 1971, YBCA, 1976, I,
p. 190) : <<whenever the form of correspondence used does not permit personal signature of the original which is
received by the other party and, it seems, even in cases where the agreement has taken place by exchange of letters,
either one or both of which do not carry a personal signature, the requirement of the written form must be considered to
have been met inasmuch as it ay be ascertained in practice in some other way>>.
11Chloe Z. Fishing Co, Inc v. Odissey Re (London) Ltd, 109 F. Supp. 2D 1236 (S.D. Cal. 2000). Similarly, the Court of
Appeal of Geneva (Carbomin S.A. (Switz.) v. Ekton Corp. (Pan.), 14 April 1983, YBCA, XII, 1987, p. 502) stated that
art. II(2) envisages in a general way the transmission by telecommunication of messages which are reproduced in a
lasting format.  However,  courts  have  occasionally  relied on a  narrow interpretation of  art  II(2)  of  the  NYC:  in  a
decision of the Halogaland Court of Appeal (Norway) of 16 August 1999 (Stockholm Arb. Rep., 1992, 2, p. 121), it was
held that an exchange of email messages does not satisfy the writing requirement of Article II(2) of the Convention,
since it failed to meet the basic requirements of legal protection set up by the Convention itself.
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 The third order of problems arise because the writing requirement is out of step with commercial
reality, since it fails to take into consideration a wide range of ways in which arbitration agreements
are often concluded. Both requirements of signature and exchange seem to exclude any contract that
has been drafted in a written text or offer, but has been accepted in some way other than in writing,
for example, tacitly,  orally, by performance, or by conduct. This is for example the view of the
Italian Corte di Cassazione, Italy being the country with the largest amount of case law under the
New York Convention, frequently concerning issues of form12.  Moreover, relying  on the notion
that there must be a mutual agreement to arbitrate, either by signature or by exchange of documents,
courts have generally ruled out oral arbitration agreements, even if confirmed by the other party in
writing13, or even if both parties subsequently appeared  before the arbitrator14, tacit acceptance15 or
performance of the contract16.  By contrast, in some cases courts have recognised an arbitration
agreement in the absence of written form, based on the conduct of the parties, either by reference to
domestic contract law principles17, or by considering that the  lack of written form was cured by
participation in arbitration without objection18.
 Particularly relevant is also the incorporation of the arbitration clause contained in general contract
conditions by a reference made in the main contract. In this case, the most important issue is to
establish which kind of reference is needed to satisfy the writing requirement under the Convention,
i.e. whether a specific mention of the arbitration clause contained in the general contract conditions
is  needed,  or  a  general  reference  to  the  standard  terms  without  specifically  mentioning  the
12W.L. Craig, W.W. Park, J. Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, Oceana, 2000, p. 58 in which it
is observed that 146 Italian cases dealing with the New York Convention have been summarised in the fisrt 22 volumes
of the Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration from 1976 to 1997.  For example, in  Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Società
Italiana Impianti (25 January 1991,  YBCA, 1992,  XVII,  p.  554)  the Court  considered as  not  enforceable,  in the
absence of written acceptance, an arbitration clause contained in a fax  which was sent to a party but was not answered
in writing.  In Robobar Ltd v. Finncold SAS (28 October 1993, YBCA , XX, 1995, p. 739), a purchase confirmation sent
by a party to the other contained an arbitration clause. The Court regarded such arbitration clause as invalid on the
grounds that art II NYC recognised as valid an arbitration clause contained in a document signed by the parties or in an
exchange of letters or telegrams , and there was no doubt that none of these formalities had been met in the case at
issue, since the clause was only contained in the purchase confirmation which the other party did not seem to have
agreed to by letter or telegram.
13For example, in Universal Peace Shipping Enterprise SA v. Montedipe Spa ( 28 March 1991, YBCA, 1992, XVII, p.
562), the Italian Corte di Cassazione held that an oral contract for sale and a bill of lading which included an arbitration
clause sent by one party but not signed did not satisfy the requirement of art. II(2) of the NYC.
14OLG Duesseldorf ,1971, YBCA,  II, 1977, p. 237.
15OLG Rostock, 22 November 2001, (1 Sch 03/2000)
16Robobar Limited (UK) v. Finncold sas (Italy) 28 October 1993, YBCA , XX, 1995, p. 739.
17United States, Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Mary D. Slaney (US) v. International Amateur Athletic Federation
(Monaco), 27 March 2001, YBCA, XXVI,  2001, p. 1091, where the court stated that non-signatories to an arbitration
agreement might nevertheless be bound according to ordinary principles of contract and agency, including estoppel.
18
 Court of Appeal of Athens, Greek Company v. FR German Company, Decision No. 4458, 1984, YBCA, XIV, 1989,
p.  638,  where  the  lack of  written  form was  cured  by participation  in  arbitration  without  objection;  to  reach  this
conclusion, the court applied the domestic law governing the arbitration proceedings (without referring to article VII(1)
of the New York Convention)
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arbitration clause contained therein will suffice19. The relevant case law seems to have followed the
test that the party against which the arbitration clause is invoked must be able to check the existence
of  such  a clause in the standard terms20. Accordingly, although it is not necessary that standard
terms shall be physically attached to the main contract, a reference clause is generally needed in the
latter, in which specific attention is called for the arbitration clause contained in the standard terms21
(e.g. “this contract is governed by the general conditions, including the arbitration clause contained
therein”): in this way, the other party is made aware of the existence of an arbitration clause and
therefore can be considered to be able to check it22. If however the parties have a long standing
business relationship in which the same standard conditions are being used, the existence of the
arbitration clause need not be mentioned in the main contract23. Another exception is the case where
the standard conditions are so well known in the trade sector concerned that any party participating
therein can be deemed to be fully aware of these conditions24.
The fourth order of problems regards the relationship between the strict writing requirement as laid
down under the Convention and more lenient national rules on contract formation. If an arbitration
agreement is valid under the pertinent national law, should it not be enforceable under the New
York Convention? Since nowadays most arbitration statutes provide less stringent requirements for
the written form of the arbitration agreement, it has been argued that a party may rely on these
requirements for the validity of the arbitration agreement and at the same time still  rely on the
enforcement  regime of  the award  under  the Convention. This view is founded on an extensive
interpretation of the most- favourable-right provision, contained in art. VII and literally referring
only  to  arbitral  awards,  which  would  be  applied  also  to  the  enforcement  of  the  arbitration
agreement. On this reading, the party seeking enforcement of the agreement may rely on domestic
19K.P. Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business, cit., p. 411
20A.J. van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: an Overview, cit, p. 49
21In Bothell v. Hitachi Zosen Corp. ( 19 May 2000, 97 F. Supp 2d 1048, W.D. Wash. 2000) an oral agreement for the
manufacture of specialised equipment was concluded between the parties and subsequently confirmed in a letter. The
contract  was  then  performed  through  three  purchase  orders,  each  containing  a  reference  to  “General  Terms  and
Conditions”, being a separate attachment containing in turn an arbitration clause. The court held that the arbitration
clause was not unequivocally incorporated in any documents exchanged between the parties. Rather, these documents
merely contained a vague reference (“General Terms and Conditions for Purchasing”), which, on its face, did not in any
way implicate arbitration. In the court's view, <<in a series of documents where the words used to refer to a proposed
arbitration agreement are so vague as to be meaningless and no further explanation is provided, either by attachment,
discussion  or  otherwise,  the  totality  of  the  documents  exchanged  between  the  parties  does  not  constitute  a  valid
“arbitration agreement” under the Convention>>.
22A.J. van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview, cit, p. 49-50
23Bomar Oil N.V. v. ETAP, 11 October 1989, Rev. Arb. 1990, 1, p. 134; YBCA, 1990, XV, p. 448. Contra James Allend
(Ireland) Ltd. v. Marea Producten B.V (17 February 1984,YBCA , 1985, X, p. 585), in which the Court of Appeal in the
Hague held that the regular prior use of particular general conditions containing an arbitration clause could not give rise
to an enforceable arbitration agreement, where such general terms had not been specifically referred to.
24Cp Chloe Z. Fishing Co., Inc v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd, 29 April 2000, 109 F. Supp. 2D 1236 (S.D. Cal. 2000):
<<London arbitration clauses are ubiquitous in the London marine insurance market,  and a competent  and diligent
London broker would be familiar with all important terms of the insurance contract, obviously including arbitration
clauses>>.
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law  for  the  formal  validity  of  the  arbitration  agreement,  excluding  thereby  art.  II  (2)  of  the
Convention, but for other aspects of the enforcement still rely on the remaining provisions of the
Convention. Until recently, the most common opinion was that the written form requirement under
the Convention constituted a “maximum-minimum” rule, not susceptible of derogation by national
law25 and therefore  prevailing over  any provision of  municipal  law regarding the form of   the
arbitration agreement in those cases where the Convention is applicable.26 Accordingly, either the
Convention or the other basis for enforcement (national law or international treaty) must be relied
on in toto. Relying on a combination of the two bases would run against the systematic character of
the Convention, whose provisions constitute a whole, and consequently cannot be applied in bits
and  pieces27.  Nonetheless,  especially  after  the  adoption  of  the  Model  Law  on  International
Commercial  Arbitration  in  many  national  jurisdictions,  an  increasing  number  of  courts  have
considered the written form requirement under the Convention as a maximum rule, which may be
derogated  by  less  stringent  municipal  law.   In  so  doing,  they  have  relied  on  an  extensive
interpretation of the more-favourable-right provision under art. VII: for instance, in 1995 the Court
of First Instance of Rotterdam affirmed that art. II of the New York Convention did not preclude the
application of relevant Dutch Law, because  the more-favourable -law provision in article VII of the
Convention could be applied by analogy28; likewise, in 1992 the Court of Appeal of Cologne stated
that art. II(2) of the Convention did not provide for a uniform rule, as it can be deduced from article
VII(1)29. On the other hand, other courts have interpreted art. II (2) of the Convention in light of the
Model  Law,  which,  even  before  the  2006  reform,   provided  in  art.  7(2)  for  less  demanding
requirements30.  An example of this new trend is  constituted by a decision of the Swiss Federal
25
 Cfr e.g. Oberster Gerichtshof, November 17, 1971, YBCA, II, 1976, p. 183, in which the Supreme Court of Austria
expressly stated: <<the requirement of the written form of the arbitration agreement is exclusively governed by the New
York Convention>>; likewise the Italian Corte di Cassazione in Getreide Import Gesellschaft Mbh (FRG) v. Fratelli
Casillo (Italy) (7 October 1980, YBCA, VII, 1982, p. 342), according to which art. II NYC constitutes a lex specialis
rendering inapplicable the general Italian rules of form concerning arbitration agreements.
26
  A .J. Van den Berg,  The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation,
Kluwer Law, 1981, p. 173
27
  Contra M. Rubino-Sammartano, op. cit, pp. 944-945: <<it does not seem to be sure that, in the absence of an express
provision,  a  party  may  not  apply  for  recognition  based  on  the  Convention,  but  base  some  specific  aspect  of  its
application on domestic law or another convention>>
28Court  of First  Instance,  Rotterdam,  28 September  1995,  Petrasol  BV (Netherlands),  v.  Stolt  Spur  Inc.  (Liberia),
YBCA, XXII, 1997, pp. 762-765
29Court of Appeal of Cologne, Danish buyer vs. German seller, 16 December 1992, YBCA, XXI, 1996, p. 535
30
 Whereas the Convention considers as an agreement in writing only an arbitral clause or an arbitration agreement
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams,  the original version of art. 7(2) of the Model
Law provided a broader definition of “agreement in writing”, which took into account the modifications occurred in
international practice. First of all, art. 7(2) of the Model Law broadened the range of means by which an agreement in
writing could validly be concluded: not only an arbitral clause or an arbitration agreement signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams, but also resulting from other means of telecommunication that provide
a record of the agreement.  On this  reading,  the Model Law encompassed in the definition of agreement in writing
modern means of communication, such as telefax or e-mail, which had  become indispensable tools of everyday work
and did not exist at the time the Convention was drafted.  Secondly, art. 7(2) of the Model Law provided an answer to
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Tribunal, which held that art. II (2) of the Convention has to be interpreted with reference to the
Model Law, since the latter is intended to adapt the rules of the former to the present needs of
arbitration31. 
In conclusion, as observed by the UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration in March 2000, art.
II(2)  of the Convention,  if  interpreted  narrowly,  can lead to  results  which are  not  in  line with
international practice. Although national courts have increasingly adopted a liberal interpretation of
this  provision  in  accordance  with  international  practice  and  the  expectations  of  parties  in
international trade, there are still divergences as to its proper interpretation. This lack of uniformity
is a problem in international trade, which reduces the predictability and certainty of international
contractual commitments32.
The “soft” reform of art. II of the Convention
The amount of problematic aspects related to art II prompted UNCITRAL in 1999 to give to the
reform of the written form of the arbitration agreement  priority among the thirteen topics initially
identified for future work in the area of international commercial arbitration33.  Various views were
expressed as to the means through which modernization of the New York Convention could be
sought. A traditional amendment of the Convention provisions, which had so far been adopted by
more than 140 countries, would have been very difficult to achieve, if not impossible. The idea of
drafting a protocol  amending the terms of article II  of the New York Convention was actually
discussed,  but  it  was  eventually  discarded  because  it  was feared  that  it  would  excacerbate  the
another crucial interpretation problem related to the concept of agreement in writing under the Convention, namely
whether the agreement may be proved by other means than those provided in its definition (document signed by the
parties  or  exchange  of  letters  or  telegrams).  Whereas  the  most  common  interpretation  was  that  the  written  form
requirement  was  a requirement  ad substantiam  and therefore did not  allow proof by other means  of an arbitration
agreement concluded in a form different from that envisaged by art. II (2), the Model Law adopted  a less strict view. It
provided that an agreement in writing is considered also an exchange of statements of claim and defence, in which the
existence of an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another. It also provided that the reference in a
contract to a document containing an arbitation clause constituted an arbitration agreement, provided that the contract is
in writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the contract. 
31
 Compagnie de Navigation et Transports S.A. v. MSC S.A., Swiss Federal Tribunal, 16 January 1995, YBCA, XXI,
1996, p. 697. Similarly,  Hong Kong, High Court, Jiangxi Provincial Metal and Minerals Import and Export Corp v.
Sulanser Company Ltd, 6 April 1995, YBCA, XXI, 1996, p. 546: the court held that the definition of writing in article
II(2) was not exclusive and did not bar the application of article 7(2) of the UNCITRAL  Model Law.
32UN Doc A/CN.9/468, par. 88
33Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on its thirty-second session, 17 May- 4 June
1999, UN Doc/A/54/17, par. 350
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existing lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the Convention. A formal modification of the
provisions on the writing requirement could lead to suggestions for changes to other provisions,
which should not be reopened34; moreover, adoption of a protocol by a number of countries was
likely to take a significant number of years, during which uncertainty as two different potentially
applicable  regimes  would  increase35.  It  was  also  suggested  that  a  formal  amendment  was
unnecessary,  since the existing text of art. II was already subject to liberal interpretation without
any amendment, as evidenced by existing practice across many countries: any reform of the existing
text  might  therefore  undermine  these  liberal  interpretations36.  Finally,  it  was  observed  that  the
Convention had survived since 1958 without any amendment and had become one of the most
successful  commercial  treaties:  given its  evident success,  shown by the unparalleled number of
ratifications, the New York Convention could be rightly regarded as the foundation of international
commercial arbitration, and that fact by itself demanded that utmost caution be used in considering
any changes to its text37. What was needed was a declaratory instrument recommending a uniform
interpretation of art. II(2) of the New York Convention, in view of the fact that in some states a
liberal interpretation of art. II(2) was accepted, whereas in other states a more narrow interpretation
was  still  prevalent.  The  purpose  of  the  declaration  was  to  extend  to  all  states  this  liberal
interpretation38. Another view was that, while no attempt should be made to revise the New York
Convention  directly,  the  desired  result  with  respect  to  art.  II  (2)  might  be  achieved  indirectly
through model legislation. This could bring national arbitration laws more in line with international
practice; in turn, national laws might supersede the outdated provisions of article II (2), by relying
on the more-favourable- law provision of art.  VII of the Convention.  Such a solution could be
pursued  only if  art.  II  (2)  were  no longer  to  be interpreted  as  a  uniform rule  establishing the
minimum requirement of writing, but would instead be understood as establishing the maximum
requirement of form, which could be derogated by a less stringent national law. It was pointed out
that  the worldwide  acceptance  of  such an interpretation  was currently doubtful  and could only
become established as the result of a lengthy harmonization process based on case law. However, it
was suggested that UNICITRAL could usefully contribute to speed up that process, by elaborating
34The protocol would have been adopted by a sovereign diplomatic conference, which would be empowered to decide
on any amendment of the Convention and  would not be bound by the narrow scope of amendments currently under
consideration by the Working Group (UN Doc A/CN.9/508, par. 46).
35A/CN.9/468 par.  92. The drafting, signature and ratification of the protocol would have entailed the existence, at least
for a certain period of time, of two groups of states parties to the New York Convention, namely those that adhered to
the Convention in its original form only and those who, in addition, had adhered to the amending protocol (UN Doc
A/CN.9/508, par. 44)
36T. Landau and S. Moolan, Article II and the Requirement of Form, cit., p.  232
37UN Doc A/CN.9/508, par. 46
38UN Doc/A/CN.9/497, par. 43
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an interpretative declaration on art.  II  (2)  of the Convention39.   Accordingly,  it  was decided to
embark upon the elaboration of  two related measures  of a soft  law character:  1) a  declaration,
resolution  or  statement  addressing  the  interpretation  of  the  New York  Convention,  that  would
reflect a broad understanding of the form requirement and would permit the application of more
lenient  national  law;  2)  the reform of  the provisions  on the form of  the  arbitration agreement,
contained in art. 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitation, in order
to bring national laws more in line with international practice and thus render arbitration agreements
more  easily  enforceable  in  Model  Law  countries  where  the  courts  were  willing  to  follow the
interpretative declaration on  art II (2) of the Convention.
The idea underlying this “soft” reform is a shift in the purpose of the written form requirement. As
stated above, the written form imposed upon the arbitration agreement had traditionally absolved a
“cautionary” function, whereby it served to prove certainty of the will of arbitrate, thus alerting the
parties that they were giving up litigation in favour of arbitration. By contrast, UNCITRAL's “soft”
reform has intended to achieve a radical change of perspective, by structuring the written form as
means to prove the terms of the arbitration agreement, so as to secure the certainty of the rules
designed  to  govern  the  conduct  of  the  arbitration  proceedings40,  avoid  breakdowns  during  the
arbitral  process  itself  and  minimise  disputes  before  courts  in  relation  to  arbitration  and  the
challenges to the award at the stage of recognition and enforcement41.  The reason for this shift was
due to the fact that arbitration was now widely accepted for resolution of international commercial
disputes  and  consequently  could  no  longer  be  regarded  as  an  exception  requiring  careful
consideration  by  the  parties  before  choosing  something  other  than  litigation  before  courts.  As
arbitration  was  now  the  preferred  or  the  usual  method  for  international  commercial  dispute
resolution, the warning function of the writtern form was no longer as important as before42.  This
shift  of purpose was clearly stated by the Working Group in charge of reforming art.  7 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law at its forty-fourth session on 23-27 January 2006: it was discussed whether
the purpose of the writing requirement was to provide a record of the parties' consent to arbitrate or
of the content of the arbitration agreement. The Working Group was generally of the view that what
was to be recorded was the content of the arbitration agreement, as opposed to the meeting of the
parties'  minds or any other information regarding the formation of the agreement:  the question
whether the parties actually reached an agreement to arbitrate was an issue to be left to national
legislation43.
39UN Doc A/54/17, par. 348
40Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.9/609, 4 May 2006, par. 6
41T. Landau and S. Moolan, Article II and the Requirement of Form, cit., p. 221
42A/CN.9/468 par. 88-89
43Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/CN.9/606, 13 April 2006, pars. 3-4.
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The UNCITRAL Recommendation on the Interpretation of art. II(2) and art.
VII(1) of the Convention and the reform of art. 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
On  7  July  2006,  at  is  thirty-ninth  session,  the  UNCITRAL  Commission  adopted  the
“Recommendation  regarding  the  interpretation  of  Article  II(2)  and  Article  VII(1)  of  the
Convention”.  At  the same session,  revised  provisions  on the form of  the arbitration agreement
contained in art. 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration were
also approved.
At the outset there was uncertainty as to which form the interpretative instrument should take, i.e.
whether a resolution, a declaration, a recommendation, or a simple statement.  Eventually, it was
decided that the most appropriate form for such a document was that of a recommendation, instead
of a declaration, which could be misinterpreted as to its nature: the Commission agreed that the
purpose of the document, in line with the Commission’s mandate44,  was to propose a harmonizing
interpretation  of  certain  provisions  of  the  New  York  Convention  and  not  to  issue  binding
declarations  regarding the interpretation of  that  treaty45.  Although the recommendation  was not
considered to be legally binding, the fact that it was drafted by UNCITRAL, the core legal body in
the United Nations system in the field of international trade law, gave it a particular persuasive
force46; furthermore, in order to increase the persuasive value of the instrument, it was suggested
that   the interpretative declaration should be  endorsed by the General  Assembly of  the  United
Nations47. However, the Recomendation was not expressly approved by the General Assembly: in
its  Resolution of 18 December  2006 the General  Assembly only limited itself  to <<express  its
appreciation (empasis added)  to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for
formulating and adopting the recommendation regarding the interpretation of article II, paragraph 2,
and article VII,  paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards>>48. Non-approval of the Recommendation by the UN General Assembly shall be
44The  General  Assembly  Resolution  2205  (XXI)  of  17  December  1966,  which  established  the  United  Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, envisaged within the mandate of the Commission , inter alia, the task of
promoting  ways  and  means  of  ensuring  a  uniform interpretation  and  application  of  international  conventions  and
uniform laws in the field of the law of international trade.
45UN Doc, A/61/17, par. 179
46A/CN.9/468 par. 93
47A/CN.9/592, par. 84
48A/RES/61/33
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read as a strong indication of the non-binding character of this interpretative instrument, avoiding
any doubt that it may constitute a “subsequent agreement” or “subsequent practice” in the sense of
art. 31.3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties49.
The Recommendation consists of two limbs: the first regards art. II(2), the second art. VII(1) of the
Convention. In the first limb it is recommended that art. II(2) should be applied recognising that the
circumstances  described  therein  are  not  exhaustive.  Consequently,  if  the  definition  of  writing
contained in this provision is not exhaustive, then the provision does not set a minimum standard,
but  instead  allows  for  other,  more  expansive  forms  of  “writing”50.  In  other  words,  the
Recommendation is seeking to promote the interpretation of art. II(2), which is increasingly gaining
ground  in  international  practice,  whereby  the  writing  requirement  under  the  Convention  is  not
mandatory, but is susceptible of being derogated by more lenient national laws. The second limb
recommends that art. VII(1) of the Convention, which by its own terms only applies to arbitration
awards, should be interpreted to apply to arbitration agreements as well. As it stands, the second
limb of the Recommendation only authorises the application of a more favourable national law on
the enforcement of the arbitration agreement to the exclusion of the New York Convention regime.
This was already a well-established rule:  the omission of an express  mention of the arbitration
agreement  in  art.  VII(1)  was  regarded  as  unintentional,  since  the  provisions  concerning  the
arbitration agreement were inserted in the Convention at a very late stage of drafting; accordingly, it
would seem contrary to the pro-enforcement bias of the Convention that the most-favourable-right
provision would not apply also to the enforcement of the arbitration agreement51.
Nonetheless, by reading the second limb of the Recommendation in connection with the first, a sort
of dépeçage of the Convention seems to be allowed, in the sense that the New York Convention’s
provisions might be combined with more liberal provisions of domestic laws regarding the written
form of  the  arbitration  agreement.  In  other  words,  the Recommendation  seems to  authorise an
extensive interpretation of art. VII, whereby  the party seeking enforcement of the agreement may
rely on domestic law requirements for its formal validity, but still rely on the remaining provisions
of the Convention for other aspects of the enforcement procedure52.
The Comission has repeatedly emphasised the opportunity of building a “friendly bridge” between
the Recommendation and the revised version of art.  7 of the Model Law: on the one hand, the
former shall allow an interpretation of the written from requirement of the Convention in light of
less stringent national law, on the other hand the latter shall encourage national legislators to adopt
49See infra pp.431 ff.
50T. Landau and S. Moolan, Article II and the Requirement of Form, cit.,  p. 244.
51A.J. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation, cit, pp.
86-87 
52In this sense, T. Landau and S. Moolan, Article II and the Requirement of Form, cit.,  p.  253
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updated provisions on the written form requirement. The overall effect of this interaction would be
that  an arbitration  agreement  would be  more  easily enforced  under  the New York Convention
regime.  As stated above53, the new version of art. 7 of the Model Law envisages two alternative
options which a country may adopt. Option I is very close to the previous version of art. 7 and only
adds small improvements, taking into account most recent contractual practice. In particular, in par.
3 it clarifies that the written requirement is satisfied if the content of the agreement is recorded in
any form, whether or not the agreement has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means.
More  importantly,  par.  4  provides  that  the  writing  requirement  is  met  by  an  electronic
communication, so long as the information can be used for subsequent reference; furthermore, the
term “electronic communication” is defined in the same way as in the United Nations Convention
on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts54 and the definition of “data
message” is also identical to that of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce55. By
making the definition of “writing” in the amended art. 7 consistent with these two instruments,
UNCITRAL is attempting to create an internationally accepted definition of written form extended
to the modern practice of electronic commerce56. By contrast, Option II completely does away with
the written form requirement; consequently, if a country has adopted the “no writing” requirement
of Option II in its national arbitration law, an enforcing court in that country should be able to
enforce an oral arbitration agreement  under the New York Convention, assuming that  the court
applies the “more- favourable- right” provision of art. VII(1) to arbitration agreements57. 
The close connection between the Recommendation and art.  7 of the Model Law has led some
commentators to conclude that the latter may be used as a source of interpretation of art. II of the
New York Convention. UNCITRAL's work on the writing requirement of the Convention and of
the Model Law was carried out conjunctively and art. 7 of the Model Law and the Recommendation
were  adopted  simultaneously  at  the  same  session  of  the  UNCITRAL Commission:  this  would
indicate that the two instruments concerned broadly similar issues and were designed to achieve
53
 See supra pp. 219 ff.
54The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, signed in 2005,
has not yet entered into force in any country. The text of the Convention is available at www.uncitral.org
55The text of the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce is available at www.uncitral.org
56M. L. Moses,  op cit, p. 26. This trend is also confirmed by the decision to include a reference to the New York
Convention in art. 20 of the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International
Contracts.  Art.  20  states  that  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  apply to  the  use  of  electronic  communications  in
connection with the formation or performance of a contract covered by a number of other Conventions, in which the
New York Convention is included. The reference to the New York Convention under article 20 has been considered as
means to provide a uniform definition of “writing”, which is more consistent with current practices in international
commercial arbitration, and would therefore contribute to uniformity in the interpretation of article II (2) of the New
York Convention. (UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.132, par. 12).
57M. L. Moses,  op. cit., p. 25
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homogeneity and consistency in their results58. Although this approach has already been adopted by
some courts59, it must be noted that during the travaux preparatoires of the Recommendation this
issue was expressly dealt with and concerns were put forward that  promoting an interpretation of
article II(2) of the New York Convention in line with the revised draft article 7 of the Model Law
would  be  regarded  in  a  significant  number  of  countries  as  an  innovative  or  revolutionary
interpretation of the form requirement under  article II(2)  of the New York Convention , which
might be regarded as an unwelcomed development60.
The reform of the written requirement under the Convention through soft law instruments has not
met unanimous consensus within the arbitration community. It has been argued that the New York
Convention’s  shortcomings  cannot  be  adequately  and  comprehensively  remedied  by  a
recommendation  providing  interpretation  guidelines  which  are  too  complicated  for  courts  and
difficult to reconcile to the letter of art II.(2) of the Convention. What is needed is a formal revision
of the Convention, which, after more than fifty years, is starting to show its age61. Accordingly, as
we have seen in  the previous session, on 10 June 2008 at the ICCA Congress in Dublin, prof. van
den Berg has submitted his draft of a completely revised text of the New York Convention (the so-
called “Dublin Convention”). As far as the issue of the writing requirement is concerned, the Dublin
Convention adopts a very drastic solution: the new version of art. II completely abolishes not only
the requirement of the written form of the arbitration agreement, but also any definition whatsoever
of  arbitration  agreement;  it  limits  itself  to  provide  a  specific  regulation  of  the  enforcement
procedure of the arbitration agreement. As stated in the Explanatory Note,  the writing requirement
of the New York Convention poses one of the major problems in practice, as it is more stringent
than what is imposed by virtually all modern arbitration laws. Accordingly,  the draft Convention
follows the trend as evidenced by Option II of the new art. 7 of the Model Law, by offering the
possibility  of  no  longer  imposing  an  internationally  required  written  form  for  the  arbitration
agreement62.
58T. Landau and S. Moolan, Article II and the Requirement of Form, cit.,  pp. 253-254
59
 See e.g. Compagnie de Navigation et Transports S.A. v. MSC S.A., Swiss Federal Tribunal, 16 January 1995, YBCA,
XXI, 1996
60UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.118, par. 29
61
 A. J. Van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and
Awards – Explanatory Note- 26 May 2008, par. 3 available at www.arbitration-icca.org
62A. J. Van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and
Awards – Explanatory Note- 26 May 2008, par. 34
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The legal nature of the Recommendation
During the travaux, the UNCITRAL Secretariat submitted a paper in which the public international
law  status  of  the  future  Recommendation  was  discussed.  The  Secretariat  argued  that  the
interpretative instrument found its source in art. 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, according to which, in interpreting a treaty, account should be taken of  any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation. According to the Secretariat, the interpetative instrument responded to the need for
clarity in the interpretation of article II(2) of the New York Convention, arising from changes in
communication  technologies  and  the  increased  use  of  commercial  arbitration  in  international
trade63. Subsequent practice is a very effective instrument which parties sometimes use in order to
implicitly modify the terms of a treaty, without going through the formal emendment procedure:
there is in fact a close link between the concept that subsequent practice is an element to be taken
into account  in the interpretation of a  treaty and the concept  that  a treaty may be modified by
subsequent practice of the parties64. Nonetheless, commentators make clear that art. 31.3(b) does not
cover subsequent practice in general, but only concordant subsequent practice common to all the
parties65. We have seen that, at least for the time being, the interpretation of the written requirement
under the New York Convention is not concordant at all: as a result, rather than as an expression of
“subsequent practice”, the Recommendation may be considered as a soft law instrument deemed to
foster the emergence of a subsequent practice in the sense of art. 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention.
Only if national courts follow the Recommendation and interpret art. II and VII of the New York
Convention accordingly,  will  a  significant  body of  case  law be formed constituting subsequent
practice in the sense of art. 31.3(b) of the Convention.
It has also been argued that the Recommendation may be considered as a “subsequent agreement”
in the sense of art. 31.3(a) of the Vienna Convention66: a subsequent agreement need not be a formal
agreement or a subsequent treaty;  it  can take various forms, including a decision adopted by a
meeting of the parties, or an interpretative declaration, provided that the purpose is clear67.
Yet,  the  notion  of  subsequent  agreement  implies  that  each  State  party  expresses  its  individual
consent to the new agreement68:  an interpretation agreed between only some of the parties to a
63UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.110, par. 30
64I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Manchester University Press, 1984, p. 138
65Ibidem; A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 194.
66T. Landau and S. Moolan, Article II and the Requirement of Form, cit., p. 239
67A. Aust,  op. cit., pp. 191-192; R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds),  Oppenheim's International Law, Longman, 1996, p.
1268
68UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.110, par. 31
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multilateral treaty may fall within the scope of art. 31.3(a) only to the extent that it is consistent
with the interests and intentions of the other parties69. As we have seen, the Recommendation was
approved only by the UNCITRAL Commission, which is an inter-governmental body with limited
membership, and not also by the UN General Assembly, in which all the States parties to the New
York  Convention  are  represented.  Besides,  the  travaux make  clear  that  in  no  way  shall  the
Recommendation be intended as a binding text providing an authentic interpretation and therefore
constituting  an  implicit  emendment  of  the  New  York  Convention;  on  the  contrary,  the
Recommendation is meant to have only presuasive force and propose a harmonising interpretation
of certain provisions of the New York Convention, without interfering with the competence of the
state parties to issue binding declarations regarding the interpretation of that treaty70.
In conclusion, according to a merely legal analysis, the Recommendation has no legal value, since it
does not fit into any of the traditional public international law categories. However, International
Relations theory – and in particular  models of  norm  diffusion and the concept  of  legalization
outlined in the introductory part of this work71 - can help to assess the role this soft law instrument
can play in the modernisation and harmonisation of the law of international arbitration. On this
reading, the Recommendation can be viewed as a catalyst allowing a liberal interpretation of art. II
of the New York Convention to climb up a further rung of the legalization ladder. Such liberal
interpretation, which is gaining ground among national courts, is still  inconsistent and uncertain
among them. The Recommendation is the product of an epistemic community (UNCITRAL), which
is  attempting  to  challenge  the  existing  standard  of  interpretation  of  a  given  norm (the  writing
requirement  of the arbitration agreement under art.  II  Convention) and persuade the rest of the
international community (in particular, the various national courts) to replace the old standard with
a new one, more in line with current contractual practice. Given the authority and the worldwide
recognition of its issuing body, it is very likely that the Recommendation will trigger a process of
“norm cascade”, whereby a significant “critical mass” of national courts will be persuaded to follow
the  more  liberal  interpretation  of  the  writing  requirement  suggested  therein.  Only  when  this
threshold is reached, will the times be ripe for a formal modification of art. II of the New York
Convention,  which  will  take  stock  of  the  successful  work  of  persuasion  carried  out  by  the
Recommendation.
69R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim's International Law, cit., p. 1268
70UN Doc A/61/17, par. 179
71
 See supra pp. 69 ff.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The emergence of transnational law
This  work  has  aimed  at   analysing  the  process  of  harmonisation  of  the  law  of  international
commercial arbitration with particular reference to the drafting and diffusion of its uniform rules
It has attempted to show that traditional legal thinking identifying the notion of law exclusively as
an expression of state sovereignty cannot adequately account for recent developments in the field of
the law of international commercial arbitration.
As new actors are emerging in international relations, one cannot give a complete account of law in
the modern world without paying any attention to non-state forms of regulation (which Teubner,
emphatically, calls “global law without a state”), challenging state centralism, that is the idea that
the state has a monopoly of lawful power within its own territory.  Scholars studying  law at the
world level have so far considered nation states as the only relevant actors on the international scene
and state law as the sole product of official state entities1. Accordingly, they have focused on only
two types of normative systems: those enacted by nation states (national law) and those enacted
among nation states (international law). Law and globalization scholars argue that the conception of
law founded on this dichotomy is inadequate to understand new regulatory phenomena occurring on
a global scale. 
The most important effect globalisation has exerted on the law is the marked decline of national
sovereignty and the concomitant proliferation of international regimes, institutions, and non- state
actors2. As a result, the regulation of social activities, especially in the economic field and at the
global  level,  is  increasingly  becoming  the  product  of  the  interaction  of  states,  international
organizations, networks, non-governmental organisations and other non-state actors, rather than the
exclusive expression of state sovereignty3. This has radically restructured the context in which law
is produced: the divide between national, international  and non- national law wears thinner and
thinner,  since  the  whole  international  legal  order  is  open  to  forms  of  interpenetration  between
international and domestic, state and non-state law.
1P. Schiff Berman,  From International Law to Law and Globalization, Columbia Journal of Transnational law, 2005,
43, p. 485.
2
 H..Koh, Review Essay: Why do Nations Obey Law? Yale Law J., 1997, 106,  p. 2604
3H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 19-20.
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The  most  important  reason  fostering  the  emergence  of  these  hybrid  regimes  is  the  mismatch
between the global reach of economic activities and the scarce development of international law.
Economic activities that previously took place between national markets, that is between distinct
economic  and  political  units,  are  now  carried  out  independently  of  national  boundaries.  The
growing interconnectedness among world markets, reducing obstacles to the exchange of goods,
capital, and services across national boundaries, has fostered the emergence of an increasing range
of transnational  transactions,  transcending national  boundaries  and covering a  great  part  of  the
world. On the other hand, legislation on a world scale is a difficult process: in the absence of an
overarching  global  authority,  there  are  few  signs  of  a  development  of  legal  institutions  and
regulation at the global level; rather, there is a vacuum of authority, a regulatory anarchy in which
legislation moves away from its privileged place at the top of the norm hierarchy and is placed on a
equal footing with other types of social law-making4. Accordingly, at the global level it makes no
longer sense to define law as a chain of hierarchically ordered acts, because there is no overarching
authority which can legitimate such chain. The traditional view of law as an exclusive product of
the state  is  inadequate to understand self-regulation phenomena occurring at  the global level,  a
context in which the state has partly lost its law-making monopoly. Transnational transactions are
increasingly  de facto regulated by a new form of law (the so-called “transnational law”), which
cannot be encompassed in any of the traditional categories of national and international law.  On
this  reading,  transnational  law may be defined  as  a  body of  rules  regulating  actions  or  events
transcending national  frontiers,  whose sources include both public and private international  law
(international  conventions,  international  customary  law,  conflict  of  laws  rules)  and  other  rules
which do not wholly fit  into such standard categories (standard contract  terms, rules drafted by
formulating agencies, lex mercatoria)5 
Towards a post-westphalian order
The development of transnational law is premised on a particular conception of the role of the state
in international relations which emerged in the Nineties in the wake of the diffusion of globalisation
in every field of human activity. 
4
 G. Teubner, Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria, European Journal of
Social Theory, 2002, 5, p. 205
5Cp. P. C. Jessup, Transnational Law, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, p. 2
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The  vast  literature  on  anthropology,  sociology,  geography,  and  cultural  studies  concerning
globalization  has  challenged  the  idea  of  the  nation  state  as  the  only  relevant  form  of  social
aggregation  and  revealed  new  ways  in  which  norms  are  articulated  and  disseminated  among
multiple, often overlapping, communities6.  In particular, the debate on the state and globalisation
engaged in by International Relations theorists has pointed out the emergence of a post-westphalian
order,   no longer centered on states as the sole actors in the international scene.  The so-called
westphalian order is the international order that was established in Europe pursuant to the Peace of
Westphalia  in  1648,  which  brought  to  an  end  the  Thirty  Years  War.  This  peace  settlement  is
commonly  regarded  to  have  laid  down  the  foundation  of  the  modern  international  order:  the
international system of sovereign states. The westphalian order is based on four main principles7.
The first is territoriality,  according to which states have fixed territorial boundaries defining the
limits to their jurisdiction and scope of their political authority. On this reading,  territoriality is  a
crucial principle of modern political organisation: humankind is divided into political units defined
in terms of fixed and exclusive territorial realms.8  The second principle is internal  sovereignty,
whereby  states,  within  their  territory,  can  claim  effective  supremacy,  since  they  represent  the
ultimate and undisputed source of legal  and political  authority.  Accordingly,  in the westphalian
order mankind is organised into a limited number of sovereign territorial states, which recognise no
higher  legal or political authority than themselves. The third is autonomy or external sovereignty,
whereby states are entitled to conduct their internal and external affairs in a manner which only they
are competent to decide, free from external intervention or control.9 Finally, the fourth principle is
legality, which provides that there is no legal authority above and beyond the state, able to impose
legal duties upon it or its citizens. Relations among sovereign states may be subject to international
law, but only to the extent that each state agrees to being so bound.
The  vast  majority  of  International  Relations  scholars  maintain  that  globalisation  -  conceived
essentially as  the growing interconnectedness  of social activities across the globe, occurring as
more and more people,  goods,  capitals,  technology flow swiftly and smoothly across borders  -
fundamentally compromises the principles upon which the westphalian order was constructed. In
particular,  this growing interconnectedness poses three main constraints on state sovereignty. The
6
 P. Schiff Berman, From International Law, cit., p. 511
7A.  McGrew,  Globalization  and  Territorial  Democracy:  an  Introduction,  in  ID  (Ed),  The  Transformation  of
Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, ch 1, Cambridge University Press,  1997, p. 3 
8Ibidem
9
 Internal and external sovereignty are two diametrically opposed concepts. The former is the state power to impose an
order that allows individuals to peacefully coexist within the state territory, the latter means independence of any other
outside authority.  Accordingly,  internal  sovereignty is based on the concept of supreme authority;  on the contrary,
external  sovereignty  presupposes  the  lack  of  supreme  authority  and  therefore  the  independence  of  states  in  the
international system. On this point see W. Reinicke, Globalization and Public Policy: An Analytical Framework, in ID,
Global Public Policy: Governing without Goverment?,  Brookings Institution Press,1998, p. 56-58
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first is  mutual vulnerability among states: events originating in one state or part of the world can
have an immediate and direct effect on individuals and communities residing in distant part of the
globe.  Accordingly,  globalisation  erodes  the  boundaries  between  what  is  foreign  and  what  is
domestic,  what  is  national  and  what  is  international.  For  example,  pollution  generated  in  UK
contributes to acid rain, which spoils forests in Norway or Sweden: it is therefore at the same time a
domestic and international matter. The second is the emergence of forms of social activities which
are transnational in character, i.e. transcend national borders, the most important of which is the
organisation of global industrial production carried out by multinational corporations. Economic,
social  and  political  activities  are  increasingly  "stretched"  across  the  globe:  they  are  no  longer
primarily or solely organised according to a territorial principle.10 The third is the emergence of
global  problems and threats (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global  warming and
pollution, terrorism), which in no way can be solved by a single government alone, but only through
multilateral  or  international  cooperation.  New  global  problems,  especially  environmental  and
population threats have become too broad and too menacing to be handled by nation-States alone11.
The proliferation of multilateral  institutions and international regimes designed to manage these
new common problems compromises further the state´s autonomous capacities. Governments and
societies across the globe need to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction
between international and domestic.12
The result of these constraints is that national governments have lost control over an increasing
range of activities occurring within their territory; on the other hand a new set of arrangements is
emerging in which states, institutions and non-state actors interact in order to regulate new global
issues.  National  governments  are  no  longer  able  to  control  an  increasing  range  of  activities
occurring within their territories (free flows of capitals, information, goods, technology). This wide
range of transnational activities fosters the emergence of global and transnational networks linking
people  and  organisations  in  different  parts  of  the  world  (e.g.  multi-national  corporations,
transnational groups). As a consequence of these new emerging forms of economic and political
10
 D. Held and A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton,  Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,
Polity Press, 1999, p. 28
11M. Mann, Has Globalizaton Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?, Review of International Political Economy,
1997, 4-3, p. 472.
12
 D. Held and A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton,  Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,
cit., p. 7
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organisation at a global level restricting the scope for the exercise of state sovereignty, the world
order is a post-wesphalian order, in the sense that is no longer state-centric. The world order is no
longer composed only by independent States exerting their sovereignty within their fixed territory;
states are forced to share their sovereignty with other actors in the international system in order to
regulate phenomena lacking a defined territorial scope. 
From a community of predominantly western states, the global arena now encompasses more than
four times the number of states that existed at the beginning of the 20th century. In addition, other
actors  have  emerged:  intergovernmental  organisations,  non-governmental  organisations,
professional associations, transnational corporations, and mixed entities made up of members of
different communities. They all contribute to the making of international norms and are increasingly
bound by them13.
Yet, this does not mean the demise of the state as an effective political organisation: globalisation
leads to a re-construction of the power, functions and authority of national governments. Territorial
boundaries have become increasingly problematic: although states formally retain the ultimate legal
claim to supremacy over what occurs within their territory,  their effective control must come to
terms  with  the  expanding  jurisdiction  of  complex  global  systems,  global  infrastructures  of
communication  and  transport,  institutions  of  global  governance,  which  support  new  forms  of
economic and social organisation, transcending national boundaries. What is at stake is not the legal
concept  of  state  sovereignty,  since  formally  states  remain  sovereignty  entities:  globalisation
challenges operational or de facto sovereignty,  that is to say the ability of states to practice this
concept in the daily affairs of politics14.  In this context, the notion of the nation-state as a self-
governing, autonomous unit appears to be more a normative claim than a descriptive statement.15
The forms  and  functions  of  the  state  need  to  adapt  to  this  changing  global  order:  rather  than
bringing about the end of the state, globalisation has encouraged a range of adjustment strategies to
manage  the  growing  arrays  of  cross-border  issues.  In  this  new context,  the  power  of  national
governments is not necessarily diminished, but is being reconstituted and restructured in response to
the growing complexity of processes of governance. Accordingly,  the relationship between state
and globalisation shall  not  be conceived as a ”zero-sum game”,  whereby either globalisation is
13D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, in D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: the Role
of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.  6
14W. Reinicke, Globalization and Public Policy, cit.,  p. 56
15
 D. Held and A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton,  Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,
cit., p. 8
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considered weak and consequently states have all the power, or globalisation is considered strong
and states are considered to be losing power;  rather,  the relationship between states  and global
networks may be better described as a “positive-sum” game, in which the interaction among local,
domestic, international and global actors can lead to potential gains for all the parties involved. In
particular,  states may increase their power by exerting both constitutive and adaptive strategies:
constitutive, because they are able to circumvent or even shape global, domestic, local constraints;
adaptive,  because  sometimes  they  adapt  their  structures  to  pressures  stemming from the  same
levels.  For example, states can often decide to bind themselves to international agreements in order
to overcome opposition from powerful domestic groups (as in the case of WTO membership, which
enabled states to overcome domestic demands for protectionism by industrial groups).  Far from
eroding state sovereignty, international institutions are in this way used as “scapegoats” in order to
pursue a precise  domestic strategy.  By the same token, European  states  have jointly agreed  to
implement measures preventing regulatory tax competition among them, in order to hamper global
constraints stemming from MNCs,  which tend to allocate their production on the basis of better
fiscal  conditions.  Also,  states  can sometimes act  on the national  level,  in order  to mitigate  the
negative effects of globalisation: they can decide to increase labour costs in order to discourage
systems  of  production  based  on  low  wages,  or  decide  to  limit  tax  benefits  only  to  highly-
technological  firms.  On  the  other  hand,  states  are  not  totally  free  from  domestic  and  global
constraints. In many cases states create the domestic political-economic environment (developed
industrial infrastructures, low tax regimes, disciplined and cheap labour force) hospitable to MNCs.
In pursuing this constitutive and adaptive strategies, states help to promote the interaction among
the regional, national, global levels, thus enabling the development of an increasingly integrated
global architecture. 
The main tenets of legal pluralism
The most important theory challenging state centralism is legal pluralism. Originally conceived as a
term denoting the coexistence of different  systems of norms in former colonial  countries,  legal
pluralism has developed into a theory challenging the idea that the state has a monopoly of lawful
power within its own territory.  Legal pluralists maintain that legal centralism is a fiction, a myth, a
product of ideology.  They also argue that  legal  centralism constitutes the main hindrance to an
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accurate, empirical observation of the legal phenomenon. The legal reality of the modern state -
they contend – is not at all the tidy, consistent, organized ideal so nicely captured in the common
identification of the law with state law. Rather, empirical observation reveals that the legal field
constitutes an unsystematic set of inconsistent and overlapping parts.16
In contrast with the idea of legal centralism, they suggest that all societies have a diversity of legal
orders,  of  which official  state  law is only one,  and not  necessarily the most powerful.  On this
reading, globalisation creates a multitude of decentered law-making processes in various sectors of
civil society, in relative insulation from nation-states17. Technical standardization, professional rule
production, intra-organisational regulation in multinational enterprises, lex mercatoria are all forms
of private rule-making on a global scale, which have come into existence not by formal recognition
of nation-states, but by acts of self-validation18.
This  last  version  of  legal  pluralism  challenges  the  traditional,  positivist  conception  of  law.
According to the traditional doctrine of legal sources, all forms of legal pluralism are no more than
social  rules,  customs, usages,  contractual  obligations,  intra-organisational  agreements,  but  in no
way can they be considered as law. This is because positivism bases the distinction between law
and  non-law  on  a  hierarchy  of  legal  rules  where  the  higher  rules  legitimate  the  lower  ones.
Normative phenomena outside this hierarchy are not considered law, but merely facts. At the top of
this hierarchy lies the constitution of the nation-state, which is the highest product of the democratic
legislative  process  and  therefore  the  ultimate  source  of  legitimation  of  legal  validity.  On  this
reading, contractual rule-making, as well as intra-organisational rule production, is either seen as
non-law or as delegated law-making, which requires recognition by the national legal system.
Legal  pluralism  supporters  suggest  that  globalisation  is  breaking  this  hierarchy.  In  their  view,
political law-making has lost its leading role in the globalisation process19: sovereign states are not
able to agree on certain legal principles which may guarantee the development of a just  legal order
for mankind. The political process has reached only a proto-globality in international relations20. On
the  other  hand,  legal  pluralism  supporters  maintain  that  various  sectors   of  civil  society  are
developing a global law of their own, partly independently of nation states, the latter appearing too
weak on a global scale. The difference between a highly globalised society and a weakly globalised
politics is pressing for the emergence of a global law that is not a product of the nation state's
legislative  process  and  is  not  dependent  upon any political  constitution and  politically  ordered
16J. Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 1986, 1,  p. 4
17A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Standford University Press, 1990, p. 70 
18G.  Teubner,  Foreword:  Legal  Regimes  of  Global  Non-state  Actors,  in  ID  (Ed),  Global  Law  Without  a  State,
Dartmouth, 1997, p. xiii
19G. Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in  ID (ed), Global Law Without a State, cit. p. 5
20G. Teubner, Legal Pluralism in the World Society, cit. p. 6
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hierarchy of norms: in Teubner’s terms, a global law without a state.21 This makes it necessary to
rethink the traditional doctrine of the sources of law. Globalisation breaks the hierarchy within this
order, moves the national law-making process away from its privileged position and puts it on an
equal footing with other types of social law-making.
But the coexistence of a plurality of legal orders affecting the exercise of national sovereignty does
not mean the demise of the state at  the global level. On the contrary, the situation of normative
pluralism is an indication that none of them alone is capable of being applied to the exclusion of the
others. These normative orders are incomplete: legal certainty emerges from their interaction with
state law. The  transnational law-making process is characterised by a high degree of hybridism:
interaction  between  state  law  and  other  legal  orders  gives  rise  to  forms  of  hybrid  regulation,
characterised  by  an  overlapping  of  hard  and  soft,  state  and  non-state  law.  On  this  reading,
international commercial arbitration can be better theorized as a hybrid regime, dualistic in nature,
combining both a state-centric system, organized around the New York Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards and other bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties,
and a multi-centric system made up of a complex network of private contracts, non-national norms
elaborated by formulating agencies and international arbitral institutions22. 
The concept of legalization
The concept of legalization, elaborated by rational theorists of International Relations, is a very
useful  tool  accounting  for  the  emergence  of  these  hybrid  regimes  in  the  globalisation  era.
Legalization is a concept coined by a number of political scientists in order to provide an alternative
to the positivist view of law, which identifies law only with norms bestowed with enforcement by a
coercive power23. Legalization comprises a set of characteristics which a given set of norms may or
may not possess, namely obligation (the addressees are legally bound by the rule, in the sense that
their behaviour is subject to scrutiny under the procedures and discourse of law: challenges to such
a legal obligation can occur only through legal procedures and legal reasoning; a state cannot depart
21G. Teubner, Foreword: Legal Regimes of Global Non-state Actors, cit. p. xiv
22
 K.  Lynch,  The  Forces  of  Economic  Globalization:  Challenges  to  the  Regime  of  International  Commercial
Arbitration, Kluwer, 2003, p.  404
23
 K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, IO, 2000, 54,
3, p. 402. See also P. F. Diehl, c. Ku, D. Zamora,  The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of Normative
and Operating Systems, IO, 2003, 57,1, p. 49 <<There has also been an expansion in the forms of law. This had led to
thinking about law as a continuum ranging from the traditional international legal forms to soft law instruments (...)The
concept of a continuum is useful because these modes are likely not to operate in isolation, but  rather to interact with
and build on each other>>.
from such rules on the ground that they do not comply with its own interests: it must give reasons
stemming from the interpretation of the norm justifying possible exceptions); precision (the rule
specifies clearly and unambiguously the behaviour it requires, authorises or interdicts); delegation
(third parties are granted authority to implement, interpret and apply the rules, as well as to solve
disputes)24.  Each  characteristic  is  conceived  as  a  continuum,  ranging  from  a  minimum  to  a
maximum, so that for each norm or set of norms it is possible to identify a higher or lower degree of
obligation, precision and delegation25. 
The  legalization  paradigm  shows  how  blurry  the  boundaries  between  hard  and  soft  law  are.
Examples of full legalization, where all the three dimensions are present at the highest level, are
rare: more common are those arrangements in which at least one dimension is relaxed. For example,
treaties with imprecise or indeterminate provisions have been termed “legal soft law” in that they
merge legal form with soft obligations; the International Court of Justice has recognised that legally
binding obligations among states may be created through oral agreements,  unilateral statements,
minutes  of  a  meeting,  exchange  of  letters26;  reservations  and  interpretative  declarations  are
instruments on which states may rely in order to deny or limit legal obligations stemming from hard
law commitments;  treaties  frequently envisage private  dispute resolution processes (negotiation,
mediation,  conciliation,  arbitration)  instead  of  adjudicatory  mechanisms.  Accordingly,   the
widespread inclusion of soft law commitments in hard law instruments shows that it is not always
clear where law ends and non-law begins, or, in other terms, where soft law should be placed27. By
contrast, some soft law instruments may have a specific normative content that is “harder” than the
soft commitments in treaties; moreover, they frequently envisage supervisory and implementation
mechanisms traditionally found in hard law texts28. The distinction between hard and soft law is
becoming  ever  more  difficult  to  draw,  mainly  because  it  is  rare  to  find  soft  law  standing  in
isolation; rather, it is most frequently used either as a precursor or as a supplement to a hard law
instrument29. Soft law can be used to fill gaps in hard law instruments or supplement hard law with
new norms30.   In other instances, a given set of rules is first formulated in a non-binding form with
24K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 401
25K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, op. cit., p. 404
26Cp Qatar v. Bahrain, 1994, ICJ Rep. 6, in which the International Court of Justice upheld the binding character of the
signed minutes of a meeting
27D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, cit.,  p. 8
28
 This is the case for instance of  Agenda 21,  adopted at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development,
which,   although  laying  down  non-binding  rules,  envisaged  an  ad  hoc  body  (the  Commission  on  Sustainable
Development) to supervise implementation.
29D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, cit., p. 10.
30
 International  environmental  law-making  provides  numerous  examples  of  conventions  generating  “secondary”  or
“delegated” soft law, i.e. the statements and practices which develop under a treaty to supplement or correct its text: a
framework  convention  is  combined  with  a  series  of  accompanying  non-binding  instruments  (such  as  conference
resolutions,  administrative  agreements,  memoranda  of  understanding)  specifying  the  details  of  the  convention's
provisions or providing guidance to their interpretation and application.  See e.g.  The 1992 Montreal Protocol to the
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the possibility, or even aspiration, of hardening the provisions of an existing treaty, developing into
a subsequent treaty, or becoming a catalyst for the establishment of customary international law31.
Application of the legalization paradigm to the law of international commercial
arbitration
The application  of  the  legalization paradigm to the  main  sources  of  international  commercial
arbitration (the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts) shows that also within the field of the law of
international commercial arbitration the distinction between hard and soft law is blurry. The New
York Convention, which from a legal standpoint is to be considered a hard law instrument, does not
reach the full level of legalization: its provisions are legally binding, but they often lack precision,
since key concepts such as “arbitration agreement” and “award” are not defined; on the other hand,
it provides  a full level of delegation, since its interpretation and application is left to state courts.
By contrast, the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UNIDROIT Principles – both soft law instruments
from a  legal  standpoint  –  are  not  legally  binding,  but  on  the  other  hand they have  a  level  of
precision (or imprecision) comparable to the New York Convention (they are a systematic set of
rules,  in  which  many  key  concepts  such  as  “good  faith”  or  “commercial  arbitration”  are  not
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (YBIEL, 1992, 2, p. 819) which provides a framework for
non-compliance  procedure  the  details  of  which  have  been specified  by the  internal  practices  and decisions  of  the
Implementation Committee envisaged by the Protocol itself.
31C.  Chinkin,  Normative  Development  in  the  International  Legal  System,  in  D.  Shelton  (ed),  Commitment  and
Compliance: the Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System,  cit., p. 30 and 32.  For example, the
1996 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR) contained very weak obligations, had
no  monitoring  committee  and  no  compliance  mechanism;  however,  a  number  of  external  factors,  such  as  greater
political and scholarly attention to economic and social rights, NGO activity,  practice of similar bodies, notably the
Human Rights Committee, led to the establishment in 1986 by ECOSOC of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights to which states where required to report. In turn, the Committee has strengthened the provisions of the
Covenant through its General Comments, which have inter alia suggested steps to take against states failing to comply
with  their reporting obligations:  accordingly,  the combined impact  of these measures has been to raise the level of
obligation under the Covenant far beyond that originally envisaged. Likewise, the use in international trade of pesticides
and chemicals was for years regulated through non-binding instruments developed by the FAO and the United Nations
Environment Programme, but in September 1998 ninety-five states adopted a treaty with binding obligations to regulate
this trade: the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and pesticides in
International Trade  (ILM 1999, 38, 1).  Moreover, in recent years non-binding instruments have sometimes provided
the necessary statement of legal obligation (opinio juris) to evidence the emergent custom and have helped to establish
the content of the norm: as stated by the International Court of Justice, although non-binding instruments do not become
binding merely through repetition, a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required
for the establishment of a new rule (ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
ILM, 1996, 35, par. 71).
442
precisely  defined)  and  a  lower  (albeit  still  significant)  level  of  delegation,  because  their
interpretation and application is largely left to arbitral tribunals, which enjoy a certain degree of
autonomy from state courts.. 
The particular features of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UNIDROIT Principles (non- legally
binding nature, moderate precision and delegation) allow to combine some of the advantages of
hard law  with those of soft law.  Their non-binding character and moderate level of precision has
allowed the drafters to reach a consensus in a relatively short period of time on a systematic set of
norms,  covering  a  large  part  of  the  arbitral  process  and  the  subject-matter  of  international
commercial  contracts  respectively;  this has  also permitted the adoption of  “best  solutions”,  not
necessarily reflecting the rules common to all the legal systems of the world.  The moderate level of
delegation has allowed to overcome the disadvantages related to the lack of precision, by fostering a
process  of mutual  learning among law-makers,  courts and arbitrators,  aimed at  filling the gaps
within  the  rules  of  these  harmonisation  tools  and  testing the impact  of  the “best  solutions”  in
practice. It is thus not surprising that the drafting of the UNIDROIT Principles has been defined as
an “ongoing process”: after the second edition published in 2004, a third one is under preparation
and is expected in 2010.  Finally,  the moderate level of delegation implies that state courts may
intervene when arbitral decisions appear to breach imperative rules of public policy by setting aside
or refusing enforcement of arbitral awards. 
 As the analysis of the diffusion of the main sources of international commercial arbitration has
shown, the  international  commercial  arbitration regime is characterised by a strong hybridation
between hard and soft law instruments. After 50 years, two provisions of the New York Convention
have  been  de  facto  modified  by  a  soft  law  instrument,  the  “Recommendation  regarding  the
interpretation of Article II(2) and Article VII(1)  of the Convention”, in order to update them to
current arbitration practice. Nonetheless, the diffusion of the liberal interpretation suggested by the
Recommendation will  depend on the successful  interaction between the Convention, the Model
Law and the various national arbitration laws:  on the one hand, the Recomendation shall allow an
interpretation of the written from requirement envisaged by the Convention in accordance with less
stringent national law; on the other hand, the reform of art. 7 of the Model Law shall encourage
national legislators to adopt updated provisions on the written form requirement of the arbitration
agreement in their national  arbitration laws. Likewise,   the wide number of  national  arbitration
legislations largely based on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration has given rise
to  hybrid  forms  of  laws,  which  have  been  formally  adopted  through  national  law-making
procedures, but whose content has been almost entirely determined by a non-national source.  The
application  of  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  as  means  to  interpret  and  supplement  national  and
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international legislation (which has so far proved to be the most successful use of the Principles)
has  fostered  a  creative  interpretation  of  unclear  or  outdated  provisions  more  in  line  with
international practice: in particular, they have been an important instrument for the promotion of the
acceptance of the principle of good faith in common law jurisdictions.
Finally,  it should be noted that, although the distinction between hard and soft law is becoming
increasingly blurry,  it  is  still  important  to identify which norms in  the international  system are
meant to be binding and which are not. After all, much of the work of lawyers and judges still
consist in administering the law/non-law boundary by deciding on which side of it various alleged
norms and conduct fall32. Moreover, the aim of most global governance is to achieve enforceable
hard obligations: a fully legalised treaty bestowed with coercive sanctions is still the best means to
ensure cooperation among states and non-state actors generally strive to get non-binding principles
transformed into hard law so as to be able to enforce the norms they champion33.
The diffusion of norms in the international system
The debate on globalisation of the law is almost exclusively focused on the identification of a new
concept of law which may overcome the old positivst definition and encompass new forms of rule-
making not stemming from state authority. This agenda risks to lose sight of the most important
implications of the phenomenon of law beyond the state: what is lacking in this debate is a theory
explaining  how  norms  emerge  and  spread  in  the  international  system,  as  well  as  the  mutual
interactions between state and non-state law. International Relations theory can bring an important
contribution to this discussion. In order to account for the origin and diffusion of norms in the
international  system,  constructivists  have  theorised  a  norm “life  cycle”,  which comprises  three
stages: norm emergence, norm cascade and internalization34. In the first stage new norms emerge as
a  result  of  a  persuasion  effort  carried  out  by “norm entrepreneurs”  (also  known as  “epistemic
communities” or “meaning managers”), that is groups of professionals  with recognised expertise
and  competence  in  a  particular  domain,  whose  members  agree  on  a  well-defined  regulatory
approach to a given issue. Epistemic communities are essential to the diffusion of new norms in the
international system: they challenge existing rules laying down standards of appropriate behaviour
32R.B. Bilder, Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate, in D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: the
Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, cit. , p. 71
33M.E. O'Connel, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: the Role
of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, cit., p. 111.
34J.G. March and P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, IO, 1998, 52, 4, p. 895.
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and try to persuade the rest of the community to replace the old standards with the new ones. If
these norm entrepreneurs are successful and thus a “critical mass” of states and other actors of the
international system are persuaded to adopt the new norms, the second stage consists in the norm
cascade, whereby the “norm leaders” (i.e. the avant-guarde of actors which have adopted the new
norms) try in turn to persuade others to become norm followers. At the far end of the norm-cascade
stage,  norms may become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a
“taken-for granted” quality, that makes compliance with the norm almost automatic. 
This theoretical framework  opens up new insights into the analysis of the harmonisation of the law
of  international commercial arbitration. This harmonisation process can be seen as a process of
diffusion  of  uniform  norms  in  the  field  of  international  commercial  arbitration,  following  the
constructivist “norm life cycle” in at least two of its three stages, namely norm emergence and norm
cascade. Formulating agencies, like UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT, can be considered as epistemic
communities or norm entrepreneurs, challenging the existing logic of appropriateness with which
the arbitral process was conducted in the various states, characterised by a mistrust vis à vis this
method of dispute resolution, in favour of the more traditional litigation in national courts,  and
trying to foster the emergence of a common culture of arbitration, i.e. the gradual convergence in
norms procedures  and expectations of participants in the arbitral  process.35 Despite their formal
status as intergovernmental UN agencies, UNCITRAL's and UNIDROIT's membership resembles
more  an  epistemic  community  than  an  intergovernmental  conference  of  state  representatives.
UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT sessions represent  a <<wholesome mix of  academic specialists  in
commercial and comparative law, practising lawyers, and members of government ministries with
years of experience in international lawmaking>>36. Although their formal membership is limited to
states, their working sessions are open to participation as observers to international organizations,
both governmental and non-governmental: they are allowed to join all sessions to the same extent as
members, with the sole exception that they have no right to vote37. This exception is however of
35A.J. Van den Berg, International Dispute Resolution: Towards an International Arbitration Culture, Kluwer, 1998, p.
31-34
36
 J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, Kluwer, 1999, p. 51 
37The reports of UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT's last working sessions show a steep increase in the participation of non-
state actors as observers. At the 12th  UNCITRAL Session in 1979 only four non-governmental organisations attended
(Baltic and International Maritime Conference, International Bar Association, International Chamber of Commerce),
whereas at the latest 41st Session in 2008 their number was 28 (inter alia  Institute of International Banking Law and
Practice, Instituto Iberoamericano de Derecho Marítimo, International Association of Ports and Harbors, International
Bar Association, International Chamber of Shipping, International Council for Commercial Arbitration, International
Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations). Similarly, during the drafting sessions of the UNIDROIT Principles
2004, only 4 non-governmental organisations were invited as obeservers (UNCITRAL, ICC, ASA, the Milan Chamber
of National  and International  Arbitration);  in 2006, at  the first  session for the preparation of a new edition of the
UNIDROIT  Principles,  the  circle  of  invited  observers  has  considerably  enlarged  (the  Cairo  Regional  Center  for
International Commercial Arbitration, the International Bar Association, the Swiss Arbitration Association, the New
York City Bar, the German Arbitration Institution, the Milan Chamber of National and International Arbitration, the
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little significance, since these formulating agencies typically reach  their decisions by consensus,
rather than by voting: during working sessions, all efforts are made in order to take into account all
concerns raised and to reach a final text which is acceptable to all.38   Constructivists observe that an
emergent  norm,  in  order  to  move  towards  the  second  stage  of  norm  cascade,  needs  to  be
institutionalised in specific sets of international rules, so as to clarify what the norm exactly is and
what  constitutes  a  violation  thereof.  This  is  what  is  currently  happening  in  the  field  of  the
harmonisation of international commercial arbitration: over  the past twenty years, there has been an
evident move toward the codification or  restatement  of  general  principles of  law or commonly
accepted practices (e.g. the UNCITRAL Model Laws on International Commercial Arbitration and
Conciliation, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the rules of procedures of the various international
arbitral  institutions,  such as  the International  Chamber of  Commerce  and  the London Court  of
International Arbitration) and the vague notion of lex mercatoria is being progressively replaced by
written codifications, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the
Principles of European Contract Law and the CENTRAL database. Once a “critical mass” of states
have been persuaded to adopt the new norms, constructivists say that these have reached a threshold
or tipping point, since from this moment on they start to bring about a change in the prevalent
beliefs and values within the international system. 
Two of the main harmonisation tools in the field of international arbitration seem to have reached
this  threshold:  the  first  is  the  New  York  Convention  on  the  Recognition  and  Enforcement  of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, which has been adopted by most states in the world and therefore seems
to have achieved even the final stage of internalization; the second is the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, which has reached or is reaching the tipping point, since
nearly 50 states around the world have so far  enacted legislation based on this instrument and
among them feature many of the world's  main trading nations, such as some Canadian and US
states, Germany, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom. In the norm-cascade phase, constructivists
envisage three major motivations pulling other states to respond to the pressure stemming from
“State  leaders”  and  ultimately  adhere  to  the  new  rules:  legitimation,  that  is  the  concern  with
international approval (in the sense that not complying with internationally accepted standards may
undermine their  reputation and credibility)39;  conformity,  whereby states comply with norms to
demonstrate  that  they  have  adapted  to  the  social  environment  to  which  they  belong;  esteem,
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Study Group for a European Civil Code,
the ICC International Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration, to mention only a few).
38
 The  UNCITRAL  Guide,  United  Nations  Publication,  2006,  p.  3,  available  on  the  website  uncitral.org   at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/V0650941.pdf
39J.G. March and P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders., cit, p. 903
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whereby state leaders conform to norms in order to avoid disapproval stemming from violation of
internationally  accepted  standards  and  thus  enhance  national  consensus  (and,  as  a  result  their
prestige)40.  These motivations  appear too general and do not take into account the peculiarities of
the international trade context. More convincing seems the explanation that states decide to conform
their national laws to international trade standards because they want to convey a “signalling effect”
to  the  international  business  community:  they  want  to  make  their  national  laws  dealing  with
international trade matters immediately familiar and recognisable to the foreign practitioner, so as to
attract as many foreign investments and arbitrations as possible within their territory. In the specific
context of international commercial arbitration, this signalling effect can also be interpreted with
reference  to  the  nationals  of  the  state  concerned.  As  arbitration  is  largely  founded  on  party
autonomy,  parties  are  free  to  choose  the  place  of  arbitration  and  therefore  the  procedural  law
governing their dispute. If a given country has an outdated arbitration law, it will rarely be selected
as  a place of  arbitration;  consequently,  even its  nationals will  tend to go abroad to solve their
disputes and thus will have to deal  with a foreign arbitration law with which they may not be
familiar.
 As mentioned above, the diffusion of the Model Law has been particularly successful, whereas the
UNIDROIT Principles have so far been considerably less applied in arbitration as lex contractus or
as restatement of lex mercatoria and general principles of contract law. Accordingly, from a legal
process standpoint, the model law has proved to be a more effective vehicle of norm diffusion than
a restatement. Whereas the latter is primarly addressed to contracting parties, judges and arbitrators
throughout the world, with the consequent difficulties in ensuring its diffusion among such a huge
and indefinite moltitude of actors, the model law is addressed to national law-makers, which are
much more identifiable and limited in number. Indeed, the Principles seem to have worked better as
a  model  law,  rather  than  as  a  restatement,  since  their  impact  on  national  and  international
legislations has been comparatively stronger. This may lead to a re-thinking in the purposes this
instrument  may serve.  It  might   perhaps  be  worth  considering the opportunity  of  adopting the
UNIDROIT Principles in the form of  a  model  law, so as to exert  persuasion directly on those
officials who, within their respective national governments, are in charge of adopting legislation in
the field of international commercial law, with a view to convincing them of the need for reforming
outdated national contract laws in accordance to international standards.
The impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the UNIDROIT Principles on national legislations
is also fostering the emergence of a particular legislative technique, which is becoming the standard
40J.G. March and P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, cit, p. 904
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for national or international codification of private law41.  This drafting approach is characterised by
two  main  features:  an  extensive  comparative  law  research  underlying  the  elaboration  of  each
provision, which takes into account a large number of foreign sources of both national and non-
national  origin;  the involvement in the drafting process of a wide range  of outside experts and
stakeholders not belonging to the state or formulating agency's bureaucracy, in order to strengthen
the  legitimacy  of  the  harmonisation  tool  and  facilitate  its  reception  in  practice42.  In  turn,  the
diffusion of such national and international instruments, reflecting widely accepted rules, ends up
constraining the choice of legislatures embarking on new law-making projects, since they need to
provide reasonable grounds every time they decide to adopt rules departing from internationally
accepted standards43. This is particularly evident in the diffusion of UNCITRAL Model Law, which
has “trapped” into the logic of arguing even those states which have decided not to adapt their
legislation to this harmonisation instrument. This is the case for example of Great Britain, which
decided  not  to  enact  the  Model  Law  essentially  on  grounds  of  self-interest,  i.e.  for  fear  that
departure  from its  traditional  legislation  would  have  undermined  its  ability  to  attract   arbitral
disputes into its territory. Yet, the large success of the Model law forced Great Britain to justify on
rational grounds the validity of its self-interest, by publishing in 1989 a detailed report – the Mustill
Report – in which the Model Law was thoroughly analysed and reasons were given why English
arbitration law should not conform to this harmonisation tool.
Legitimacy of international commercial arbitration
Interdisciplinary approaches to international commercial arbitration have been mainly adopted with
a view to addressing the issue of its autonomous character with respect to state sovereignty. Very
few attempts have been made to assess its legitimacy and  no detailed analysis has been conducted
so far of how legitimacy in this field may be justified under the various theories envisaged by  law
and social sciences literature. Although this task falls outside the main purpose of this work, some
broad considerations are worth making. As outlined in the introductory part of this dissertation, in
41B. Volders,  The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial  Contracts and Dutch Law, in  E.  C. Cashin
Ritaine and E. Lein (eds),  The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and
Codification- Reports of the IDSC Colloquium 8/9 June 2006, Schulthess, 2007, p. 142; D. Tallon,  The New Dutch
Civil Code in a Comparative Perspective – a French View- Point, ERPL, 1993, p. 190. A similar procedure has for
example been adopted in 2001 by the EU Commission, with a view to identifying a new strategy of harmonisation in
the field of European contract law.
42B. Volders, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and Dutch Law, cit, pp. 139-141
43B. Volders, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and Dutch Law, cit., pp. 142-143
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the literature there are two main different approaches to the notion of legitimacy: a normative and a
descriptive approach.  The first is used in order to identify the characteristics which make a given
institution or regime responsible to the people subject to it44: in this context scholars often prefer to
use the term  “accountability”, rather than legitimacy. The second approach attempts to explain why
or when people obey or accept a given regime or institution. This reading of legitimacy investigates
the specific empirical motives for obedience: it does not attempt to evaluate political regimes, but
rather to provide reasons for a particular social action, namely obedience to a regime or institution.
 From a normative standpoint,  the issue of the legitimacy of international commercial arbitration
depends on how the issue of its autonomous character is  addressed.  Supporters of the globalist
approach  to  arbitration,  who  consider  arbitration  as  an  increasingly  autonomous  legal  order
increasingly  detached  from  State  sovereignty,  may  either  emphasise  its  dangerous  lack  of
legitimacy, or rely on autopoiesis in order to emphasise the self-legitimation of this regime. As seen
above45,  according to Cutler the tremendous growth of international commercial arbitration is being
encouraged by states, which are involved in a regulatory competition to provide a hospitable legal
framework for arbitration proceedings and accordingly limit the powers of their national courts to
review arbitral  awards46. By so doing,  states are increasingly assuming the role of enforcers  or
stabilizers of rules and practices established by private authorities47 and consequently  weakening
mechanisms that work toward participation and democratic accountability48.  By contrast, Banakar
considers  arbitration  a  self-reflexive  system,  in  the  sense  that  it  regulates  self-regulation49:  it
establishes procedural rules to foster the development of a self-regulated area of the market (i.e.
44More precisely, Keohane (Kehoane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force, Michigan
Journal of International Law, 2003, 24, p. 1124) defines accountability as a relational term, denoting a relation between
a power wielder and the accountability holders to which the former is held accountable.  As far as the content of the
definition of accountability is concerned, Kehoane identifies two essential elements: information and sanctions.  For a
relationship to be one of accountability, there must be some provision for interrogation and provision for information,
and  some  means  by  which  the  accountability-holder  can  impose  costly  sanctions  on  the  power-wielder.  To  be
accountable means to be compelled to answer or give explanations for one's action or inaction and, depending on the
explanation, to be exposed to potential sanctions, both positive and negative.
45
 See supra pp. 186 ff.
46
 A.C. Cutler,  Private Power and Global Authority:Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy,
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 225 and 26-27.
47
 A.C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority, cit, p. 237-239
48
 A.C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority, cit, p. 235
49See supra p. 200. Teubner introduces the concept of reflexive system as a consequence of the operative closure of the
various social systems. Autopoiesis implies that social systems are operatively closed, that is they function according to
their own internal logic and do not allow external interference in their internal normative operations. Accordingly, no
single social system can, by way of controlling the normative operations of the others, control the whole of the society.
It follows that society assumes a polycentric structure: it is impossible to steer it from a single control centre and the
only alternative is to rely on the self-regulation of social systems. On this reading, reflexive systems are those systems
which  establish  norms  of procedures,  organization,  membership  and  competence  of the other  social  systems:  they
regulate self-regulation, they further the development of reflexive structures within the other social sub-systems. Cfr G.
Teubner,  Substantive  and  Reflexive  Elements  in  Modern  Law,  Law & Society  Review,  1983,  17,  p.  239-285;  R.
Banakar,  Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration, in V. Gessner and A.C. Budak, Emerging Legal Certainty:
Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law, Ashgate, 1998, p. 360-361.
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international commercial transactions)50, it sets up a favorable environment in which the business
community can strengthen its own self-regulation51. On the other hand, scholars seeing arbitration
as a hybrid regime composed of national, international and non-national sources may argue that in
this field there are enough links with state sovereignty to make it accountable to its addressees.
Governance of international commercial arbitration occurs through the interaction between states
and a restricted number of intergovernmental organisations (such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT)
and non-state actors (such as the various arbitral institutions). Accountability is ensured through the
instrument of delegation: the increasing use of soft law and the wide scope of party autonomy in
arbitration are indicators that states are delegating to international organisations and non-state actors
the task of determining the most appropriate standards for the conduct of arbitration, but at the same
time they retain the power of supervising the arbitration process. State law is still a fundamental
source of international commercial arbitration, although the content of many national arbitration
laws is increasingly determined by model laws elaborated by transnational epistemic communities.
Moreover,  the increasing role of  party autonomy in the arbitration process  has spurred  arbitral
institutions as well as specialized formulating agencies to create a large amount of private informal
norms of dispute resolution; yet,  in the absence of  a supra-national arbitration tribunal, national
courts  and  laws  continue  to  play  an  important  supportive  and  supervisory  function  at  various
moments in the arbitration process: for example,  in the recognition and enforcement of arbitration
agreements,  in  the determination of  which disputes  can  be submitted to  arbitration,  and in  the
recognition  and  enforcement  of  arbitration  awards.  The  legitimacy  problem  of  this  form  of
governance  lies  in  the  restricted  number  of  actors  taking  part  to  the  decision-making  process.
Nonetheless,  as  already  noted  above,  in  recent  years  there  has  been  a  steep  increase  in  the
participation  of  non-state  actors  as  observers  to  the  working  sessions  of  the  main  formulating
agencies  in  the  field,  i.e.  UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT.   The fact  that  these  observers  are  not
members  and  therefore  have  no  right  to  vote  is  of  little  significance,  since these  formulating
agencies  typically  reach   their  decisions  by  consensus,  rather  than  by  voting:  during  working
sessions, all efforts are made in order to take into account all concerns raised and to reach a final
text which is acceptable to all. The involvement  of a wide range of outside experts and stakeholders
not  belonging  to  the  state  or  formulating  agency's  bureaucracy  in  the  drafting  process  of
UNCITRAL  and  UNIDROIT  is  therefore   an  attempt  to  strengthen  the  legitimacy  of  their
harmonisation tools and facilitate their reception in practice.
50
 R. Banakar, Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration, cit, p. 361
51
 R. Banakar, Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration, cit, p. 393
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The particular decision-making process followed by UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT is also the main
indicator of the legitimacy of international commercial arbitration from a descriptive perspective.
One of the most important descriptive approaches to the legitimacy of global governance is founded
on  Habermas'  notion  of  communicative  action.  Communicative  action  implies  that,  when
individuals are discussing a given issue, their views are not fixed, but are subject  to discursive
challenges,  i.e.  actors  are open to being persuaded to change them in view of better arguments
founded  on  reasonable  grounds.  This  is  because  in  communicative  action  the  goal  is  not  to
maximize fixed preferences or to make one’s own view prevail, but rather the achievement of a
common understanding or  reasoned  consensus.  Building on Habermas,  it  is  argued  that  in  the
absence of democratic forms of participation and control, governance beyond the s tate may receive
legitimacy and support only  by subjecting international relations to justificatory discourse52: people
will accept rules and institutions of global governance only in so far as they accept the aims and the
principles according to which they function.53 On this reading,  legitimacy becomes the people's
belief  in  the  validity  of  the  procedure  by  which  a  rule  has  been  worked  out54.  Habermasian
communicative  action  is  regarded  as  a  significant  tool  for  non-hierarchical  steering  in  global
governance,  which may improve its  legitimacy problems by providing “voice” opportunities  to
various stakeholders  
 Despite  their  status  as  inter-governmental  bodies,  these formulating agencies  usually  follow a
decision-making process based on consensus, rather than on voting and veto mechanisms, which
closely resembles the logic of communicative action and allows the adoption of widely acceptable
solutions   founded  on  rational  arguments,  rather  than  on  a  trade-off  among  the  various
stakeholders55.  Accordingly,  they represent an example of legitimate governance in habermasian
52J. Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations, European Journal of International Relations, 2003, 9, 2, p. 188
53J. Steffeck, op. cit., p. 250
54T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2, p. 293
55J. Honnold,  The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods, Am. J. Comp. L.
1979, 27, p. 210-211, who explains how consensus is reached within UNCITRAL. Much depends on the skills of the
chairman: when he senses that the debate has produced the basis for consensus, he will invite the group to accept the
result. When differences persist, he may appoint a small working group which discusses the different points of view and
finds an acceptable solution. When objections still remain, a member of the commission may ask that the records show
that he “reserves his position” on the point. This dissenting opinion shows that the state representative was loyal to his
government’s  instructions  and  “fought  the  good  fight”.  A similar  decision-making  process  has  been  followed  by
UNIDROIT Working Group during the drafting of  the UNIDROIT Principles. The Working Group appointed among
its members some rapporteurs for each of the different chapters of the Principles, who were entrusted to prepare, after
the necessary comparative studies, a first draft, together with comments. These preliminary drafts were discussed by the
Group as a whole and then revised again by the rapporteurs in light  of the comments expressed during the Group
sessions. The revised drafts were circulated, together with a list of the most controversial issues, among a wider group
of experts, mostly law professors, throughout the world. In addition, they were examined at the annual sessions of the
UNIDROIT Governing Council, which provided its advice, especially in those cases where the Working Group had not
reached  a  consensus.  All  the  observations  and proposals  for  amendment  received  were  submitted to  the  Working
Group, so as to enable it to take them into account when proceeding to the third and final reading of the drafts.
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terms, i.e. a decision-making process aimed at reaching a reasoned consensus among actors and  in
which the various stakeholders' interests are taken into consideration.
452
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bibliography on Global Governance
R. Abdelal and A. Segal, Has Globalization Passed Its Peak? Foreign Affairs, 2007, 86, 1, pp. 103-
14
H. Bull, Beyond the States System? in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations
Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 577-582.
A.Chayes  and  A.  Chayes,  The  New  Sovereignty:  Compliance  with  International  Regulatory
Agreements, Harvard University Press, 1995
R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press, 1996
P. Evans,  The Eclipse of the State: Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization,  World
Politics, 1997, 50, pp. 62-87
A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Standford University Press, 1990
J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The Global
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 542-
547
453
F. Halliday, Global Governance: Prospects and Problems, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The
Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate., Polity Press, 2003,
pp.  489-499
M. Hardt and A. Negri, Globalization as Empire, in  D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The Global
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 116-
20
D.  Held  and  A.  McGrew  (eds),  The  Global  Transformations  Reader:  An  Introduction  to  the
Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2003
D.  Held  and  A.  McGrew,  D.  Goldblatt  and  J.  Perraton,  Global  Transformations:  Politics,
Economics and Culture, Polity Press, 1999
J.M. Hobson and M. Ramesh,  Globalisation Makes of  States What  States make of  It:  Between
Agency and Structure in the State/Globalisation Debate, New Political Economy, 2002, 7, 1, p. 5-
22
R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye Jr,  Globalization: What´s New? What´s Not? (And So What?) in D.
Held  and  A.  McGrew  (eds),  The  Global  Transformations  Reader:  An  Introduction  to  the
Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 75-83
I.Kaul, I, Grunberg, M. Stern, Global Public Goods, Oxford University Press , 1999
Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed.), Globalization and Public Governance, Ashgate Publishing, 2004
454
M. Mann, Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation State?, Review of International
Political Economy, 1997, 4-3, pp. 472-496
J.T. Mathews, Power Shift, in  D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader:
An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 204-12.
A. McGrew (Ed), The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy,
Cambridge University Press, 1997
W. Reinicke,  Global Public Policy: Governing without Goverment?,  Brookings Institution Press,
1998
J.N. Rosenau,  Distant Proximities:  Dynamics  beyond Globalisation,  Princeton University Press,
2003
J. N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds), The Global
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 223-
34.
J. G. Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond, International Organization, 1993, 41, pp. 139-74
A.M. Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in D. Held and A.
McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate,
Polity Press, 2003, pp. 189-203
455
S. Strange,  The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge
University Press, 1996
T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2,
pp. 288-313
Bibliography on Law and Globalisation
K.W. Abbott,  Elements  of  a Joint  Discipline,  in International Law and International Relations
Theory : Building Bridges, ASIL Proceedings, 1992, 86, pp. 160-192.
J. Arnoldi,  Niklas Luhmann, in A. Elliott and B.S. Turner (eds), Profiles in Contemporary Social
Theory, Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 249-259.
R. Cotterrell, The Sociological Concept of Law, Journal of Law and Society, 1983, 10, 2, pp. 241-
255.
R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: an Introduction, Butterworths, 1984
G. P Calliess and M. Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: the Juridification of Global
Governance, Ratio Juris, 2009, p. available on the internet at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030526 (July 2009)
H.Fix-Fierro,  Pluralism of Normative Orders and Globalized exchange Processes: A Preliminary
Theoretical Framework,  paper presented at the Workshop on “Self-Governance and the Law in
Multinational Corporations and Transnational Business Networks”, Onati, June 2005
V.  Gessner  and  A.C.  Budak  (Eds),  Emerging  Legal  Certainty:  Empirical  Studies  on  the
Globalization of Law, Adelshot Publishing, 1998
456
J. Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 1986, 1, pp. 1-55.
K. Günther,  Legal Pluralism and the Universal Code of Legality: Globalization as a Problem of
Legal  Theory, p.  8,  paper  presented  at  the  2003  Colloquium  in  Legal,  Political  and  Social
Philosophy  at  NYU  School  of  Law  available  on  the  internet   at
www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2003/readings/gunther.pdf
Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and
Constititionalism, Hart Publishing, 2004
H. Koh, Review Essay: Why do Nations Obey Law? Yale Law J., 1997, 106, pp. 2599-2659.
P. C. Jessup, Transnational Law, Yale University Press, 1956
M. King, The Truth about Autopoiesis, Journal of Law and Society, 1993, 20, p. 218-31.
M.King and Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann's Theory of Politics and Law,  Palgrave Macmillian, 2005
R.  Lempert and A. Arbor, The Autonomy of Law: Two Visions Compared, in G. Teubner (ed),
Autopoietic Law: a new Approach to Law and Society, Walter de Gruyter, 1987, pp. 152-190.
M. Likosky (Ed), Transnational Legal Processes, Butterworhs, 2002.
N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, Oxford University Press, 2004.
N.  Luhmann,  Closure  and  Openness:  on  Reality  in  the  World  of  Law, in  G.  Teubner  (ed),
Autopoietic Law: a New Approach to Law and Society, Walter de Gruyter Publishing, 1988, pp.
335-348.
N. Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in G. Teubner, Autopoietic Law: a New Approach to
Law and Society, Walter de Gruyter, 1988,  pp. 12-35.
457
N.  Luhmann,  Operational  Closure  and  Structural  Coupling:  The  Differentiation  of  the  Legal
System, Cardozo Law Review, 1992, 13, pp. 1419-1441.
N.  Luhmann, The Coding of the Legal System, in A. Febbraio and G. Teubner (eds), State, Law,
Economy as Autopoietic Systems, Giuffrè, 1992, pp. 20-34.
J. Meritus, Considering Non-state Actors in the New Millennium: Toward Expanded Participation
in Norm Generation and Norm Application, NYU Journal of Int’l L and Pol., 2000, 32, pp. 537-
566.
S.F. Moore, Law and Social change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject
for Study, Law and Society Review, 1972/73, pp. 719-746 .
R. Michaels,  The Re-statement of Non-state Law : the State Choice of law, and the Challenge of
Global Legal Pluralism, Wayne Law review, 2005, 51, pp. 1209-1259.
E.A. Nadelmann,  Global Prohibition Regimes: The evolution of Norms in International Society,
International Organization, 1990, 44, pp. 479-526.
D.  Nelken,  Law in Action  or  Living Law? Back  to  the Beginning  in  Sociology  of  Law,  Legal
Studies, 1984, 4, pp. 152-74.
J. R. Paul, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under International Law, Hastings Intl
& Comp. l. Rev., 2001, 24, pp. 285-298.
J. Reidenberg,  The Yahoo Case and the International Democratization of the Internet, Fordham
Law  and  Economics  Research  Paper  n.  11,  April  2001  available  on
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=267148 (July 2009).
T.  Risse-Kappen,  Bringing Transnational  Relations  Back  In:  Introduction in  ID  (ed),  Bringing
Transnational  Relations  Back  In:  Non-State  Actors,  Domestic  Structures  and  International
Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 3-36.
458
P.  Schiff  Berman,  From  International  Law  to  Law  and  Globalization,  Columbia  Journal  of
Transnational law, 2005, 43, pp. 485-98.
P. Schiff Berman,  A Pluralist Approach to International Law, Yale L.J. 2007, 301, 32 ,  pp. 301-
329
B. de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, J. Law
& Soc., 1987, 14, pp. 279-302.
B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense , Northwestern University Press, 2003
G. Teubner (Ed), Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth Publishing, 1997
G. Teubner,  Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society,  in  ID (ed),  Global Law
Without a State, Dartmouth Publishing, pp. 3-28.
G. Teubner, Autopoietic Law: a New Approach to Law and Society, Walter de Gruyter, 1988
G. Teubner,  Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and the Emergence  of  Lex Mercatoria,
European Journal of Social Theory, 2002, 5,2, pp. 199-217.
G. Teubner, R. Nobles, D. Schiff, The Autonomy of the Law: an Introduction to Legal Autopoiesis,
in  J.  Penner,  R.  Nobles,  D.  Schiff  (eds),  Introduction  to  Jurisprudence  and  Legal  Theory:
Commentary and Materials , Butterworth, 2003, pp. 897-954.
G. Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, Cardozo Law Review, 1992, 13,
pp. 1443-1444
G. Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centred Constitutional Theories, in
Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and
Constititionalism, Hart Publishing, 2004, pp. 3-40.
459
G. Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous
Sectors  in  World  Society ?  in  Karl-Heinz  Ladeur  (ed.),  Globalization  and  Public  Governance,
Ashgate Publishing, 2004, pp. 71-88.
W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory, Northwestern University Press, 2000
W.  Twining,  Have  Concepts,  Will  Travel:  Analytical  Jurisprudence  in  a  Global  Context,
International Journal of Law in Context, 2005, 1, pp. 5-40
W. Twining, Reviving General Jurisprudence, in M. Likosky (ed), Transnational Legal Processes,
Butterworhs, 2002, pp. 3-22.
Bibliography on the concept of legitimacy in social sciences
K. A.  Annan,  We  The Peoples:  The  Role  of  the  United Nations  in  the  21st Century,  UN Doc
DPI/2103 (2000)
 I. Clark, Legitimacy in a Global Order, Review of International Studies, 2003, 29, 1, pp. 75-95
 I. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford University Press, 2005
R. Cotterrell, Law's Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995
 R. Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European
Agencies, J. Eur. Pub. Pol., 1997, 4, pp. 246-61.
A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the study of  the Law of the Constitution, Macmillian, 1939.
A.  Edgar, Habermas: The Key Concepts, Routledge, 2006
T. M. Frank, Legitimacy and the International System, Am J Intl Law, 1988, 82, 4, pp. 705-759.
460
J.  Habermas, Fatti e Norme: Contributi per una Teoria Discorsiva del Diritto e della Democrazia,
Guerini e Associati, 1996
J.  Habermas, La Crisi della Razionalità nel Capitalismo Maturo, Laterza, 1975.
J.  Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Heinemann, 1979
L.  Henkin, How Nations Behave, Columbia University Press, 1979
I.  Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, International Organization, 1999, 53, 2,
pp. 379-408.
R. O. Kehoane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force, Michigan
Journal of International Law, 2003, 24, pp. 39-62.
R. O.  Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, Redifyining Accountability for Global Governance, in M. Kahler
an D.A. Lake, Governance in a Global Economy, Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 386-411.
R.O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation andthe World Trade
Organization: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, Working Paper n. 4, The John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Visions of Governance in the 21st Century, p. 3 available at
www.hks.harvard.edu/ visions/ publication/ keohane_nye. pdf (July 2009)
G. Majone, The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information, J. Eur. Pub. Pol., 1997, 4, pp.
262-75.
J. G.  March and P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,
International Organization, 1998, pp. 943-69.
J.  Priban, Beyond Procedural Legitimation: Legality and its “Inflictions”, J. Law and Society,
1997, 24, 3, pp. 331-49.
D.  M.   Rasmussen,  How is  Valid  Law Possible?,  in  D..M.  Rasmussen  & J.  Swindal,  Jürgen
Habermas, Sage, 2002, pp. 21-44.
461
R.A. W.  Rhodes, Understanding Governance, Open University Press, 1997
T.  Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39,
2, pp. 288-313.
C.   Schneider,  The  Challenged  Legitimacy  of  International  Organisatons:  A  Conceptual
Framework for Empirical Research, Paper presented at the 2005 Berlin Conference on the Human
Condition of Global Environmental Change, 2-3 December 2005
A.  M.  Slaughter,  Disaggregated  Sovereignty:  Towards  the  Public  Accountability  of  Global
Government Networks, Government and Opposition, 2004, pp. 159-90.
A. M. Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies and Disaggregated
Democracy, Michigan Journal of International Law, 2003, 24, 4, pp. 1041-1053.
J.  Steffeck, The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach , European
Journal of International Relations, 2003, 9, 2, pp. 249-75.
J.  Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations: from State Compliance to Citizen Consensus, in
A. Hurrelmann, S. Schneider and J. Steffek (eds), Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, Palgrave
Macmillian, 2007, pp. 175-92.
M. Suchman,  Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,  The Academy of
Management Review, 1995, 20, 3, pp. 571-610.
L.  Troyer, Legitimacy, in G. Ritzer (ed), The Blacwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, vol VI,
Blackwell, 2007
M.  Weber, Economy and Society, University of California Press, 1978, (1914).
M.  Weber, The Three Pure Types of Legitimate Rule in S. Whimster (Ed), The Essential Weber: a
Reader, Routledge, 2004, pp. 133-45.
462
M.  Zurn, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2,
pp. 260-87.
Bibliography on the diffusion of norms
K. W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, The Concept of
Legalization, IO, 2000, 54, 3, pp. 401-419
K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, Hard and Soft law in International Governance, IO, 2000, 54, 3, p
E. Adler and P.M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a
Reflective Research Rrogram, IO, 1992, 46, 1, pp. 367-90.
R.B. Bilder, Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate, in D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in The International Legal System, Oxford
University Press, 2000, pp. 65-74.
J.T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, World Politics, 1998, 50,
pp. 324-48.
C. Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in D. Shelton (ed),
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in The International Legal System,
Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 21-42.
P. F. Diehl, c. Ku, D. Zamora, The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of Normative
and Operating Systems, IO, 2003, 57,1, pp. 43-75
W.J. Drake and K. Nicolaidis,  Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalisation: Trade in services and the
Uruguay Round, IO, 1992, 46, 1, pp. 37-100.
A. Edgar, Habermas: The Key Concepts, Routledge, 2006
M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Cornell University Press, 1996
M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, IO, 1998, 52,4,
pp. 887-917.
A. Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, International Studies  Quarterly, 1996, 40, 3, pp.
363-389
463
J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol I, Polity Press, 1984,
J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action , Polity Press, 1992
P.M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, IO, 1992,
46, 1, pp. 1-35.
T. Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security,
1998, 23,1, pp. 171-200
M. Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, IO, 2000, 54, 3, pp. 661-83.
J.G. March and P. Olsen,  The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, IO, 1998,
52, 4, pp. 943-69.
M. E. O' Connell, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in D. Shelton (ed) Commitment and
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in The International Legal System, Oxford
University Press, 2000, pp. 100-14.
W. Outhwaite, Habermas: a Critical Introduction, Polity Press, 1994
W. H. Reinecke and  J. M. Witte, Interdependence, Globalization and Sovereignty: The Role of
Non-Binding International Legal Accords, in D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The
Role of Non-Binding Norms in The International Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.
75-99.
T. Risse, Let’s Argue!: Communicative Action in World politics, IO, 2000, 54, 1, pp. 1-39.
T. Risse, Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversations across Paradigms,
in I. Katznelson and H.V. Milner (eds), Political Science: State of the Discipline Palgrave , 2002,
pp. 597-629.
T. Risse, Global Governance and Communicative Action, Government and Opposition, 2004, 39, 2,
pp. 288-313.
D. Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in The
International Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2000
D. Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of  Soft-Law, in ID, Commitment and Compliance: The
Role of Non-Binding Norms in The International Legal System, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.
1-20.
C. Reus-Smit, Constructivism, in  S. Burchill, A. Linklater, J. True, M. Patterson, and R. Devetak
Theories of International Relations, Palgrave,  2005, pp. 209-30. 
464
P. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, Am J. Intl L. 1983, 77, pp. 413-42.
A Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, IO, 1992,
6, 2, pp. 391-425. 
S. K. White, The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, Cambridge University Press, 1995
Bibliography on the harmonisation of the law and the concept of lex mercatoria
C. Baasch Andersen, Defining Uniform Law, ULR, 2007, 1, pp. 5-54.
C.  Baasch  Andersen,  The Uniform International  Sales  Law and the  Global  Jurisconsultorium,
Journal of Law and Commerce, 2005, 24, pp. 159-79.
J.E. Bailey,  Facing the Ttruth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the International sales of
goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, Cornell International Law Journal,
1999, 32, 2, pp. 273-317.
K. P. Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer Law International, 1999
K. P. Berger,  The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place,  in Id  (ed) The Practice of
Transnational Law, Kluwer, 2001, pp. 1-22.
 H.J.Berman  and  C.  Kaufman,  The  Law  of  International  Commercial  Transactions  (Lex
Mercatoria), Harv. Int. L.J., 1978, pp. 221-270.
C.M.  Bianca  and  M.J.  Bonell,  Commentary  on  the  International  Sales  Law:  the  1980  Sales
Convention, Giuffre’, 1987
M. Bogdan Comparative Law, Kluwer, 1994
M. J. Bonell,  International Uniform Law in Practice – Or Where the Real Trouble Begins, Am J
Comp l, 1990, 38, 4, pp. 865-888.
M.J.  Bonell,  Non-Legislative Means of  Harmonisation,  UNCITRAL (ed), Uniform Commercial
Law in the Twenty-First Century, United Nations Publications, 1995, pp. 33-41.
465
M. J. Bonell, Unificazione Internazionale del Diritto, Enciclopedia del Diritto, Giuffrè, 1992
M.J. Bonell, Why an International Restatement?, in ID, An International Restatement of Contracts,
Transnational Publishers, 1997
M. J. Bonell, Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?, Dickinson Law Review, 2001, 106, pp. 87-
100.
M .Boodman, The Myth of Harmonisation of Laws, Am J Comp L, 1991, 39, pp. 699-724.
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International law, Oxford University Press, 1973
T. Carbonneau (Ed.), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration,  Juris Publishing, 1990
F. Cafaggi, Una governance per il diritto europeo dei contatti?, in Id (ed.), Quale armonizzazione
per il diritto europeo dei contratti? CEDAM, 2003, pp. 183-211.
J.  Carver,  Uniform  Law  and  Its  Impact  on  Business  Circles:  The  Experience  of  the  Legal
Profession, in. UNIDROIT (ed), Uniform Law in Practice (3rd Congress Rome 7-10.9.87), Oceana
Publishing, 1988, pp. 411-30.
E. Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, Va J Int L,
2004, 44, 2, pp. 431-500.
R. David, Methods of Unification, Am J Comp Law, 1969-69, pp. 13-27.
R.  David,  The  Legal  Systems  of  the  World:  Their  Comparison  and  Unification,  International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol II, ch 5, 1971
F. de Ly,  Uniform Commercial Law and International Self-regulation, Dir. Comm. Int, 1997, pp.
519-47.
A.L. Diamond,  Conventions and Their Revision,  in  Liber Amicorum J.G. Sauveplanne,  Kluwer,
1984, pp. 45-60.
G. Eorsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods,
Am J Comp L, 1983, 31, pp. 333-56.
466
E. A. Farnsworth,  Problems of the Unification of Sales Law from the Standpoint of the Common
Law  Countries,  International  association  for  Legal  Science  (ed),  Problems  of  Unification  of
International  Sales  Law: Working  Papers  Submitted  to  the  Colloquium  of  the  International
Association of Legal Science- Potsdam: August 1979 , Oceana Publications, 1980, pp. 3-25.
 
H.  M.  Flechtner,  The Several  Texts  of  the  CISG in  a  Decentralized  System:  Observations  on
Translations, Reservations and other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), Journal
of Law and Commerce, 1998, 17, pp. 187-217.
F. Galgano, Diritto Civile e Commerciale, vol. I, CEDAM, 1993
M. Gebauer, Uniform Law, General Principles and Autonomous Interpretation, ULR, 2000, 4, pp.
684-706.
P.Glenn,  Unification  of  Law,  Harmonization  of  Law  and  Private  International  Law,  in  Liber
Memorialis François Laurent,  Story-Scientia Publishing, 1989, pp. 783-804.
 
 B.Goldman,  La  Lex  Mercatoria dans  les  Contrats  et  l’Arbitrage  International:  Réalité  et
Perspectives, Journal du Droit International, 1979, 106, pp. 475-505.
J. Goldring, ., Unification and Harmonization of the Rules of Law,  Federal Law Review, 1978, 9,
pp. 284-321.
R. Goode, H. Kronke, E. McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials,
Oxford University Press, 2007
R.  Goode,  Reflections  on  the  harmonisation  of  commercial  law,  in  R.  Goode  & G.  Cranston,
Commercial and Consumer Law, Clarendon Press, 1993.
R. Goode, Rule, Practice and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law, ICLQ, 2005, 54, pp.
539-62.
R. Goode, Usage and its Reception in Transnational  Commercial Law, ICLQ, 1997, 46, pp. 1-36.
H.C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study &
Research, Cambridge University Press, 1946
467
K.Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, Tulane Law Review ,1989, 63, pp. 613-29.
J. Honnold,  Goals of Unification, in UNCITRAL (ed), Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-
First Century, United Nations Publication, 1995, pp. 11-14.
J. Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales , Kluwer, 1989.
J.  Honnold,  Uniform Law for  International  Sales  Under  the  1980 United  Nations  Convention,
Kluwer, 1999
N. Horn, Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of International Commercial Contracts, in N. Horn,
C.  Schmitthoff  and  J.  Barrigan  Marcantonio  (eds),  The  Transnational  Law  of  International
Commercial Transactions, Kluwer, 1982, pp. 3-29.
R. Hyland,  The American Experience: Restatements, the UCC, Uniform Laws and Transnational
Coordination, in  A.S. Hartkamp and E.H. Hondius (eds), Towards a European Civil Code, Kluwer,
2004, pp. 59-75.
 F.K.Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, Va J Trans L, 1995, 28,
pp. 487-501.
G. Jimenez, The International Chamber of Commerce: Supplier of Standards and Instruments for
International Trade, ULR, 1996, 2, pp. 285-6.
W.J.Kamba, Comparative Law: a Theoretical Framework, ICLQ, 1974, 23, pp. 485-519.
A.H. Kastley, Unification and Community: a Rethorical Analysis of the United Nations Convention,
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 1988, 8, pp. 574-622.
H. Kotz, Unification and Harmonization of Laws, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, North-
Holland, 2000
H.  Kronke,  International  Uniform  Commercial  Law  Conventions:  Advantages,  Disadvantages,
Citeria for Choice, ULR, 2000, 1, pp. 14-23.
O. Lando, Some Featutes of the Law of Contract in the Third Millennium, Pace International Law
Review , Fall 2001, 13, pp. 343-402.
468
O. Lando, The Lex Mercatoria and International Commercial Arbitration,  ICLQ, 1985, 34, 4, pp.
747-68
J. Lookosfsky, Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales. Problems in the Harmonisation of
Private Law Rules, Am J Comp Law, 1991, 39, pp. 403-16.
A. Lowenfeld,  Lex Mercatoria: an Arbitrator's View, in T. Carbonneau (Ed.), Lex Mercatoria and
Arbitration, Juris Publishing, 1990, pp. 37-59.
F.A.Mann, Uniform Statutes in English Law, Law Quartely Review, 1983, 99, pp. 376-406.
L.L.McDougal,  Private  International  Law :  Jus  Gentium  versus  Choice  of  Law  Rules  or
Approaches, Am J Comp L, 1990, 38, pp. 521-37.
L. Mistelis, Is Harmonisation a Necessary  Evil? The future of harmonisation and new sources of
international trade law, in I. Fletcher, L. Mistelis, M. Cremona (eds), Foundations and Perspectives
of international trade law, Sweet and Maxwell, 2001, pp. 3-27.
P.J.Osborne, Unification or Harmonisation: A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980, LLM Disseration, University of Hull,  2006,
available at http: //www.cisg.law. pace.edu /cisg/ biblio/ osborne.html (July 2009)
A.  Rosett,  Unification,  Harmonization,  Restatement,  Codification,  and  Reform in  International
Commercial Law, Am J Comp L, 1992, 40, pp. 683-97.
R. Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, Am J Comp L, 2001, 49, pp. 171-189.
R.B.Schlesinger  & H.J.  Gundisch,   I  Principi  Generali  del  Diritto  come Norme Oggettive  nei
Procedimenti Arbitrali.  Un Contributo alla Teoria della Denazionalizzazione dei Contratti,  Riv.
Dir. Civ., 1997, 3, I, pp. 311-355.
P. Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Manzsche Verlags- und Universitatsbuchhandlung Wien,1986
P. Schlechtriem and I. Schwenzer (eds),  Commentary on the UN Convention on the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford University Press, 2005
C. M. Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions,  in
N. Horn, C. Schmitthoff and J. Barrigan Marcantonio (eds), The Transnational Law of International
Commercial Transactions, Kluwer, 1982, pp. 30-55
C.M. Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate, Sweet and Maxwell, 1981
469
C.M. Schmitthoff, The Law of International Trade: its Growth, Formulation and Operation, in ID
(ed) The Sources of the Law of International Trade With Specific Reference to East-west Trade,
Steven and Sons Publishing, 1964, pp. 3-35.
C.M. Schmitthoff, The Unification of the Law of International Trade, JBL, 1968. pp. 100-30.
Secretariat  of UNCITRAL,  Promoting wider awareness and acceptance of uniform law texts, in
UNCITRAL  (ed),  Uniform  Commercial  Law  in  the  Twenty-First  Century,  United  Nations
Publication, 1995, pp. 252-9.
L.B. Sohn, Uniform Laws require uniform interpretation: proposals for an international tribunal to
interpret uniform legal texts, in UNCITRAL (ed),  Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-First
Century, United Nations Publication, 1995, pp. 50-54.
L. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law, Wm. S. Hein Publishing, 1983
W. Vis,  Process  of  preparing universally  acceptable  uniform legal  rules,  in  UNCITRAL (ed),
Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-First Century, United Nations publication, 1995, pp. 14-
16.
S. Walt, Novelty and Risks of Uniform Sales Law, Va J. Int L, 1999, 39, pp. 671-706.
Z. Yuqing,  Principles of interpretation of a uniform law and functions of travaux preparatoires,
commentaries and case collections for the interpretation of a uniform law, in UNCITRAL (ed),
Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-First Century, United Nations Publication, 1995, pp. 41-7.
P. Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in Jan Smits (ed.), Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Edward
Elgar  Publishing,  2006,  pp.  738-754,  available  also  on  the  internet  at
http://osgoode.yorku.ca/osgmedia.nsf/research/zumbansen_peer  (July 2009).
Bibliography on arbitration in general
470
R. Banakar,  Reflexive  Legitimacy in  International  Arbitration,  in  V.  Gessner  and  A.C.  Budak,
Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law, Ashgate, 1998, p. 347-
398
K.P. Berger (ed), The Practice of Transnational Law, Kluwer Law, 2001
K.P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration, Kluwer, 1993
K.P. Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business, Kluwer, 2006
H.J. Berman & F.J. Dasser, The "New" Law merchant and the "Old": Sources, Content, and
Legitimacy, in T. Carbonneau (ed),  Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, Kluwer, 1998, pp 32-65.
G.M. Bersesford Hartwell, (Ed.), The Commercial Way to Justice, Kluwer, 1997
S. R. Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited),  in C.R. Drahozal and R.W. Naimark
(eds), Towards a Science of International Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research, Kluwer,
2005,pp. 65-80.
G.B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials, Kluwer, 2001
C. N. Brower, W(h)ither International Commercial Arbitration ?, Arb. Int., 2008, 24, 2, pp. 181-98.
C. Bühring- Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, Kluwer Law, 1998
T. Carbonneau, A Definition of and Perspective Upon the Lex Mercatoria Debate, in T. Carbonneau
(ed),  Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, Kluwer Law, 1998, pp. 3-15.
P. Capper, International Arbitration: a Handbook, Lovells Publishing, 2004.
J. H. Carter, The International Commercial Arbitration Explosion: More Rules, More Laws, More
Books: So What ?, Mich. J. Intl. L., 1994, 15, pp. 780-5.
A.C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global
Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, 2003
471
W.L.  Craig,  W.W. Park,  J. Paulsson,  International Chamber of  Commerce  Arbitration,  Dobbs
Ferry Oceana, 2000
R. David, Arbitration in International Trade, Kluwer, 1985
Y. Dezalay and B.G. Garth,  Dealing in Virtue : International Commercial Arbitration and the
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order, University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International
Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, Law and Society Review, 1995 ,
29, 1, pp. 27-67.
P. Fouchard, E. Gaillard, B. Goldman, Traite’ de l’Arbitrage Commercial International, Editions
Litec, 1996
R. Garnett, H. Gabriel, J. Waincymer, J. Epstein,  A Practical Guide to International Commercial
Arbitration, Oceana, 2000
S. Goldberg, F. Sander & N. Rogers, Dispute Resolution,Little, Brown and Company, 1992
R. Goode, The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial Arbitration, in F.D. Rose
(ed),  Lex Mercatoria: Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis Reynolds,
LLP Publishing, 2000, pp. 240-62.
T.A.  Guzman,  Arbitrator  Liability:  Reconciling  Arbitration  and  Mandatory  Rules,  Duke  Law
Journal, 2000, 49, 5, pp. 1279-1334.
E. Hall, The Silent Language in Overseas Business, Harv Bus Rev, 1960, pp. 87-96.
M.  Huleatt-James  &  N.  Gould,  International  Commercial  Arbitration:  a  Handbook,  Lovells
Publishing, 1996
G. Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, Va. J. Trans. L., 2003, 36, pp. 1314-
1333.
M.Kerr, International Arbitration v Litigation, JBL, 1980, pp. 165-89.
P. Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, in P.
Sanders (ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, Kluwer,1987, pp.
257-318.
472
D. Lehmkuhl, Resolving Transnational Disputes: Commercial Arbitration and the Multiple
Providers of Governance Services, in M. König-Archibugi, Mathias; Zürn, Michael (eds.), New
Modes of Governance in the Global System. Exploring Publicness, Delegation and Inclusiveness.
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillain. 2006. pp. 101-124.
J.D.M. Lew, Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration, Arbitration International, 2006, 22, 2,
pp. 179-203.
J.D.M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis, S. Kröll;Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer,
2003  
J.D.M. Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, Kluwer, 1987
J.  Lew Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration,  Oceana, 1978
R.  B.  Lillich  and  C:N.  Brower  (eds),  International  Arbitration  in  the  21st Century:  Towards
“Judicialization” and Uniformity ?, Transnational Publishers, 1994.
J. M. Lookofsky and K. Herz, Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration, Transnational
Juris Publications,1992
K. Lynch,   The Forces  of  Economic Globalization:  Challenges to  the Regime of  International
Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer, 2003
F.A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in P. Sanders (Ed), International Arbitration Liber Amicorum for
Martin Domke, Martinus Nijhoff , 1967, pp. 157-183.
M. L.  Moses,  The Principles and Practice of International Commercial  Arbitration,  Cambridge
University Press, 2008
M. Mustill, S.C. Boyd , Commercial Arbitration, Butterworths, 2002
473
L.J. Mustill,  Contemporary Problems in International Commercial  Arbitration: A Response,  Intl
Bus Law, 1989, 17, pp. 161-4.
F.S. Nariman,  The Spirit of Arbitration: the Tenth Annual Goff Lecture, Arb. Int., 2000, 16, pp.
261-78.
W.W.  Park,  When  and  Why  Arbitration  Matters,  in  G.M.  Bersesford  Hartwell,  (Ed.),  The
Commercial Way to Justice,  Kluwer, 1997, pp.72-100.
W.W. Park,  Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice, Oxford
University Press, 2006
J.  Paulsson,  Arbitration  Unbound:   Award  Detached  from  the  Law  of  its  Country  of  Origin,
ICLQ,1981, 30, pp. 358-87.
J. Paulsson,  Delocalisation of International Commercial  Arbitration: When and Why it Matters,
ICLQ, 1983, 32, pp. 53-60.
J.F. Poudret and S. Besson, Droit Compare’ de l’Arbitrage International, Bruylant, 2002
A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet and
Maxwell, 1993
J.W. Rowley (ed.), Arbitration World,  The European Lawyer, 2006
J.W. Salacuse, Making Global Deals: Negotiating in the International Marketplace, Random Hause
Business Books, 1992
M.R. Sammartano, International Arbitration Law and Practice, Kluwer, 2001
A. Scott Rau and E.F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure,
Tex. Intl L. J., 1994, 30, 89
H. Smit, Proper Choice of Law and the Lex Mercatoria Arbitralis, in T. Carbonneau (ed),  Lex
Mercatoria and Arbitration, Kluwer, 1998, pp. 90-102.
474
C. Soderlund, A Comparative Overview of Arbitration Laws: Swedish Arbitration Act 1999,
English Arbitration Act 1996 and Russian Federal Law on International Commercial Arbitration
1993, Arbitration international, 2004, 20, 1, pp. 73-84.
J. Werner, Competition within the Arbitration Industry, Journal of International Arbitration, 1985,
5, 2
P. Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, ELJ 2002,
8, 3, p. 400-432.
Bibliography on German arbitration law
Bundestags-Drucksache n. 13/5274 of July 12, 1996, in K. P. Berger (ed), Das Neue Recht der
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit – The New German Arbitration Law, RWS, 1998
K. P. Berger, ,The New German Arbitration Law in International Perspective, Forum
Internationale, 2000, 26,  pp. 1-35.
K. P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration in Germany: A New Era, Arbitration
International, 1993, 8, 2, p. 101-20.
K. P. Berger (ed), Das Neue Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit – The New German Arbitration Law,
RWS, 1998, 
K. H. Bockstiegel, An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act based on the UNCITRAL
Model Law, Arbitration International, 1998, 14, 1, pp. 19-27.
K. H. Bockstiegel, S.M. Kroll, P. Nacimiento, Arbitration in Germany: The Model Law in Practice,
Kluwer Law, 2007,
M. Buhler,  The German Arbitrations Act: Text and Notes, Kluwer, 1998
P.S. Heigl, Das Deutsche Schiedsverfahrensrecht von 1998 im Vergleich zum English Arbitration
Act 1996, Peter Lang Publisher, 2000
R. H. Kreindler and T. Mahlich, A Foreign Perspective on the New German Arbitration Act,
Arbitration International, 1998, 14, 1, pp. 62-78.
475
G. Lorcher, Schiedsgerichtberkeit: Übernahme des UNCITRAL Modellgesetzes?, ZRP 1987, pp.
230-5.
G. Lörcher, The New German Arbitration Act, Journal of International Arbitration, 1998,15,2, pp.
85-9.
H. Raeschke-Kessler, The New German Arbitration Act v. Old German Case law: Which Case
Law of the of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) is to be Applied to the New
Act?, Arbitration International, 1998, 14 ,1, pp. 46-61.
O. Sandrock, International Arbitration in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Hitherto Missed
Opportunity, Am. Rev. Int'L Arb, 1990, 1, pp. 49-63.
O. Sandrock, Procedural Aspects of the New German Arbitration Act, Arbitration International,
1998, 14, 1, pp. 39-45. 
V. Sangiovanni, La Compromettibilità in Arbitri nel DirittoTtedesco, Rivista dell’Arbitrato, 2006,
XVI, 1, pp. 219-36.
 P. Schlosser, Bald Neues Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland?, RIW, 1994, pp.  720-
8.
 P. Schlosser, Das Recht des internationalen privaten Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Mohr Siebek Verlag,
1989
K. Schumacher, Fragen zum Anwendungsbereich des künftigen deutschen Schiedsverfahren Recht,
Festschrift Glossner, Heidelberg 1994, pp.  340-5.
F.J Semler, German Arbitration Law: The 1998 Reform and Recent Case Law, Journal of
International Arbitration, 2001, 18, 5, pp. 579-86.
F. B. Weigand, The UNCITRAL Model Law: New Draft Arbitration Acts in Germany and Sweden,
Arbitration International, 1995, 11, 4, pp. 392-403.
Bibliography on English and Scottish arbitration law
DAC 1997 Supplementary Report on the Arbitration Act 1996, Arbitration International, 1997, 13,
3
476
DAC 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, Arbitration International, 13, 3
 F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration in Scotland, Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial
Law Quarterly, 1992, 3,, pp. 360-90.
F. Davidson, Some Thoughts on the Draft Arbitration (Scotland) Bill, JBL, 2009, 1, pp. 44-67.
F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act- A Model Law?, JBL, 1997, 2, pp. 93-115.
Lord Dervaird, Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law: The Report of the Lord Advocate of the
Scottish Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, Arbitration International, 1990, 6, 1, pp. 60-82.
R. Goode,  The Adaptation of English Law to International Commercial Arbitration, Arbitration
International, 1992, 8, 1, pp. 1-20.
B. Harris, R. Planterose, J. Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, Blackwell Publishing,
2000, 
M.  Hunter,  The  Procedural  Powers  of  Arbitrators  under  the  English  1996  Act,  Arbitration
International, 1997, 13,4, pp. 345-60.
R. Merkin, Arbitration Law, vol. 1, LLP Publisher, 2000 
Lord Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? The Response of the Departmental
Advisory Committee to the UNCITRAL Model Law, Arbitration International, 1990, 6, 1,  pp. 1-56
Lord Mustill,  and S.C. Boyd,  Commercial  Arbitration: 2001 Companion Volume to the Second
Edition,  Butterworths, 2001,
A.S. Reid, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the English
Arbitration Act: Are the Two Systems Poles Apart?, Journal of International Arbitration, 2004, 21,
3, pp.  227-41.
The   Scottish  Government, Consultation  on  Arbitration  (Scotland)  Bill,  Scottish  Government
Publication, June 2008, available on the internet at www.scotland.gov.uk/consultation
J. Steyn, Towards a New English Arbitration Act, Arbitration International, 1991, 7, 1, pp. 17-26.
D. St. J. Sutton  and J. Gill, Russel on Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, 2003,
J.  Tackaberry  and  A.  Marriott,  Bernstein’s  Handbook  of  Arbitration  and  Dispute  Resolution
Practice, Sweet and Maxwell,  2003, 
A. Tweeddale and K. Tweeddale,  Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English
Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 2007
477
B. Zuffi, L'Arbitrato nel Diritto Inglese, Giappichelli, 2008
Bibliography on UNCITRAL Model Law
P.  Binder,  International  Commercial  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  in  UNCITRAL  Model  Law
Jurisdictions, Sweet and Maxwell, 2005
A. Broches,  Birth of UNCITRAL, in UNCITRAL (ed), Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-
First Century, 1995, United Nations Publication
J. Carey, UNCITRAL: its Origins and Prospects, Am J. Comp. L. 1967, 15, pp. 626-39.
I. Dore,  The UNCITRAL Framework for Arbitration in Contemporary Perspective, Kluwer, 1993
G. Herrmann, « United Nations Commission on International Trade Law », in R. Bernhardt (ed.).
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol IV, North Holland, 2000
G. Herrmann, The Role of the Courts under the UNCITRAL Model Law Script, in J.D.M. Lew (ed),
Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, Centre for Commercial Law Studies Queen
Mary College, 1986
G. Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Introduction
and General  Provisions,  in  P.  Sarcevic  (ed.),  Essays  on  International  Commercial  Arbitration,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 3-26.
H.M. Holtzmann, Report V: The Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings, in P. Sanders (ed.), UNCITRAL'
s Project  for a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer, 1984
H.M. Holtzmann and J. E. Neuhaus,  A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law : Legislative History
and Commentary Kluwer, 1989
J. Honnold,  The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods,
Am. J. Comp. L. 1979, 27, 2/3, pp. 201-11.
478
P. Sanders  Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of  the Model Law, in Arbitration International,
1995, 11, pp. 1-37
P. Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation , Kluwer, 2001
 P. Sanders (ed.), UNCITRAL' s Project  for a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
Kluwer, 1984
P.  Sanders,  UNCITRAL's  Model  Law  on  International  Commercial  Conciliation,  Arbitration
International, 2007, 23, 1, pp. 105-42.
UNCITRAL,  Uniform  Commercial  Law  in  the  Twenty-First  Century,  1995,  United  Nations
Publication
UNCITRAL, The UNCITRAL Guide, United Nations Publication, 2006, available on the website
uncitral.org at at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/V0650941.pdf (July2009)
UNCITRAL,  UNCITRAL Model  Law on International  Commercial  Conciliation  with  Guide  to
Enactment  and  Use ,  United  Nations  Publication,  2002,  available  at
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml.../ml-conc-e.pdf (July 2009)
Bibliography on the UNIDROIT Principles
J.P. Beraudo, Les Principes d'UNIDROIT relatifs au droit du commerce international, La Semaine
Juridique, 1995, 1, pp. 189-84.
K. Boele-Woelki, Principles and Private International Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of
International  Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law: How to Apply
them to International Contracts, ULR, 1996, pp. 652-78.
M. J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Initiative for the Progressive Codification of International Trade
Law, ICLQ, 1978, 27, 2, pp. 413-41.
M. J. Bonell, A Restatement of Principles for International Commercial Contracts, Revue de Droit
des Affaires Internationales, 1988, 7, pp. 873-88.
479
M.J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles
of  European Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same Purposes?, ULR, 1996, 2, pp. 229-46.
M. J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, Transnational Publishers, 1997
M.J. Bonell,  The UNIDROIT Principles – A Modern Approach to Contract Law, in H.L. Weyers
(Ed), Europaisches Vertragsrecht, 1997, Baden-Baden, pp. 9-21.
M.J. Bonell and F. Bonelli (eds.), Contratti Commerciali Internazionali e Principi UNIDROIT,
Giuffrè, 1997
M.J. Bonell (ed.), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts: The UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Kluwer, 1999,
M.J. Bonell (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles  in Practice: Caselaw and Bibliography on the
Principles of Commercial Contracts, Transnational Publishers, 2002,
M.J. Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles 2004 – The New Edition of the Principles of International
Commercial Contracts adopted by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law,
ULR, 2004, 1, pp. 5-38
M. J. Bonell, Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT Principles?, ULR, 2007, 2, pp.
233-45.
A.Di Maio, I “Principles” dei contratti commerciali internazionali tra Civil Law e Common Law,
Riv. Dir. Civ., 1995, 1, pp. 609-27.
A.G. Doudko, Hardship in Contract: The Approach of the UNIDROIT Principles and Legal
Developments in Russia, ULR, 2000, 3, pp. 483-509.
M. Fontaine, L'avant-projet d'Acte Uniforme OHADA sur le Droit des Contrats: Vue d'Ensemble,
ULR, 2008, 1/2, pp. 203-14.
M. Fontaine, Explanatory Note to the Preliinary Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contract Law,
ULR, 2008,1/2, pp. 561-634.
 M. P. Furmston, The UNIDROIT Principles and International Commercial Arbitration, in Institute
of International Business Law and Practice (ed), UNIDROIT Principles for International
Commercial Contracts: a New Lex Mercatoria?, ICC Publication, 490/1, 1995
J. Gordley, An American Perspective on the UNIDROIT Principles, Centro di Studi e ricerche di
diritto comparato e straniero: saggi e conferenze e seminari n. 22
480
B. S. Hardjowahono, The UNIDROIT Principles and the Law Governing Commercial Contracts in
Southeast Asia, ULR, 2002, 4, pp. 1006-15.
A.S.  Hartkamp,  The  UNIDROIT  Principles  for  International  Commercial  Contracts  and  the
Principles of European Contract Law, ERPL, 1994, 2, pp. 341-57.
A. S. Hartkamp, Principles of Contract Law, in  A. S. Hartkamp, M. W. Hesselink, E. H. Hondius,
C. Joustra, E. Du Perron (Eds),  Towards a European Civil Code, Kluwer Law International, 1994,
pp. 125-43.
A.S. Hartkamp, The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts and the New
Dutch Civil Code, in Festschrift Christian Johan Henri Brunner, Kluwer, 1994, pp. 127-37.
M. Heidemann, Methodology of Uniform Contract Law- the UNIDROIT Principles in International
Legal Doctrine and Practice, Springer, 2007
ICC International Court Bullettin, Special Supplement on the UNIDROIT Principles, ICC
Publication, 2002
ICC International Court of  Arbitration Bulletin,  UNIDROIT Principles: New Developments and
Applications, , Special Supplement, ICC Publication, 2005.
Institute of International Business Law and Practice (ed.), UNIDROIT Principles for International
Commerc ial Contracts: a New Lex Mercatoria?, ICC Publication n. 490/1, 1995
G. G. Lettermann, UNIDROIT's Rules in Practice: Standard International Contracts and
Applicable Legal Rules, Kluwer, 2001.
D. Oser, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Governing Law?,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008,
C. Kessedian, Un Exercise de Rénovation des Sources du Droit des Contrats du Commerce
International: les Principes Proposés par l' Unidroit, Rev. crit. dr. internat. privé, 1995, 84, 4, pp.
641-70.
A.S. Komarov, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Russian View,
ULR, 1996, 2, pp. 247-54.
O. Lando, Principles of European Contract Law and UNIDROIT Principles: Moving from
Harmonisation to Unification?, ULR, 2003, 1, pp. 123-34.
481
M. Matteucci, UNIDROIT: The First Fifty Years, in UNIDROIT (ed), New Directions in
International Trade Law: Acts and Proceedings of the 2nd Congress on Private Law by the
International Institute of Private Law Unidroit, Oceana Dobbs Ferry, 1977
J.M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: the Black-letter Text
and a Review, Fordham Law Review, 1994, 63, pp. 281-317. 
M.R. Saulle, Istituto Internazionale per l’Unificazione del Diritto Privato, Enciclopedia del Diritto,
vol. XXIII. Giuffrè, 1973, pp. 58-64.
Z. Shaohui, L'Influence des Principes d' UNIDROIT sur la Réforme du Droit Chinois des
Obligations, ULR, 2008, 1/2, pp. 153-78.
Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on
Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codification- Reports of the IDSC Colloquium 8/9 June
2006, Schulthess, 2007,
H. van Houtte, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Arbitration
International, 1995, 11, 4, pp. 373-90.
S. Vogenauer and J. Kleinheitsterkamp (eds), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford University Press, 2009
R. Zimmermann, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial contracts 2004 in
Comparative Perspective, The Tulane European and Civil Law Forum, 2006, 21, pp. 1-33.
J.C. Wichard, Die Anwendung der UNIDROIT-Prinzipien fur internationale Hadelsvertrage durch
Schiedsgerichte und nationale Gerichte, Rabels Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationales
Privatrecht, 1996, 60, pp. 269-302.
P. Widmer, The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law: Shipyard for World-wide
Unification of Private Law, EJLR, 1998/9, 1, pp. 185-90.
Bibliography on the New York Convention
482
 K. H. Böckstiegel,  Public Policy and Arbitrability in P. Sanders (ed),  Comparative Arbitration
Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, ICCA Congress  Series No. 3, Kluwer, 1987
 A. Bucher, Court Intervention in Arbitration, in R. B. Lillich and C. N. Brower (eds), International
Arbitration  in  the  21st Century:  Towards  “Judicialization”  and  Uniformity?,  Transnational
Publishers, 1994, pp. 29-44.
P.  Contini,  International  Commercial  Arbitration:  The  United  Nations  Convention  on  the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Am J Comp Law, 1959, 8, 3, pp. 283-
309
D.  di  Pietro  and  M.  Platte,  Enforcement  of  International  Arbitration  Awards:  The  New  York
Convention of 1958, Cameron May Publisher, 2001
E.  Gaillard  and  D.  di  Pietro  (eds),  Enforcement  of  Arbitration  Agreements  and  International
Arbitral Awards: the New York Convention in Practice, Cameron May Publisher, 2008,
International  Chamber of Commerce,  Enforcement of International  Arbitral Awards.  Report and
Preliminary Draft Convention, ICC Brochure n. 174, 1953, reproduced in UN DOC E/C.2/373
Kirry, Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe, Arbitration International, 1996, 12, 4, pp. 373-89.
T. Landau and S. Moolan, Article II and the Requirement of Form, in E. Gaillard and D. di Pietro,
Enforcement  of  Arbitration  Agreements  and  International  Arbitral  Awards:  the  New  York
Convention in Practice, Cameron May Publisher, 2008
E.  G.  Lorenzen,  Commercial  Arbitration.  International  and Interstate  Aspects,  The Yale Law
Journal, , 1934, 43
 A.  Nussbaum,  Treaties  on  Commercial  Arbitration:  A  Test  of  International  Private-Law
Legislation,  Harvard Law Review, 1942, pp. 219-44.
P. Sanders, Consolidated Commentary vols III and IV, in Yearbook Commercial Arbitration vol IV,
1979
C.  Schmitthoff,  Finality of Arbitral Awards and Judicial Review, in J. Lew (Ed), Contemporary
Problems in International Arbitration, Kluwer, 1987, pp. 230-40.
483
D. P. Stewart, National Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under Treaties and Conventions, in R.. B.
Lillich  and  C.  N.  Brower  (eds),  International  Arbitration  in  the  21st Century:  Towards
“Judicialization” and Uniformity?, Transnational Publishers, 1994, pp. 163-98.
A. Sultan,  The United Nations Arbitration Convention and United States Policy,  Am J Int Law,
1959, 53,4, pp. 807-25.
A.Uzelac, Written Form of the Arbitration Agreement towards a Revision of the UNCITRAL Model
Law, Croat. Arb. Yearb., 2005, 12, pp. 111-23 , available online at alanuzelac.from.hr  (July 2009)
A. J. van den Berg,  The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial
Interpretation, Kluwer Law, 1981
A. J. van den Berg, When is an Arbitral Award Non-Domestic under the New York Convention of
1958?, Pace L. Rev. 1985, 6
A. J. Van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements  and  Awards  –  Explanatory  Note-  26  May  2008,  pars  5-6,  available  online  at
arbitration-icca.org/articles.html (July 2009)
484
